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ABSTRACT 
In common with other philosophers of existence, Gabriel Marcel is 
deeply concer.ned about life as it affects the individual in his situation-
in-the-world. Marcel's uniqueness stems from his attitude to the meaning 
of life. His whole philosophy can be summed up as the expression of an 
option: that life can have a positive meaning. This can be appreciated, 
he asserts, if life is seen in a theocentric perspective which is itself 
possible only when the "sacral" character of life is recognized. Marcel 
suggests that this recognition will lead to the awareness by man of his 
situation as a being participating in the overall Mystery of Being. 
The basis of his metaphysics is an ontology of participation on three 
interconnective levels: of sensation (the self), of communion (others), 
and of transcendence (union with God). While he insists on the individ-
ual's freedom to accept or reject this option, Marcel's "concrete" philo-
sophy of existence is revealed as an "applied theocentrism". This theo-
centric orientation is at the heart of his three "concrete" approaches to 
the mystery of being fidelity, hope and love - which, because they are 
directed towards and grounded in God, are shown to be philosophical trans-
lations of the three "theological" virtues - faith, hope and charity. 
According to Marcel's dialectic, man's consideration of self leads to the 
awareness of his ontological status as creature dependent on God as Creator. 
In his relations with others the individual is led to acknowledge that the 
ground and guarantee of all I-thou relationships is God as 'Absolute Thou. 
Finally, man's aspiration to transcendence is sublimated in union with God; 
this possible union involves the question of' survival after death, which 
Marcel postulates in the immortality of fidelity in the sustained presence 
of those who have loved and who have been loved. 
The conclusion reached is that Marcelrs dialectic is an attempt at an 
"applied theocentrism" so that not only is God central in Marcel's thought 
but Being is identifiable with God, in the manner in which Marcel under-
stands these terms. The Mystery of Being is seen as the ontological counter-
part of the Mystery of God. The "need" (exigence) for being is translated, 
in the terms of Marcel's metaphysics, into the need for God. The fundamental 
option on the ontological plane, to be or not to be, is to be understood as 
the counterpart of the real fundamental option in Marcel's dialectic of the 
meaning of life, to believe or not to believe in God. 
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Throughout the thesis, certain deficiencies in Marcel's writings are 
pointed out. These include an excessive r.eligious element, traces of 
literary dilettantism and elitism, the aphoristic nature of many of his 
pronouncements, his reluctance to give rational grounds for these state-
ments, his evasiveness in that he glosses too readily over awkward quest-
ions and avoids giving any firm indication of his definitive position. 
These deficiencies outweigh his more positive contributions to a philo-
sophy of existence, albeit a Christian philosophy of existence, so that 
his propaedeutics to a metaphysics of being remains a propaedeutics. 
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IKTRODUCTIOi\ 
Mal nos efforts le probl~me de 
la transcendance divine se pose 
inevitablement; quoi que nous en 
ayons, il ne semble pas possible 
que llintellectualisme puisse 
arriverb fonder la rEalit~ de 
Dieu sur une conception Elargie 
et dynamique de l'individualite. 
Duns llintellectualisme Dieu 
n'existe jamais que pour le philo-
sophe; or c'est ce que nous ne 
voulons pas; une religion purement 
phHosophique ne saurait ctre vrElie. 
- G. MARCEL, Fragments philoso~~E_~ques, 16. 
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Among the nemes of thinkers who are commonly listed as belonging to the 
Fr'ench school of existentialism that of Gabriel Marcel is often relegated 
to one side and promptly overlooked if not forgotten. Marcel himself makes 
no protest against any such oversight because he dissociates himself from 
the contemporary brand of existential thought. His repudiation of the label 
I! tentialist!l would seem to lend support to the view, currently held by 
those unfamiliar with this style of philosophizing, that all existential 
philosophy inevitably involves atheism. In fact, however, Marcel repUdiates 
any label. l\otw ithstanding his aversion to classif ication~ we may safely 
say that he is a theistic philosopher of existence. The aim of this thesis 
is to determine the place of God and the role of religious thought in his 
work, principally in his philosophical treatises. 
In the first chapter a review is made of his works as a whole, for 
~Ie.rcel is both a dramatist and a philosopher. The close correlation of his 
theatre to his philosophical insights will be indicated where relevant in 
the ensuing chapters and an appendix provided of illustrations in his plays 
of aspects of his "concret.e" philosophy. In common with other philosophers 
of existence, Marcel is deeply concerned about life, an interest which ex-
tends from his first published notes to the last lines of his latest treat-
ise.' His uniqueness stems from his attitude towards the mee.ning of life. 
His who 1 e losophy can be summed up as the expression of an 0ption, namely 
tha.t 1 ife CB.n have a positi.:ye meaningfulness. Such a meaning to life, he 
asserts, Can be appreciated if life is seen in a theocentric perspective of 
consecration. His approach is made through a renewed ontology of partici-
pation on three interconnective levels of sensation (the self), of communion 
(others), and of transcendence (unibn with God). The last section of the 
first chapter will deal with Marcel!s interpretation of "being". This is an 
important consideration because it is my contention that Marcelts concept of 
Being is such that it can be identified with God, so that God must be centre:! 
in Marcel's whole ontology. 
The I!needl! ) for being is translated, on the metaphysical level, 
to the need for God. The second chapter treats of Marcel's views on contemp-
orary irrel igion and his suggestions (pre-Vaticsn II) for a religious renewal. 
Investigations into a renewal, on the philosophical plane, of the nature of 
reflection - which he divides into two disciplines, Itprimaryt! and !lsecondaryl! 
- are paralleled on the plane of natural theology by a further distinction, 
between problem and mystery. The I\lyst.ery of Being is seen as the ontologicel 
countErpart of the ~Iyslery of God. A criticc:l examination is made of Marcells 
religious terminology and his use of theology, bot.h natural and negative. 
In the third chapter I proceed to a considerat ion of I\larcel f s dissatis·-
faction with the classical "proofs!! of God!s existence ana, correspondingly, 
of his own approach within the framework of metaphysics. This involves his 
very personal notion of "pl'esence" by means of which he arrives at an 
analogical inference of God. A further consideration of the extent of 
Marcel's misunderstanding of Aquinas, together with his affinity to 
Augustine, is the subject of the first of the two appendices. 
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The affirmation of God is the subject of the fourth chapter, the key 
chapter of the thesis. The fundamental option on the ontological plane, 
to be or not to be, is to be understood as the counterpart of the real 
fundamental option in Marcel's dialectic of the meaning of life, to 
believe or not to believe in God. Marcel's discussions of those areas 
which he sees as encompassed by faith are accordingly subjected to critic-
al examination. Principal among these is his one-sided view of the non-
believer's "idea of God". Other topics include his treatment of atheism, 
fideism~ and the question of evil and suffering. 
In line with his "concrete" philosophy, the later Marcel (after his 
conversion to Catholicism) becomes more interested in the witness to faith 
through fidelity. The fifth chapter deals with Marcel's phenomenological 
analyses of what he calls the "concrete approaches" to the "ontological 
mystery" - fidelity, hope and love. Because these are all directed towards 
and grounded in God, they are shown to be philosophical translations of the 
three theological virtues - faith, hope and charity. Prominence is given 
to his study of hope, the presentation of which distinguishes Marcel from 
his contemporaries and reveals the basis of his option against "absurdisme". 
The ultimate goal towards which tends his metaphysics of hope, based 
on fai th in God, and inspired by love, is final fulfilment (the "pI eroma" ). 
In th~ sixth chapter I examine Marcel's argument for the possible trans-
cendence of death. For Marcel, this proposition entails the postulation 
of immortality, Criticism is made of Marcel's inadequate answers to the 
questions of survival after death and the nature of personal resurrection. 
The conclusion reached is that Marcel's dialectic is an attempt at an 
"applied theocentrism" in the tradition of the Fathers of the Church, that 
God is therefore central in Marcel's thought and that Being is identifiable 
with God, in the manner in which Marcel understands these terms. However, 
throughout the thesis and again in the conclusion, certain deficiencies in 
Marcel's writings are pointed out. These include an excessive religious 
element, traces of literary dilettantism and elitism, the aphoristic nature 
of many of his pronouncements, his reluctance to give rational grounds for 
these statements, his evasiveness in that he glosses too readily over 
awkward questions and avoids giving any firlll indication of his definitive 
position. These deficiencies outweigh Ilis more positive contributions to 
a philosophy of existence, albeit a Christian philosopl~ of existence, so 
that, as is pointed out quite early in the thesis, his propaedeutics to a 
metaphysics of being remains a propaedeutics. 
Because of their number and length, the references are given en bloc 
iwmediately after each cha.pter. Besides the appendices already mentioned, 
a bibliography is provided; this is subdivided into three sections : 
primary, secondary and tertiary sources. 
FOOTNOTE TO THE INTRODUCTION 
1. In Marcel! s first recorded entry (22nd June 1909) he writes: "Si la 
. tAt' Al" I'd' t t Vle a un sens, ce ne peu e re a coup sur que ce Ul-Cl: re Ulre ou ce 
qui en nous est nature a n'~tre que l'expression.voulue et consciente 
de cette pensee €ternelle ("Rien n'est hors de Iteternelle subjectivite"); 
hors de la pas de moralite" (FP 16)-.-His very next entry (4th July), 
concerns the affirmation of God and is given as epigraph to this Intro-
duct ion. It may be objected that this book ~ Fragments philosophiques, 
is a selected collection of his earliest notes and was not published 
until1961.-It is interesting, in that case, to observe that the open-
ing wOI'ds of his first published work, Journal mftaphysique, are: 
"11 y a un plan o~ non seulement le monde nla pas de sens, mais 00 il 
est mgme contradictoire de poser la question de savoir s'il en a un" 
(JM 3, 1st Jan. 1914). The concluding sentence of his most recent pub-
lished treatise, Pour une Sagesse tr2gique (1968), points to his hope 
for a "better world"; he considers that "la veritable sagesse consiste a 
s'aventurer, prudemment certes, mais avec une sorte de fremissement 
heureux, sur les chemins qui conduisent, je ne dis pas hors du temps, 
mais hors de notre temps, la OU les technocrates et les statisticiens 
d'une part, les inquisiteurs et les bourreaux de Itautre, non seulement 
perdent pied, mc.is s' evanouissent cornme les fume'es au lever d' un bee.u 
jour" (ST 309-310). 
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CHAPTER OKE 
THE WORKS OF GABRIEL MARCEL 
Lorsque je tente de consid{rer (mon de'veloppe~ 
ment philosophique) dans son ensemble, je suis 
force de constater qulil a ete domine par deux 
preoccupations qui peuvent dtabord sembleI' 
contradictoires, et dont If une G ~st dtabord 
traduite beaucoup plus directement dans mon 
oeuvre dramatique que dans mes essais specula .... 
tifS f Itautre sfexprimant dans le registre 
metaphysique, mais restant presente au moins 
a l~arri~re-plan de toutes mes pieces, queUes 
qu1elles soient. Celle-ci, crest ce que 
jtappellerai Ifexigence de lletre; celle-la, 
c'est la hantise des etres saisis dans leur 
sin6ularite et en-m1rme temps atteints dans les 
mysterieux rapports qui les lient. 
"-
- G. MARCEL, Es sai de philosophie concrete, 
220-221. 
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I. The Philosopher of the Threshold. 
i. Marcel resists classification 
While it is convenient to categorize philosophers according to their 
adhesion to or sympathy with a particular school of thought, this proced-
ure cannot be applied so easily to Gabriel Marcel. 1 Although credited 
with introducing t.he term "existentialism", into· the vocabulary of French 
philosophy at least, he himself has, since 1950, repudiated with un-
characteristic vehemence any attempt to classify him as an existentialist 
or even as a "Catholic" writer.2 He prefers to call himself a philosopher 
of existence. But, if he must be identified by his philosophical atti-
tude, Marcel has expressed no serious objection to the label "neo-·Socratic" 
(first applied, it would appear, by his former pupil Joseph Chenu). Indeed 
in his later years he has liked to describe his method or approach as 
"heuristic" or "maieutic".3 By entering into discussion with his readers, 
4 he proposes to bring forth "the child of eternity" ,not by aggressive 
proselytizing but by casting new light on familiar experiences and in 
that way to lead them to the "threshold"of conversion. 5 
Marcel's "philosophical c2tholicity", when reinforced by his aversion 
to formulating conclusions, makes it very difficult to evaluate his con-
tribution not only to a general philosophy of existence but also to con-
structing a viahle metaphysical framework within which to elucidate the 
ultimate meaning of Being. Nevertheless, I hope to show that, through his 
phenomenological analyses of experience and interpersonal relationships, 
Marcel demonstrates the logic of a natural theology. From the analogue of 
the self one may move to the affirmation of a transcendent, personal 
6 integrator whom Marcel calls the Absolute Thou. The intention of his 
philosophy is to lead, by an application of the mutual I-thou relation-
ship, to an enlightened awareness by man that he is destined to achieve 
eternal, inseparable communion with Being. It can be construed, in rel-
igious terms, as an attempt to show that man's eternal orientation lies in 
God. In this thesis I propose to investigate the centrality of God in 
~1(HCel! s thought as expressed in his work, both philosophical and dramatic, 
and to determine how far Marcel's concept of Being can be identified with 
the Christian notion of God. 
In order to show that the place of God in Marcel's thought is inherent-
ly central, a review of his principal themes is necessary. Without such 
a presentation any isolated study of one aspect would he unintelligible. 7 
It is as difficult, however, to present n well-ordered resume of his 
philosophical thought as it would be to attempt a systematic schema. The 
difficulty arises from the diffusive range of his interests 8 and the 
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interrelation of his major themes. His philosophy may be likened to an 
intricate tapestry of ideas and insights in which his central themes are 
so intimately interwoven that to extricate one thread would draw out 
several others with it. Thus, in following out the stages of a particular 
moment of his dialectic, certain notions may reappear, whose relevance 
serves to emphasize the Itcontrapuntal lt harmony of his whole thought. 9 
Any confusion as to what exactly is Marcel l S ::jtandpoint on any philo-
sophical issue stems, in part at least, from his peculiar methodology 
which is, in fact, unmethodolo This disregard for philosophical 
conventions results in an elusiveness which Gallagher considers is essential 
to 1Ilarcel! s thought. Any attempt to eliminate it, Gallagher claims, would 
be sel f-defeating. 1 0 Marcel had originally intended to proGuce a compre-
hensive summa philosophiae but, as he turned away from his idealist train-
ing, he came to realize that that ambition would never, and could never, 
11 be fulfilled. He holds that systematization tends to exploit and mani-
pUlate one!s thoughts. This, he charges, produces an arbitrary and, at 
times, an artificial division. In the realm of metaphysics - to which, for 
him, the all-important question of being relates - any attempt to system-
atize onels thoughts is to debase them. Furthermore, he told Paul Ricoeur, 
it is impossible to place oneself at a central point of view which should 
be Godts alone: 
il y avait la une pretention qui me semblait tout e fait 
incompatible avec notre statut de creature. (12) 
i 1. ~larc el ! s th ea tre 
(a) An integral part of his work. 
Because Marcel sets such store by his dramatic writing, it is both 
necessary and helpful to see how far it constitutes an integral part of 
his work. 
Marcel ascribes his sense of the tragic from his earliest years to a 
feeling of unmerited guilt accruing from his suspicion that his father and 
aunt had married on his account. 13 It would appear that the young Marcel!s 
t trical bent had bolstered him during his lonely childhood which he 
peopled with imaginary characters. 14 When, in later years, he continued 
to write plays, he considered them at first to be independent of his philo-
sophical work. It was not long~ however, before he realized that the 
separation was illusory. The lines of enquiry expressed in the concrete 
situations of his plays were seen by bim to find metaphysical embodiment 
in approaches no less concrete in his later philosophical writ Un-
consciously, he declares, he had been actualizing his basic tendency to 
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combine his philosophical investigations with his theatrical creations. i5 
To clarify the rei at ion between his theatre and his philosophy, 
Gabriel ~\larcel compares his whole work to a country like Greece which is 
partly continental and partly insular. The continental area represents 
his philosophical work, the insular his theatre. The secret, he asserts, 
lies in the islands. 16 Dram~tic art, as he understands it, is the repre-
sentation of persons engaged in concrete situations, the development of 
which he follows in union with the spectators. He"makes the rather curious 
claim that he does not oblige his characters to conform to a pre-arranged 
plan. This d.oes not mea.n that he allows the act~ to extemporize; what 
he is claiming is that as he wrote his plays his characters somehow tended 
to give voice to insights which he himself as the author had not decided 
upon in advance. Often, he assures us, he has been surprised by these 
revelatory insights. It is on this that he bases his claim that his pl'ays 
can be celled truly existential. 17 More realistically, we may be inclined 
to take as his meaning that when he saw his plays performed he gained 
fresh insights into his own writing. 
It follows tha t his theatre is quite often disquieting. No dramatist 
worthy of the name, Marcel declares, should provide only those palliatives 
thE<t calm and satisfy.18 Marcel's plays ask necessary, albeit awkward, 
(~estions about life and being. He explains that if he did not pose these 
questions he should be suspicious of himself as trying to build a comfort-
able refuge in such philosophical thoughts which neglected the tragic and 
disturbing aspects of concrete existence. He designates his theatre as the 
Drama of the Soul in Exile. For him, the soul in e is the soul which 
has become a stranger to itself, which ce.n no longer understand itself, 
which has lost its way.19 He differs from other existential playwrights in 
while his plays often end on a tragic question-mark (e.g. ~
Dieu).,.. he does not presume to offer neat solutions to all human problems -
he does not, for all that, leave one with only the inevitability of despair~O 
His characters give us the impression that they can still extricate them-
selves from situations not always of their own making .... provided they 
t " If" 21 1·1 1 I " re 0 varIOUS appea s rom varYIng sources. uarce C alms that this 
awareness can be experienced by the audience as well as by the characters 
directly involved in the dramatic action. In this light Marcel's theatre 
Id b d "b d f t"" t" 22 cou e escrI e as one 0 par IClpa Ion. 
(le) "Artistic" ssion in Marcel's work. 
One of the criticisms levelled at Marcel is that he allows art and 
literature to intrude into his philosophy. We have just noted that he 
claims a close connection between his theatrical works and his philosophical 
writings. He does not, however, propose to use the former as a vehicle to 
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propagate his metaphysical insights. The Thomists as a group deny that 
poetic insight has a direct bearing upon a theoretical discipline like 
metaphysics. One of Marcells more favourably disposed Thomist critics, 
Jacques ~laritain, reproves him on this score. According to Maritain, 
~16Tcell s literary analyses give only concrete analogues to metaphysical 
truths; they do not attain to the formal and theoretical attitude necess-
ary for speculative enquiry. 
This is an interesting objection and one which seems justif ied. In 
view of the fact that my aim is to ascertain the place of God in Marcells 
whole creative output (the theatrical illustrating the philosophical), it 
is necessary to consider what Marcel has to say on the subject. 
Contrary to his critics, Marcel holds that there is a correspondence 
and an ultimate convergence between metaphysical enquiry and artistic re-
presentation. Furthermore, he even quotes Maritain to substantiate his 
argument : 
Je demeure persuade que clest dans le drame et a travers 
le drame que la pensee metaphysique se saisit elle-m~me et 
se definit in concreto. M. Jacc...'Ues Maritain, dans une con-
ference fai te a Louvain, il y a un ou deux ans (Marcel is 
writing in 1933], sur le Probl~me de la Philosophie Chr~­
tienne, disait : 'Rien n'est plus facile pour une philoso-
phie que dlgtre tragique, elle nla qul~ sfabandonner a son 
poids humain t , allusion sans doute aux speculations d'un 
Heidegger. (23) 
His reason for quoting Maritain is that he, Marcel, believes that this is 
precisely where Maritain and other critics of an existential theatre are 
mistaken. The natural trend of philosophy, as interpreted by Idealists 
for example, leads into a sphere where tragedy has simply vanished, 
"volatise au contact de la pensee abstraite ll • Marcel will not acquiesce 
in the banislunent of the tragic factors of human existence to IIje ne sais 
quel principe anonyme d'inte'riorite pure ll • This attitude, he retorts, is 
associated with the rejection of the ontological need and is one which he 
strives to combat. It is through a consideration of the concrete examples 
of all factors of human existence, with its joys and its sorrows, its 
problems and its mysteries, that Marcel claims it is possible to gain some 
intelligible notion of the meaning of life, of man's status aspiring to 
ultimate communion in transcendence. As he sees it, this is what his 
whole work is about and must be seen in its totality. 
Lorsqu' on prendra la peine - et il faut reconna1tre que ce 
sera la une tftche tr~s malaisle - d'€tudier mon oeuvre 
dans sa totalit6, on sera amen~ ~ recofUla1tre non seulement 
que certains themes ccntr'Jux comIne cdui de la 'Fidelite 
Cr~atrice' apparaissent en pleine lumiere dans les pieces, 
mais aussi qu'un grand nombre de celles-ci, COIl~me je l'ai 
deja indique, constituent cc qu'il faudrait peut",,-etre 
appeler les all;orc;:ages existcntiels de toute une thernatique 
dont je suis certaineIl!ent trcs loin d'avoir epulsc les 
richesses d2ns lIles eeri ts philosophiques. (24) 
15 
For his part, Marcel continues to uphold his defence of the use of 
literary devices in his phenomenological descriptions and analyses. He 
is quite prepared to resort to quasi-mystical and quasi-theological 
expressions besides indulging in lyrical outpourings. Furthermore, he 
is inclined to think that more often than not a truer appreciation of 
2:;-
the hurcan condition and of man's destiny is to be found in the poets • ./ 
It is through literature, he states, that we can gain SOll'.e understanding 
of the great mysteries of life. He goes so far ~s to allege that if 
ever the harmony between death and resurrection, for example, is to be 
discovered, it will be by some poet of humble origins who has not read 
the works of the popular ("progressive") philosophers, but who will be 
granted some special grace to give voice to that Idea which all poets 
f 1 . 26 ee as an lnner urge. 
It does appear, then, that on the score of literary profusions in 
his philosophical works, Marcel's critics are justified. Marcel sets 
considerable store by poets and artists, placing them at least on the 
same level as philosophers. Moreover, he seems to favour an eclectic 
and elitist society of intellectucds, of the type favoured by Plato, in 
which would be vested the responsibility for interpreting not only meta-
physics but ethics as well. Elements of elitism in Marcel' s thought will 
be indicated where they appear in the course of the thesis. 
iii. The Philosopher of the Threshold (conversion and reaction) 
Marcelts whole philosophy can be seen as a study of interpersonal 
rela tionships directed tow2.rds an apprecia tion of man's condition as 
cre2.ture in communion with others and in dependence on God. He describes 
the condition of man as that of the traveller, "homo viator, l'holl'JTIe en 
marche lt 27 He identifies as man's goal the "light of truth" which, in 
f is is "the Light which comes intD the world and which en-
1 ens every man who comes into the world,,28. But man will be en-
lightened only if he first crosses "the threshold of conversion", and 
this step involves a major decision. From his own experience I~rcel 
claims that he can appreciate the difficulties encountered by those who 
are still groping towards the "light of truth". 
Ce voyage, je ne le regrette pas; cela pour maintes raisons, 
mais surtout parce que j'en garde un souvenir assez present 
pour vouer une sympathie pBrt.iculiere n tous ceux qui sont 
eux-m~mcEi en voyage, et qui chtminent parfois peniblemcnt 
sur des es analogues A cElles que jlai suivies moi-m~me. (29) 
On account of the very ~)b-'ong religious element in his philosophy, 
we may think that Marcel would show his gratitude for having been 
the grace of conversion by assisting those who would approach the 
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threshold. His rSle, he believes, is to show the way but, because, as he 
claims, all forms of proselytizing are abhorrent to him, he leaves to them 
the decisive step across the threshold. He sees himself as a latter-day 
Pylades stretching out his hands on the other side in encouragement, or as 
a spokesman, well-equipped by experience, for both believers and unbeliev-
ers. 
Je me considere comme ayant ete toujours un philosophe 
du seuil, un philosophe qui se tenait, d'une maniere 
a~z inconfortable d' ailleurs, sur une 1 igne mediane 
entre les croyants et les non-croyants, de fa~on ~ 
pouvoir en quelque sorte mtadresser aux croyants, m'ad-
resser ~ la religion chr~tienne, ~ la religion cathol-
ique, mais de maniere a pouvoir parler aux non-croyants, 
a pouvoir me faire comprendre d'eux et peut-&tre ~ les 
aider. (30) 
From what Marcel tells us, his family background was not one of uncon-
sciously nurtured religion. It would seem to have been almost calculated 
to arouse an aversion to any form of spirituality, and certainly to 
Catholicism,3 1 His interest in the nature of religion must have been 
awakened when he began his studies in philosophy. During his investigations 
into the question of faith and belief in God, he discovered that the same 
question intruded into other spheres of his research. It was only years 
later, he claims, that he realized that his preliminary considerations into 
the relationships of the self and the body were leading to the Incarnate 
32 God, the God who conferred existence on himself when he became man. At 
the time he wrote his thesis, in 1909, Marcel chose as his epigraph these 
words of Hugh of St. Victor : 
To rise to God is to go inside ourselves; and not only that, 
but to the very depth of our self, transcending ourselves. (33) 
Twenty years later Gabriel Marcel could be said to have acceded to this 
approach to God which is as much of the order of metaphysical enquiry as 
it is of conversion. 
For Marcel, the initiating impulse to man's recognition of the Fellowship 
of Being (tithe ontological communion tl ) IS an invitation, or as he terms it, 
an tlappeal", Actual communion becomes effective with the response to the 
appeal. Marcel declares that he received his appeal in a postscript to a 
letter from Francois Mauriac. He assures us that this appeal (tlPourquoi ne 
venez-vouS pas nous rejoindre?") served as a catalyst to crystallize the re-
solve which had been prepared by his openness to respond. His eventual con-
version and baptism, he insists, Were not a break with the past nor with his 
Protestant friends (his wife and her family were devout Protestants), but 
rather the accomplishment and almost the conclusion of thoughts which had 
been developing in him for years.3~ He admits that he cannot explain why 
he chose Catholicism; perhaps he saw in it a 1I10re cleorly defined "organic 
reolity".35 The important thing, as far as he is concerned, is tlwt he was 
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converted. Later he can point to elements of Christian (i.e. Catholic) 
tradition that serve to confirm, in a theological register, his own 
philosophical insights. A conversion worthy of the name, he wrote with 
convenient hindsight more than thirty yea.rs afterwards, is an absolutely 
sincere and spontaneous conversion at the heart of an individual. 
Le converti repondra en effet : je n'ai pas trouve (a solution 
to~ or remedy for, my difficulties], j'ai ete trouve; en 
d t autre::: termes, il repondra td~s justereent que tout Si ex-
plique ou plus exactement s' eclaire par la gd~ce et par le 
fait qu'~ cette grace il ne slest tout simplement pas 
refuse. (}6) 
According to Marcel, the proper return for the gift of faith is humble 
gre.ti tude by which we return thanks for our enjoyment of being. The object 
of our thanks should be the Giver and Source of all being, the "cement" of 
th - f b - - tl t f d d' . f B - 37 - 1 e communIon 0 e1ngs 1n le mos pro oun 1mens1on 0 e1ng. Gabr1e 
~larcel believes that, whatever may be our shortcomings and omissions, we 
have to recollect with gratitude all that has been given to us by 
- , -I "t '" . d 38 une pUissance qu 1 ne me paral pas necessalre e nommer. 
In the final section of this chapter I propose to show that this "power" 
is a Christianized version of Plato's Being ("Being is power" 39). Through-
out the COUl~:=oe of the thesis I intend to see how far Marcel! s God is a 
personal God, not just a supra-temporal abstraction as the term "Being" 
may imply. 
II. Marcel's Philosophy. 
i. General outline 
Marcel considers his whole philosophical effort as directed towards 
a re-birth of life in certain areas of the mind's activity which seem to 
be falling into torpor or even into decay.40 While expressing his con-
cern about man's ambiguous situation in the world - that man is finite yet 
at tracted to the inf inite - he does not allow himself to succumb to the 
fatalistic anguish-dread of some existentialist thinkers. There is, for 
Marcel, a positive value In anguish. He describes the form of anguish-
uneasiness which he experiences as not derived from man's finite condition 
but occasioned by the environmental state of affairs. 41 The blame for 
this, in his view, is to be laid, in some part, at the door of a "science 
f t - I .,,42 . 1 -e IS11sm WhICh eads to anthropocentrlsm, a Promethean defiance of God, 
and ultimately to Sartrcan seJ.f--divinization. Without recourse to any 
transcendental values, man, according to MarceJ., would have no other 
alternative than despair. 
Marcel inveighs, perhaps too singJ.emindedly at times, against the con-
temporary "techniques of degradation" which he sees as having l'eachcd a 
18 
high level of sophistication under totalitarian regimes. 43 He ascribes 
the blame for this tendency of alienation, in great part, to an inordinate 
self-sufficiency engendered and fostered by a "philosophy of applied 
science". By this he means a philosophy of life grounded on the belief of 
man's supremacy in all fields of knowledge and endeavour because of techno-
logical progress. 4Li· As a consequence of this outlook there has been, in 
his words~ a parallel loss of a sense of human dignity and a "drop in the 
price of life",45 Life itself would seem to be re,ndered meaningless, 
precisely becs.use it has become "desacralized".46 
Marcel asserts that what is needed to offset this danger is for a 
positive meaning to be attributed to life so that it does,not degenerate 
into "a tale told by an idiot"o47 Marcel denies that "life" is a pure ab-
straction; for him, life is an unspecifiable ensemble of experiences in 
which the human "existent" and his situation are inextricably involved. Life 
for man should be more dynamic than existing in a pure vegetative state. 
Marcel tries to establish a distinction between active and passive exist-
ence : 
Ce n'est pas sur la vie, mais sur le vivant, sur l'atre 
vivant que l'attention doit se centrer. (48) 
What is needed) he insists, is not a biological explanation but an "axio-
logical" consideration: 
c'est-a-dire laisser ouverte la question de savoir non 
seulement si la Vie est bonne ou mauvaise, mais bien 
plus profondement si cette questior. pnfsente un sens 
quelconque. (49) . 
What has been lost and must be regained, Marcel proclaims, is a sense and 
appreciation of the "sacral" quality of life so that it is given fresh 
prominence in our contemporary "world of transition, a world of changing 
values".50 
This "sacral" element, Marcel explains, has not necessar.ily anything 
to do with ritualism or religion in a technical sense; even unbelievers 
can experience it. Despite his suspicions of other thinkers' ter.ms to con-
vey some idea of this desired attitude, ~larceIfs own suggestion of "sacral" 
appears to be just as nebulous and intangible, if one is to seek for its 
definition. 51 He insists that the term has nothing to do with sentiment, 
but only suggests that it can be experienced through integrity, innocence, 
simplicity, honour, and wonderment or en:n adoration before life. 52 To 
help us appreciate thc "sacral" eJemept in life, Marcel offers his inter~ 
pretation of religion as a realm where the subject is confronted with some-
thing which he cannot fully grasp by resorting to any kind of objective 
analysis. The subject cGn only make some gesture of recognition before the 
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I! sacral I! .53 Because the subject is so caught up in the awareness that 
the tlsacral" element permeates his own life and therefore his very being, 
a true and proper consideration of the "sacral" is not only axiological 
but definitely ontological as well. This is to say that Marcel holds 
that the que:: tion of life can find its solution not only in meaning and 
value but in the awareness of 
--""'-
as well. Marcel asserts firmly 
Je dirai sans l'ombre d'une hesitation ~le llontologie 
elle-m~me n1est rien si elle n1est pas un retour aux 
sources et par la meme au sacre. (54J 
Following a phenomenological reflection which should show up the dual-
ism of life as an experience to be lived and as an object for clinical 
examination, Marcel hopes that we shall accede to a realm of recollection55 
wherein We may be granted a more complete awareness of the sanctity of 
life. This awareness of the value of recollection characterizes the 
thought of the Fathers of the Church : 
LI idee antique reprise et approfondie par les Peres de 
l'Eglise d1apres laquelle la contemplation est llacti-
vite la plus haute est une idee completement perdue. (56) 
Such a desired re-orientation of our thinking implies, for Marcel, a nec-
essary !lconversion". By this he means a movement by which the conscious-
ness turns away from the oppressive spectacle of a technocratic view of 
the world, Marcel's lIconversion" is a return to the consideration by the 
individual of his fundamental status as being. Marcel affirms that this 
basic ontological status of man is that of a creature, a created being. 
This necessary conversion is an !'intro-version", or, as Marcel explains, 
an "ingatheredness fl of our spiritual forces whiCh will lead to the recog-
nition of the individual. He proposes further that this" ingatheredness" 
is a free movement : it is not a restriction of the individual to himself, 
but is outgoing as well as inward-looking at the same time. True "in-
gatheredness lf becomes a relationship of one individual to another, of an 
"I" to a "thou",57 This, then, is the intersubjective sense of "con-
version ll • It is not a subjectivist notion, for in the fusion of the "I" 
and "thou" in a "We", the separate individualities are maintained. 
As a result of this kind of approach, Gabriel Marcel sees the whole 
~estion of life more as one of love than of value. 58 Through my love for 
the other I shall appreciate his value; I shall value life - my own and 
the other's - if first I love. This is the order of priority which Marcel 
urges should be established. According to this, I shall see that life is 
a benefaction; but more than a blef:;sing or a curse, life 
ed as u possibility, or more exac tly an opportunity, 
My life will be a chance for good, Marcel proclaims, 
egocentrism and, through love, give expression to the 
mc by another. In this way, 
for 
once 
should be regard-
good or evil. 59 
I bl'cak free of 
addressed to 
Je suis cet te reponse d' abord informe~ mais qui peu 
a p~ ll1esure qljYell e s'articulera, se conna1tra 
elle-meme comme reponse et comme jugement; oui je 
suis irresistiblement conduit ~ faire cette decou .... 
verte que je porte moi-rn~me un jugement, par le fait 
que je suis qui je suis, sur ceux qui m' ont intro-
duit dans If~tre; et du m~me coup, une infinite de 
rapports nouveaux se cr~ent entre eux et moi. (60) 
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There is a need, Marcel asserts, in this century to renew the bond 
(he CoIls it the "nuptial" bond) between man and,life. 61 Marcel's view 
62 
of man is that he is not so much a collabore.tor with God as a co-
creator. Procreation should be seen as not just a biological function 
but as participation in creation. With that realization man will gain 
a truer "sacral" awareness of procreation once he understands that he is 
a rr:ediator 1 a go-between, and not a sole agent, Life, Marcel affirms~ 
will then be understood not as a biological phenomenon but as a gift. 
And as a gift demands a giver, we should become aware of the Creator, 
and consequently of our true ontological status as creature. 63 
Our reaction to that awareness, Marcel tells us, should be one of 
gratitude. Here, it will be noted, we return to the conclusion reached 
in the preceding section. There is a connection between the awareness of 
the gift of life in its physical sense and the awareness of a newness (a 
"rajeunissement") of life in the spiritual order. Marcel's authentic 
existent is a man of honour, and honour is closely linked with grati-
tude. 64 This gratitude will be dynamic, as life is dynamic, by being 
expressed as service. Conversely, I!l'~me du service, cTest la genero-
't,l" 65 .. t S1 e. In thlS way, we lnfer from Marcel hat life finds its solution 
in commitment. Life, he explains, is a service in the sense of "servir" 
more thEm of "servir '8.".66 Accordingly, it may also be inferred from 
Marcel! s interpretation that no life is truly creative except to the 
degree that it is consecrated. For it is by this consecration that the 
67 gift of life is made possible and given its value. In Marcel's view 
it is of the essence that it be consecrated: to God or, on a lower level, 
to any high purpose or chosen social need. The importa~ce of Marcel's 
insistence on the restora.tion of the "sacral" awareness of life as the 
expression of his ~ against "absurdisme" will be thrown into sharp 
relief in the concluding chapter of the thesis. For ultimately service 
means service of God : 
Servir, dans tous les sens valables du mot, cela veut 
dire servir la v(rit~, et peut~~tre est-cc dans cctte 
lum.iE~re qu j on peut apel'cC'voir ce qu i est le serv ice au 
ser.s absolu du mot, Cl est'>O~l-dire le service m0me de 
Dieu. (68) 
iii. The main St80~_~ .. _?i..!L~.!.:..ce1~_s dialecUc of ontological participation 
.,--~~-,-""".--",~--."~-~~~~~.~,~ <"-~~'~'.'~-"--.-" 
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In order to consider the general dialectic of Marcel's philosophy of 
existence, or more correctly of his metaphysics of being, it is necessary 
to recall his statement, 
Ce n'est pas sur la vie, mais sur le vivant, sur 
l'etre vivant que l'attention doit se centrer. (69) 
Marcel stresses that both lI~tren and tlvivant ll should be accorded equal 
is. To be, he adds by way of explanation, is not simply to be in 
, but to be of value. In agreement with other existential thinkers, 
he holds that a life-existence is a continual process of becoming. This 
is what he means when he declares that man has to it is his respons-
70 ibility to be. By this he implies that the duty of the "authentic!! ex-
istent is to fulfil himself in a process of continual activity or develop-
ment of his potential. This "having-to-be" is the impulse of what Marcel 
call s .the ontolog~ need. 
I " t " 71 Il faut qu'il y ait - ou il faudraitqu il y eut - de I etre, 
~Iarcel proclaims in his famous pronouncement. We aff irm being, he declares, 
simply because being is. But such an affirmation seems impossible since it 
is only when it is made that one can regard oneself as qualified to make it. 
In the play umissaire Roger, when asked by Sylvie who he is; replies 
C'est la question a ne pas poser, eelle qui ne comporte 
pas de reponse. Si je savais qui je suts, je pense que 
je n'existerais plus. (72) 
According to ~rarcel, I cannot put myself in a privileged position to look 
at being because I am myself within it. This is the force of what he terms 
the "mystery of being" and serves to illustrate his distinction between 
mystery and problem. 7} Being wholly envelops the affirming subject: 
L'@tre nous est imm€diatement pr€sent, mais nous 
ne lui sommes pas immedia tement presents. (74) 
Closely related to this central notion of being in Mareel!s dialectic 
is his interpretation of He shows his affinity with those contemp-
orary thinkers who are existentialist or personalist by postulating that 
freedom is the fundamental characteristic of man. The "authentic ll existent, 
in Marcel's view, has to recognize not only that he must be (that is, that 
he must become more fully by striving to realize his potential) but that he 
is free to determine the nature and direction bf his development. This is 
what Marcel means when he asserts that being-man is to be undel'stood as 
being-free. He affirms that these parallel "needs" of the authentic exist-
ent are established in the parallel formulae: "l am not, I have to be" 
and "1 am not fr'ec, I have to become frec.,,75 This is to say that the 
existent is not truly authentic he is not "engaged" in existence ("l am 
not'l) - until he recognizes that he needs to discover his true self and his 
abilities ("l have to bell). Thus the authentic existent will only be able 
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to live and act freely when he realizes the nature and scope of his freedom. 
It is on this icore that Marcel differs from some of his contemporaries. 
Contrary to Sartre, for example, Marcel holds that freedom is not an end in 
itself 76 but rather the motivating impulse which determines man's attitude 
to life. We are free, he declares, to accept or reject the notion that we 
participate in being only as creatures. This is the ontological import of 
the dichotomy between acceptance ("invocation") and rejection ("refus ll ), a 
dichotomy which is rooted in the spiritual order as much as in the order of 
IIbeiIlg". For Marcel suggests that a positive choice of freedom is valid 
only when it is elicited by If.race so that man recognizes his ontological 
status as participating in being. 77 Only in this li~lt, he affirms, can life 
be given meaning, He goes on to suggest, as we have seen, that what is need-
ed is a return to the medieval view which proclaimed the "sacral" nature of 
life and described mall as one who seeks God. 
Given this interpretation of freedom, man's being, in Marcel's view, can 
be aff if'med as oriented towards God. ~lan' s "having--to·-be ll is, to use 
Husserl's terminology, lIintended ll (directed) towards God. But because it is 
of the essence of man that he is free, he has the responsibility of making 
his own choice. 78 We can therefore infer that to refuse to acknowledge God 
is to deny oneself. This is how Marcel agrees that nmn's being can be render-
ed absurd; to be doomed is to experience the meaninglessness of one's being 
as eternal unfulfilment. In the sense of self-liberation, Marcel sees free-
dom as necessitating a humble opening of oneself to the operation of grace, 
It is the cheerful, sacrificial response to a call which may come from onels 
fellow-existents or from God. 
Marcel believes that a fresh approach must be made, if man is to be made 
aware of his ultimate orientation and at the same time be accorded hi~; full 
dignity and personality in the world. For too long, in Marcel's opinion, 
(and it is to be borne in mind that he was already expressing his views 
when modern French positivism was enjoying its hey-day), philosophy has 
become increasingly ossified in impersonal abstractions. 79 For his part, he 
advocates a "concrete ll philosophy which is based on concrete situations of 
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experience. It is, in short, experience transmuted into thought. Marcel's 
fresh start begins, not with a withdrawal, but with a return. He urges 
a restoration of the 1I0ntological weight" to experience, and the primacy of 
belOng 81 understood as- I t I d' t· d 'f t d . , man s na ura or lna lon an lllaIU es e ln man s 
existential situation. This existential situation hinges on participation 
in an ascending hierarchy of unions: with the self, with others, and with 
God. The notion of participation is the pivot of Marcel's metaphysics. To 
be is to participate in being. I am only insofar as I participate in Being. 
This is participation, not in any Platonic Idea, but in Act for Being lS to 
be understood in its verbal sense (and this is a cardinal point). It is a 
2,3 
participation in Reality.82 This is a crucial moment in Marcelfs dialectic 
and we shall return to it in the evaluative section that follows. 
There are, then, three levels of participation, each of which is super-
ior' to its precedent. Marcel calls these incarnation, communion, and 
transc But this simplified summary does not mean that the levels 
are sepal'a t e. Whi! e there is certainly an ascending hierarchy of orders, 
they interpenetrate each other. 
Marcel initiates his metaphysicell enquiry with a consideration of experience 
and sensation. The realization of the inner urgings of the ontological 
exigence and the need to restore to human experience its ontological weight83 
is the first great moment of his dialectic. It leads him to formulate his 
very importarlt differentiation between existence and objectivity.84 Thanks 
to thi s distinction - to which frequent reference will be made in the thesis 
... ~Iarcel is able to explore the possibilities of what could be called an 
"existential" ontological argurr:ent for the reality pf God. Marce! f s thesis, 
which he claims is not a return to pre'"'critical dogmatism, is that 
la distinction entre llid'e de Itexistence et l'existence 
elle-meme - impasse 00 la reflexion philosophique risque a 
tout moment de se fourvoyer, - doit @tre rejet€e ensemble: 
nous ney voyons quant Et nous qu1une fiction qui prend 
naissance dens 11 acte arbitraire par lequel la pensle pre'" 
tend transformer en affirmation dtobjet ce qui est une 
ccnnaissance immediate et une pa.rticipation. (85) 
Incarna tion 1 the "donn'e centrale de la metaphysique", is, Marcel tells us, 
the situation of a being who appears to himself to be, as it were, bound to 
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a body. It is the self incarnate incernate in the body. Incarnation is 
at the very basis of all human experience : through my body I am in relation 
87 to the world, to others, and to God. 
The consideration of the body, the embodied self, as "le nexus de ma 
P d '1188 1 t h . presence au mon e rendu me.nlfeste , eads Marcel 0 t e appreciation that 
I sh2Te this world with others. (At this point we have to note that the 
term 11 exister:t", already used, is applied by Marce! only to hum~_beings.) 
The existent. 9 ~'aTcel says 9 is not alone - although there can be a salutary 
1 . t . d t h t (b t t· . 1 t' 1 . t . ) 89 T . t qua L y In e ac men u no In 150 a lon or a lena Ion. 0 eXl5' 
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authentically - in the Marcellian sense M is to co-exist: esse est co-esse. 
Conununion, on the plane of personal being, arises only in a personal res-
ponse, in a mutual encountero The clues to to this second level of onto-
I cal participation are presence and encounter and commitment. Marcel 
holds that, as a person in constant contact with others, my relationship 
with them may be either of the objcctifying Idnd (widch has no existential 
v61ue) or of the s\lbjectifying kind which is of value only when transcended 
into the ir!..!:~subjccti vc kind. Aliwording to this, I am to treat the other 
not as a "hel! or Cl "she" (this is the objectifying kind of tionship) 
but as a 11 thou" • 91 When, following Mareel! s suggestion, this intcrsubjective 
approech is sublimated to the consideration of the absolute, interpreted 
as the Absolute Thou, we arrive at the third level of participation. 92 
As far as Marcel is concerned, a true philosophy of existence does not 
reduce everything merely to existence, for existence needs to be defined 
with r to something other than itself. He aff irms that the need for 
transcendence 93 stems from the reelization that we do not entirely belong 
to a world of things; Marcel reinforces his claim by referring to Saint 
Paul t s ol::servation, "You are not your own. It The need for transcendence 
apparently springs from a feeling of dissatisfaction at the instability of 
a world characterized by a "displacement It of th:e notion of function. The 
motto of the genuine existent is not ~ but sursum as the starting-point 
of Maree!! s metaphysics is not ~ogito but sumu Existence is a continu-
ous movewent of transcendence, a passing-beyond that which is now. The 
authentic person should be aware of himself far less as a being than as a 
Hdesirel! to rise above everything that he is and is not, to rise above the 
actuality in which he feels he is involved and has a part to play, but 
which does not satisfy him because his present actuality falls short of his 
aspiration and to which he identifies himself. 
that we arrive at the goal of self-fulfilment 
From this we may conclude 
a progression fro~ one 
stage to the next a progression that is not only horizontal but vertical 
- until we find our fulfilment in Being. 96 On the religious level this 
final fulfilment is communion with God. 
But it must be noted that the transcendence towards which we aspire is 
not ineffable nor inaccessible (as Jaspers have us believe); it must 
be abl e to be experienced if the term is to ha.ve any meaning. Marcel does 
. 
not consider that the word "transcendent!! means "transcending experience!! 
since he holds that we can have experience of the transcendent. We aspire, 
he says, towards a purer mode of existence, an experience more "recollect-
97 
ed ll and more intensely lived. Our need for being impels our aspiration 
to transcendence where our soul longs to be reunited with its Source. 
Therein lies the secret of the transcendence of hope which locks out above 
this "wrinkled!! world. 98 God is not just sowe objectifiable object lIout 
there!! (as J.A.T. Robinson has emphatically pointed out) but a presence. He 
is the Presence to be experienced as other presences ar~ experienced. This 
Presence is the manifestation of God's reelity as transforming love among 
those who ackno"ledge his reality in faith. 99 
Once it is reco zed that God can be approached through the experience 
of presence, the uni r61e of intersubjectivity in Marcel's metaphysics 
can be apprcciat This Marcdlian intersubjectivity is an outgoh!g love 
which, in its interpersonal expression, prevents the individual being from 
shrivelling up in egOCentric nardssism. Rather it draws out. his full 
potential of self-fulfilment in commitment. In the measure that the individ··' 
25 
ual existent "opens credit" in favour of the other, he is led to open him-
self to the irradiations of light emanating from the God who is Love. In 
the final analysis of Marcel's metaphysics, love - the "seed and pledge of 
immortality" - involves a trusting recourse to Absolute transcendence, an 
opening to that universal communion which can be centred only in the 
Absolute Thou. 100 Transcendence is universal because Being embraces all 
being, all beings, all realities. And this Universal Reality, "cet uni-
101 
versel vivant" ,is God. 
Ill. An examination of Marcel's philosophy of being. 
The central concern in Marcel's thought is the question of the nature 
of being. It is also the central concern of this thesis, for an elucidation 
of what he understands by "being" will enable us to establish the role of 
God in Marcel' s thought. While Marcel may eschew systematization, arguing 
tl1at one can be creative only as long as experience still contains uncharted 
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zones ,there must be at least a definite cohesion and consistency in 
his dialectic which would allow for an eventual systematization of his 
tl10ught along the lines followed by Troisfontaines, for example. We should 
do well, then, to apply Wittgenstein's principle that "the meaning of a 
d ' , b th 't' d,,1 03 . t 'f "M l' wor IS gIven y e way 1 IS use as a crl erlon or examInIng arce s 
use of the word "etre". 
Marcel agrees that the question of being is not new. It is, he declares, 
one of those eternal problems which we (meaning himself) approach with our 
own personal resources, in a different context and with a different horizbg~ 
The problem about being, he tells us, is that it is really not a problem at 
all, for problems admit of solution. Marcel stands by his interpretation 
of being as a non-objectifiable "mystery" in that we are so intimately 
bound up with being (because we are) that we cannot really look at it critic-
ally or analytically. He recognizes that one of the difficulties arises 
from the limitations of language. 105 Marcel uses the French form ~tre which 
can be taken as the infinitive of the verb "to be" or as a noun (Le. the 
inf initive used substantivally). He reje.cts the u~e of the participle etant 
and dislikes the idea of attaching partitive articles ("un", "des") to the 
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wor'd (~) When he wishes it to be taken in its verbal force. 
Despite this intention, Marcel uses the term as both etre and etres; 
his two great preoccuI1ations are given as "1'exigence de l'etre" and "la 
. ~ 107 hantlse des etres." It would appear, tllen" that he is not always 
consistent in his application of the term. But is he really inconsistent? 
Whenever he refers to "etres", it is quite clear that he alwElys refers to 
human beings or existents. (The French term "existant" is not favoured by 
Marcel because it connotes a certain spatio-teulporal limitation - that of 
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finitude - and detracts from his notion of fidelity.) We shall consider 
his use of the term !1~tre1! and determine whether he uses it consistently, 
bearing in mind his theory of participation. Should there be a unifying 
interpretation of !1 etre", it will be necessary to see if lI~treslt can p~r­
ticipate in it. 
The principal references to !I~tre" in Marcel's philosophical works are: 
Seulement c'est d'etre qu'il s'agit, non de _l_'~~ 
Il me t indispensable de souligner que l'etre 
qui e t vise dans des expressions telles que poids 
ou enjeu ontologique doit etre entendu cormne verbe 
et non comme substantif. (109) 
La e que je ressens en ces matieres vient en 
partie de la diff iculte que j I ai toujours eprouve 
a discerner le rapport entre etre et exister. Il 
me paratt evident qu'exister est une certaine fa~on 
d'etre : il faudrait voir si c'est la seule. Peut-
etre qu que chose peut-il Hre sans exister. (110) 
Assimiler ll~tre a un mode d'exp~rience, ~Iest 
tomber dans les pieges de la psychologie et du 
psychologisme. Il ne serait pas faux de dire dans 
une perspective assez analogue a celle de Fenelon, 
~le nous, gtres humains, nous sornmes dans une 
sorte d'entre-deux, de metaxu, entre l'etre et le 
At 1 ~ , At non-e re ou encore que nous sommes appe~ ere, 
que nous Ce qui interv ient ici de 
fa~on vo a plenitude a laquelle nous 
aspirons. 
'La presence et la distance tout ensemble' (?farce! 
is referring to a phrase from Charles du Bos's 
Dialo ] : c'est bien cette sorte 
de qui permet de definir 
mon rapport a mon etre. Car ce que Du Bos appell e 
ici l'ame, c'est bien en realite mon etre, et in-
versement on ne voit pas comment cet etre que nous 
tentons d'approcher iei pourrait ne pas ~tre quali-
fie d'ame. Mais s'il en est ainsi, on voit aussi-
tot avec quell e prudence do it etre abordee I! aff ir-
mation : je suis - eette affirmation qui. chez 
Descartes, parce qu' il a cru pouvoir la valider 
une fois pour toutes, est en quelque fa90n proelamee. 
~lais je dirais bien plut8t quant Et moi qu! elle ne 
doit pas @tre proferee sur le ton de l'outrecui-
dance et du defi, ma piu tot murrnuree sur un ton 
qui est a la fois eelui de l'humilite, de la crainte 
et de l'emerveillernent. (112) 
L'~tre comllle lieu de la fidelite. (113) 
(108) 
Etre, e'est bien iei sister Et cette epreuve [of life), 
a cette dissolution progressive; nier l'@tre~ ee 
sera pretendI'e que rien nly peut. r6sister. (1-14) 
Au fond, 
probleme 
ID ou il 
ou mort. 
tout •• a tend vers cctte conclusion que le 
de ltgtre et du non-@tre nla de sens que 
se convertit dans le dilemrne : plenitude 
(-115) 
L'gtre gage ou selllencc dl~ternit~. (116) 
L'~tre cornmc prineipe d l inexhaustibilit€. (117) 
Lt@tre 9 ctest ce qui ne de~oit pas; il y a de l'etre 
du moment o~ notre attente est comb16e; je parle de 
cette attente a laquelle nous participons tout 
entiers. (118) 
Aussi tot qu'il y a creation, Et quelque degr~ que ce 
soit, nous somn:es dans I2~tre. (119) 
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The last quotation holds the key to Marcel's ontology. Clearly 
Being is creativity, it is the spirit (Ilpowerll) of creation. Marcel 
agrees that the last-quoted phrase is significant and, furthermore, re-
inforces its importance when he notes, 
The converse is equally true : tha t is to say, there 
is doubtless no sense in using the word 'being' except 
where creation, in some form or other, is in view. (120) 
It is in the light of the creativity which characterizes being that all 
his other pronouncements and his investigations into the nature and scope 
of being are welded into cohesion and become intelligible. It is because 
Being is creative that we can appreciate Marcells stress on the verbal 
force of the term; it is because Being is inexhaustible that it is ever 
creative; it is because being is a gift that it is creative, of self and 
of others. Being is not a passive state of reception or a closed area of 
atrophied self-consciousness: this is the meaning of Marcel's distinct-
ion between being and having. 121 Being is not an object nor a thing; 
the awareness of the non-objectifiable quality of being explains Marcel's 
disagreement with the suggestion of a distinction between IlAbsolute and 
Relatl'\re Bel'I1g"e122 F '1 1 b' . d . db' . or lIarce, elng lS ynaffilc an open; elng lS 
iT 
creative. ) Its creative spirit is manifested in an active participat-
ion which is bo th inward-looking (through recoIl ection) and outgoing 
(in communion and communication). It is because being is creative that 
we can appreciate the central importance of Creative Fidelity in the 
quest of the authentic existent for ultimate fulfilment. 
Once the creative activity of being is established, it is clear that 
when ~Iarcel refers to the truly creetive activity of Being, he is refer-
ring to God. ~Iarcel i s Being can only be understood as God. For as God 
is characterized by creation, it is through his creative activity that 
he menifests his reality through presence in our world. God's creativ-
ity is mirrored in the activitY of those (lI@tres ll ) who, having first 
used their freedom to acknowledge their relation of dependence on God, 
aspire to full and complete partiGipation in creative being. Our other 
question is thereby answered : Il~tresll can participate in the central 
activity of etre. The place of God lS indeed central in ~Iarcel' s thougllt.: 
it underpins his entire rnetaph,ysics of ontological communion. On the 
highed level of huma.n participation is the saint; on a more attainable 
level is the Ilordinaryll human. The latter, with whom Marcel shows him-
self to be more concerned ,,- or so he professes ~. , can sha.re in the 
creative activity of God in various ways: in parenthood, in Ilproducing" 
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works of art~ but above all in creating themselves more fully by expan-
sion in outgoing 10ve. 121r 
Yet being remains 9 for Marce! at least, a mystery. It is mystery 
because it escapes the grasp of objective knowledge. In the next chapter 
we shall consider in more detail Marcel's distinction between problem and 
mystery ~ with particular reference to the question of God. In the present 
context it is important to note what Marcel has to say on the connection 
between being and mystery : 
COIncidence du mystirieux et de I' ontologie. Il y a un 
myst~re de la connaissance qui est d I ordre ontolo que 
(rI!aritain l'a bien vu), mais l'lpistemologie l'ignore, 
se doit de l'ignorer et le transforme en probl~me. (125) 
Tou te sp~cif ication (portant sur tel contenu auquel 
j'effirme savoir que je crois) presuppoEe au moins la 
po sibilit~ dlun tel d~nombrement, dlun tel inventaire. 
Mais d'autre part il me semble que l'~tre auquel va la 
croyance transcende tout inventaire possible, crest 
dire-que ce ne peut pas ~tre une chose d! 
un objet parmi d'autres (et invers 
nla de sens que pour ce qui est chose 
Now if his investigations into the nature of being lead him to an 
awareness of the non-inventoriable quality of be so that being is a 
supra=eirpirical reality, Marcel is led to affirm that we are now in the 
same dimension as faith. For faith is directed to that which cennot be 
objectively grasped by knowledge. Faith relates to the unknown insofar 
as the unknown is unverifiable (by empirical processes). But is Marcel 
speeldng here of tlbeingl!, or is he spee.king of II~ being ll ? It would seem 
that he is speaking of the latter, that is of ~ being. At once, however, 
he notes that this "object" (for want of a better 'word) of faith is not 
~ being among other beings, an object among other objects. Being, he 
insists, is transcendent: it goes beyond and is to be "found" beyond 
the scope of the empirical. It is because we ourselves are !lsitue.ted" in 
being tha t we cannot really hope to finish wi th our enquiries into the 
question of being, We are reminded that being, according to Marcel, is 
inexhaustible. Of course, he urges us equallYt we are always free to 
dcny all this. In the final analysis it is by our use of freedom that we 
shall accept or reject the notion of being, as Marcel understands it, that 
is as ontological mystery. It is by our use of freedom that we choose to 
believe in or deny thc reality of God. But, Marcel warns, a denial of 
being is a denial of self. 127 
As far as Marcel is conccl'flcd. the solution to the qucf,tion of being 
is to be perceived in the notion of a need, an exigency, Wllich arises 
f · . t . t . f tIt f' t' 128 rom an lnner assur-Dnce, an HI,\ll ,lon 0 le mys ery 0 .lelng. Thic., is 
a feature of Marcel's metaphysics which will be considered in the follow-
ing chapter. Just [cl it can be claimed th8t t.here is v,due in negative 
theology, so Alarcel appears to set sorr:e store by negative ontology. To 
know whet the self is not (e.g. not-material) is to know something about 
it. From a consideration of what being is not, one may proceed to follow 
tlie thread of the discussion back to its true source : 
On ne peut guere discourir que sur ce qui n'est pas (l'Etre) 
et par fa indirectement, humblement aussi, reperer ou 
jalonner les pistes qui menent vers lui, a condition 
que nous sachions les remonter, car il est tout aussi 
vrai de dire que ces m-emes pistes eloignent ou detour-
nent de lui. (129) 
SimilarlY1 from this we may infer that, since ,the question of God is 
not approachable as a question of an object, a certain aWE'.reness of his 
reality can be evoked by considering attributes which are not predicat-
able of him, Unlike some philosophers and theologians, Marcel does not 
favour attributing powers to God. He holds that such attributes belong 
to the sphere of the "problematic" in that they can be as, easily disproved: 
Le metaproblematique (the expression he uses to explain 
his more familiar term "mystery"), c'est avant tout 'la 
Paix c~i passe tout entendement', mais cette Paix est 
une Paix vivante, et, conllTIe l'a ecrit Mauriac dans le 
Noeud de Viperes, une Paix qui est quelqu'un, une Paix 
creatrice. Il me semble que I' Inf init(~, la Toute-
Puissance de Dieu ne peuvent @tre etablies, elles aussi, 
que par la voie reflexe : il nous est possible de co m-
prendre que nous pouvons nier ces attributs sans retom-
bel' dans la sphere du problematique. Cela reviendrait 
a. dire que la th-eologie Et laquelle la philosophie nous 
conduit est essentiellement negative. (130) 
It will be shown, in the course of the thesis, that MarceJ.'s philosophy, 
at least, does tend to become expressed in theological terms, and that it 
appears to be inclined to negativity. Furthermore, the question of Marcel 
) ' If d't' t 'b fG 'lIb 'd 131 llmse pre lca lng a trl utes 0 od WI e raIse • 
At this point, however, we may conclude that, for Marcel, creation is 
the characteristic of being; creation is the renewal of being. In the 
terms of his dialectic, creation is the meaning of being. Being is creat-
ivity. We can declare that his dialectic of participation does allow for 
both terms, ~ and ~tres, to be compatible with the interpretation of 
"being" as creativity. Being-itself is creative of the universe and of 
~tres; "beings'l can be creative of themselves and of others. According to 
MarceJ., "beings" C2n only recognize their true ontological status as 
creatures in reference to the Creator. God is therefore the source of 
being. God is; God is Being. It is clear, then, that the place of God is 
central in Marcel's thought. We shall now proceed to see how he treats of 
the "problem" of God. 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER ONE 
1. ~Iarcel could be described as a "philosopher for all seasons lt who 
can hize with empiricists, phenomenologists, existentialists 
and even idealists. Elements of their varying approaches can be dis-
cerned in his writings. He sees himself as both an inheritor of the 
igl1tenment thought and a resuscitator of the primacy of self as 
the object and starting-point of reflection. cf. PI 14 : "Cl est vers 
des consonances de cet ordre (a superior awareness of being's integ-
rity] que ma pensee philosophique est orient Elle est polyphonique 
par essence, et stoppose par l~ radicalement ~ t6utes les id~ologies 
plus ou mo ins directement issues de la pens . philosophique frans:aise 
du XVIIIe siec1e. 1I 
2. Even when the atheistic emphases of writers like Sartre and Camus 
were capturing the minds of intellectuals in the immediate years after 
World War 11, Marcel did not despair of a Christian brand of existent-
ialism. In 1947 he affirmed: "Je suls convaincu qu10n serait Et peu 
pres dan la v6riH en disant que l!existentialisme est en soi d'ess-
CEce ci1retienne j et quI il ne peut devenir que par accident et en 
se sur sa propre nature ll (TM 11 345, cL PE 88). However, 
the "accident!! did happen j at least according to the Holy Office. On 
2nd t 1950 Pope Pius XII, in his encyclical Humani Generis, con-
demned ( ic) existentialism as an aberration and a danger to 
the Christian community. Gabriel Marce! has never explicitly acknowl-
edged the coincidence of the encyclical and his abrupt dissociation 
from the !!existentialistl1 (cL ST 193, SdI 9, HP 72, PR-GM 73, 
751 116). At any rate$ he has not been discouraged from remaining 
true to himself and from continuing to philosophize, using the exist-
ential frame of·reference. Just as he will not be labhlled thus, 
neither will he consent to being called a HCatholic" writer (DH 150, 
cL PR-·GIII 77-79). 
3. PI 184, Socrates who taught and lea.rnt from the people of the 
city y rather than from inanimate nature (Plato, Phaedrus 230 D), 
sought out his fellowmen who were wrapped in the cocoons of limited 
consciousness to show them by an obstetric (!J.at.su'tl..tdx;) process of 
elucide.t awareness, how to live in the world, relate to others, 
and to know God. 
4. PI 184. 
5. PR--GM 82. The significance of this expression (the "threshold of 
conversion") is shown on pages 15-17. 
6. This (1Iintegratorll) is a term used, not by MarceJ., in recent 
7. 
religious thought, e.g D John E. Smith, Religion and Empiricism, The 
Aquinas Lecture, 1967, Marquette V.P., Milwauke~~---
••• despite Marcel' s fear that his philosophical 
have been subjected to over-enthusiastic commentary. 
SdI 11-12; see below, fn 79. 
works, at lea t, 
cf. PR-GM 68, 
8. Troisfontaines devotes over a hundred pages of the second volume 
of his opus, Del1existence h l'@tre : La phil~sophie de Gabriel Marcel, 
to a comprehensive index of all Marcel! s putlished writings - Philo-
sophical treatises, articles, plays and dramatic criticism - from 1911 
to 1959. 
9. This interesting characteristic, to some exasperating (e.g. Mar~ 
jorie Grene, Introduction to Exi~tentialism 128), is at best approp-
riate to a philo r w t and fresh inspiration 
from the solitude of his music. Mnrcel delights in improvisations 
f or the piano. 
10. Kenneth Gallagher, The P 
cf. EPC 9. 
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11. However, he often harks back to it with some nostalgia; EPC 9, 
SdI 9. cf. HV 5. 
12. PR·-G~l 117-118. 
13. Sctg 97. Examples from his plays of remarriages (in both cases 
of the widower) are to be found in l'Iconoclaste and les Cceurs avides. 
"Le drame de ll~me 
~ais in Lordon, 1950. 
en eIdl", lecture given to the Institut Fra.n-
cf. PE 106, TM I 30. 
15. DB 89, PI 13, Schg 96. cL ilIa dominante existentielle dans mon 
oeuvre" in Contemporary Philosophy III (ec. Kl ibansky ~ Firenze, 1969), 
172 : "c t e~td!abord,- et je pui.s dire fondanientalerrent a travers 
11 expression dramatique 9 que ma pensee a accec.e' a 1 f existentie!, non 
sans avoir a se liblrer aux prix d1efforts p{nibles de Ifespece de 
carcan ideal iste dans 1 equel au depart ell e risquai t de demeurer em·-
prisonnee, II Illustrations of such philosophical insights anticipated. 
in his plays are given in the course of the text of the thesis and 
particularly in Appendix 2. 
16. SdI 8~'-10, "La dorninante existentielle dans mon oeuvre ll , loco citof 
174·. lIlarcel
'
s preference for his thegtre (cf. Schg 101) may be 
attributed to his co~plaint~ already noted (fn 7) that his philosoph-
ical work mEty be devitalized through excessive interpretation. On the 
other hand, he finds that his plays retain their freshness and scope 
for the exploration of new depths of meaning. 
17. SdI 10, 13, Schg 96, 115. In this phenomenon of being surprised 
by his characters and occasionally enlightened by his philosophice.l 
meditations, lies the link betweer. the two bra.nches of his work: 
"Je dirGis~ pour resumer ma pensee, c'est que ma philosophie est 
existentiell e dans la mesure m~me ou eIle est en meme temps thee.tre, 
Cl est-a-'dire cree.tion dramatique. 1I 
18. Schg 115-116. In this respect Marcel CE.n be seen as a successor 
to the Greek traditior. of tragedy. cf. Sottiaux's comments on the 
play, Un Homme de Dieu E. Sottiaux, Ga~riel hlarcel~ Ptjlosophe et 
Dramatuf_f!:$ 1"68~-
1 9. IILe drame de 1 t ~ffie en exil ll , Schg 108--109. 
20, T'bis doe~ not mean that 11arcel ignoreE, the possibility of despair. 
As he points out, a great deal of his Prolegomenon of Hope (Homo Vi~=tor) 
is concerned with the question of despair (Schg 109). 
21. While Rose hleyrieux may exclaim that the only real suffering is 
to be alone (le Coeur des autres 111), Christiane Ctesnay recognizes 
that we are not-;;-~either~~1I sin ll or in IIvirtue ll (MC 250). 
22. ScJ-g 116. 
23. PP.010 67. It is interesting to note that Marce! appears to be 
supported by the very text of Baudelaire (a poet!) which ~!aritain him-
sel f usei': in order to show the correlation between God and BeCiuty. 
This occurs in ~Iaritainfs ApproE'.cres to God, 68, where he quotes Baud-
elaire to substantiate from literatur-;-the'staterr:ent by Aquinas tha.t 
God is sUI'sistent Bee.uty and thc.t "the beauty of all things derives 
from the divine bec,uty" (Aquinas, Comm. in De divinis nominibus, 4, 5). 
The text from BaudeJ.aire reads : IIClest. ccl ad;:Lirable, cet immodel 
im:tinct du Beau qui nous fait considerer la Terre et ses spectacles 
cor~me un aper9u. comme ulle E.2.!T~.~:.p_c:'~l.si~I!~C_~ tIu Ciel. La soif insati~' 
able de tout ce qui e::t au-·dcla, et quj revelc la vie, est la pre1.lVC 
la pIui': vi Yclnte de notrc immOl-tal i tell ('lL! Ad Ron;anti que ll in Quelques--· 
uns de lllC'S contelEporains, VII: ThGophjle Cautier, p. 159, frO;--~'---
o e uiT~~~~~~i)J~ ~~~~~~~ SI:~~~=l.s~_ B o.~~.~} .. ~ .. :!:.!:~.' Par.i s, Co na I'd, 1 925. ). 
Among philosopher~ ~la.rcel find,; support in R.G. Collin;;\\'oocl who wrote: 
"Quite othenvise them the scientist a.nd far more than the histori<1n, 
the philosopher must go to school with tile pocts in order to learn 
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the uo;;e of language, and must use it in their way: as a means of 
exploring ones mind, and bringing to light what is obscure and doubt-
ful in it. •• The principles on which the philosopher uses lang1Jage 
are those of poetry; but what he writes is not poetry but prose. Frcm 
the point of view of literary form, this mE:BnS that whereas the poet 
yields himself to every suggestion that his language makes, and so 
prOcic.ce8 word-patterns whose beauty is a sufficient reason for their 
exister:ce 9 the philosopher ' s word-patterns are constructed only to 
reveal the thought which they express, and are valuable not in there-
selves but as a means to that end" (Philosophical ~lethod, Oxford, 
Clarendor., 1933, 213-214). 
24. "La dowinante existentieJle dares mon oeuvre", loco cit., 174. The 
single sentence quoted illustrates a feature of ~!arcel' s literary style. 
Another example of a lengthy sentence is given as epigraph to the Ccn-
clusion. Whereas in his notebooks, and particularly in his journal 
Etre etavoir (I), the sentences are often verbless and telegrarr@atic, 
thoie of--Tli~treatises or essays often tend to be involved and cumber-
some" 
25. ~lE<rcel quotes John Keats who describes the world as a "vale of soul-
me,king" (EP, I 4Li), praises Crarles Peguy (ME II 170), and devotes two 
che_pters of his Homo Viator (283-344) to a eulogy of R.M. Rilke, 
IITe-moin du Spirituel". 
26. TR 93-94 : "Si jamais cette hoxmonie est inventee, il y a ced a 
un a parier contre un quI ell e le sera par quelque poHe de tr~s simple 
origine ~ humble comrr:e le furent Mozart, et Schubert, et P~guy -
queJ qu I un qui ne saura rien de Hegel, DU de Kierkegaard ou de Sartr-e t 
mais qui ~ dans son coeur, par quelque gr~ce pour nous a peine imagi-
nable, portera comme un fruit sanglant et benefique cette Idee C[Lle 
chacun de nous - je parle des po~tes et des artiste8 - sent au fond de 
soi ~~rr.In~ u-;~exigence imprescriptible Et laquelle il ne pent se refuser 
sans sceller, du scea.u de sa volont€ mauvaise, sa propre mortalite. I1 
Empheses mine. See Crapter 6, p. 192. A furU:er example of Marcel's 
Ilbelief" in the superior claims of artists and poets may be read into 
Werner Schneels declaration that lithe artist will esacpe ontological 
poverty" (le Dard 117-118; see Chapter 4, fn 100). 
27. HV 10. See Chapter 3, fn 99$' p. 101. 
28. st John 1: 19, ST 33. 
29. EA II 51-52. 
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.31. 
3n k. 
.33. 
PR-GM 82. cf. EPC 181, Schg 71. 
References by Marcel to his family background are given in PE 109-
115, DH 41-43, Schg 96 .... 98, T~l I 21. References to his opinion of 
Cutholicism in his school deys are to befot:nd in Existentialisrne chre'-
tien: Gat-rid Marcel 300-.301 (nJ I 21) and Terr,oigna~etien (1948) 
and ma~y'~be-reflected in the attitude of Marc-Andre in the play Rome 
nlEst plus dans Rome (.~-3). It could be that Marcel regretted thelack 
~g-T~)\.ls upbringing. There is a temptation to read an autobiogrcph-
iCEd regret, on ~!arcel I s part, into the words of Jacques Delorrr:e to 
~:adeleine about his children : "Je t I ai di t simplement que je ne voul-
ais pas qui ils fus8ent e'leves comme je l'ai He moi-meme, dans 
11 ignorance de tout ce qui touche a la religion" (1' Iconoclaste 19). 
ST 264-265. 
"AsceEc,ere ergo ad Deum hoc est intrare ad serretipsum, et non solun: 
ad se intrare, sed ineffabili quocc,mlllO(;O in intimis sejlJ!:Oum tran~:ire" 
- De Vanitate ~IlIlJdi, Il (Opera omnia llugonis S. Victoris), PL 176, 715B. 
Gi ven~-tl"'al~~J~tT;-~'n, nJ ·rT5-'~~~ld~i t'e-~-I))I-\{:E~-ll~c-l~j~16'- The_Ql!_~_i::.~:ig~ 
Experien~~-.9.?~., .379. 
DH 92. Marcel records his conversion and baptism in his second 
publ ished diary, ~.!Ee _eJ __ ~v2.i!:. (I, 15-·-27.) 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39, 
40. 
43. 
44·. 
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Te'moignage chr~tien (24th Sept. 1948), cited TM I ~: "Non, vrai-
ment, je ne m'explique pas comment, le jour 011 F. Mauriac m1eut lance 
son appel, j'ai opte pour le catholicisme, pIu tot que pour le protes-
tantiswe. Je me suis dit: 'Oui, je suis ien; ce serait une 
lEtchete de me derober plus lor:gtemps.' l\1ais j'ai senti alors COfr'me 
un appel yenant. de plus loin que ~rauriac, et il m'a fallu opter pour 
le catholicisme. H In the course of an interview, IIReponse a une en-
qu@tt sur I! idee de Dieu!l ,1 t P 41), he attempts to 
clarify his choice of religious ion: !!J'ai pu me demander 
d'abord si je serais protestant ou catholique, mais il mTa semble que 
le catholidsme constituait une lite organique dont le protestant-
isme ne nous presentait que des expressions affaiblies, variables 1 
sans Bucun critere qui permette de chois1r er.tre les unes et les 
mItres, Pour moi Cl est trE:s net, le catholicisme represente un {tat 
plus orgClnique que le protestantisme trop 1 a soi-meme.!1 
DH 215. As far as Marcel is concerned, he says that all his fears 
about COlr.mitting himself in the decisive step of cor:version were dis-
sipated when grace shone throu On 5th March 1929, he writes: IiJe 
ne doute plus-. -~Iiraculeux bor,heur ce matin. J' ai fait pour la 
prerl'ier'e fois 11 experience de la •• Jl ai ete enf in cerne par le 
christianisme, et je suis subme ••• Cl est bien une naissance" (EA I 
~). 
In his own case at least, Marcel asserts, his baptism - 29th ~,!arch 
1929 - was the beginning of a new life or at least a rejuvenation (re 
was, after all, in his fortieth year). Shortly ~fter his baptism he 
wri tes: IILe miracle chretien m I apparait a 1 I heure actueUe comme poi.nt 
de rajeunissement absolu. Et peut-l?tre comme source €ternelle ou per-
maneme de tout rajeunissement absolul! (EA I 28). 
DH 2"l9. ef. HCH 191-1 
• J' .. vcq.nt; 
1 • 'J.f ~ JI " '" P-ato~ SophIsta 247: 'ta 0\11:0:. wC; EO''!L\) ova aAAo 1:L n:ATJ\I 61)-
It is inLeresting to note that Professor John E. Smith takes up this 
idea and extends it to a def initioc of God. "God is primarily Power 
e)~pressed in that special form which is Spirit,l! He concludes: "The 
reality of God is the ity of the Power that once created and now 
sustains the Beloved Community." - J.E. Smith; "The Reality of God 
and the Denial of God,1! presented as Presidential Address at a meet-
ing of the American Theological Society in 1968 and publi in 
Journel of ReI n, vol. 5, No. 2, April 1971,83-102. The senter.ces 
quo appear pages 100 and 102. 
EPe 22. 
HP 82 Marcel does not hesitate to assert that philosophies 
founded on sh have seen their day and in fact lead to a dead-end 
(HP 1 ), He affirms, on the other hemel, that a sense of uneasiness 
similar to that understocd by Augustine in his Confessions cen be 
salutary. In 1965 (Biblio 33/7, "Que"tior.naire ~larcel Proust") :I!arcel 
described his state of mind as ItL'angoisse en presence du monde qui 
IH'end forme sous nos yeux et du declin de toute civilisation. I! cf. 
Le de-cl in la sa sse IILe crepuscule du sens communI!, EA I 94, i 57, 
, , PE 84, ST 29-34, Schg 43. Marce! pre"ents a 
"fashior:able ll version of anguish through the character of the pseudo-
intellectual Prusz in Mon Te1fPs nlest pas le vbtre (185). 
The phrD:-;e is not ~Iarcel!s but of Dictrich von lUldebr2no. 
cf. IICIr 20, 28,30,36-·58, 6.'), 176~177, 197, EAIJ 23, 25-26, 
BV lIr8, Schg 51. 
EA 11 He allct=:e5 tliat even the nihilism is imbued 
with a technocratic character (Hell 197), For further comments on 
"tecbnoJatry" QC; a facet of contemporar'Y irr'eli (in ~larc(:l! s eyes), 
see ter 2, PP. 45-46. 
45. 
46, 
47. 
48. 
49. 
50. 
51. 
52. 
53. 
54, 
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Schg ';-9. cf. DH 204 
S1' 166. cf. HCH '139: "La vie n'est plus aim<fe." Marcel charges 
that not only "la technique" but Carte8ian ratior.alism has brought 
about this desacralization (ST 166). 
P/ICMO 51 (with a referer:ce to W. Shakespe6re, Mac12eth, V, v, 26-27). 
cL HV 149, HCH 47, ME I 189 , HdD 70, CM 39,49. That there should be 
a "positive" me6ning to life is the basis of Marcel's option for a 
theistic existentialism. See Chapter 6. 
ST 170. 
S1 154-155. 
S chg 42. 
Marcel expresses reservations, for exa.rnple, about Tillich's inter-
pretation of "holy" (Schg 41-42). TiUic1', was influenced by Rudolf 
Otto (The Idea of the Holy, tr. Harvey, 2nd ed., London, OUP, 1957) 
and on~may~~---C;-onvergence in Marcel' sown interpretat.ion of 
"sacrsJ.l' in the text of the thesis whicrc follows. But it would be 
going toe, far to presume that Marcel was in any way influenced by Otto. 
r,farcd notes, for example, "The word! sacred' (which he later cldls 
'sacral' in the same context) superseces every assent to a specific 
credo; even if one is certainly able to interpret it in the light of 
higher certitudes" (Schg 21). cf. ST 158. Furthermore, Marcel says, 
one does not have to go out of tOVln to any "Sacred Woods" to find the 
"Sacr·al l '. He does, however, allow that the Japanese (whose country he 
has visited) seem to have understood the meaning of the word better 
than SOIT.e Western people (ST 161). 
Schg 50, 52, ST 163-165. He gives as an example the adoration of 
a mother before her child (ST 160). 
ST 159-160 (quoting EA II 28). cf. Schg 50. 
5T 173. The "return to the sources", he explains, is not to be 
un~erstocd in terms of chronological origins. What he is implying is 
a retUl'n to the ackno\vledgment of our status as cre2.ture and so to 
the acknD"ledgment of the Creator. 
ST 157, 173-174. Marcel claims that he prefers to remain on a 
plane more philosophical than theological. He speaks of recollection 
rather' than of prayer, !!cer ce mot (prayer] comporte des resoDances un 
peu ambigtles, auxquelles je con~ois que certaine8 arr:es pourtant tres 
hautes demeurent refractaires!! ~HCH 76). However, he runs the risk of 
ensuring that these !!deeply spiritual" souls remain refractory when he 
jumps off his philosophical plane and asserts that the acknowledgment 
of the "sacral" cen be brought about only by the intervention of grace. 
"Grace can only reach the individual, and if it reaches the masses--
through the individual then it will only happen if the masses arouse 
themselve::: from the stupor that made them masses in the first place!! 
(Schg 52). And thot rather derogatory statement about the "masses" 
serve::: to strengthen the feeling that ~Iarcel is propo8ing an elitist 
metaphysics (see page 15). 
56, EA 11 29. "Et," he adds, "il vaudrait la peine de se demander 
pou.rquo.i • " 
57. 5d:.g 53. cf. HCH 95. Ma.rcel points out that this is what Martin 
Buber and he have tried to prove in their writings (cf. Schg 73-92). 
58. Ilea 76, 141. In thj slight, the quest ior. of evil and suffer-inl; is 
also illumjnccl. I\ccorcing t.o ~bI'cel! s expoE;ition (see Ctapter le' sect--
ion v (a), 1 cc,'n only interpret another's suffering to the extent 
tbat, through inter'subjeebvity 5 I si1nre in it. My response to the 
other!s suffering should be 0),(; of love. ef. PAC~!O 58, IICB 9Li-~95, 
PI 176. 
59. lIV 117. 
60, 
61. 
HV 92~93. 
HV 109. cf. HV 90-91, HCH 140, ST 165. 
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62. ST 168. cf. HV 133 (where he treats of the impossibility of a 
"biological morality"), Schg 44·, ST 155-156. 
63. Schg 46, HV 122. 
6tH HCH 191. He adds, "On pourrait dire, je crois, qu'une ethique 
de I' horneur n' est pas seulen:ent une ethique de la fidelite', mais 
encore une ethique de la gre.titude, et qu'a la limite cette gratitude 
affecte un caractere ontologique, car elle porte sur le fait m~me 
d1ayoir He admis Et etre, c' est-a.-dire au for.d d'avoir ~te creee" 
(HCH 191-192). cL HV 149. 
65. HCH 141. 
66. HV 174. Not only doeE. a "sacral" awareneES of life revea.l to us 
6-1 { . 
the true meaning of life, but also it reveals our very being and 
destiny, or inc2rnation (HV 122; see following section in the~is) and 
redemption (HCH 140; see Chapter 6). Mareel acknowledges his indebt-
edness for the realization of life's meaning as service to Ctristian 
trc,dition : "J' aperliois maintenant la profonde realite du theocent-
riswe b~rullien. Nous sommes ici pour servir; oui, c'est l'idie de 
service en tous sens qu'il faut creuser" (EA II 23). cL HCH 156. 
The nature of Marcel's "aPF)lied theocer.trism" will be considered in 
the Conclusion. 
HV 166. cL PI 37. 
68. HCH 156. 
69. ST 170 (emphase8 mine). v. supra fn 48. 
70. DH 108, PE 64. cL EA I 46. This does not mean, as Plato has 
pointed out (Protagoras 340)t that being and becoming are synonymous. 
71 • PAC~!O 51. 
72. SdI 265. cf. PACMO 56. 
73. Sce Chapter 2, pp. 57-58. 
74. Given, without reference, by Troisfontaines as epigraph to his 
first volume. cf. EA I 176, EPC 19. 
75. DH 120, Life, Marcel declares, is a constant effort to achieve 
the identification of "I am free" with "I am I", for freedom is 
neitber attribute nor predicate (DH 120, 197, ~IE II 115, ST 226). 
76. See TM I 307 for two of Marcel's public statements on his own 
vie,1 of' the fundE,mental difference, on the questior~ of freedom, 
between Sartre and himself; the difference lies in the recognition 
by ~Iarcel - and the rejection by Sartre - of grac~. A useful critique 
of Sartrean freedom is given by W.A. Luijpen, Existential Phenomen-
01 C LY.1 p, 344. 
77. HP 70~71 : "Contrairement. ~ une tendance qui pr{vaut actuelle-
ment chez norr,bre de philoEophe8 etrangers a toute experience, je 
dirais m~me ~ toute pr€occupation religieuse, je demeure convaincu 
que crest seulement par rapport a la gr'i3ce que la libert€ humaine 
peut~etre derinie en profondeur : et que si elle est consideree en 
elle-rngme, elle risque fort de se cha.nger en son contraire, ou 
encore dc se reduire a unc sorte d'ando/'..;ue derisoire et caricature-d. 
des aUributs dont on a au preillable d6p~uille un Djeu jut;e inexis-· 
tar.t. En d'uutres terlTlc~~, la libcrt6 cst S8ns doute essentiellen:er:t 
1 f acc;,uiescClflcnt Oll le refus qu' il nous appartient dc lTlClrquer per 
rEpport a la grDce, ce refu~; pouvont d'ajlleul's toujours SE' dcguiser 
en une neutralH6 fal1acieusc." 
78. 
80. 
8~ I. 
82. 
83. 
85. 
86. 
8"{. 
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IIll sfagit," ~Jarcel says, using Sartre's own distinction between 
being and nothingness (although he does not use neant), IId'une option 
d€ci~ive, d'un choix entre etre et ne pas etre. fiIais nous avons 
aujourd'hui a reconnaltre que le non-~tre peut etre prefere, qulil 
peut affecter le visage m~me de l'@tre, et crest ce travestissement 
que le philosophe est tenu de denoncer expressement" (HCH 96). It 
can be seen, then, that Marcel in no way entertains Sartre's propos-
ition of a n€ant as an alternative to Stre. 
Frustrated by Fichte's attempt to deduce the empirical self from 
the transcendental self, Marcel directed his first researches towards 
the IIconcrete ll examination of the individual 'and of the transcendent, 
as opposed to idealism (represented by L~on Brunschvicg) which was 
bosed on the impersonal and the immanent (HV 190-191). Philosophy, 
for ~larcel9 is a response to an appeal, a voca tion in the full etymo-
logical sense of the word and, therefore, a metter of personal commit-
ment, cL ST 17, HCH 34-35, 80-81, 85, 195~ 198-199, PI 14, DH 217, 
PR-G~l 108, 111. Marcel's wariness of commentators' opinions ·on his 
philosophy is probably due to his awareness that in the past "concrete ll 
thought has degenerated into scholasticism or has been IIsterilized ll by 
devitalized COMnentaries (EPC 94). 
EPC 44. Marcel acknowledges the influence of Bergson on his own 
thought and on his lIuntiring and obstinate battle against the spirit 
of abstraction. 1I cf. J~I ix (Preface to English translation), HCH 7. 
cf. the comment at the end of the paragraph on page 23. 
PAC:'IO 5'\, EPC 37. Marcel may be greatly indebted to Royce whose 
ideas influenced Hocking who in turn influenced Marcel. The French 
philosopher observes a close parallel in Royce's own theory of being 
OlR 224; see epigraph to the Conclusion, p. 205). 
EA I 128, DH 106-107. Bollnow, in his Franz8sischer Existential-
l~ (PP. 165-166), makes the interesting observation that, in the 
matter of experiential knowledge, both Marcel and Dilthey, while work-
ing from vastly different starting-points, arrived at parallel con-
clusions. 
JM 309-329. This treatise, which first appeared as an article in 
la Revue de Metaphysique _et de Morale (1925), can be described as the 
blue-print of existentialism, certainly in the French sphere of influ-
ence. ~larcel notes that the appearance of a st.able agreement between 
thought and its object does not always correspond to reality; this, he 
proposes, is particularly the case with existence. Existence and the 
thing that exists, he asserts, cannot be dissociated; we must admit 
the indissoluble unity of existence and of the existent (JM 313). As 
knowledge minimizes its object (J~j 273), we cennot dissociate the Ill" 
of "I exist" without establishing a dualism and thereby destroying the 
union and assurance of personal individUBlity. This assurance coincides 
closely with the reality on which it bears, a reality which is as glo-
bal as the assurance itself (JM 314). The same union of myself with 
my self. (incarnate in my body) can be seen in the soul-body relation-
ship and this realization leads to an awareness of the almost inexpress-
ible (for fear of objectification) relationship of self with being) and 
so to the question of the "existence ll of God. The tremendous signif i-
ca.nce of ~la.rcel' s distinction between existence and objectivity with 
reference to God will be thrown into sharp relief as we proceed. 
J:'l 314-'3'15. 
EA I 11. 
EPC 37. cf. JM 261, ST 26/fo Sensation is Cl mode of participation, 
but not the only dimension of participation. One of the problems 
arising from this first level is the spatial reference of incarnation 
which would seem to indicate that incarnation is situated in time and 
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space whereas communion and transcendence extend beyond such limits. 
This is one area of thought which Marcel h&5 not fully clarified (cf. 
GaUagher9 op" ci to, 21). The term" inca.rniation has certain theo-
logical undertones, as well. Although Marcel insists that he uses 
the word to denote the human condition and without religious conno-
tations, it none the less finds its fulfilment (as Troisfontaines 
suggests strongly, TM 11 295, Existentialisme et pens€e chr~tien~e, 
60) only in the Incarnation. This theolog{~al Mystery refers to the 
manifestation of the Word of God incarnate among his creatures. 
Marcel himself has no objection to this cor~<clusion. "Sans que je ml en 
sois rendu compte exact.ement t tout au moins Et Itorigine, cette 
recherche s'orientait vers le Dieu incarne, vers le Dieu qui sleEt 
confere I' existence en devenant un homme CO.lDime moL" And if, he 
admits, his research leads to God - in the matter of incarnation 
which is the bodily form of my being ... it fnllows that his whole re-
search into being, tracing it to Being in its fulness, must lead to 
God o 
88, EPe 36. cf. PI 114. In order to refute the obj~ction that his 
enC{Uiry into sensation may lead to an interpretation of sensation as 
the reception of messages which would complicate the soul-body relation-
ship~ ~Iarcel distinguishes between being anrl having (JM 239, 251 ~ 253, 
30'i~302s EA I 104·~105, 168~ 195, EPC 33, HV 78, PI 70, DH 67-68, 130). 
See Germaine Cromp's article on Marcel's eErly investigations into the 
body-soul relationship (included in the Bibliography). Furthermore, 
~!arcel repudiates the charge of materialism (Jh! 305, PI 185). 
89. EPe 36, cL EA I 22 .... 23, EPC 37, 130, PI 114. 
90. 
9,1 ! • 
92. 
cL PAC~:O 82, EPC 22, M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit 5 117 : "Alles 
Dasein ist ~ritsein." 
cf. Schg 73, EA I 36. Among the obstacles to communion Marcel in-
dicates i) jud&'lllent : PI 54""57, Schg 10; cL PR-GM 56~'57, CM t;~9, RPR 
45y 71~72, 126, 134~141, FdT (SdI) 341, 348; ii) alienation: H\' 228, 
PI 123~ Schg 80, 88--89; cL MC 55, 250, nl I 18; iii) egocentrism 
ME II 1'i ~ 370 
Commitment to God, being the highest existential value chosen in 
metaphysical terms, needs to be absolute. The yardstick of Christian-
ity is charity - to self in a selflessly motivated manner, to others 
in intersubjectivity, and to God in love and consecration. Thus 
against Heideggerfs radical "no" to the world, the true Christian says 
"yes" and 9 as Seymour Cain has observed (Gabriel Marcel 29), to say "is" 
is to say "yes" and to say "yes" is to sa~ EA I 118. We 
are reminded of Jacob Bl.lhmets summary that all things derive from a 
Yes and a No (FragI~. 43 1 iXr BetEachtung gottlicher offenbarung, Sog. 
177) ~heos~~che Frage~; 3, 2f). 
93. ~lE I 47~66. cL ME II 1840 
940 PI\Cr,IO 46~ EPC 215, HV 31, 202, ~1E II 12. For MarcePs concern at 
the "indiscreet and indistinct" use of the term "transcendence", see 
RPR. 172 (Postface) and ME I 47 .... 48. His own notion of transcendence 
will be taken up again for consideration in later sections of the thesis, 
cf. Chapter 2, p. 60 and Chapter 5, p. 152. On the possibility 
of "transascendence" as suggested by Jean Wahl, see RPR 171 and ST 97. 
BV 31. cf. P. Tillich, .I~e ____ ~.b.~.~0.~~:._~! __ ~"~~J..9.~!:l~LE'0i~ns., 31. 
cr. K. Gallut;her, op" cito 9 xi (Preface). 
97. ME I 64. He asks (ME 153) : "Ne pourrait·_·on dire que cr~er, crest 
toujours creer au·-dessus de soi?'.' Defending his us~:ertion that expcri-· 
ence can extend beyond tlle immanent, he makes these comments: "11 con-· 
vient cependant de se demander si ce ne serait pas cette confuse re-
presentation qui est impliquce lorsqufon pn.rle, Et' la fa~on du kontisrne 
pris a la lettre, de ce qui est. en dehors de ltexperience, de cc qui 
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est au del~ des limites de l!exp€rience. Ceci en derni~re analyse ne 
veut absolument rien dire, puis~~le la determination en dehors de est 
elle~meme empirique~ est elle~fr.elfie Et 1 i interieur de 1 i experience!! 
(ME I 55), "Dire que le transcendant est encore immanent Et lfexperi-
ence~ c'est malgre tout persister Et objectiver celle-ci et l'imaginer 
con;me une sorte d 1 espace dont i1 serai t pour ainsi dire une dimension" 
01E I 56). "Je le repete, I! exigence de transcendance ne saurait eg 
aucun Cos etre interpretee COlf,me le besoin de depasser toute experi-
ence quelle qu'elle soit; car au deLi de toute experience, il nly a 
rien qui se laisse je ne dis pas seulement penser· mais meme pressel:tir. 
Il serait be8.Jlcoup plus juste de dire que ce qui est en question Cl est 
la substitution d!un certain mode dtexperience Et dtautres" O:E I 56). 
"!(ous aboutissons donc a cette conclusion negative mais trE~S impor-
tante qu!il n 1 est pas possible de reduire l'experience au fait pour un 
sujet d! experimenter ses propres etats" (AlE I 60). 
98, Schg 66. 
99, cr. ~IR 224, EA I 214, and John E. Smith! s address on "The Realit.y 
of God and the Denial of God" (see above, fn 39). Fo·r a more complete 
exanlination of Marcel's notion of presence, and in particular of his 
"presential analogy" with reference to God, see Chapter 3, pp. 82-84. 
100, HV 200 9 "Theism and Personal Relationships" (in Crosscurrents, 
1950) ~ pp, 37 ..... ~·0. The application of this idea of !!~Zredi t" in 
love and fidelity, and its extension into Marcel's notion of immortal-
ity will be considered in Chapters 5 and 6. For an illustration from 
Marcel!s theatre of his dialectic of ontological communion, see 
Appendix 2, II, pp. 225-226. 
101. EPe 18. Using a musical metaphor, Marcel says that transcendence 
is a communion in a polyphonic universality (ME II 188), indicating a 
whole of harmoniously functioning parts. It is, he asserts, the only 
concrete universality (ME II 142). And only Christianity, as long as 
it remains faithful to the spirit of universality which is its very 
principle 9 gives us the lever to transcendence (RPR 172 (PostfaceJ ). 
102, PE 128. Marcel claims in his defence that his "disposition heuris-
tique" in no way implies a "dilettantisme de la .recherche!!. What is 
of importance to him9 "c I (Hai t d' acceder a la confirmation d! une cer-
taine assurance initiale, mais qui au depart se presentait bien plus 
comme un pressentiment que comme une conviction." (!!La dominante 
exi s t en t ie 11 e dan s mon 0 euvre" in Co n t en;p..2E~£y_'yhi 1 0 soJ?1:l..:y, II I, ed. 
R. Klibansky, p. 171). Despite his protestations, it will be indic-
ated in the course of the examination of some of his themes that 
Ma.reel appears to indulge in literary dilettantism. 
10]. L. \l'ittgenstein 9 Investigations,II, 23 (Oxford, Blaekwell, 1958, 
pp. 6, 12), Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.6, 5.61 (London, Kegan 
Paul, Trencb l• Trubner & Co. Ltct j 1922, p. ·"148). cl. R.B. Braithwa.ite, 
~~iclstt.s View of the_;\ature of Bel.ief, p. 10 (Cc .. mbridge, LP., 
1955). 
104. ST 112-113. This refers to a part of a transcription of the dis-
cussion \l'i th certain prominent French thinkers (in this instance )1. 
Alquie)9 after Marcel had delivered a paper "LIEtre devant la pensee 
interrogative!! before a meeting of the Societe Fran~aise de Philosophie, 
25 January 1958. 
105. ST 32 H 33. We cnnnot, he thjnks, put ourselves in "being" or "grasp" 
it. (If anything, being has a hold over us) cL EA T~55, 122. Mareel 
stresses what he calls his recourse to t.he "concrete approache~;" to 
being: we can see only the areas illumined by the "light 11 irradiating 
from being (cl. FP Gf;). Elsc\';hcre (lfCE 129), he states firmly that 
"being" is not a "thing"; accordingly, "or.tology as the science of 
being!! is not, for him, a h3PfY expression. It would be nice, he Inu::::es s 
(ST 97) if a metaphysics could be constructed without reference to 
"be but nobody has succeeded, or could succeed, in him 
tha t service .• 
106. ST .304~ 89, 103. 
107. EPC 220-221. Given as the epigraph to this chapter. 
1 JM 202. 
109. DH 107. 
110. EA I 44 .• In a footnote (same page) he corrments : "Vexemple le 
plus simple qui se presente a moi est celui du , ntexiste 
plus~ fil2is je ne peux pas dire purement et simplement qu?il ntest pas." 
He notes (ME II 25) that Aquinas, as interpreted by Gilson, seerr:s to 
identify being and existence. A study is made in Appendix 1 of ~arcel's 
affinity to Augustine rather than to Aquinas on the interpretation of 
the cl assical philosophical concept of "essence tl • We shall limit our-
selves, in this present context, to Marcel's observation, after refer-
ring to a passage from Rilke, that every human being, insofar as he is 
endowed with memory, shares in the activity (proper to the poet) by 
which the visible is transmuted into the invisible. tI~!ais ne ser;:iit-
cc pas justement ici 1 " he asks, "que se situe Itarticulation de 
I t existence et de l' etre?" (ME II 31 ). 
111. DH 107~108. 
1·12. ME II 33-34. His explanation is important; he says that he pro~ 
nounces the affirmation "I am ll with humiU because being is something 
that can only be granted to us as a because we are 
liable to m8.ke ourselves unworthy of the being and be con-
demned to lose it except for the assistance of grace, and with wonder 
because the gift of being brings with it light and is in fact lig~ 
Marcel insists on the virtue of humility in the recognition and 
aWE>-renefS of the "mystery of being", As Gallagher explains: IIWhat 
~!arcel refel's to is ontolo cal humility, which is an existential 
attitude : it is a recognition of a depth in being which surpasses 
and includes us. In a word, it is the profound acknowledgment of 
finitude" (Gallagher, op .. cit., 5). Concerning the element of wonder 
at beings cf. E.L. Mascall, p. 80 and H.De'Lewis 1 
Our Experience of God, Pp. 1 
1'13. EA I 49 ~ 117. cf. PE 1 
1-;4. JM 178. 
115. PI 105. 
1 '1 6 0 P I 1 04. 
1i7. EA I 127. The next day ( 1 November 1932) he wonders, "L'univers 
comme dehiscence de l'etre? Notion a essayer." 
118. JTh! 1 cf. JM 179-180 J ME II 46. 
1'i9. EA I 188. cL EPC 19 : "Au depart de toute crea.tion, visible ou 
non, on decouvre la meme presence, et, ajouterai-je, la m€me sommation 
de Petre a }tame qutil investit, mais aussi l'acte, identique en ses 
specifications infinies, par lequel Jlame rend temoignage Et ceUe 
meme presence qulil lui est au reste donn~ de pouvoir recuser, c!est-
a-tiire annuler, dans la mesure m@me ou elle est &me, c i est-au-c!ire 
Ubede." See Cbapter 3, fn , po 100. 
120. nlarcel, wr.it in his Foreword to GaLlagherts work, op" cit"~ X.lll, 
In his l'eview of Gal 1S book, Louis··B. Geiger does not agree with 
Mar-cel t s comment that the converse is true. Geigei~ explains : 
"LYaffirmation de Marcel est peut· .. €'tre vraie, mais elle ne Ped cer-
tainement pas, ni en vertu de Itexperier.cc de It~tre faite dons la 
cd;8.tivi f ni, moins encore, en vertu d1une regIe logique qui 
commande la conversion des propositions H (Dialogue, 1964· .... 1965, 
vo1. 2, pc 430; the review extends from P'~P. 432). 
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121. JM 301 : HAu fond tout se ramene ~ la distinction entre ce quton!! 
et ce qu t on st!l cf. PACMO 86, EA I 181-190, 193-220. See above, 
fn 88. 
122. ST 9 M. B~nh~ had suggested the terms Absolute and Relative 
Being to help Marcel. Absolute Being, he explains, has the force of a 
noun and is singular in connotation~ Relative Being has the force of a 
verb and is mul tiple in connotation. The Re}ati ve supposes the Absol-
ute, but the Absolute has no need of the Relative. There can be a 
movement only from the Relative to the Absolute. In reply, Marcel 
agrees with the last proposition but he is not enthusiastic about the 
terms, least of all with IIAbsolute" which he says makes for "thing-
ification (r~ification). At once we note that he himself does not 
seem his objection to his own use of the word in his key phrase, lithe 
Absolute 'nlOU tl • This is a matter to which we shall return in Chapter 
2 ( p. 60). Continuing his comments on tlabsolute ll in the present 
context t he declares that it has lI une sor{;e de resonance chosiste ll • 
He also sees an untenable duality if Grund (associated with the idea 
of Absolute Being) and Pleroma are both used. His own term, 
relates to perfect communion in Being which, in Marcel's view, 
sufficient guarantee for its retained use (ST 95). It all depends, 
of course~ on his own interpretation. 
123. It can be appreciated by now that Marcel is following the lead of 
Plato who, as we have already noted, defined being as power (see p.17). 
MarceIl s affinity with Plato as well as with Aristotle, but only in 
a IIChristianised" form, will be commented on in Appendix 1. He ac-
knowl s his admiration and indebtedness to Plato, particularly in 
the Sophista (ST 112). This is in connection with his rejection of 
the word";oubassement" (for Grund) is "soubassement" is "substance ll • 
For him, the term "substance", also, is Ii de ce que j 1 ai e 
les associations chosistes." It should ba noted p in passing~ that 
Marcel1s Being as Creativity is in no way similar to A.No Whitehead!s 
Ilcl'eativityl! or !lGod" (Process and Reality., po 9). 
124. This is in accord with his aim which he gives as "to establish the 
relationship of a subjects in his actual capacity as a subject, to a 
reality \\'hieh cannot be regarded as objective, yet which is persistent-
ly required and recognized as real" (PE ). Elsewhere he adds: 
IIJe ne me soucie de Ifetre que pour autant que je prends conscience 
plus ou moins distinctement de 1 tuni te sous·~jacente qui me relie a 
dfautres @tres dont je pressens la r~alit 1I (ME 11 20). 
1 EA I 125. 
1 EA I 153. Emphasis of Ilcroyance" mine. 
1 EA I '150 : "Au lieu que 1 Yordre ontologique ne peut etre reconnu 
que personnellement par la total ite d' un gtre engage dans un drame qui 
est le sien tout en le d~bordant infinimrnt en to us sens M un €tre 
aUCiuel a e te impartie la puissance singu3 {ere de SI aff irmer ou de se 
nier, selon quill affirme PEtre et stouvTe a lui - ou qutil le nie et 
du meme temps se cl\)t: car crest en ce dilemme que reside Pessence 
m&rne de sa liberte.!! cf. EA I 166 : IlPlus je suis, plus je mfaffirme 
cornme etant .~ moins je me po;:;e comme autc'i:ome. 1I 
128. ST 80~·85. 
129. HCH 129. cf. Erc 9'1 : !Ill faudra done dc(clarer, si scandaleuse 
que puisse dtabord sembler une telle aff.;,rlllution, que plus je parti~· 
cipe effectivement ~ l'~tre, mojns je SDLS en mesurc de savoir ou de 
dire il 3::1.9i je participc t ou, plus e:xacilemcnt~ moins cette question 
offre pour moi un sens; et la s i cill:1 on essent iell e de la theo-· 
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logic negative consistera a cerner, par exclusions successives et 
comme concentriques, cette affirmation centrale avec laquelle celui 
qui la profere en vient a faire corps au point de ne pouvoir meme 
plus la proferer. 1I As far as the possibility of any charge of pan-
theism is concerned, Marcel considers that his notion of partici-
pation does not lead to any pantheist position. He bases his lIac-
qui ttaI", in part at least, on the idea of reciprocity in partici-
pation; his dialectic concerns a spiritual relationship of being 
with being and, therefore, we infer, of being with Being. IIEt ceci,1I 
he states, "suffit a refuter un certain pantheisme, a en montrer le 
neant metaphysique ll (JM 207). As it can be seen from the text of 
the thesis, Marcel understands as one of the basic facts of his meta-
physics that being is something we receive - it is a gift, and our 
ontological status is that of creature who has received his being, 
his life, his existence from God as Creator. God is separate from 
us as we are from him. We are invited to share more fully in being 
without being Being itself. Similarly, we are not the being of others; 
in participative intersubjectivity the real core of the individual 
per'son is indissoluble and distinct. cL Chapter 3, p. 89; Chapter 4, 
p. 106; Appendix 1, pp. 218, 219 Un 1). 
130. EA I 151-152. 
131. For a consideration of the element of negative theology in 
Marcel's thought, see Chapter 2, p. 61; for his treatment of faith and 
his attributes of God, see Chapter 4, p. 115. 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE PROBLEM OF GOD 
N2avoir pas son centre en soi y 
mais en Dieu : 
hors de la pas de religion. 
- G. MARCEL,~ Journal ~pe. 231. 
Ce qui manque le plus aux hommes, 
crest la connaissance de Dieu. 
- FENELON, Oeuvres XVIII, 276, 
(Paris, 182.3). 
/ "J 
<t- '" 
Avant tou t ~ ce qui manque a cc monde J 
crest la conscience de Dieu. 
- G. ~IARCELy "Reponse Et une enquete 
sur .1 {idee de Dieu
" 
in 
Age NOllveml, -j955, 40. 
Where there .is no God there is no man. 
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1. Man in a World-wi thout'-God. God as Problem. 
i. 
La question fondamentale reste celle de I? existence 
de Dieu. (1) 
Gabriel Marcel expresses quite forcefully his concern for the plight of 
man who seems, to him, to be increasingly isolated in the world. He attrib-
utes this alienation to a loss of a sense of need for God. There has been 
such a progressive dissatisfaction with the presentation of the idea of God 
(vlhieh Marcel blames on an outmoded theological tradition) that. the decline 
of interest in the idea of God can be remarked in the juxtaposed citations 
of re'nelon and TIlarcel given as epigraphs to this chapter. When Fenelon was 
writing (in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries) the possi-
bi! ity of God wa's at least admitted; Fenelon complains tha t his contempor-
aries do not know God. What Marcel s as his diagnosis of the world's 
malady in the mid-twentieth century is that man is no longer aWare of God. 
Among the factors which Marcel points out as contributing to the 
decline of a need for God are the rationalized gods of the philosophers and 
of deists~ the attempts of agnostics, the psychology of Feuerbach, and the 
2 
socio-economic ideologies of Marx and Is. However, he identifies as an 
increasingly powerful influence in the eclipse of God the rise of a socio-
logical humanism. Its encouragement to man to improve his condition without 
acknowledging dependence on God as creator is a source of grave concern for 
Marcel 
D'une mani~re g~n6rale, on peut dire, semble-t~il que 
llhomme, si nous consid~rons l'evolution historique et 
sodolo gique, telle qu r eIle s test poursuivie depuis 
deux siecles, a perdu sa reference divine : il cesse 
de se confronter ~ un Dieu dont il serait la creature 
et lfimageo (3) 
It was against this background and in an atmosphere charged with the varying 
principles of positivism, agnosticism, theosophY$ deism and rationalism, of 
naturalistic evolution and anthropomorphic that the young and 
reI ously uncommitted Marcel began his own investi ions into the nature 
of religion. He became concerned with those features of irreligion which 
he saw as combining forces with other elements obstructive to the develop-
ment of true participation in the mystery of being. 
iio Morce!! s views on cont. 
Of the influences contribuLing to a sense of irreligion in tile world of 
the twentieth century, Marcel distinguishes three as the most insidiously 
potent. These are the points of view presented by what he calls the philo--
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sophies of "modern" enlightenment, of the supremacy of Life as "the Vital 
Principle", and of applied science (la technologie).4 His aversion to 
these "dangers" seems to stem, negatively, from a lingering reaction to 
idealism and, positively, from his desire to restore the "sacral" element 
to life. 
(a) Modernism. 
Referring to what he sees as a brand of modernism, Marcel notes that 
those who claim to be "enlight.ened" tend to disparage, wilfully or uncon-
sciously, the degrees of attainment reached in preceding times. He is not 
being original when he proclaims that this attitude, and its corollary that 
any given period of history is different and distinct in its morality and 
priority of values from any other era, is a grave oversimplification. 5 
Marcel gives as examples of disparagement in the domain of religion state-
ments which emphasize the date : 
11 IJ. n' est plus possible aujourd' hui, dira-t-on communement, 
de croire au miracle ou a I' incarnation. 11 n' est pas permis 
a un homme de 1930 d'admettre le dogme de la resurrection 
de la chair." (6) 
For his own part, Marcel does not appear to share the fashionable ~ 
of his contemporaries in this sphere at least. He himself favours an 
flapplied theocentrism" on the model of the medieval thinkers of the Christ-
ian trad it ion, 7 
At the time of his conversion he seems to have been antagonistic to any 
historical criticism of Christianity. This antagonism may well have been 
an expression of his desire to break with idealism which, in his early 
years, had been principally represented by the German school. This school 
was also characterized by an attitude of historical critique. 8 In that 
period leading up to his "exorcism" of idealism, Marcel observed that a 
pragmatic historicity may lead to the rejection of faith as a human experi-
ence. But while the intelligibility characteristic of.each is undoubtedly 
different, it does not follow - as Marcel suggested at the time - that faith 
and historical knowledge are incompatible. With time he has mollified in 
his attitude. However, he has never really bothered to show that historical 
criticism, although it is limited to a certain degree of truth, is never-
theless open to a higher sphere of intelligibility. Marcel admits the 
value of historical criticism only as a means of showing that. philosophy 
has t.o be ~JJ-_~£.?:, so t.hat only onc who has l)v_e..<:!. a philosophical pf'ol:lem can 
appreciate its significance to those who have lived it before him. He 
states f la Uy, 
L'hist.oire de la philosophie pr~suppose la philosophie, 
et non inversement. (9) 
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Gabriel Marcel is content to leave the area of historical appreciation to 
such writers as Henri Daniel-Raps and Etienne Gilson. 
The basic idea of the philosophy of Life as the Vital Principle is 
given by ~!arcel to be that the progress of I ife is considered not as a 
value but as a source of values or a basis of eva~uation.10 He is at once 
opposed to this outlook in which life is treated more as a generalized 
abstraction than as that which affects the individual in his personal 
entity. The danger as he points it out is that if a person prefers to 
believe in life as the pure present moment, he should soon be led to reject 
the notion of the creativity of being, that is of being f.j.S a continual pro-
cess of becoming. His only conclusion on this kind of philosophy is that 
by its nature it is destined to be ambiguous. i1 In his own view value and 
life are inseparable, especially when related in a spiritual context, and 
that life has value only when its value is witnessed through consecrat1on 
(the idea of service and, at its highest level 9 of sacrifice)~12 
Marcel insists that my life is not the same as my being : this distinct-
ion permits the possibility of salvation. Despite his misgivings about 
13 \Tari tain I s I! sixth way to God" ,Marcel t s OWn argument is very similar. ~iy 
life; he says, has been given to me so that, mysteriously, I am before I 
exist. Only thereafter do I live, do I exist. Given this distinction 
between being and life, once I begin to live, my_ being is at stake, for my 
b · . I f th' Id' I . f 14 Ad' - I . t e1ng 1S lence or- 1nvo ve 1n my 1 e. ceor l~g y, we can appreC1a e 
how Marcel explains the meaning of life with its attendant sense of anguish, 
as well as the meaning of evil and suffering. In terms of Marcel f s dia-
lectic, a person's life is a continual struggle: negatively, to ward off 
the inclination to despair at the apparent unintelligibility of existence 
and to hold on to something that has been entrusted to him; positively, to 
"create!! himself in the constant process of becoming so that his being is 
ul timately fulf illed. We may infer that. since what is entrusted is one t s 
being and since this world is a "val e of soul-making,,1 5 , the soul is 
in@ersed in being& There is an evident connection between Marcelts dis-
tinction between being and life 
ce qui ntexiste de plus profond en moi ntest pas de moi 
16 
and Saint Paul! s axiom, frequently quot.ed by Marcel, lIyou are not your own. 11 
(c) 
A salient feature of Marcel's own philosophy of life is his hostility 
to the lIclesacrali tendency of technology as a meO,ns of alienat man 
fpom God. By ied science or technology Marcel understands any branch 
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of learning which tends to guarantee to man the mastery of a definite ob-
ject so that it can be regarded as manipulation~ that is a way of handling 
or moulding a given mutter.17 Marcel hastens to assure us that he has no 
quarrel \Vi th applied science in itself provided it is kept in its proper 
place. To explain, he distinguishes two areas for examination by the 
human mind : the objective or "problematic" which is situated in the sphere 
of IIhaving ll and the "metaproblematic" which is situated in the sphere of 
1 t h · 18 IIbeing". The first is proper to science, the atter 0 metap YS1CS. 
~!arcell s wor-nings against excessive enthusiasm for the progress of man 
through his technological advances seem to be heavily influenced by his 
fear that man is too easily "won over ll to techniques. He implies that man 
has left himself defenceless against the enticements of a Ilheresy of tech-
nolatry". Without enlightening us on his own position, Marce! declares 
that sin, for example, is beyond the operations of science; salvation also 
is rendered meaningless in an intellectual climate dominated by the belief 
that it is the business of science to restore all that is accidentally up-
set in a natural order. 19 But, although he recognizes the validity of 
scientific achievement in its proper areas of competency, Marcel fails to 
sho\l' that, while man is homo faber9 man need not be a prisoner of his tech-
niques. It can be objected that man ccn invent his means and instruments 
to realize his spiritual aims. By working to improve his earthly situation, 
mEm C8n humanize his universe and, as Claudel says, make it better than it 
was even in God's eyes. 
Marcel appears to be obsessed with a need to rescue man from the snares 
of a divinized technology. In his view, man's oflly chance for salvation 
from the depersonalizing and dehumanizing tendencies of "technolat ry ll is 
conversion. As has been noted, this conversion is primarily an awareneES 
~ o~r ontological condition. 21 He insists, moreover, that this conversion, 
although not specifically religious in nature or orientation, implies grace 
and freedom. At once difficulties arise with the introduction of quasi-
theological notions. We must first consider his argument concerning the 
need to break away from t.he temptation to anthropocentrism which he claims 
is latent in the glorification of technology. 
Marcel proclaims that the grace implicit in "conversion" is accorded to 
us only if first we are disponible (available, willing to respond), by 
understanding that grace is analogous to the gift itself. If, therefore, 
we are prepared to give of ourselves, to open ourselves to illimitable 
credit (a pllcnomenological metaphor used by MBrcel to illustrate ontologic-
al d.ispo~ib_-iJJJ;~)9 in turn we shall receive the grace of conversion. But, 
he warns, this conversion still depends for its actualization on our will 
~. and therefore on our freedom .... rather than OH our reason. lle proceeds to 
argue that if we are truly open to others and cal'e for them in 10ve 9 fidel·-
ity and hope f this conversion will be facilitated by the awareness that con--
temporary mankind is being pervasively assimilated into a $cilematization of 
things. It is this urgent and insidious assimilation which l'IIarcel identif-
ies as the cause of spiritual destruction. Just as faith and other r'it-
un! realities have a proper Itintersubjective reference!! (as we shall see), 
so sin is understood by Marcel as basically the establishment of one1s 
centre in the self. We can only infer from hlarcel, in the light of the 
religious thinking which permeates his philosophy, that sin must be under-
stood in relation to God. One shuts oneself off against others, against 
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the "Universal" $ and against God. It is against this sin, so properly of 
one!s own lllak , that Marcel urges us to strive. 
An examinetion of Marcel!s proposition reveals a very definite circular-
ity of thought. Tllis deficiency in reasoning will be seen and noted when-
ever we meet his notion of the interpenetration of freedom, "availability" 
and grace. This notion will be considered more fully in the next chapter 
bllt it is useful to point out here the way in which ~larcel begs the quest~ 
ion. Briefly, his argument is as follows. By an initial di nibilit~5 
-"-~~....;.,,-,-~--
we open ourselves to the workings of grace which will direct our freedom to 
opt for an opening of self (through disponibil_l~e) to others, through inter-
subjectivity and fidelity, and to God through faith. It would seem~ then~ 
that the whole operation depends on an initial ibilite Gut one's 
indis lit& (the lack of a desired predisposition in favour of the other 
>.,_ •• ,----------
or of God) may not be completely voluntary. Furthermore~ not every person 
is an extrovert~ This is a possibility Yarcel has not considered and its 
lack reinforces the charge that he is an elitist. He does counter the ob-
jection (or rather he provides scope for a counter-objection) by assert 
that if the initial nibilit~ is lacking in oneEs nature, the insuffic-
iency will have to be supplied by a special grace. But then one's recog·· 
nHion and acceptance of such a "special" grace still depends on di_12,p,?~;!:,'. 
The difficulties involved in disentangling the skein of his argu-
ment are compounded by the lack of any satisfactory exposition by ~larcel of 
what he means by IIgrace". This lacuna in his dialectic will also be shown 
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up in the following chapter. 
ilL 
Sartre 
school as tzsche and 
The "final solution" to the problem of God is provided by Nietzs 
the deeth of God. In Thus e Zarathustra the Ugliest Yan who murdered 
God gives as his reason: !!He had to die.1! The U iest ~!an, who typifies 
that subconscious part of nature whicll is prone to sin, could not endure 
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the all-seeing eye of God probing into man's innermost depths, into his 
most hidden shame. 24 Marcel declares that the death of God meant much 
more for Nietzsche than it does for Sartre. For the former it heralds the 
assumption of tremendous responsibilities; for the latter it is merely a 
cause for triumphant exultation. Marcel observes that the Nietzschean 
affirmation is infinitely more tragic than Plutarch!s "The Great Pan is 
dead ll s since it states that we ourselves have killed God. 25 This awareness 
accounts for the sacred dread with which Nietzsche expresses himself. 
Whereas, in Sartrets proclamation to the journalists at Geneva in 1946, 
"Messieurs, Dieu est morU 11, the existential tone is absolutely diff erent ~ 
Marcel says~ precisely because the sacred dread has been replaced by a man 
"qui pretend etablir sa doctrine sur les ruines de quelq~e chose a quoi il 
n' a jarnais cru o ,,26 The God killed off by Nietzsche and Sartre is not that 
of the philosophers but the God of the Christian tradition. With good 
reason Marcel warns that the history of modern philosophy seems to supply 
abundant illustrations of the progressive replacement of atheism, in the 
grammatically privative sense of the word, by an anti-theism whose main-
spring is the will that God should not be. 27 
Marcells reaction to the situation created by Nietzsche and Sartre ~s 
to turn the tables on them. He suggests that when we see the misery of 
manEs own making in the world we may be inclined to murmur that it is not 
God who is dead but that man is in his death-throes. We should do well, 
Marcel recommends, to use that reflection as a starting~point to find that 
God is living yet, after all. Offering new hope to a disillusioned world, 
he declares : 
Si lIon peut dire que la mort de Dieu au sens nietzscheen 
a precede et rendu possible Ifagonie de It"homme Et laquelle 
nous assistons, il reste legitime en un certain sens 
d~affil'mer que c'est de ces cendres de Ifhomme que Dieu 
peut et doit res5usciter. (28) 
This reflection brings us to a consideration of Marce1 2 s prescription for 
the resuscitation of God in our lives. 
II. Towards the Rediscovery of God. God as Mysteryo 
In a world in which religious indifference would appear to be rife, 
Marcel affirms that it is necessary, to recall the significance in respect 
to our being of such essential notions a"~ sin~ grace and salvation. He 
fears that these may be too easily dismissed as !laId 'stuff!l or even as 
!l obsolet e!l.29 Bllt~ as has already been indicated~ his own treatment of 
grace is vague and circuitous and, as will be noted, his discussion of sin 
is minimal. 30 For a proper realization of the import of these notions~ he 
goes on to say, the renewal of the awareness of our being and its integrity 
should be paralleled by a renewal in the sphere of reI Just as onto-
logy is concerned wi th being9 religion concerns itself with the relation-
ships within the true ontological communion which is established in God. 
As far back as December 1930 when, only twenty mo~ths after his baptism into 
the Catholic Church, he delivered his address on contemporary irreligion, 
Gabriel Marcel proclaimed the need for such a renewal. It should be, how-
ever~ a renewal which does not mean so much demolishing the existing struc-
31 ture of religion as clearing away the rubble. Marcel expresses himself 
f01'cefully on the dangers of an institutionalized Church being corrupted 
and degraded by fanaticism or by the investment of temporal power. He went 
so far as to run the risk of shocking those of his co-religionists whop to 
him~ seemed COil1placent : he stated that he preferred a Church of the Left 
t . l' h . t b h 1 th' 1" . t 32 '0 one In W1IC 1 S mem ers e d elr re Iglon as a prlva e reserve. 
Today, among the number of those in clearing aWay the rubble 
surrounding the structure of religion are to be found certain theologians 
and philosophers whose zeal may impel to burrow so deeply as to undermine 
the very foundations of belief.33 Gabriel Marcel has avoided such excesses. 
He agrees, none the less, that religion should not degenerate into myth-
ology : 
Croire en un Dieu vivant, si ce ntest pas tomber dans 
la mythologie) ctest dire, non pas exclusivement, mais 
aussi secondairement que, par exemple, toute atteinte 
A la justice ou A la charit~ en la person~e de mon 
prochain est en m~me temps une atteinte ~ ce Dieu lui-
m~me~ ce qui suppose une relation tout It fait concrete, 
bien que tr~s myst~rieuse entre ce Dieu vivant et cette 
cnf8ture qutest mon semblable. Si ceel nfetait pas ad-
mis, cela quion pretendait gtre un Dieu vivant se re-
duirait du m8me coup ~ une idee n~cessalrement inalt~­
rabIe et contre laquelle je ne puis pecher. (34) 
On the other hand, for the same reasons that he is concerned with the harm-
ful effects on our relationships with ourselves, with others and with God, 
Marcel does not propose that demythologization should be carried to such 
extremes that religion finally loses its religious content. God should 
then be d to an abstraction of the worst kind since there is involved 
a degradation of the st and at the same time the most profound mystery 
of being, of our bejng. 
Marcel believes that the resurgence of the idea of God in the modern 
world will be enhanced by a true appreciation of what is meant by reIl 
Of fundamental importance is the rale of man!s personal and inviolable free-
dom. Faith, which is the mainspring of religion, is an existential value 
of the highest order and as such is to be chosen or rejected absolutely. 
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(a) Freedom. 
For Gabriel illarce1 9 freedom is not an end in itself : man is not free 
simply for the sake of being free. His freedom is in essence availability 
in favour of grace - a participation in being. 35 Man's freedom is orient .... 
ed towards a 11light" which ul timately is transcendental. Marcel establish..., 
es the connection between freedom and light in a long but illuminating 
passage 
La religion, disait Rilke 9 est "une direction de coeur". 
Cette definition est certes discutable, mais elle pre~ 
sente, du moins ~ mes yeux, le grand m~rite de mettre 
en lumi~re l'existence d'une aimantation spirituelle par 
l'aquelle 1 t etre se constitue et se revele a lui>-meme. Ce 
terme d!aimantation est diailleurs peu satisfaisant 9 
parce qlJ t il est emprunte a une domaine ou les forces se 
manifestent comme des contraintes o lci, il nten est pas, 
i1 ne peut pas en @tre de m~me; et d~ailleurs le terme 
de force convient aussi mal que possible la OU il stagit 
de traduire Itautorite qutexercent sur nous des valeurs 
non point choisies mais reconnues~ et quY i1 faudrait 
peut-8tre definir comme des ~vidences actives. Je pense, 
en derniere analyse, que nous sommes libres dans la 
, A ~ , • l' mesure ou nous sommes controles par ces eVldences- a p 
car ceS ~vidences sont comme les foyers ~ la fois 
proches et lointains ou il nous est donn~ de nous saisir 
et nous rassembler. Etre libre, ctest etre dans la 
lumi~re. dans cette lumi~re-l~. Rentrer dans l!ombre, 
c'est~a~dire dans le desarroi et dans l'incertitude, 
avec toute lYindetermination que celle-ci comporte, crest 
au cOlltraire reprendre le collier 9 crest s'enfoncer dans 
le. servitude. (6) 
Along with other contemporary thinkers who ma.y be classified as person-
alists and/or "existentialist", Marcel recognizes freedom as the chief 
characteristic of the human person. He differs in asserting that man t s un~" 
aided freedom of choice is ~ot sufficient of itself to achieve self-fulfil-
ment and ultimately tlsalvationtl which is to be taken as the immortal guaran-
tee of beingfs integrity. Marcel does not admit that freedom is synonymous 
with autonomy. He sees the claim of the self-sufficiency of the self-
enclosed consciousness (le moi) as antipathetic to communication, to commun-
ion, and to truly expansive commitment. For his justification he appeals 
to the reI evancy of human experience : the anonymous tlone 11 (1' on) or the 
"other" is not cl'eated as person without mutual response in commitment. 
(Too often, however~ it seems as if this response to the "presence" of the 
other is a participation of kindred spirits only.37) Along with the person-
alists Marcel agrees that this conunitment is directed to the task of estab-
lishing our personality. This task is done neither by the one nor by the 
other~ but by "us". This is what Mareel understands as the true intersuL··-
jective relationsltip9 the person·-to·"person relDtionship. It is through 
this intersubjective relationship that I become myself: I need the recog'-
nition of the other to maintain myself. hlorce1~ however, asserts that 
5i 
ity cannot be exhausted in anyone commitment. Personality parti-
c 
. 38 tes in Belng, 
Cle ~ in MarcePs terms, freedom is an oriented freedom. 39 It is 
oriented to others and~ ultimately, to God; it is founded in Being and 
oriented towards Being. Marcel is not just concerned with interpersonal 
relationships for the sake of the common goodli) but to show how we can 
t1become I1 persons by transcending the restricted cO,nf ines of egocentrism (la 
moi) in love for other persons and in the free acceptance of ~~~~~~--~~,~~~~---~-
a sonal relationship with God. And for this acceptance to be actualized, 
Marcel sees no option but to postulate a grace which can only come from God. 
This awareness s he reasons, will surely come to one who is Itopenlt to such 
influences, who is permeable to the "lighttl in that he is, prepared to be en .... 
lightened. This is the force of his declara Lion, cited above, etre libre, 
~i.:iliL~daJ~~iere. Marcel is yet consistent with his whole meta"" 
physics of bdng whose impulse is creativity. To be truly free is what he 
meeflS when he says that freedom involves our recognition of a measure of 
dependence on God e We are still free to reject this notion of dependence, 
we are still free to claim autonomy. But this is not authentic freedom in 
that it is not constitutive of the full development and realization (in the 
t ' f th d) f lOt 40 erea lve sense 0 e wor 0 our persona 1 y. 
The rCile of freedom in religion, then, is to ensure that we actively 
recognize our dependence on God'"'" once we have made our choice. It can also 
be seen that, coupled with freedom is grace which enlightens the recognition 
of our status as creature, and that we share in bein,g which is creative. 
Closely associated with freedom and, as it were, flowing from it is the 
tingll is, after all, the achieve-
ment of freedom. At once we come back upon the central notion that creat-
ivity is the quintessential characteristic of Being. 
(b) Creativi 
Religion, Marcel asserts, only for the person who surrenders himself 
to it~ when considerations on faith pass over into faith. 4i Religion, like 
faith, is not an abstraction. liOn ne peut croire clans l~abstraitll~ Clarisse 
protests in le lion ne peut croire dans le vide. tl42 
Religion is life; it is concerned with life and living. There is a vital 
need ~. if it is to remain true to its miss ion.,.. to concern itself with 
people. 43 1I0wever$ Tllarccl stre ses that Chrisbanity lIlu:o;t be more them 
socially-conscious; as a relig.ion its purpose y by definition~ is primarily 
to lead people to God. According to Marcel, there arc too many Christians 
who are too deeply absor'bed in the purely social (or s,ociological) 
of Christianity. They run the risk of losing sight of what he cnlls lithe 
light of the beyond lt • He notes v 
What Berdyaev said about Communism can also be applied 
to spirit ism : it actually developed because of the 
severe lack of genuine Christian thinking. (44) 
To those who would consider that the Church does~ or should, concern itself 
with social programmes, Marcel has this to say: 
Je crois que ceux qui avec une entiere candeur estiment 
que le christianisme doit etre dfabord et avant tout 
social, que c1est avant tout une doctrine'd'entraide, 
une sorte de philantropie, sublim~e. commettent une grave 
et dangereuse erreur. lci encore le mot vie se revele 
tout charge d'ambigu'ite. Dire IIpeu impo e ce que vous 
pensez, du moment que vous vivez chretiennement lt , ctest, 
je pense, se rendre coupable de la pire offense envers 
celui qui a dit "je suis la Voie, la Verite, et la Vie. 1I (45) 
The implication is that the basic concern of religion is God; it is the 
reco tion of dependence on God who is Life. One cannot live a Christian 
life without thellassistance ll of Christ, without taking account of God. 
While it is true that Marcelts philosophy is one of active participation 
and tru tful intersubjectivity, these elements flow as the practical and 
cl'eaUve consequences of the initial activity of belief. Marcel establish-
es his o~n priority of values in his investigations and through his own 
experience. As I see it, Marcel asserts that personal relationships 
are possible only in terms of the recognition of the Absolute Thou 
as the base of all relationships. It is in this sense that religion is 
truly creative. For Marcel, man creates himself inasmuch that what he 
becomes on his choices, on his use of freedom. But also, man is a 
self-transcending subject in the sense that he en~ers not only the sphere 
of personal communication with others but through them can be led back to 
God; he can also affirm his relationship with the Transcendent, with God. 
iie 
Long before his conversion to Catholicist Marcel had decided that lack 
of t.he reI consciousness of man as creature made in the image of his 
Creator was the fundamental cause of a depersonalization of man in an ever-
increa ingly functionalized world. When he was still a student, Marcel1s 
em:uiries were 1 him away from an impersonal and immanent idealism 
to the re co tion of the personal and the transcendental. 46 In the twenty 
years prior to his conversion (the period he calls his peri-christian zone), 
he gradually became aware, in his own mind; of the role of the Christian 
tradition as the f;ourcc of a lIfertiliziIlg principle" for certain lines of 
thought. 1r7 Christianity, he declares, does not necessarily supply the 
philosophical ideas; but it eel'tainly helps make them morc intelligible. 
This realization explains his reply to the objection that his own philo-
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sophical ideas are only an unformulated reference to the data of Christian-
ity and as such of little value as a philosophy for those who do not accept 
Christianity. 
11 est tres possible que 1 t existence des donnees 
chr~tiennes fondamentales soit requise en fait pour 
permettre a l~esprit de concevoir certaines des 
no bons dont j t ai esquisse 1 r analyse : on ne peut 
s{lrement pas dire que ces notions soient sous la 
d~pendance de la r~v61ation chrftienne, elles ne 
la supposen_t pas. (4·8) 
As it happened, Marcel himself experienced considerable difficulty in 
coping with the dogmatic (Thomist) approach to the discovery of God, espec-
ially since it was at this very time (immediately after his baptism) that 
he was formulating his distinction between existence and objectivity.49 He 
concluded that~ as far as he is concerned, we cannot argue to the existence 
of God. That exercise is to make of God an object of thought, a concept. 
He assures us that he remains convinced that God does not will that he 
should be adored as some sort of idol~ which is as bad as an abstraction~O 
He had already. years before his conversion, studied the possibilities of 
faith in an unverifiable God and had reached the conclusion that, in effect9 
religion concerns not an absent God of whom we have some information 
(whether by argument or revelation), but a God whose living presence can be 
perceived only faith. 51 Undaunted, therefore, by his innate antipathy for 
doctrinal codification, Marcel reverted to his own method which is pheno-
menological in principle, is based on experience, and personalist in 
52 
epistemology. 
iiL Ma1'cel! s method. Preliminary investigations into the nature of 
~~~~.~~~~~--~--~-~ 
Thollght 
Ao Primary and secondsry reflection: the "existential fulcrum". 53 
As a necessary preliminary to an investigation into the quest.ion of 
God, Gabriel hlarcel postulates a distinction within the very notion of 
thought itself. His initial premiss is that. it is a self-evident truth 
54 that philosophic thought is by nature and definition reflective. Accord-
ing to l\!arcel, there is a need, with the increasing encroachment of science 
into certain preserves of philosophy, to observe a differentiation between 
two levels of reflection, not contrary to each other but complementary in 
that each is apprOIJriate in its proper field,55 In arriving at his divis-
ion of reflection ac; "primary" and "secondary", Marcel adapted BCI'gsonts 
earlier distinct ion between "open" and Ilclocicd", identif ied by Blondel as 
pense~l?Ensee (for primary and closed) and l~'::.!ls{~ .. _JJ.~~l'::i.~:!:~.!.~ (for secondary 
and open). lIIarcel further differentiates between "thinking" (pcE.:~~r) and 
56 tlthinking of" ( ens er h). 
The first level of reflection is straight thinking (pens~e pensee) 
which bears on essences only.57 This reflection, which is proper for the 
analytical sciences, br about a separation between the thinking subject 
and the object of his thought. While Marcel concedes that this level of 
thinking is legitimate in the field of the natural and physical sciences, 
he insists that it is quite inapplicable in the realm of metaphysics. 
Because of the very nature of being, the unity of individual beings in them-
selves and with others cannot be dismembered but must be preserved inviol-
ate, I cannot separate the "1" of the 111 amlt; existence cannot be predic-
ated, The personal communion which makes me what I am would otherwise be 
severed in favour of a Cartesian dualism of body and soul. Marcel argues 
that if this indissolubility applies to mer so much the more does it apply 
to God, and 1:0 my relations with God. Praying, he reasons, is the only way 
real y to think .of God. To this statement it may be countered that by pray-
I must be addressing myself to God; this means that I must be setting 
him from me. What Marcel seems to be stressing is tha t I should 
accept God and in my prayer to him I should not concentrate on itemizing 
his attributes. Any attempt to place God apart in order to subject him to 
scrutiny is to destroy the mysterious quality of my relationship to God. 
The conclusion which Marcel urges us to reach is that primary reflection 
cannot operate in spheres relating to the self and to God. Primary reflection 
is not the vehicle of metaphysics. 
Me ics, for Marcel, is concerned not with problems but with myster-
ies Q The primary concern of metaphysical enquiry, on the human level, is 
the ol1tolo status of the person moet intimately involved: myself. This 
status, Marcel believes, can be defined only in terms of my relationsh 
with God in the fellowship'of being (the ontological communion) in which 
I and all other beings participate. This is the level on which secondary 
reflection is exercised. 
Marcel asserts that secondary reflection meets the need of a recovery of 
-9 
the original unity from which the initial, dispersing reflection departed) 
by reflect 
decline to ac 
upon that first reflection whose objective conclusions we 
as definitive. Reflection is thereby elevated to a higher 
register, it i a reflection "a la deuxieme puissance". This inverse, re-
cuperative movement is oriented towards be 
---'" 
so that the unity of partici-
pation and experience is grasped in ilIa lllorsure du el!! and restored in 
GO the concrete beyond the disjointed determination of abstract thought. 
This reconstructive reflection lIgrafted onl! a critical (primalY) reflection 
is recuperative only through a recipi'ocal intuition which, on account of 
its being latent in our consciousness, Marcel eaU a "blindfold lf (av-ell ee) 
intuition of our ol1tolo cal condition. It would appear, then, that ;-;econd--· 
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ary reflection can be pursued only on condition of mants awareness of the 
ontological need. If we "sense" that there must be being (this must be the 
meaning of this latent, aveugl~e, intuition), we have already realized that 
there is a need for being, 
Although ~larce 1 affirms that secondary ref lection is intuitive, so that 
thought can be fruitful only when prolonged into reflection, Marcel general-
ly distrusts philosophical doctrines which claim to be based on intuition 
alone. What is in question here is not so much an intuition as a calm yet 
f inn assurance 
A 61 qui se confond avec ce que nous appelons notre ame. 
This assurance is acquired not so much by introversion as by conversion, by 
which, in this context, Marcel means the movement towards the light, the 
1 · It f t th d " f" 1 1" t d '" L" ht Whl"ch l"S Tru~h.62 19l 0 ru an, ln lna ana YS1S, owar s ~l~ 19 ~ 
This secondary reflection is indeed re-collection and at the same time 
recollection (as used in the spiritual sense) insofar as it is capable of 
thinking about itself. 63 "Secondal'y reflection" and IIrecollectionll are 
terms used synonymously by Marcel; recollection is not to be understood as a 
passive state conducive to reflection but the activity itself. 
Thus we can see how Marcells ontology is easily transformed into natural 
theology. The reflective process of recovery is more properly "syneidetic ll , 
encompassing the totality of being. The affirmant is enlightened because 
his recollection has been transcended so as to encompass the totality of 
b . 64 elng. For Marcel. recollection is indispensible : it is by re-collecting 
our thoughts that ontological reflection is made possible as a natural pro-
gression. It may be not what is most spectacular" in the soul, he says, for 
il ne consiste pas a regarder quelque chose, il est 
une reprise, une r~flection int~rieure, (65) 
but he himself is convinced of its value : 
Je suis convaincu pour ma part quliJ. nly a pas 
dlontologie possible, clest~a-dire dlapprehension du 
mys tere ontologique, a quelque degre que ce soi t, 
que pour un etre capable de se recueillir. (66) 
Its spiritual value and importance are no less. Nearly twenty years after 
aff inning, 
il semble que le salut ne puisse resider que dans 
la contemplation. Je ne crois pas que ceci puisse 
@tre depasse, (67) 
he was as firmly sure 
JI en demcure intinlclIlent convaincu, et Cl est] e sens 
de tout ce que j' ai {cri t prcs de cinqunnte ans : 
la r6flexion est notre seul recours. (68) 
It is clear from t.his sample of stat.emcnts that Alarcel lS consistent in this 
matter of the worth and efficacity of secondary rcflection as I'ecollecUon. 
All the while, of course~ he insists on the necessit.y and primacy of per~oOll'" 
al freedom in this wholly exist.ential exercise. That we choose "correctly" 
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is a consequence of grace welcomed by a soul who is I1disponible". Speaking 
of the recuperative power of secondary reflection, Marcel reminds us : 
Il faut ajouter que cet te vertu propre a la ref lexion 
t " . f t '" /d' t· ne peu guere se manl es er que grace a me la lon 
d'autrui. Mais cette m€diation est essentiellement 
spirituelle; elle est offerte, ou elle se propose ~ 
nous, mais nous avons toujours ~ la reconna!tre et ~ 
l'accueillir, il nous reste toujours possible de la 
refuser. (69) 
The act of recollecting oneself is both a grasp of the self (prise de 
soi) and a relaxation of tension detente lien presence de - 11.70 One can 
only infer from all that he has to say on the matter that Mercel implies 
11 in the presence of God". It is characteristic of him that the sentence 
is unfinished~ but it is to God that his ontology leads, even if Marcel is 
not prepared to supply the name. For Gabriel Marcel, it must be remembered, 
"Being" is more an act than a state; the word is to be understood in its 
verbal sense. He is, therefore, reluctant to give a positive identificat-
ion of Being and God for it is normal to think of God in a substantival 
sense, Marcel considers that to name God is in some way to restrict him, 
to "objectifyll him in the same way as the traditional proofs. 71 
Marcel speaks of recollection illement rather than "prayer". 
The latter term, he thinks, has, in a purely philosophical context, ambigu-
ous overtones uncongenial to many who are "right-minded" without being con-
fessed adherents of any reI n or denomination. 72 Recollection is poss-
ible, he claims, to anyone who has freed himself of the ontologically 
deadening influence of a world given over to functionalization, a world 
which seems, to Marcel, to be founded on a refusal to reflect. 7) Imitating 
the detachment of the saint (not the uninterested isolation of the spect-
ator) such a man can and m\1st withdraw in silence into the depths of the 
inner self in order to gain a better awareness of his condition as partici-
patiOD in be ,as participation in Being. 
In la s Melanie, who is not religiously inclined, takes ~~~~~~-~---~~ 
pity on the Hungarian, Sandor, who is suffering from both his 
shabby surround and the workings of his conscience. She advises him 
Comme tu souffres! Laisse-moi te tenir la main. Et 
restons quelques minutes sans parler. Jlai remarque, 
e i Iton ne prie pas, on est autrement lorsqufon 
a fait le silence en soio (74) 
Silence is as conducive to prayer or to contemplation as it is to philo-
sophical reflection or to music. It is in contemplation, Marccl affirlns~ 
. 7'5 that the soul can ,;trengthen its grIp on the real' which, for it, is the 
realization that its true destiny is to be reunited in communion with God. 
Despite his reluctance to use religious or theo cal vocabulary, 
'-'6 Marcel cannot avoid such terms as soul, grace, charity, faith and hope.' 
It may be that this reluctance on his part derives from his fear of being 
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dismissed by "professional" philosophers as being as theological as the 
neo-Thomists. However, he does suggest that there should be a "secret con-
vergence" of philosophy and theology, stipUlating at the same time that the 
instrument is different in each case. For religion the instrument is faith, 
for philosophy it is reflection o 77 Indeed, reflection assumes quasi ... 
theological dimensions in the framework of Marcel's metaphysics since it is 
essential for any approach to the ontological mys.tery inasmuch as reflection 
regains contact with Being. 78 
B, Problem and Mystery. 
The next stage in the propaedeutics of Being is the classical Marcellian 
distinction between problem and mystery. His postulation of the notion of 
mystery is the crystallization of his earlier thoughts on the notion of the 
"unverif iable". 
In ~larcells terms, a p~ belongs to the order of objectivity. It 
consists of certain facts presented in disorder which, when I have sorted 
it out~ fall into an orderliness capable of satisfying the requirements of 
thought and thereby are open to solution. 79 The problematic process of 
enquiry is legitimate in such fields of pragmatic investigation as the 
sciences, and even in certain areas affecting man~ e.g. medicine. But, 
generally, any claim to validity for treating of the "problem" of man - and 
more so of God - is a transgression into the domain of philosophical know-
ledge. Then the problematic process pretends, through its tendency to 
c3tegor ize, to equate all values with techniques and, by reducing all 
matters pertinent to man's being to the level of objective problems, it in-
volves a depersonalization of man, Marcel implies that man would then be 
'1 ' lIt Id b' , 80 derlled a sou, so that his fu 1 ontologics sta us shou e ImpaIred. 
This full ontological status is a sharing in being, and ultimately, as 
creative creature~ it is a participation in the Being (Creativity) of God. 
If there is a danger in treating man as a soluble problem, there will 
be the risk of treating God, in a similar anthropomorphic manner, as a 
problem. A constant danger is the temptation to baulk at proceeding to 
secondary l"eflection, which is of the order of the "metaproblematic" (mys~ 
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tery), and so to degrade mysteries by converting them into problems. All 
the great existential realities, in Marcel1s view, by virtue of their in-
separable intimacy with the enquiring subject, are mysteries and not prob-
lems; they admit of no reudY-'fllOde ~;olutions" Given M,[rcelYs interprc~tClt,·, 
ion of metaphysical t1,ought as reflection tr'aincd on rnystcrY9 there Cei!1 be 
!lO progl"eSS (in the ~;cnsc Undel"stood by t.he c.linical analysts) in this SOl't 
82 
of thinking; there i,3 pr'ogl'ess only in problematic thought. Secondary 
reflection does not aim at producing results but is more an explorator'y 
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line of fhought into those questions in which the questioner is so closely 
and intimately involved that he cannot set himself apart for an objective 
study. In Marcel1s view, the primary metaphysical and ontological question, 
"What am I?". is the example par excellence of the need to pass on to a 
higher level of reflection, to pass from the problematic to the metaprob-
lematic, We may, therefore, trace an anterior hierarchy from questions 
about our own being and being in general to Being in particular. This I 
intend to explore through Marcel's dialectic. 
Un mystere c1est 
donnees, qui les 
simple probl~me. 
un probleme qui empi'ete sur ses propres 
envahit et se d~passe par lh comme 
(83 ) 
Such is Marcel's classic description of myst~ry. Fundamental in the 
realm of existence is the problem of being. But because of the inseparable 
and indivisible nature of its component elements and the status of the 
person involved, being is the example par excellence of the metaphysical 
mystery, Being is, therefore, not a problem at all but a mystery. In the 
question "What am I?" both subject and object interpenetrate in such a way 
that an objeetified judgment is impossible. 8ft- Mystery, Marcel explains, 
is something in which I am caught up, in which I am engage85 , not partially 
but entirely. I cannot dissociate myself from it and adopt the role of an 
outsider, a spectator; I am totally immersed in it. Only something which 
af feet s 
qualify 
The 
my own being so closely as to be bound up inseparably with it can 
86 
as mystery. 
absolute mystery is God himself. 87 It is, according to Marcel's 
dialectic, incorrect to speak of the "problem" of God. Once we consider 
the question of God we find that no objective criteria can be applied to 
him. In the question of God we soon realize that all the data encroaches 
upon itself, inevitably a~d irresistibly. This is the reasoning behind 
Marcel's objections to the "proofs" for God's existence, as will be given 
in the next chapter. God's "existence" cloes not admit of intellectual 
"proof"; any attempt at such a proof remains pl"oblematic, on the level of 
primary reflection. Because we participate in being which has its source 
in God, we have to acknowledge, without adopting pantheism, by the use of 
secondary reflection, that our own being (rather than existence) is intim-
ately bound up with Godts. As Owen says, "Hunan persons are only partially 
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mysterious; God is wholly so," Marcel himseJf Soys as much 
J'avais ecrit, il y a bien longtemps : ql13nd nous parlons 
de Dieu, cc u' e~;t P(]~; de Dieu que non,::,. parlon~;, et cette 
phrase gDl'cie pour fIloj 0;011 po.id:-; exic;ic~nLiel. le suis de 
plus en p.tu~; cOllvaincu que si pur-ler ,che Dieu vcut dire le 
definiJ.", en enUI\iel"er les attribllh;,fLc", on e~;t conduit 
a. elaborer une theo 1 ogie qui se r'cccH,'c<;ctncle [! coup sur 
d'ancetres venerClbles, mais qui ne jN,ut qu!elrc cn conlrw" 
diction avec nos exigences le~; plus imlH'cscr.Lptilllcs. (89) 
59 
Ill. The ReI ious Element in Marcel's Ontology. 
i. 
Cri tics of Tllarcel! s terminology also charge him wi th failing to dis-
tinguish adequately between philosophy and theology. At least Marcel is not 
guilty of flooding the philosophical market with neologisms to the extent of 
Sartre or Heidegger.; His principal contribut.ion in this matter is the term 
disponlbilite. Hather Marcel is criticised for the connotations - religious; 
mystical or subjective - with which he invests certain terms already accept~ 
ed in their I!traditional" The difficulty lies in the need for 
thinkers to use the "current. coin of intellectual exchange,,90 if they are to 
be. intelligible to their contemporaries. Marcel's own difficulty .LS to give 
fresh significance to such terms as "mystery", the "Absolute ll (as in tlthe 
Absolute Thou ll ) and, with it, the "Transcendentn. 91 
(a) "i\iysteryll. 
Given the fact that I exist, not every question which affects me intim·-
ately need be Ilmysteriousll92, if by that is meant Itincomprehensible". Of 
course, we may concede that whenever we come into contact with the infinite, 
we are in the realm of the mysterious. For, as Marcel interprets metaphys-
ics, God is the infinite mystery of me ics. But God's infinity cannot 
be considered identical with the mathematical 0,0 ; the infinity of math-
ematics can only be analogous to the divine infinity. Now, if "mystery" is 
not to be taken in a rational sense, nor as secret, a pseudo-problem, the 
agnosticls and the idealist's Uunknowableu93, we are left with the early 
connotation of flUC1'r~pL.OV not only as a ious secret but as a sacra-
ment. If this is Marcel's' acceptation of the word, it could be stated that 
the all-embracing mystery of being is conferred upon us in a sacramental 
fashion. Does this mean that, despite his confessed avoidance of theology, 
Marcel is in fact transgressing his own self-i~posed limits and delving at 
least into a quasi-theology? 
His is not very satisfactory and at best illustrates his penchant 
for evasion, Alarcd asserts that there is no question of confusing those 
myst er'i that are developed in human experience as such with those myster-
ie which are revealed (e.g. the Incarnation or the Redemption) and to 
which no effort of thought bearing on experience can enable us to attain. 
From his own st.andpoint, t.he distinction between t.he nat.ural [rnd the super·-
t I t t ' J ',' d 94 I I 't t. tl ne, ura mu~;· je l'lgorcIUs.y InQllltaH\C-, It wou ( seem t Ifl lere are 
natural mysteries and supernatunll mysteries. Doe t.hi mean that t.he 
I'natural mysteries l! belong t.o a natural theology and the "supernaturnl mys--
ter.ie I! belong t.o a "professional" (i, (,,, classi ) theology? If so, hi 
use of the t.erm "lIIystery\! is quite reconcilable with t.he re] i conno" 
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tation of IJUCf't"11P t.ov 9'-as a sacrament. ) As I interpret Marcel's use 
of the term, its relevance is shown in his plea for a recognition of the 
Ilsacrall' character of life. But at the same time, because it appears to 
belong to a natural.theology, his use of the term reinforces~ and seems to 
confirm, the claims that he is not wholly neutral and that he allows a 
strong rei igious bias to inf luence his philosophy. At best Marcel! s 
IImystery" may be described as metempiri 
the agnostic' s "Unknowable". But filarc 
and this would be very close to 
vehemently repudiates any charge 
of agnosticism. Despite his reluctance, so curiously inconsistent in a 
philosopher who insists on commitment, jlarcel must be classed as a 
thinker. 
(b) ':"~~£lute" and lITranscendent". 
Marcel has been criticized for his identification of God as Absolute 
(Transcender,t) Thou. Both Sweeney and Verneaux. for example, take issue 
with him on the use of these terms. For Sweeney. the phrase is contradict-
ory since a "thou" is one understood in relation to another, which would 
disc[ualify the predication of "absolute".96 For Verneaux, the def inite 
article in lithe Absolute Thou" reveals a measure of objectification and the 
only possible subjective relationship could be situated in the personal 
invocation of the Absolute Thou as Recourse. 97 Once again, the difficulty 
arises f['om the choice and range of language available. Certainly, if one 
is to propose any dialectic, there must be some measure of systematization. 
If we are to speak of the Transcendent we cannot av~id "objectifying" it I 
no mattel~ how much we may insist on its unique, unverifiable nature. 
These are, when all is said and done, not very serious criticisms of 
:',larcel f s stubbornness. This issues from his avowed crusade against the 
spirit of object In his determination to avoid the pitfalls of 
abstractioni and rsonalism, Marcel does appear to exaggerate their 
snares. He J'escues himself from the opposite danger of subjectivism by 
clevat hi adherence to personal and immediate experience to the level 
of intersubjectivity. From this level he feels he can authentically philo-
sophize. The in this, however, is that his intersubjeetive experi-
enees may be dictated by COlllinon emotions so that they are transmitted in 
terms tantamount to a subjectivist attitude. Mareel does express uneasi-
ness over the term "Absolute Thou". There must be, he urges, no question 
of enclosing God within the cil~cle of his I'elations with the individual; 
God cannot be a sort of ideal limit to which All love tends. 99 Mnrcel!s 
solution to this dilen@Q is to postulate 8 distinction between existence 
and objecUvHy so that existence cannot be treated ns a 9!:.!!.1O~..:?J:E~lD51u!~1. 
The question of existence, he adds not altogether hcipfully, cannot be 
, bIt <"'·ld for 811. 100 gIven an a so u e answer once u 
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ii. Marce~!s use of negative theology 
Negative theology is recognized as a preparatory aspect of a natural 
101 theology. Verneaux charges that Marcel tends towards a negative theo-
logy with the result that there is nothing positive about his approach to 
God. Mercel himself gives some thought to the matter of his reliance on 
negative theology without, however~ providing any really satisfactory re-
bu UaI. 
He recognizes that his famous phrase, "Quand nous parlons de Dieu, ce 
nlest pas de Dieu que nous parlons", could be construed as negative theo-
logy even if he points out that what. he is trying to emphasize is that God 
cannot be treated as an object. His aim, he pleads, had been to show that 
it was possible to believe in the reality of God while ye~ refusing him 
existence, One can deny God's existence but not his reality; this, Marcel 
argues, reveals the apparent contradiction of a real but non-existent Go~?2 
He goes on to say that this position can be clarified by the idea of 
attestation, but his explanatory example is not really relevant to the 
matter and as 5uch lacks the appeal of validity, From his own experieGce, 
Marcel assures us, he could believe in the faith of others while as yet he 
did not admit sharing their faith. That is all very well, but it does not 
follow - as he claims - that their example points to Godts reality. One 
can believe in another's "faith" that the world is flat or at the centre of 
the planetary system, but it does not follow that the earth is so designed 
or situated, 
The vocation of the existentialist philosopher, Marcel suggest.s, is to 
b . , t 1 ' t' 1 t b' 1 03 . Ch" I . 1 h ear WItness 0 va ue ana cer aln y 0 elng. For rlstlan pll osop y 
the God who is witnessed is not the god of the philosophers but the God 
whose characteristic is hol.iness : he is the Deus Sanctus. 104 This latter 
statement, heavily larded with religious feeling, brings Marcel back to the 
original question~ which is a consideration of whether his natural theology 
is negative, His attempted reply is evasive: 
C' est. une question de savoir si cette affirmation 
ressortit encore ou non a la theologie negative, 
C' e"t la un point sur lec,uel je ne me prononcerai 
pas de fa90n categorique. Je dirai du reste quia 
mes yeux, c1est. avant tout un probl~me de definit.ion. (105) 
As an aid in this enquiry, he stresses that true existentialist. philosophy 
should be founded on dialogue, and that our relations with others should 
106 be on the level of the "second personll. According to Marcel, it is 
through this personal.i~)t epj~;temology, which is pOCiiUve and not negative). 
that we may approach the recovery of God, This propo:c::ition leads \I~; to t.he 
next chapter in which Mar-celts whole dialectic is aligned with t.his diulog .. · 
iCed appr02ch to tlIe ~lystel'y of' Being, and in which we shall see ho\\' this 
sume approach leads, in his view, to a more cOIT,plete aWCll'eneSS of tlIe 
tlyst ery of God. 
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Conclusion. 
It is precisely because his philosophy is an approach to the Mystery of 
Being that Marcel leaves himself to the criticism that his metaphysics is 
at best a propaedeutics of the Ontological Mystery. He appears reluctant 
to formulate concepts and to establish a definitive "summa ontologiae". 
Even at the end of his investigations into the meaning of the Mystery of 
Being, which he promises at the outset of his Gifford Lectures~ Marcel still 
evades a positive definition of Being. In one sense, the Mystery of Being 
remains a mystery. It is presumably because of the incomplete nature of his 
work that he has not rated a mention in some studies of contemporary philo-
sophy - even of the existentialist school107 - or at most only a brief 
chapt er. 
Through his fundamental distinctions between having and being, primary 
anC: secondary l'ef lection, problem and mystery ~ he has undoubtedly done much 
to pav~-.Jlle _~ay for a more elaborately expounded presentation of metaphys-
ics considered as the philosophical study of beings as they are in them-
selves and in their concrete totality. Marcel is like John the Baptist : 
the precursor rather than the teacher of precepts. His philosophy is not a 
set of expol'.nded concepts, it is more a ~~ctlon on being and existence. 
He indicates areas for further enquiry or just meditation without always 
p~rsuing his first line of thought. Perhaps this is what he means by his 
"heuristic" or llmaieutic" method; he sees himself more as a philosophical 
lllid~wife than as a !lfather of a philosophical school". As Etienne Gilson 
ren'arks : t,larcel's philosophy seems to tend spontaneously towards a meta-· 
I . f tl t f . t· . th t t t :. . t 108 P1YS1CS 0 . le ac 0 eX1s 1ng W1 OU ever a B1n1ng 1-. 
Marcel himself recognizes and accepts this criticism. Yet while he en-
vies those who may have wrJtten the book he had originally proposed or who 
have formulated in a more systematic manner certain aspects of his own 
. 109 1deas 1 he defends himself by asserting that the true philosopher lives 
in a state of continual intellectual creativity since his thought is being 
110 
called in question frorr: one moment to the next. The philosopher, after 
all, is a lover of wisdom; he should not claim to possess wisdom. 
On nlest pas sage, on tend ~ le devenir. (111 ) 
Like any mG.n~ the philo::.opher is also homo vi_~.~or; he is always on the move 
towards that ultimate enlightenment which apparently CBn be found only in 
the "other kingdom". Perhaps, Marcel suggests, there is a basic misunder-
standing at the core of his COlJ1l1lcntators [ cri tici~;m, a lIli sllndcn;tanding 
which is to be found as much in hiJll~;eJr as in them. In the CQurse of a 
le c ture given in 1938 he sp eak~; of hi s commcnta tors 
crest curieux, leur mani'erc de me cOll1pI'endre; ce n l e~d: 
pas du tout de la sorte que JC me COll1prCI1CJJS rnoi""meme. 
And he concedes wryly, 
Apre!':~ tout, crest peut-ctrc bien eux qui ont raison. (112) 
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FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 
i 0 filE II 17 
2. ~lar(;el declares that the anthropomorphic god of superhuman qualit 
ies; at the centre of the "god for good people!! of the de s ,is an 
inheritance of the "Copernican revolution" in philosophy which sets up 
El new anthropocentric theory, but which differs from the original in 
that it no longer considers man as a being but rather as a complex of 
epistemological functions (EA 11 12). G. Gusd~rf, in My the et m6ta-
J!,I;x.0:.s~ (Por'is, 1923), ,speaks of "the rationalistic evaporation 
of God il v We may say that l'I1arx, Engels and Feuerbach brought about the 
diEsipation of a rationalistic God. As shall be seen later in the text 
and again in Chapter 4, Marcel says much the Same of the God disposed 
of by Sartre. The lead ish representative of the latter-day 
ag'nostics was Herbed , to whom Marcel alludes (EA I 75). In 
r\Iarcel ' s view Spencer's closest French counterpart is Julien Benda. 
Bendals infinite God, Marcel concludes, is neither perfect nor imper-
fect, and his indeterminate Be is somewhat similar to Spencerls 
Unknowsble (EA I 78-85). Marcel provides as the "fundamental differ-
ence!! between theism and deism: lIWhereas deism does not rise above 
the idea of a certain moral entity, of a supreme and all-wise Being 
who in a general way controls the dest.iny of the universe~ theism 
asserts the existence of a personal God - I shall even say of a living 
God. with whom a concrete able to get into touch." ("Theism and 
Per'sonal Relations ll in s, 1950~ p. 35). 
3 • HP 26. c f. HCH i 95. 
4, EA II i 2. 
5. If the level of knowledge reached in former times is comparatively 
childish. ~arcel suggests that we may well ask if childhood does not 
have its own values to be prized - for example. trustfulness and cand-
our (EA II 14). In the connection of "mod.ern enlightenment" and 
"changing morality", it is to be noted that ~larcel gave his comments 
on what he saw as "Contemporary II'religion ti thirty years before the 
revival of interest in Whit.ehead t s Ilproce losophyl! $ taken up, 
explicitly, by Ct~arles Hartshorne and, implicitly, by Leslie Dcwart. 
We cen safely assume 9 from the tenor of his comments on irreligion and 
from his indebtedness to the Fathers of the Cturch, that Marcel is as 
oppo8ed t.o any process-philosophy or process-theology. 
6, EA 11 12 (his lecture, flRemarques sur I' igion contemporaine ll , 
was delivered. 4 December 1930, to the F6de'ration des Associat.ions 
d'Etucliants chre'tiens). cf. RPR 43. It should be borne in mind that 
in any age there are to be found in juxtaposition opposing trends and 
doctrines. The difference between two contemporaries may be greater 
than the di.fference between two men separated more distantly in time. 
In his conception of the Absolute Mind or el is closer to 
Aristotle (EA II 16) than he is to Kierkegaard. I lilarcel is far 
closer to S iut Augustine than he is to Jean-Paul Sartre. The term 
Ilman of the twentieth (or any) century" is amI: iguous. There is no 
really universal l1 mo dern H man. (Sartre declares flatly that there is 
no such th as human nature, anyway.) Human nature does not change, 
even if a per'ioc of Ume Illay be dominated by some par·ticular outloo!u. 
7, cL E.I\ II 2]. Scc CLapiel~ '1, p. '19 and Conchl ion? pp. 206·-2.09. 
The hj c,torical eJen;(~nt. has always inf lut-need German thought since 
tile beginning of t.he last centul'Y~ and can be seen operat in t.he 
philosophicDl approt:;.ches of llegel and Dil the::iv 
9. EPe 99. 
10. EA 11 36. 
11. EA II 39. He explains that a generalized translation of biolo cal 
properties may be useful within the domain of those sciences related to 
the of human and animal behaviour, but it loses its experimental 
status and cannot claim to give an otjective analysis of life once life 
i recognized as a spiritual force rather than as a phenomenal process. 
12. e.g. propre de la valeur est en effet d'assumer une certaine 
fOLction par rapport a la vie, et corrme de Iui apposer son sceauo (HV 
1 i cf, PI 1 ,124, RP 4~--45) ; "Je pense que l'ictee chretienne de 
la valeur inf inie des ames est au fond la simple negation de la cro,Y-
ance i't un pcix des etres tl (Jnl 286; cf. HCR ~;22, PI 105, PE 87~·88, HV 
i , ~!E II 43). See Chapter '1, pp. 18-20 and Chapter 6. 
13. For Maritain's tlsixth way" see his Approaches to God (tr.), 59-65. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
It appeaTS to be a mixture of the Augu",Unian ~Neo-Platonic) 
notion of Idea, of Thomist causality. and of Tillichian II non-being" • 
cf. Chapter 3, fn 18. 
EA 11 '-44. cf. HV 109, filE II 175. In this way, filarcel contrives 
to reconcile the of the essentialists and the existentialists. 
The initial 111 am" may be interpreted as the "essence" which precedes 
my actual existence. At the same time, once: I exist it is my "projectll 
(to use Sartre1s term for onels aim in life) to make or develop my 
character or Itessence". Marcel says that he is not interested in be-
coming involved in the controversy over the relative priorities. The 
important thing is that we do exist (having come into existence through 
1 He IIl'ich has been to us) and it is up to us to make something 
meaningful of our life. For Marcel1s interpretation of Itessence" see 
Appendix 1, po 218. 
John Keets, letter of 28 April 1819, quoted by Marce! (EA II 41r) 
who tells us that when Keats declares in the same letter that lIas 
various as the Lives of Men are - so various become their souls, and 
thus does God make lndi Vidual be ! Souls t Identical Souls, of the 
sparks of his own essence,ll 
idee qui dans son langage a 
parable!! (EA 11 45). 
EA 11 97 and Saint Paul, 
117, 136, 1~2. 162, PACMO 63 
1 8~l $ 1 82. 
tI il a en '"ue 1 f idee meme que j! expdme ici; 
lui un eclat et une fralcheur i~om-
19. ef. EA I 88, 109, 
I 152, 154, 163, 169. 180-
K~ 11 22. This trends Marcel says~ appears as a progression fron: 
the first (that of I1modern tl enlightenment). Most people, he declares 
hopefully, would agree that the progress of enl enment cannot take 
place without a progressive elimination of the anthropocentric elen:ent. 
But, he war'ns, this outlook only seen:s to be satirizing human pride; 
it is in fact exalting it. This tation~ he goes on to say, stems 
fro~ man's claim that Science, the laboratory of the Mind and Thought 
(both depersonalized), CBn and does transcend the mat world to 
which man is reduced (EA 11 15). 
81' 299, PR·-GM 100. Philosophy, the mother of the sciences, gave 
birth to experimental science, nurturing it so protective that for 
centuries it stunted its child's development and d its expansion. 
Now it would seem that science has indeed come of age and, fl its 
"physic(al)'1 muscles, is making philosophy pay in much the same coin. 
Thls, it would seem, is the cont.clr.porary sit.uat.ion as Marcel secs iL. 
While it is gener'ally conc(:ded tlkt. sc.ientific questionE cam~ot be 
answered by pJlilosophy, it is not alw<l,Y allowed Uwt the conver::'c 
obtains equally. Philosophic;c>l que bons .~ and especially those 
concerned with man's bejng - are not mat.erial for the labor~tory ob-
jectif iced ion of science. This is the force of "orcel! s argument 0 
Even Comte admitted that science js interested in ~~.b!l.t b, not , j 1 (. 
is. Science can account for many thin1::s in the world of phenomena 
but it cannot an'ogate to itself the same techniques for eluciclaLing 
everything is or exits. Although it is true that technology has 
our power, Marcel reminds us (without giv examples) to 
think of the price paid for such victories (EA II 23). He s 
that by looking upon the world as a subjugated slave, we tend to con-
sider natural disasters as vengeful retaliations of a monster. And a 
world entertaining this pantheistic view has reverted to that of 
Thales of l\!i!etus. Our modern world is IIfull of 11, be they class-
or race-consciousness, capitalism, or collectivism. As Etienne Gilson 
corr:ments (God and PhilosophY$ 136) : IIMillions of men are starving and 
bleed tz-ct-;;atI1 because two or three pseud05cientific or pseudosocial 
deified abstractions are now at war. For when f among them-
selves~ men have to die." 
19. EA II 35. 
20. P. Claudel, 253-270. 
21. See Chapter 1~ p. 19. 
22. When it is said that Marcells philosophy tends towards unjversality, 
it does not mean that it tends towards universalism. His philosophy 
rests on the indissoluble unity of faith~ hope and love within a con-
crete ontology wherein each individual is thought of as actively part-
icipating. Of ourselves, we are in no position to know whether we 
shall all be saved; that is God's prero ive although our salvation 
or damnation depends on our own activity. The claim of universality 
is impossible to define, says Marcel, and he recognizes the true worth 
of Christian philosophy and theology as having established it in the 
foundations of our being. "Mais I' d'universalite est impres-
criptible; la philosophie et la theolo chretiennes authentiques ont 
la gloire imperissable nor. seulement de ne llavoir jamais meconnue, 
mais de l'avoir au contraire port ~ son comble et fond6e sur les 
assists inclestructibles de l'etre" (HV 33). This pronouncew,ent will 
pn'pare us for a study of the element in Marcel' s thought 
(pp. 59-61) and of his affinity with classical Christian tradition. 
cLChapter 3, pp. 76-78. 
23. See Chapter 3, p. 87 and Chapter 4, pp. 1Q7-108. 
24, L N iet zsche, lmstra (Nietzsche I s Werke, Lcipzig~ 
'i90L;, Band VI), musse sterben: er sah mit Augen, 
welche Alles salm, - er sah des Menschen Tiefen und Grilnde, alle seine 
verhel te Schmach und Hlissl ichke it. I 11 
25. HP 27; Marcel quotes from Nietzsche I s Joyful Wisdom. I! 'Wohin ist 
Gott? vo 0 ieh will es euch Wir haben-ihn-getl.idtet - ihr und ieh! 
Wir Jdle sind seine M(Jrded I 11 - F. Nietzsche, Die frtlhliche Wissen-
~:l}E-ft C\ietzscbe's Werke, Leipzig, 1900, Band V)~~III, 125, p. 163. 
26. HP 30. cf. HCH 81 The American school of the Death-of-Cod 
movement, represented by Altizer, Hamilton and van Buren, seems to 
want to retain the label "Christian!!, yet ally themselves with Sartre 
in their optimism of self-sufficiency. They proclaim that man is 
liberated in order to assume his own creative reeponsibility. While 
Niet che proposed a biological evolution of supermen capable of re-
pIae God, Sartre considers that man already has the potential. 
Marcel warns that man will either claim for himself a self-dependence 
which caricatur'(; that of God or will think of himself as a \VHf,te 
product in an nbsun] uniVCI'si3 (Hell 5~--5rj; cL HCII 88). Sartr'c, of 
course, sees no peril ill the f il'st alternative: it is the natured con~ 
sequence of man I libCl'a t ion from Cod, but because his aspirntlon to 
divinity is doomed on account of his finjtude, hi" conclm;ion bear out 
~Iarcells second alLerncltive (cL J'E~_!::~,_<:LJ_e_!'!.§il~\j;.' 495. J ~ -n. 
Mercel brands Sartre's tbeory a nihilistjc since it dissolve into an 
tlethique de la involtun:" (HP '151) whereby filal) chooses his OW1I value s 
irrespective of the values of others. 
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ME II 177, 86. In the latter passage he adds, referring to Sartre: 
"SOI, at 1-sme a besoin d'un dieu pour ne pas tomber dans la platitude 
absolu .n 
28. HV 219. cL HCH 17, "177. HTheism and Personal Relations", loco cH., 
pc 
29. EA 11 46 : "Le p~ch~, la gr8ce, le salut ne sont des vieilleries 
que tant que ce sont des mots, et nor, pas des choses, le coeur meme de 
notre de tin.lI cL EA II 9-10. 
30. See p, 47 and Chapter 4. p. 108. 
31. EA 11 46 Marcel defines religion as constituting a realm where 
the sutject is confronted with something over which he has no hold at all 
(EA 11 )e Such a definition, if it can be called such, is very vague 
and beers little resemblance to the reI understood by both theo-
10 and counter-theologians. It is, for Marcel, a "mysteryll in that 
.it e cape the technic,.rues of obj ectif ication. Religion, he tries to 
explain, re tores to us the realization that, after the phrase of August-
ine 9 the more we know the more we become aware of how much we have yet 
to know. Under the influence of modern facilities provided by techno-
logy for the gratif ication of hedonistic pursuits we have lost a "reI ish 
for e erni " (the phrase is that of R.A. Knox), Marcel deplores that 
we have lost touch with the fundamental truth that knowledge requires a 
previolls purification (&'OHY1CHC; ) and the medieval consciousness of 
the tl sac l'sl" character of life, together with the acknowledgment of Him 
who is at the source of life. 
32. HCH 9, ! 43, 103, 107, 183-184, ST 244, SdI ,RPR 172 (Postface). 
33. 
3 [-)e 
Examples of rigid or authori tarian views of Christianity in Marcel l 5 
pla:ys sre ~Ioirans in 1 Palais de sable and Padre Ricardo in Rome nt est 
These 
ast ically 
and rather 
demytholo 
apsrt from 
ions about 
that a 
d 
those who have joined the detail in the basement, enthusi-
the mythical from the concept of God. The strenuous 
efforts of J.A.T. Robinson and others like him at 
a !lGod out there ll , a God indifferent. to his creation -
rare interventions - are justified even if one has reservat-
the sound effects accompanying their toils. Marcel agrees 
s at sus with a penchant to show himself occasionally as a 
s spurious (cf. ST 263). 
HP 70-71. See Chapter 1, fn 77 (p. 35) for text. 
IIApercus sur la liberte lt , article by Marcel in la N 
.=-. • .--<.>y.) 
1946, 1, 
pp. (2-() , 
37. See Chapter 3, pp. 81 for his notion of tlpresence ll • For further 
COflments on this feature of elitism, see Chapter 4, p. 129 Un 23) and 
Clwpter 6; p, 184. 
38. HV 31 , 
39. S2rtre t s freedom is unoriented in the sense that. there is no object-
ive value correlative to the human will. For Sartre, values are not 
recognized by man but determined by him. Man is an alien in the world 
of being, and others are just as alien to him as he is to them (IIL' enfer 
crest les autres ll ). Marccl a cen be seen, js entirely opposed to such 
a nihiljstic doctrine or fn~edoH'. 
40. TJ1e objection could be nwde thc:t by postulating grace as the opcrat 
ional element Marccl is quietist. From n consjderation of the thesj 
that ~lQrcells notion of be is that it. L; crective, jt is pos:oible to 
clear him of this charge; we can state that his notion of freedom is not 
a!dn to quietism. F01" quieLism advoc2Les the pa~'sive acceptnnce of a 
grace which is expected to opcr"cte of it.s 01111 accord, FUl'thermo!'l:, in 
4~ , 0 
L-I 
, .J e 
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this connection, Marcells philosophical treatises and plays are free of 
Jansenism (but cf. Chapter 4, fn 23, p. 129). His characters may be 
hcsitants doubtful and groping but they are not resigned to the inevi-
table. The same existential anguish (channelled into the ontological 
question "What am I?") animates them in var'ying degl'ees. They are seek-
ing to know themselves in order to "become'" complete, fulfilled. V/hereas 
Sartre maintains that, by virtue of our condition, we are perpetually 
obliged to make choices, Marcel counters that man's need is to strive 
to create himself so that he may become increasingly responsible. (But 
this does not mean that Marcel would subscribe unreservedly - if at all-
to Dewart's concept of "self-creation".) It is possible, ~larcel points 
out, that one may choose to be a coward, to put himself in a state of 
self-abdication which is hardly compatible with self-asserting freedom. 
Such a Inon is an example of one who has abandoned himself to the forces 
working at his own dehumanization (ST 128). Freedom is dynamic. We 
recall that ~farcel says "I have to be" and "1 have to become free" are 
closely related. It is, he suggests, grace which enables us to make 
the "corr'eet" choice. This grace cannot be given if 'we do not will to 
accept our status of creature, that we are dependent on God who is our 
creator, the source of being which is itself creative. Grace gives us 
the strength (and enlightenment) to continue striving for self-fulfil-
ment, This is the "corl'ect" choice, as Marcel sees it : to opt for 
transcendence and. to use our efforts so that they may be channelled 
into our fulfilled communion in the Fellowship of Being. 
JM 84. cf. FP 73. See Chapter 4. 
PdS 268$ quoted JM 85. cf. Chapter 4, pp. 115-,116. 
As far back as 1912 Marcel had seen this truth : "Les horrmes se 
tl'aitent les uns les autres corr,me des morts, en ce sehs qui ils se 
traitent comme des formules complexes mais realisees. La religion con-
siste au contraire a :>e traiter les uns les Qutres comme des vivants" 
(hIS XIII [0:otes de 1912-1913 J 39). In!.1 Insopdable Edi th Lechevallier 
charges the abbe Seveilhac with brandishing the dogmatic approach to 
a moralising religion. If all that counts is the meriting of heaven, 
she says, it is not worth the trouble to believe in God. The only 
worthwhile religion, for her, is "celle qui nous introduit dans un 
autre monde ou les miserables barri"eres qui separent les etres de chair 
sfevanouisscnt dans l'amour et dans la charite" (PI 229). 
';4. Schg 7'1. cf. HCH j84. 
45. EA II ~-7~-48. 
46, T;,I II 207. 
47" PAC~;O 90. 
48. PAC~!O 89. Although he had not read Kierkegaard at that time, ~,!arcel 
also understood that Christianity is not just pure doctrine but lived 
experience. This is not to say that he fails to appreciate the role of 
the Church. Far from it. The Church is the embodiment of communion. 
~!arcel accepts the comments of Yves Congar on the familial unity of the 
Church (EPC 29-1-294), and sees the Church as the perpetuation of the 
sublime witness of Christ (EA I119). He would agree that the Christian 
liturgy is peculiarly effective in eliciting participation from its 
adherents. More important is his recognition that the doctrine of the 
~lystical Body is the translat.ion int-,o ttlcological terlll~; of the philo,· 
sophie "ont.ological communion" (Ircll '141). 
49. Years lat.el' he confessed thDt., despite Maritainls efforts to iWotruct 
him in certain aspecU; of Tholllist doctrine, he was in no way converted to 
t1lRt type of thoul='ht Om 1i 2). l~or was it neccs~:al'ily the ponclcrou~; 
erudition of Garrjgou-LagrClnge whicb dis~;ati~;f.iecl·him. The simple fact 
is that he llUcl all'em(y adopted his O\\n method of philosophizing. For 
his important distinction between existence and objectivity, see Chapter 
1, f n 84 (P. 3 6 ) • 
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50. cr. IILa dominante existentielle dans mOE1 oeuvre ll , loco ciL, 175: 
liEn admet tant que nous ayons le droit de dire quoique ce soH sur ce 
que Dieu attend de nous, je dirai qui il ne ~peut pas vouloir ~tre adore 
par nous corr.me un souverain ou respecte co[nne un magistrat ll ; and EA I 
169 : IIMa conviction la plus intime, la plus ebranlable, crest que Oieu 
ne veut nullement @tre aime par nous c~ntre le cr€€, mais glorifi€ h 
travers le cree et en partant de lui :-::CE" Oieu dresse contre le cree 
et en quel que sorte jaloux de ses propres ot.:lvrages n t est a mes yeux 
qu I une idol e, 11 
51 c Through faith, Marcel tells us, we sense .the IIvertigineuse proxi-
mite 11 of God (EA I 27). As God is both deus revelatus and deus abscond-
itus, so Being, which is manifested only-rn~~--Wngs, ~-s­
anC:: reveals itself at the same time. 
52. This decision is an application of what Edward de Bono calls 
"lateral thinking". The expression "person;cdist epistemologyll is used, 
not by Marcel himself, but is applied to him by Paul Ricoeur (Gabriel 
'Iiarcel et Kad Jaspers: Philosophie du mysU~re et philosophiedtlpara-
d~~:~-:~ 49 rand Jeanne Oelhomme (in E~n1T;;i i~;e~~lli~~:-Gabriel . 
~~cel, ed, Ricoeur, 139). -~----, 
53, ~lE I 9'1. 
54. Reflection, in the philosophical sense, is never exercised on those 
things whicb are not worth the troubl e of thinking about (f{E I 93), 
55. S1' 33. 
56, EA I 36~37. 
57. It would appear that Marcel is here understanding lIessence" in the 
Thomist sense. At the time of writing (July 1930), he was grappling 
with Thomism (IItel du moins que je le comprends ll - EA I 35). This 
TholGist interpretation is apparent in the whole context of his distinct-
ion: liEn somme, la pensee ne porte que sur les essences, Remarquer 
que la depersonnal isat ion, parfai temen t legi time dans ce cas, est au 
contraire impossible dans l'ordre du pens er a. C'est bien un tel qui 
pense Et tel e'tre ou cl telle chose. C'eCi'e~T'-tres important~-~-Noter 
d£autre part! que plus nous restaurons le ccn(exte, plus nous glissons 
du penser dans le penser h. Ceci est important pour comprendre en quel 
sens 11 infini est envelopp~ dans le fait de penser l'individu comme 
essence" (EA I 36-37). For Marcel' s understanding on lIessence ll see 
Chapter 3~ p, 77 and Appendix 1 B, p. 218. 
58. According to the process of primary reflection~ as Marcel sees it, 
the object of thought is considered as a problem placed before the 
thinking subject; it is a problem external to him and capable of sol-
ution (cf. PR-GM 65, 47). Marcel argues that if I myself as thinking 
subject become an object of thought, liable to anal~sis and categori-
zation~ I should be isolated from myself as much as from the other 
"objects" which constitute my situation. In the play l'Iconoclaste 
(P. 47), Abel Renaudier declares: IILa conrliCLissance exiY;;-'1lr-infini 
tout ce qu I dIe croit etreindre." On the subject of lIlarcel is interpret-
ation of the meaning of metaphysics, implied here and shortly in the 
text, J.B, Olnlal1ey (The Fellowship of Being, 9) gives Marcel's defin-
ition of a metaphysici~nas--lIa philos~opher--~i~hose main concern is with 
being". O'i\!alley points out, that for the Cnglish schools at least, 
~lar'cel would not be regClnlcd as Q metaphys:i'::ian. 
59. SecondQry reflection is Cl thaw in the freezing by critical reflecL·· 
ion of life's vital impulses (ME 1 95). 
60. PR~G~l 65<,,66 : "un II10uvemcnt inverse~ u';, Hlouvement de reprise qui 
consiste a j)l'endre concicience de cc qu I i1 .y a de partiel et d' une eel'" 
taine maniere mcme de !,USpcct dens la dClIlcH'(:he purement Rnnlytiqlle et 
Et tcnLer de recuperer au n.1 veuu ce concret f\U' on Q vu precedemrnent Cll 
quclque sorte sfemieHcr ou ~;e puJvcJ~jser"tl cf. EA I 'l~J, 1~7? Ere 38-
39, PACMO 52~ 59, !IV 138, PI '120, Dill1B, ::,'0 209, JM 7'1. 
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61. ST 3.3. cL JM 72, PACMO 65, ME I 97-98, PI 19.3 9 PR-GM 47. 
62. cL JllE I 19 s 146, Schg 53, "Some Reflections on Existentialism" in 
Philosopby Today, vo!. 8, 4/4, 1964. It is evident, from TR 85, that 
Marcel identifies Truth (as self-sufficient Truth) with God: "La Verite 
qui possede reellement la suff isance Et soi-meme, ne peut etre designee 
que dtun seul nom - ce nom, il ne faudrait pas a vrai dire le prononcer 
aussi facilerr.ent et aussi legerement qu t on a coutume de le faire - le 
nom memc de Dieu." 
6" ). 
66. 
70, 
71. 
cL PI 19.3. It must be noted that Marcells use of the term "syneid-
esis tl differs from that provided by the Oxford English Dictionary. The 
latter source gives its definition as "that function or department of 
conscience which is concerned with passing judgment on acts already per-
formed", It quotes from J. Goodman, Penit. Pard., I, (171.3), Po 101 
"by (syneidesis) man is able to refle~self, and ••• pass 
judgment on himself,lt Marcel goes further than this kind of introspect-
ive and retrospective reflection in his acceptance of the term: "l'acte 
por lequel un ensemble est maintenu sous le regard de l'esprit" (HV 27). 
The "ensemble" which he gives as an example is the union of such notions 
as "personne~eng8gement-commun8ute~realite" (HV 26). J.B. 01J1:lalley 
accepts Marcelts interpretation, not only for recollection (I'the ultim-
ately philosophic reflection is metaproblematic working with synidesic 
conceptsti, OPe citop 74) but also for presence ("the integrative recog-
nition of the presence of others ••• a knowledge through convergence of 
aspects rather than by juxtaposition of properties", OPe ci t., 58) and 
for what Ot!llalley sees as Marcel's central concept of the person "whose 
meaning is recognized within recollection of himself as a whole through 
a metaproblematic reflection which recuperates the integrity dissolved 
by objective thinking" (oPocit., 1.32). For a consideration of Marcells 
notion of presence~ see Chapter 3, pp. 81-84. 
PACfll0 6fH cL DH 118, ME I 152. 
PAC!IIO 63, cf. EA 1141 and 147 : "Le recueillement, dont la possi-
bilit~ effective peut @tre regard~e comme l[indice ontologique le plus 
r~vElateur dont nous disposions, constitue le milieu r~el au sein du-
quel cette recuperation [of an .intuition which otherwise would be lost] 
est susceptible de s iaccomplir." For myst~, see P. 58. 
EA I 99 (17 March 1~31). 
In the course of a lecture at the Free University of Berlin in 1950, 
quoted by Troisfontaines, TIll 1201. cf. HeR 76, ME I 139, and ST 174 : 
" ... en definitive ne pourrait-on dire ••• que le recueillement par lui-
meme a une valeur sacralisante?" 
l\lE I 18Lr~'185. For eXClmples of spiritual mediation in Marcells plays 
see Chapter 5, P. 148 (Tante Lena for Simon Bernauer in le Signe de la 
Cr~Jx) and Appendix 2, II, Po 226 (Dom Maurice for Christia~~C~~y 
. ] r j' , ) 111 3~_'1()nge cas ~ • 
P/"C;IIO 63, nlE I 142. 
It is interesting to note that in the Bible (Old Testament) God him-
self will not give his name, e.g. Genesis 32: 29, Exodus .3: 14. The 
identification of God a"nd Being in~~rbal form-i00wever, compat-
ible with theology, Tllis j;o the contention of the thesis, as pn';oenLed 
in CllaptCI' L In Appendix 1 B wc: shall c;Ce how ~lLlrcc.Lls affinity wit.h 
Augustine allow~; him Lo reach this conclw:iion. But Mar'cel says that he 
will not force hi;3 vi(~\Vs on anyone (sec p. 16). None the les~~, he 
argues towards this ultimate identification of God[s presence by dissoc-
ioting the movcn,cnt of reflection from allY subjectivity or from the FtJr-
si_ch-~~~~ which he sees as at the centre of German idealism, j(ather'-;-· .. · 
he asserts, we are involved in Cl paradox (which j" the essence of lIlys-
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tery) so that Saint Paul's axiom, lIyou are. not your own ll , is endowed 
with its full ontological and essentially concrete significance (cf. 
PACil[O 64), 
72. HCH 76. 
73. HCH 99, ME 144,45. cf. R.A. Knox, Hie Beli.!:.E_!~.U~tholics, :\ew 
York, Doubleday, 1958, p. 15 : IIA rush age cannot be a reflective age." 
74, SdI 290. 
75. rIlE I 139. 
76. ~jarcel stresses his desire to remain on the philosophical side of 
the fence, e.g. PI 193 : IIMais clest de fa",on dHiberee que je me suis 
maintenu ici en-de\(a d'une enceinte que le - philosophe en tant que tel 
ne peut qu.e difficilenlent franchir ll • Be that as it may, we must exam-
ine the objections to the preponderance of the religious element in 
~!arcel; see Part III 'oC this chapter, pp. 59,,61. 
77" ST 33. 
78. EA I '165-166. cf. EA I 124 (IIreflexion braqU(fe sur un mystere") 
and tilE I 131 ("La reflexion seconde ... n' est pas autre chose que ceUe 
sorte de refa<;,::onnement inb~rieur; c' est bien ce qui se produit ici lors~ 
que nous voulons at teindre la participation") 0 
79. HCH 68. A problem, Marcel says, is something I meet, something 
which bars the way and is, therefore, exterior to me (EA I 121H 1~.6, 215; 
cf. PACi\!O 54). In a characterist.ic exercise of linguistic analysis, 
~lal'cel observes that "problem" and "object!! have corresponding etymo-
logical root meanings of something cast before me. "Problem" is derived 
from the Greek TCp6~A:rlf1'CX (from TCpO~CXA)\.st.V), "object" froff. the Latin 
objectufT! (from objicio). E. L, Mascall dis t inguishes further betwe en a 
p\.1zzle~i~nd a problem~:- A puzzle is "a pseudo-question which vanishes 
into thin air when the terms in which it is stat.ed are examined" and a 
problem is Ila question which does not evaporate on linguistic analysis 
and which we cease to ask only when we have discovered the answer" 
(Wor~Images, po 77). 
80. In the main, Marcel seems to accept the traditional Christian con-
cept of the soul; it is for him that innermost part of our being which 
is at stake in our existence. It is what Marcel calls the lIontological 
hazard ll (EA I 1-12)s which can be saved or lostt as well as denied. He 
asO'ures us that the gr.eat mistake in metaphysics and ethics is the 
refusal to recognize that the soul can be threatened: this refusal is 
in fact a denial of the soul (EA I 29). At the same" time we must. be on 
our guard~ he warns, against describing the soul as an "essence'l (EA I 
117). His only real definition of the soul is given in its ontologic~l 
context: "Quelque chose est mis en peril des le moment ou j!existe, 
mais peut aussi etre sauve et ne sera meme quIa condition d!avoir eU~ 
sauve. CeUe realite ntest qu!objet de foi : ctest mon ameli (JM 282). 
cf. HV 10, ~.O-/t-1 • 
81. EA I 146. This is the case of both Moirans and Clarisse in le 
Palais cle sable. Clarisse, considering the exposure of her fatherls 
dliPlICi ty~s "fall 11 , does not go beyond primary refl ection. She 
does not realize that his "fa1l'1 should have been the first step in 
clearing away the obstacles to truth. Neither Moirans nor Clarisse 
attains this reaJil':ation J:wcHuserleithel' opens the self through .~E'::I~_?2.:.L­
EJJ it~ to wel cOllle tile light of truth. 
82. EA I 125. lIe adds that it .1S a propcl' character of problems to be 
reduced to dctail, but lIlyst(TY 1.s something which cannot be reduced to 
detail (EA I 126). 
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8.30 PP.C~lO 57. cf. EA I 157-158, 216. I1Iarcel first used the term 
IImyst ery" in connection with his studies imto the nature of participat-
ion. ,,( La participat ion) apparatt essent iellement comme myst~re ~ c! est-
ci~dire comme echappant Et toute methode d'analyse qui la convertirait en 
objet" (FP 65). From this early note of 191'1 we can see, in comparison 
with his formulation of the notion of "mystery" in 1933, a consistency 
in his understanding of the term as that which resists the empirical 
processes of verification. This central term is, therefore, applied to 
that which resists problematization and is what Marcel called, using 
idealist terminology, lithe non~mediatizable immediate" as opposed to the 
"common or everyday immediate which gives rise to an infinite number of 
mediations" (JM 241, DH 113). 
8l~, As il[arcel expresses it in terms comprellensible to the followers of 
Sartre or I-leidegger, the zones of the en-moi and the devant-moi are 
abol ished in an inseparable fusion (HCR 6"9-):-
85, EA I 121H HCH 69.-
86. l\jal'cel notes that mystery is not the same as a secret which is a 
secret only because I keep it. I can reveal a secret or discover an-
other[s; secrets can be betrayed or disclosed. Mystery is not a 
pseudo-problem temporarily unsolved because of a lack of scientific 
knowledge which is capable of being produced, Nor is mystery the ag-
nostic's insoluble problem, a lacuna of knowledge nor the idealist's 
lI unknowable" which yet remains within the delimiting sphere of the prob-
leroatic, The recognition of mystery, on the other hand, is an essent-
ially positive act of the mind (EA I 147). By recollection man enters 
into himself and recognizes that, as a personal subject, he partici-
pates in being as a creative gift from God. If Marcel defines mystery 
so much in negative terms, it is because mystery, by definition, cannot 
be defined. As Gallagher points out (op, cit., 35), only an object is 
definable, and only that which is definable is demonstrable. 
87. In the light of Marcel's dialectic the title of this chapter should 
be rather "The Mystery of God" ~ just as the problem of being is trans·-
formed into the Mystery of Being. 
88. H.P. Dwen, The Christian Knowledge of CO~9 London, Athlone, 1969, 
p.328. cL D.L Jenkins, Living with Qti~-~Clons, London, SCw., 1969, 
p. 20. For comments on panthei·~;:~eI)-:-"L;·r-TChapter 1, fn 129). 
89. "La dominante existentielle dans mon ocuvre", loco cit., 175. The 
phrase jlnrce! refers t~ is to be found in ,nr (158). cf. ST 263-264 
(P. 61, fn ~102). 
90. The phl'ase is that of W.E. Carlo, The 1.iltimate Reducibility of 
Essence to Existence in Existential MetapE"','sT~~The Hague, Ni]hoff, 1966, P:~1D~ -~---
9i. Perhaps one of Marcel l s most frequently criticised interpretations 
is that of the term "pI'esence", a term whir:h has already been referred 
to during the first two chapters. Its consideration will be left to 
the next chapter (pP. 81-84 ) where its relevance is greater,. Further-
more, I should like to point out that in this section I do not propose 
to deal with the overall picture of the religious element as it is to 
be discerned in Marcel' s thought.. Here I !'l'OpOse to treat of the 
religious element in the content of Marcel's thought as already cover~d 
so far. 
92. Sce pp, 57--')8. It lIIay be objected the,! Cl situution or (juest.ioll in 
which I am involved may well be iI\telligibl.t: or even 011jcctively vcrL~ 
f iable, Such sitllations could COnCel'[l my J,'('a:::on [or beiI\g in sOll1e 
place and not Rnother', for doing onc tl1inr (e.g. following a career) 
and not another. I Cell) give as lily rcasoll ; hat J know where I am ami 
what I am doing cdrnpl y because I ltave choccn tl;:i';';-']10'r'ticulal' situation. 
94, 
72 
I may even be in a position to claim knowledge of my abilities and 
pot lities because they have been tested by experience. Marcel 
would no doubt argue that where I am concerned as a being, existence 
is involved, and that the lucid awareness of the fact that I exist 
point 0 the mystery why I exist. By probing the questioner, he 
could force him to concecle this important point. 
See above, fn 87. 
PAC\;Q 
11 • •• c' e t 
tru tIt J 
fn 62) 
Compare, in the light of this discussion, HCH 156-157 : 
je pense, dans la religion chreti,enne que ce mystere [of 
le le mieux sa puissance eclairante", and TR 85 (see above, 
9Sc It is interest to note that the German translation of 1 
--;,;..-
96. 
97. 
98. 
99. 
100, 
101. 
i 02. 
103. 
104. 
tere de 11 Etre appeared under the title of IIGeheimnis des Se 
tes that "Geheimnis" does not have the religious connotat-
terium lt but is rather like the French IImystere" in that it, 
toos could be ted as IIsecret" (Franz(lsischer Existentialismus, 
'157) • 
ie 
L. S,,'eeney, "Gabriel Marcel l s Position on God" in The New Schol~­
~ vol. XLIV, No. 1, p. 121. 
--,.-,--
Rc Verneaux, ~_~_~~~, __ ~.~= __ ~~~~~, 259. 
cf. F. Copleston, ~--~ .. ~~~~.~~--~~ 
Jin 265, 272, 275, 278. 
JM 314~ 321. 
R. Verneaux, OPe cit., 
, 223-225. 
ST 263-264. cf. JM 1 and Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gent= 
iles l 11 xxx ad fin. : IIWe do not know what God iS t but only what he-is 
not and how other things are related to him." 
81' 2660 
ST 268. cf. 8chg 1/,1-42. 
105. ST 27'1. 
"lc60 ~Iarcel disagrees with Ebner who says that thoughts on God have ceased 
to be of a philosophical nature and remain on the level of the third 
person. l'.Iarcel says that, for himself ~ "le passage de la troisieme per-
sonne ~ la deuxi~me personne, dans la mesure o~ il doit ~tre fondf ou 
jus t if.le ph.ilosophiquement, se si tue en dCfa du reI eux proprement 
dHlI (ST 270). 
107. For example~ in The Existentialists and God by A.C. Cochrane (Phila-
delphia, l'!estminster~ 1956)~' ~larcel rateSonI'j-two pas references; 
'108. 
each time he is associated wi th other "name" philosophers. He is ment-
ioned only once, again in passing, throughout an important collection of 
essays, Christianity and Existentialism by W. Earle, J. e and 
J. Wild (~\o;1hwesteril c.~-:r9m.~---
Eo Gilson s "Un exemple ll in 
1. OS 0 In his Let tre-Preface to Troisfontaines t s opus, Marcel writes 1 
speaking of the work: "11 realise en fin de compte sur une lIe beau-
coup plus vaste cc que jlai voulu donner moi dans les Gifford Lect-
ure· II (1\,.'1 I 9), 11' cl' t' f I . I 11 r (f .J~' 155 a nllra ',Ion Or' ~olns ~[\ve .. e sOl" e C e ,ill
282, EPC )7, DH 40, PI 17) is not without some reservations (EPC 9·~1). 
110. cL ME I 8, ST 98, EPe 2G,"77, 95<496. 
1'I'l. ST 307. MnrceJ is like ~;ocl'ates~ not only in hi~, method. Socrates, 
altholl hailed by Plato as the wisest of meny yet declared that if he 
had any wisdoln it consisted in knowing thot he knew nothing. 
112. TM I 25. 
CHAPTER THREE 
GOD IS 
'ErTISV 0 ()sOC~ rcpoc; MwugT)v Asywv, 
0, ~ f ) t t>-' '\.} 
by (0 C HI L 0 ~ v • Xo:. I" ELT[ E V , 
o0~w~ tpcT~ Tote; utO!C; $IoPQT)A, 
6 ~VaTIEOT~Ax€; ~E npoc; ~~ac; 
~ EXODUS s 3 : 14. 
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It is indeed absurd to. propose new grounds 
for belief in the existence of God. The 
belief has stood for more than 2000 years, 
if we are to speak of the essentials of 
transcendental theism. 
- A.M. FARRER, Finite and Infinite, 3. 
(London, Dacre, 1959) 
La demarche philosophique essentielle 
sera toujours~ je pense, plus heuris-
tique que demonstrative Et proprement 
pad er, 
- G. ~ARCEL, Le Myst~re de l'Etre I, 8. 
14 
I, !I!arcel and the classical IIproofs" of God t s existence. 
i. lIS attitude 
Gabriel Mercel is not satisfied with the traditional means employed by 
t!le apol0 sts of aff irming Transcendent Being, By these means it is claim-
ed that the existence of God is established by reasoned proof. Whether the 
proof' be a iori or a posteriori, he points out, .there remains a fundament-
al and initial presup~:tion~-prior affirmation of belief. 1 Besides, 
such proofs - especially of the latter type - have appeared (to him 
at least) unconvincing. They are, as Duns Scotus said of Anselm's ontolog-
ical argument, J2ersuasi0!.l_~s probabiles, '!Larcel suggests that historians 
should enclose the word proof in inverted commas, even when they expound 
them in minute detail. 2 All 'manner of proofs, e.g. cosmological and onto-
logical~ refer to a certain datum which is belief, and as such they forfeit 
their validity.3 The paradox, if not the scandal, of the proofs is that 
are efficacious only when they are really not needed, and serve to con-
firm what has been given in another way.4 The traditional proofs are of no 
UfJe as a means of convincing a person who has not received the prior knowl-
edge which is the basis of belief. While they may be logically irrefutable. 
they lack persuasive power since the conclusion is already formulated in 
the initial premiss. The act of , j!arcel says, 
C test faire reconnaltre a un autre que du mOlI:ent oil 
il admet une certaine propositioIl t il est tenu d t ad-
mettre aussi tel.le autre proposition qui n 2 est pas 
distincte de celle-la quten apparence? et qu.e, livre 
Et lui~meme, il mettait en doute. (S) 
For any effort of prov to be properly eff icacious, Marce! urges that 
we should have to be first agreed on a common ground for communication. 6 
, 
otherwise, he asserts, we should be pretentious. claiming to possess inform-
ation denied to the other. This unwarranted attitude may lead us to inter-
pret the other! s non-belief as "bad faith" or 'intransigence in opposition to 
our own will. The unbeliever can refuse tb follow the reasoning of the 
apologi to The refusal may be caused by the f ear that his freedom as a self 
determining human be will be limited if he is obliged to confess depend-
ence on some other-worldly power, To achieve proper communication the 
believer should be 
depths of his own be 
to hu~ble himself, admitting both that in the 
thel'e still lies some measure of unbel ief and that, 
in the li t of truth which, Morcel declares, is also that of charity, he 
may see that the other who Pl'Off~ ses to be an unbeliever may attest mOl'e 
authcntically what his intcrlocutor affirms. 7 
Evidently 11arcel himself tries to find common ground with "non·-belie\'en;l!. 
But, in his ecumCllical zeal, he seems to make a dubious claim. Tlds ari es 
from his statement Umt~ just as there are people who, pI'of'es illg to be 
75 
believers, venerate in fact an idol which would be repudiated by any decent 
theology, so there are professed unbelievers who none the less, by their 
S 
actions and conduct, reveal an inarticulate belief in God. We can only 
say that ;\Iarcel meant to say that there may be some who consider themselves 
to be unbelievers who yet are by no means convinced atheists. He returns 
to safer gt'ound when he states that the question "Do you believe in God?" 
is not really answerable by a simple yes or no. Apy answer to such a refer-
endum would have to be, "I donlt know and Il m not quite sure what believing 
in God is. ,,9 
There is, or there ought to be~ some consolidating factor in our 
experience to act as confirming evidence that our faith, the activity of 
believing, has value. This is the standpoint of some contemporary thinkers 
who claim to be empiricists i~ that they hold that all true knowledge eman-
ates from and can be referred to experience. But more often than not, these 
empereia are of the physical world and as such can be legitimately analysed 
according to established criteria in scientific investigations. Marcel is 
adamant that God cannot be judged according to objective norms. We cannot 
put ourselves in God's place, just as we cannot really put ourselves in 
10 
anyone else1s place. 
This principle of the ineligibility or disqualification of judgment is 
fundamental to ftlarcells dialectic of being-in-communion : it applies primar-
iJy to the self, then to others and by logical extension to God. God is 
unverifiable scientifically. In terms of sense experience, from the observ-
ation of the physical universe, we must admit that there can be really no 
experienceable evidence of God. Marcel recognizes as one of the "sentiment-
all' forms of atheism 11 that, if God cannot be justif ied according to the 
data of rational proofs, he is no more than a superfluous hypothesis and his 
existence is not vindicated by empirical investigation. 
On voit donc qui il Y a deux fayons radicalement dis ..... 
tinctes de d~nier lYexistence h Dieu ••• llune reven-
ant a traiter Dieu comme un objet empirique et,h dire: 
"eet objet ne se rencontre pas dans llexperience"; 
l'autre se traduisant par l'affirmation que Dieu ne 
peut pas etre traite comme un objet empiri~le et que 
par consequent l'existence ne peut lui convenir. (12) 
hlarcelts adoption of this second way of saying that God does not exist 
has caused great perturbation among some co~mentators who refer to Marcel!s 
earlier investigations as tainted with an atheistic tendency.1} This is 
not so, ~Iarcel is ~;imply }'itatlng that the questioll of Cod is heyond the 
reach of empirical proces~;eso ), t is because he says ilia t God does not 
"exist" according to ihe empiricists
' 
f illding" tha t he can aff irlll, w ithoui 
t . 1!~ conradictlon, God's transcendence. Mal'ce.l is cOIlsi,3tent in followillg 
the direction of his enquiries in a follow··Uwough of his disUnctions 
b(~tween exisience and objectivity, problem and wyst.ery. Years lat.er (1961 L 
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when def himself against the charge of ever entertaining atheistic 
notions, he says of his earlier investigations: 
Mon t au contra ire de trouver une possibilit~ 
de sauve la realite de Dieu qui m'apparaissait 
comme inevitablement compromise lorsqu'on parlait de 
son existence, l'existence ne pouvant @tre affirm~e, 
pens8is-je, quia propos de ce qui se situe dans les 
limites de l'experience. 11 y avait d'ailleurs l~ 
aus i un ressouvenir kantien. Mais la gageure que je 
tenir c'~tait dans cette atmosph~re in-
de sauvegarder cc qui~ des cette 
epoque g m! ssaft comme le plus important, je veux 
dire l'amour entendu au sens plus profond et, ajouterai-
je 1 le moins psychologique. (15) 
His concern with the God of Love, whose worship lS more a loving relat-
ionship in adoration than an adoration based on the idea of obedience to a 
supernatural feudal lord~ led him to oppose a Thomism which seemed to give 
pJ'eponderant importance to the divine attributes in such a way as to empha-
size the terial, almost the tyrannical, qualities of God$ the Supreme 
Lord and ~laster, the Judge, the King. Marcel would like to hear more of 
the lov God, the Source and Guarantor of our being and our fidelity, and 
16 
even of the Hweaknessl! of God. Above all, Marcel shows himself anti-
pathetic tmvards the Thomist concept of causali ty. 
Marcel t s opposition to the Thomis t concept of causal ity is engendered 
by his insistence on man's integral freedom. As far as he is concerned, 
this conceptualization of God as efficient and final mover deprives man of 
I ' j • d b I' h I I . t h' d t' 17 us own creat-lve free om y W HCle can c 100se or reJec lS own e~ .lny. 
In thi~ attitude Marcel mqves somewhat close to Jaspers and Heidegger who 
feel that divine causality would reduce man to an objectified subject in 
the world of Cl "passive" creation. Marcel's emphasis on the creative free-
dam of the creature, on Being as the sp of creation transmitted in 
creativity urges him to oppose any unqualified iple of causality. 
(I\ietzsche and Sartre reject God outright. because his divine causality 
denies man's complete, subjective freedom.) Marcel1s case against causality 
i as follows. Causality implies the objectif ion of man - and also of 
God. Man becomes an ohjective instrument to be manipulated by a God who 
in turn may well turn out to be El computerized deity. Furthermore, if God 
js the efficient cauc;c wIto dctennines nature, we can 10g.ico.lly post.ulnte 
stinLltion as lllanf~; condition, But God .is the Creator. His activity 
of cl'eation~ in which we :--,hare as we participat.e in be 9 should not be 
viewed in terms of cause and effect but. in those of Cl loving give!'? an 
Absolute Thou who addresses an appeal to us t.o seek our fulfilment. 
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It would appear, however, that if Marcel is to hold that participation 
is creative, that Being is Creativity, he must allow some measure of causal-
ity. If beings receive their being, is not this an indication of the 
causative influence of Being? After all, Marcel stresses man's st.atus as 
created being; surely Creation implies causality? Marcel does not provide 
any satisfactory answer to support his objection to as such. Some-
how there must be a dimension of causality in which both God's creative 
influence and man's freedom are compatible. Marcel asserts that 
tllere is such a dimension (while not recognizing explicitly that there can 
be causality) which is not of the order of objectivity, to which order the 
rationalized proofs belong as much as does atheism. This dimension, he 
-. . . t t d' tl 1 f' t b' t· . t 18 t . claIms; 1S SI 'ua e In 1e rea m 0 .ln~su Jec IVl y. Bu even In a con-
sideration of this intersubj~ctive activity there must be something which 
causes the action; it is not simply gratuitous. If it were, Marcel!s whole 
dialectic of freedom and creativity would be disqualified by itself. There-
fore, he postUlates grace; but does not (a term with theological 
cormotat ions) a Giver? And so we return full circle to the notion of 
causality, Marcel's opposition seems to be only terminological. 
Even Saint Thomas Aquinas can be interpreted from an existential stand-
point, as has been pointed out by some writers. 19 His statement that God's 
existence and essence are identical shows that God, by existing as a self-
20 
sufficient be ,is the source of every truth. Commenting on the name 
"He Who Is" as the most proper name of God, Aquinas quotes John Damascene 
who noted that this name is the principal of all names applied to God "for. 
co~prehending all in itself, it contains being itself as an infinite and 
21 indeterminate sea of substance." The basic point is the interpretation 
of essent.in as n translation of ova r.,a 22 Marcel certainly opposes the 
term II tanc!1 but he does agree that the best possible name to apply 
. to God. i 11He Who Is!!. It is, after aU, the name God himself used. 
Le 
or, 
sum de l'Ecriture serait vraiment, 
.~:~.~~~~~~---parlant~ la formule la plus adequate 
(for of God]. (23) 
M<:l.rcel (s po ition is, then, that we cannot postulate existence for God 
insofar as it would be an abstract assertion (that he is) without saying 
what he i 9 v)hich is "essence tl • Aquinas holds that in God essence and 
existence are synonymous; Marcel is more concerned not with the question 
that God exists but that he is. To state that God exists, John E. Smith 
point out, would be to trcnt God n a finite component of a systmu ralh r 
tllan as lithe groulId and goal of all by tern". and, whereas for finite beings 
existence and essence can be Ildisf'uptcd!l, it would be unintelligible to 
separate existence from God in ol'ller t.o make of it the object of demon trot-
ion. Gabriel Manel has long held. lm.ilar po~;itioll from the time he 
78 
noted with approval that Maimonides was correct in saying that ne 
cannot y to God. Throughout his philosophical career he has resisted 
any at ts to objectify God. "Dieu n' existe pas H , he said flatly in the 
winter of O,~1911 and~ to avoid appearing atheistic, he explained, "il est 
infiniment par~ dela l'existence. 1I26 
The same anthropomorphic idea of God lies at the root of the atheistic 
denial of God and the Death-of-God movement. When we speak of God, \\arcel 
repeats in order to 
of God that we are 
home this truth, we should realize that it is not 
Existence can only be defined in relation to 
something other than existence : it cannot be a predicate. Thus it is that 
~18Tcel concentrates his metaphysical enquiry on being rather than on exist-
ence. And while, in the view of some contemporary thinkeFs, it would be 
better to speak of the lI reality " of God, Marcel would seem to prefer 
Plato IS term for ultimate reality, 'to 'OV1:WC; av, which retains the signifi-
cance of reality founded in be More favourable yet, perhaps, would be 
Iilncc:-uarrie! s interpretation of the quintessence of being as lithe dynamic 
le~l~nde of beings". Reality is thus "is-ness fl rather than "thing-ness" 
and God as Beiug 1 ts-be rather than is. 
11. ~arceJ IS dialectic aligned. 
L Pc~rtic tion and reflection 
In an early attempt to approach the question of God, Gabriel Marcel 
applied himself to the Hegelian notion of Absolute Knowledge conceived as 
reality. He came to the c9nclusion that neither Absolute Knowledge nor 
Absolute Experience could be regarded as a self-sufficient whole. 29 In his 
view, the idealists' mistake seems to consist in hypostasizing what is only 
a requirement of thought, and in believing that it is possible to isolate 
and consider the product. of this act as reality itself ,.3 0 In the course of 
his study he discovered the first clue to the ion of what was to 
be formulated as the Mystery of Being. This clue is the rale of participat-
ion first considered as the total participation of the thinking subject. 
This theory \vas to be the lever for securing a release from the abstraction-
alization of idealism. 
(Les philosophil's du Savoil' clbsolu) cI'oient pouvo.ir 
coe,pcI' le lien qui un.it 110lJjct (ici le savoir ab501u) 
an et et tt'aiter I'ob,iet COffllne un c.;tcc, snns 
s'apercevoir que la l'ciJlil:e de eet 0tre est due 'El Sa 
participation au ,;avoir. Le sovoir absolu, Gornme la 
muti~re DU la vie. nlest encore qu1ul\e ub traGtion~ 
la pI us haui;e et la pluF concret e, i1 est vrai. (}1) 
Later~ as he begnn to consider the distinction between existence nnd 
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objectivityp he came to realize the need to restore the primacy of being. 
By the time of his Position et approches concretes du mystere ontologique 
he hRd s at least~ "concretized" his own position" The phrase, "ontological 
need", is another, more positive way of expressing mants primordial assur-
ance of being - the i:Dl:!:!i.!:.~on __ ,"~:~~uglee - which is the basic principle of any 
32 
"true" philosophy of being, by which Marcel calL, metaphysics. He empha-
sizes the need to restore ontological weight to experience and also draws 
our attention to the central r81e played by true metaphysical reflection. 
His whole dialectic of participation and intersubjective is, i.!:l~' di-
rected towards the most basic question of our being - God. 
It is through the ontological need that we are led to seek our own 
identity and to find it as participation in a Transcendent Being who is God. 
1 t I . 1 .. t If d ft·· L' 33 Tle on 0 oglca need lS l'se a mo e 0 par lClpa~lon. And it is through 
secondary reflection that a person may recover the metaproblematic reality 
that eludes the mind, notwithstanding the objective "proofs" for God's 
existence. These, he claims, remain on the level of primary reflection 
where they wear themselves out, as it were, in rationalization and leave the 
question of God's existence as purely problematic. Accordingly, Marcel 
asserts that the theist must resort to secondary reflection, a "hyperpheno-
menological 1l34, elucidation of those data which are not only "metempirical" but 
spiritual, This "spirituality" is intersubjectivity. Marce! holds that 
whatever experiential traces of God there are will be found in interpersonal 
relationships, of being to being, exchanging a mutual "thou-dialogue", In 
this way one can reach the reality of the Absolute Thou who guarantees and 
underpins these human relationships. 
PI'imary reflection, therefore, tends to dissolve the unity of experience 
while secondary reflection .is essentially recuperative. In the matter of 
God secondary reflection recovers man's awareness of the Mystery of Being 
and 
sans etre encore elle-meme la foi, parvient du moins 
Et preparer, Et menager ce que jtappellerais volontiers 
son emplacement spirituel. (35) 
The "problem of being", Marcel notes, will only be the translation int.o 
inadec~at.e language of a mystery which cannot be given except to a creature 
whose central characteristic is that he is not simply identical with his own 
lif~,36 
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By his method wllich he dcscribes as morc hyperphenomenological) .- SlrtCe 
the ontological need transcends the objective situation treated by plienom·-
enology " ['.larcel manage" to combine the intuitive ilnd inferential possibil·" 
iiies of attaining to knowledge of GoeL fls Ill[lny writers have shown, mere 
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direct inferential knowledge of God is not possible; likewise neither is 
purely intuitive knowledge. At this point it is necessary to recall that 
tbe ontological need is basically a "need-for-being" .38 There must be 
being, ~Iarcel argues, because we ourselves are. We are impelled to proclaim 
being simply because being is; this is the force of the ontological need. A 
higher form of phenomenological study is required if we are to appreciate the 
vastness and inexhaustibility of being because~ since we ourselves are com-
pletely "immersed" or invol ved in being, we cannot really pretend to subject 
it to phenomenological analysis. Marcel 1S in no way advocating ontologism. 
as he has been charged with by at least one commentator. 39 Ontologism is 
the view that we can know God directly in this life, otherwise than infel'-
entially, According to the ontologist propositions 9 condemned by Pope Pius 
IX in the decree of the Holy Office, 18 December 1861, God is the primary 
object of the intellect, such that we know him more immediately and more 
certainly than we know anything else. This doctrine would lead to a pro-
portioning of God to the human mind and an identification of God with the 
\vorldc 
To avoid this error, Saint Bonaventure preferred the term "contuition" 
when he said that the soul knows God as being most present to it. For the 
soul, recognizing its dependence, sees that it is the image of God. As it 
necessarily knows itself, it is aware of itself (it is self-conscious) and 
knows God in at least an in~erfect manner. This implicit awareness is made 
explicit through contemplation. IIIarcel 1 s thought is similar. Whereas 
Aquinas speaks of the causal and analogical inference of God from those 
things of which we have direct knowledge, Marcel, while recognizing the 
value of experiential knowledge, o~ercomes (to his satisfaction) what he 
sees as the problem of analogia entis by postUlating secondary reflection. 
-.....,..,..~~~-"--~ ... =~ 
The lfintuition aveuglee lf of being is not innate, it is at most latent. Its 
presences he says, is expressed by the ontological uneasiness which impels 
reflection. The intuition is not in me. He explains: 
Au fond ce qui conduit Et admettre cette intuition, 
Cl est le fait de rerIechir sur ce paradoxe que je 
ne SGis pas moi-meme ce que je crois ••• On admet 
~)Ol~t;-;iemc ;t~~;ire'~~~t-:::~-:d ire que j e 
peux faire une sorte d'inventaire de mes objets de 
croyance ou encore une IIventilation" entre ce que 
je crois et ce que je ne crois pas, ce qui implique 
'q;:; I u-n~<dif f erence n;Test~-dC;J;";:t-;:;'~~-rr;T es t sens ibl e 
entre ce Et quoi jfadhere~"~t~ a quoi je ntadhere 
pas. (~O) 
Prini cle~)crih(~~; ]ljun:cJ I s unfol'llluluted inference 
at the centre of the mystery of God which contains and penetrates us, being 
more intimate to us than our own cielves 41 since, in reality, it is the 
primordial SOUl'ce of illl our own being. IIbl'ccl would, therefore, seem to 
be presenting an exi~,tentiQl ontological argument. Ile tries, however ~ to 
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avoid its disC[Uc:lif ication by basing it not on concepts but on an "analogy 
of preser.tialHy" .42 Thus we can appreciat.e the important r'ble of the 
notion of presence in Marcel1s dialectic, particularly as it is involved 
in his approach to God. 
iij, Presence 
It is presence which underpins the loving communion between person and 
person, being and being~ on the human level of intersubjective'relationships, 
and bet~een being and Being, on the transcended level. Through the notion 
of presence we are invited, rather than led. to regard God as a Thou and 
not as a Him. Presence guarantees the validity of intersubjectivity, of 
hope in the perennity of intersubjective fidelity, and of hope in a personal 
God who is the Absolute Thou. 
In existential phenomenology - as Marcel understands it - our knowledge 
of real i ty depends on an experier,ce of p~'es~nc~ which, in turn, is inter<-
preted as the fusion of the directing intention and a given object. 43 In 
terms of ;\!arcel l s hyperphenontenology~ the relation between person and per-
son CE.11 be transcended (hence hY .. E!r-phenomenology) when I accept the other 
not as an object among other objects (animate as well as inanimate) but as 
intimately related to me~ since, like me, the other has his being from God. 
For Gsbriel i',larcel; essences are not synonymous with objects, insofar as 
the:y are beings. Rather they are "presences eclairantes,,44 which illuminate 
fcn" me; thr'ough the correspondingly illuminated intuition of being~ my 
relationship with the Absolute Presence who is the source of all Being, as 
al~o of all Light. 
Quancl je dis quf un ~tre m'est donne comme presence ou 
co~ne @tre (cela revient au meme, car il nlest pas un 
@tre pour moi s'il nlest une pr{sence), cela signifie 
que je ne peux pas le traiter comme s' i1 etait simple-
merit pose devant moi; entre lui et moi se noue une 
relatior~ qui en un certain sens deborde la conscience 
que je suis susceptible d'en prendre; il nlest plus 
seulelTed. devant moi, il est aussi en moi; ou plus 
exacterrent ces categories sont surmont~esj elles n'ont 
plus de sens, (45) 
The presence of the other to me, in encounter~ is achieved by a mutual 
re co gni tion by way of a response to an appeal '-~~Y~'?~.!1tAon) - which need not. 
/.(, 
be articulate f -,. wllcl'cbS i1 "dyadic" re] at ion~;hjp is e~)tcd>l ished coo tiled: 
each becon;es Cl I!Lhol,," for tIle other'o!,'1 Thi::; is why ~brccJ i::; d.L~;satisfjecl 
witll Cartesian du,d..ism; ~,la]'(;el! s metupJ\y";ics is that of the ~S:~,':!:E~ as opp·· 
. ~g 
osed to a lfIetapll'y~;ic~; of .~.",,~!~~!l~~' Love, susUdned. Ly fidelity, i,-; tIle 
motivating force of the reciproci ty t.hl'oU2:h llr['~'cncc : the other co"'cxi~;t,; 
1;9 
with me in a co-~resence. 
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(b) An examinet 
It can be easily stated - and with apparent good reason - that Marcel's 
notion of presence is loaded with psychological overtones, It has been ob-
jected that Ilpresence" can be an ambiguous term and an unsatisfact.ory 
notionEd approBch to God. MarceI points out that "presence" is not necess-
arily operational just because one is in physical proximity with another. 
Of course, a person can exist without making his presence felt; he cannot 
make his pre:::ence fel t without st and presumably being present. But, 
one can have the feeling that somebody is present when in reality nobody 
else is illarcel recognizes this possibility: it features in some of 
his 
there o 
50 
5" However, Marcel1s idea of ence" of one who is actually 
absent is mef1Ft to apply only to someone who is known and l~~ by the 
person who "feels!! the presence. At no time does ~larcel envisage his notion 
of "presence n aE including the possibility of a psychic (lIspiritualisttl) 
pre enCe of a person from the past who was not known personally by the recip 
ient of the mediated "encounter". As Marcel uses the term in its philosoph-
ical cor.text ~ "presence" is prinl81'ily not physical. It is the reciprocal 
response of two individual personalities to a mut.ual appeal and is condit~ 
ioned by a willingness to open oneself to the other in self-less love. 
In the light of the clarification t Marcel's definition of presence 
t 11' th t . I' h . t . 51. d' t 11 a~; ery H\ e exac' meo sure 1n W HC .l 18 presence 1S ma e 1n e -
i bleD This notion is, therefore, an int element of his ontology. It 
i also at the centre of his attempt to reach an experiential knowledge of 
the mystery of God. Presence gives the seal of ec to intersubjective 
love (lfld fid li Presence, however~ is only partially satisfied by those 
human expel'iences when the intersuhjective inspirat.ion remains in the human 
imen on. recognizing'the enduring presence of others~ we acknowledge 
no them but Being which is ever present, surrounding and enfolding uS s 
aIJp I ing to u through the "ontological need". The ontolo cal need is 
on1.y ially satisfied in finite centres of response. It will be wholly 
ati fled in eromat ic union with a Thou of a higher order ( than a !I thoull) ; 
tIta t .i to say the ontological need will be sa tisf ied fully only in an 
inf inite centl'e of response. Since presence is to be found in all creation, 
visible or not it must emanate from the Creator. Presence is thus estab-
Ijshed in an Ab olute Presence. 
A mystery, presence is closely connected with the other dimensions of 
t.he mysterious, Of the e rDj th is the mOBt important fOl' the 1Jurpose of 
thj::; the is. Faith Dud prc cnef: Illu:.,;t be irlterrcLlt ed, if l,im'c("l's "pl'C::: llt 
ial ani110 1. to be valid as El way of affinning the rei:ility of God. For" 
in hi inve ti tions .into the b·anscendel1.ce of the Ab~:olute 'l'holJ., he recog··" 
nizcd the need to djf;tinguish betwec:fl existence and objectivity f30 thnt~ 
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while in no way attributing objectivity to the Absolute Thou~ its existence 
should be safeguarded. 53 It is s therefore, through the notion of intersub-
ject ive presence that. Mareel shows the wey to a hyperphenomenolo I 
54 to the mystery of God1s lI ex istence ll • In shorty Godts presence 
is hi ex,ist(:;nce: God is because he is preser..t. 
God, then, is Absolute Presence, the transcendent 
B t' G ' t ] 11., 11 55 G d' B' t u 0 IS no. merc.y a pIesc~ce. 0 1S clng, no· is 
Pre ence, not ~ presence. Conceived as lIa presence If , he would be little 
more than ethereal and of no real value for Christian (ioe. reI ) 
experience. E~periences as Marcel understands it, is not closed: presence 
indicate:,;; openness (disponibi,liti) to the other as thou. Absolut.e presence 
is the ultimate ground of presence. It is through the dialo I chara c t er 
of our in'lolverrent in situati"on with others that we can appreciate the true 
nature 
says 
of our relationships with God as Absolute Thou. Just as Augustine 
is Is 1l56 , Marcel t s presential analogy leads to the conclusion 
(aDd not an optional inference) that God is : he is present to and in us. 57 
The connection between Marcel~s Il exigential inference ll (and at the same 
time the transcendence of the lIontological need ll ) and his ttpresential ana1·-
ogy!t can be seen in his comments on an affirmation of God more acceptable 
than tbat provided by the Thomist proofs ! 
Ce cp-,i me semble essentiel dans 1 Yaff irmation de Dieu, 
c'est quielle est IHe a l~affirmation de Jfinsuffi-
sance du monde. Alors en ce sens ce serait ma r~ponse 
au sujet des preuves : pour moi, la notion de preuves 
de P existence de Dieu est une notion que je n1accep-
terai jamais. Cette id~e d1une sorte de d~monstration 
est qudque chose qui ml est aussi qUE: possjble. 
Dans Du refm; ~. 1 ~ invo ion je dis que ces preuves 
- I 
ne sont deE, preuves que pour des gens qui ont deja des 
prem"cs intui tive::· de 1 t existence de Dieu. -"Si ces 
d~monstrationB €taient recevables. elles seraient uni-
versellement recevables pour tous. Kant est tout de 
~gme pa3s~ per 1 II y a sur cc point dans le thomisme 
une certaine na!vet~. 
En revanche, je pense qu' il peut exister des itine-
raircs qui me sent passer par cette conscience 
que le moncle ne se suffit. pas Et lui-meme. C!est dire 
que le monde, quelle que soit sa complexite t ne peut 
peS arriver Et satisfe.ire : c t est pour cda qu! il y a 
une exigence de Dieu. On est toujours oblige de le 
presupposer ou de IleveilIer (il y a une ma'l.euLique de 
cette ) mais cela ntequivaut pas Et une preuve. 
Ce qui compte c i est la sene de Dieu s or une presence 
est~ sur le exist , quelque chose qu'on ne 
demontcc po, ( ) 
(c) "Pr scnc !l clnd "revelaLion n • 
Gabriel Murccl does not. neee ~ therefoce, to elabord.e proofs of Goel 
aftel' the manner (If the ThomisLs nor even after the HlilDner of Ansclm. It 
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would appear, however, that Marcelis presential analogy is very close to 
revelation : his notion of the immediacy of presence seems to presuppose 
revelation. In an effort to avoid transgressing beyond tlpure tl philosophy, 
he clairrls that there is a distinction between theological and "ontological lf 
revelation. At no time, really, does he have recourse to the Revealed Word 
of God as it is couched in the Scriptures. 
Revelation in the theological sense, Marcel declares, is the opposite 
of enc,uirv ; an enquir consciousness desiring to be self-contained would, 
in his view, be opposed to theological revelatioc. 59 On the other hand, 
he says, revelation of the ontolo order is unspoken. According to his 
acceptance, this lIuntolo calli revelation is the impulse of the l1intuition 
aveuglee'i which is at the heart of the ontological need. 60 Marcel seems to 
be presenting an elitist doctrine, however l when he declares that revelatiop, 
in this sense 9 can be meaningful only to a person who is involved in and 
cowmitted to participating in a non-probl ic reality which founds the 
being (person) as subject. 61 He claims that this revelation ~ the recognit-
ion of the ontological mystery - can be grasped by those who are strangers 
to religion in the accepted sense. Those who are already "religious" will 
be enli ened to plumb the depths of the mystery of being in a way not 
possible 62 to those who will not venture beyond the sphere of the problematIc. 
Be that as it may ~ Marcel t s whole notion of presence and the ontological 
revelation which gives it meaning does appear to be valid only for those 
lispecialll beings who are given a lIspecialll e. which here seems to be in 
~~,-
effect sufficient insight to agree with Marcel's whole presentation of being 
Po c,uestion which Marcel leaves unanswered is the source of this Honto~' 
logiciil revelation H • If he were to reply that it comes from being itself 9 
ince it;;:; manifestation is the ontological need and content aware-
ne of t.he ort:.ological mystet~y, he should have to be more specif ic than to 
attribute it source to an abstraction. And if he shies clear by naming 
sOIr.e issanee spirituelle", we can only conclude that. the source is Being, 
Crecdive Activity of God. "Ontological U and "theolog !t revelation, 
t tcm from the same source. The phrase "ontological revelation" seems 
to to much the same thing as a translation into philo ical lang-
uege of divine revelation. From this consideration we can see that Marcel 
di tbe influence of grace as !tune sorte d' ieradiation fecondantg~11 
And the ca e of those who ohject to the thinly-conceRled religiou element 
in :lIe\l-eel j s pl,i J Ofiliphy IS fUI'Llle I' ~;trerli;tl1ened ,~ nnr! conf j f'mpd wllUt i:; 
yet to come. 
iv, nibilite" 
Fundamental to the efficacy of presence is the readiness on the 
of each to open himself (Ilto Ol~·en credit ll L to bestow himself selfle:::s 
in the ,interests of the other. This disposition Marcel calls 
It is a term which has been used already in thJ.s thesis, and 
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should be reasor1ably clear. The French term is, as ~rarcel admits, diffi-
cult to translate: it has been variol:sly rendered as "handiness", Itavail-
abil i 11 (the commonest)? Itdisposabil itytl and in the A icized form 
n.ibil i 11 While I prefer to keep the or'iginal, I have at times used 
Itavailabil i rather than a composite term, after the style of Heidegger, 
IIwillingne -to~respondtl. Whatever the translcition, Marcel stresses the 
rtance of this disposition : 
Il est en r~alit~ essentiel ~ la vie, non seulement ••• 
de se refer-er a autre chose qulelle, mc:Jis de s'articuler 
intedeurement a une realite qui lui donne son sens et 
con;me sa justif ication. (64) 
that It 16 upon our l'eady openness, our 
----'"--... ~--~,,~. 
ends our re~ponse: 
it is of our essential freedom a~ human 
the challenges and responsibilities of int 
The opposition between the two extremes, 
li ) has its roots in the opposition between 
"Unavsilabil i tyil arises from the unwill 
to lose so~e measure of status. the ur~ill 
choose to accept or refuse 
ect presence. 65 
and ~onib~­
lIhavingll, 
of oneself, fearing 
to surrender one1s poss-
e55ion5. The person who is obsessed by his possessions is self-absorhed, 
66 
and tends to identify himself with what he has and ~ot with what he is. 
This egocentric attitude is broken down when the person is open and dispon-
~~ 
ibJ~~,; selfless acts of love help to dismantle the "heclge~hog defences" 'of 
indis nihiliie. We can appreciate that "availability" is the haLl-mark 
of the Christian or it should be. It can be easily identified as the in-
spiration of Christian ethics. There is a close connection bet"een 
~--'-c __ 
bilit& and r enee Presence is essentially intersubjectivity. it is the 
gift of self, it belongs to the being capable of giving himself. To be 
incapable of presence is to be encumbered with the self. 68 . 
It is throu my readiness to put myself at the disposal of anothep who 
is mutually pre ent to me that I am enabled to recognize the "veiled ll pres-
ence ( / re ence voil ) of be 69 The "veil" is apparently removed once 
I accept the otlier find welcome him in a mutual exchange of re::opect and love. 
In response to tile nppenl ()(ldJ'(~ "cd to me i!;'. a feJIO\\'" (Cxistent, I come t.o 
see the other in Cl new light, for his presence is Cl "prcs.ence eclairiwte", 
Tbus~ in response to (;od's appeal to me for' "conversiollll, I can con:e to 
"sec" him also in a new light, the light of grace. Thly willingnes to extend 
unl imHed credi t in t.he other' favour relaxes t.he re,,:tl'ictive tension 
86 
(2rl~~.:~E) of my attachm;;nt to self (the !lmol!!) so that I am free to give 
of my "indispensible" time and attelltion. 70 I welcome him to the fulness 
of my response so thatJ in the awareness that he has been recognized as a 
7,j 
fellmv,-being '9 he too can share in the experience of grace. 
v, Grace 
For, in effect (and certainly on the reI plane) my availability 
.is my ready sition to the influence of grace. Grace, for Marcel, is 
not an empirical datum; it is an appeal from a supra-empirical reality. The 
effectiveness of grace depends on my freely chosen response to participate 
in an inter' ective communion which is grounded in an unobjectif iable 
presence. In this context, grace is the off to'me of the Absolute 
Fresence by "himself lt as Absolute Thou whose call I am invited to recipro~ 
cate. And my response should be activated by a keen sense of joy and i-
tude inasmuch as grace is, by definition, a gift. Being, life and existence 
are gifts and in this sense can be regarded as graces. My individual, pers 
on8_1 being 15 a precious gift bestowed upon me for my safe--keeping by my 
Father who is he epitonte of that prototype of t-givers, the loving 
creation of Go 
through procreation, Marcel suggests, that we share in the 
Indeed, he sayst it is precisely as fatherhood in i s 
l?~ri~t.,L that the relation between the 1 God and the faithful should be 
, ,72 
conce1veo. 
The salvific rale of freedom is the possibility presented to us to open 
ourselves to grace just as, in human love, we are- free to surrender ourselves 
to the other l s charm. While charm cannot be equated absolutely with pres-
encc, 
feI L 
Once 
charm does seem to be one of the ways in which 
Charm is non-objective, Marcel explains$ it is 
w note the cOf.nection between freedom and 
a presence makes itself 
intersubjective. 73 
74 grace. Marcel 
aE ert the idea of grace is fundamental jn the "true 1t apprehension of 
freedom. It is only on the basis of grace-freedom, he claims, that We can 
rise to the affirmation of the presence of God. 
L'i e de la grSce doit @tre jug~e fondamentale, et 
je serai m&me port~ ~ dire ~le crest seulement h 
partir cl 1 elle que nous pouvons, si gauchement que 
cc soit, nous 61ever vers liaffirmation je ne dirai 
pas de l'existence, mais de la pr~sence de Dieu. ( ) 
When we reflect on the question "What am I?", grace shows us that this 
qu :,;tion is an appeal. to the Tr;J!l~cenc1{~nt j\b~;oluLe Thou who alone knows Ille 
~ 11 d I'd' l' tt 76 WtlO, y an "" lO C2IH10L cc lye mc, )eJng TrUl e 
Weaknes cs .in Marccl' gr'acc'fre('dom-~!Lsp!?_IlLILL!L~~~ notion have already 
b 'd ' . ,77 . t I' cen Hl 1cateu ,but. her'c I must 1)0111 out t.hat Mnrce case, as presented 
in this context of his pr'csential i111ulogys leads so far and no furlhc)'. For 
t5( 
grace's mission is to show that God as Absolute Thou and Truthful Presence 
is addressing to me an appeal to ask the question about my ontological 
stE~tuS, ~larcel leaves the answer unsaid, as well as any elaboration 
beyond the "threshold" of conversion. His reluctance to proceed further 
is dictated by his own avowed position: he rem2ins the "philosopher of 
the thresho ld l1 " Any elabora tion, we mus t conc lude, would be considered 
by nlarcel as an exercise in mystical speculation., As far as he is con-
cerned, his contribution is to demonstrate, by his dialectic of partici-
pation in an ontological, intersubjective communion, bolstered by his 
presential analogy, the reasonableness of faith in God who is to be con-
sidered as Absolute Thou. 
vi, Invocation 
I cannot think of God without thinking of my relation to him as a mutual 
exchange of appeal. But we should not know to whom to appeal unless an 
ociginal appeal had already been addressed to us, urging us to enquire about 
our (ontological) condition. This is a return to the circularity of the 
notions of grace, freedom and disponibilit~. There 1S also something of 
the idea of prevenience in this argument and it can be seen operating 1n 
the ontological need. 78 In !E.,):'. invocation as prayer, by refusing to think 
of God as ~, I maintain a truly dyadic relationship and recognize the 
completeness of my dependence on GodJ9 The Absolute Thou is thus my absol-
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ute Recourse I since what is at stake is my very being. It would appear, 
then, that what ~larcel really means by the "ontological need" is that we 
should proceed from a recognition ~f the need for being to the recognition 
o ' 81 1 . 
or Be~ng. The ontological need on the plane of phi osophy 1S transcended 
on the plane of a higher philosophy Olarcel t s "metaphysics"?), in an 
identification of the need for the Absolute Recourse. 
The recognition and acknowledgment of the Absolute Thou elicits, hlarcel 
h d . 11 h .]. t 82 . t . f . t· t apes, a respon8e ma e 1n a um1,1 y by the subJec 1 1 1S 0 be 
regarded as a confession of faith in God. There must always be the possi-
hil ity of refusaL 83 It is only by free invocation that I open myself to 
the Ab::olute Thou. lilarcel defends his use of the mystical language of the 
appeal by positing a line of demarcation between mysticism and metaphysics. 
The terms of the appeal do not describe an experience, he explains; rather 
they translate a fundamental situation which the philosophcr ought to 
'l ' 8/+ recogn1ze regnrcLc::i~; of h.is pel':;on;ll helIefs. Be that as it fTl(lY, thcre 
are probably rnDny t!lillkel'~; who wouJ cl not accede to ~larcel! s request.. The 
very prayer·-like I'onn of the it(lPCDl mu:;t he construed as addressed to God, 
if it is not to be taken as the nJc1nifest.o of on agnostic 
Que suis-je? Toi seul en v~rit~ me connais et me 
juges; douter de Toi, ce nle~t pas me lib~rer, cfest 
mfan~antir. Mais ce serait douter de Toi, bien plus, 
ce serait Te nier que de regarder Ta realite COlTUTle 
sujette a probleme; puisque ces problemes ne sont 
que par moi et pour moi qui les pose, et qu! ici Cl est 
moi~"me!t1e qui suis mis en question dans 1 facte sans 
retour par lequel je m'efface et me soumets. (85) 
88 
Faith, hope and love coincide in this invocation by which we aspire to the 
fellness of the fellowship of Being. It is because of our faith and trust 
in God as Absolute Thou that we love all other beings in their presences, 
who have their value only in the Absolute Presence. Christian religion 
and ethics can be summed in the prayer, I! I hope in Thee for us". 86 
The question of experienceable relations with God is, however, not 
easily answered, Just as we do not re~ire identification from our guests 
because we respect them as persons and do all in our power to assure them 
of an unconditior~l welcome, so in prayer we do not ask God to provide his 
"papers". Just as we do not question the existence of our intimate friends, 
so we should not require objective, demonstrable proofs of God's identity, 
1 et alone of his existence. Our friends ~.£. there, and we get to know who 
they E£~, better by intercommunication. In the same way, it could be argued, 
God _tS. and we get to know him better through appeal and response., 
But here we encounter an objection, and one to which Marcel does not 
provide a cut-and-dried solution. The objection is that, whereas our knowl-
edge of others is gained through our ~~, God is not "there" in any sens~ 
ible (i.e. physical) manner, It is all very well to say that if we speak 
. 87 
of God as a "someone", we treat him as an absent third party and refuse 
to him who is the Source of our being what we freely and unconditionally 
accord to others. For then we are led to infer that God is_, and this aff irm~ 
ation depends on a presupposition of faith. This faith in God~ as Marcel 
no tes y involves the aff ir1ll8tion tha t it is itself conditioned by God, which 
88 is to say: "l' esprit pose Dieu corr.me le posant". Any relationship between 
myself and God can only be established with any validity if first I recog-
ni.ze God as God, The fundamental C[ucstjon, therefore, is one of faith and 
this shall be investigated in the following chapter. 
~Iaccel admits this necessary precondi tion of faith when he stresses 
that our relations with God are only analogous to those that unite us with 
those fellow beings whom we love. 
11 semble que SI eiJ('Juchent entre Dieu et 1 e croyant 
des cc 1 El t. j 0 n." si ngu 1 i Cl' CIliC n t iJ IlL! 1 0 SU e ~~ El"'~":'~lT~-,~-"--'-' 
qui d~:ns I' or~dn~ de I' amour unissent entre elles 
des creatures. (89) 
Then, and only then, can wc aPPI'eciate the scriptural affinllCttion, "The 
Kingdom of God IS within you", or, as ~Ial'eel says, oneis centre must be not 
in oneself but In God; outside of tIl i 0', there is no religion. 90 We cannot 
speak of G~d without invoking him in us, and for us. Our union is such that, 
as he is my Absolute Thou, I am lJ:~!. for him. As Arnaud Chartrain explaills 
to his stepmothers Eveline, that he has made a pact with God: 
.. Je ni~prouve pas le besoin de donnerun nom a mon GOO 
partenaire; je sais seulement que c'est une presence 
.,' pas une pl'esence humaine 0"'. quelqu fun dont je ne 
peu);_ pas parler, mais pour qui je suis tol. (9'1) 
Ill. God and Being. 
L Enl_~~htenment on the mystery of God 
p,jarc:el ' s approach to the mystery of God is, as we have seen, by "exigent-
ial infel'ence ll • He appears to be wary of the two main avenues, recognized 
by traditional theologians, which lead to possible knowledge of God: revel-
ation and reason, But the latter, by itself, is inadec:uate unless enlight-
92 
ened hy the fOl'mer. Marcel insists, however! that any kind of reasoning 
that tends to objectification must be avoided so that the holiness of God 
can be safeguarded. Theology and philosophy (in the accepted traditional 
sense) BYe both at a disadvantage, therefore, in the question of elucidat-
ing the mystery of God. Theology, of course~ has revelation to fall back 
on. But theology's weakness in its own field, until at least recent times, 
is seen by 111arcel to lie in its use of philosophical conceptual equipment 
which is not attuned to the demands of religious consciousness. Moreover, 
hr; adds~ its equipment borrowed from philosophy i~ outmoded. 93 Marcel 
would seem to urge his own meditative metaphysics as a better vehicle - and 
risk its disqualification as mystical and incor.sequential. 
According to this dialectic, God is always available; he remains open 
to us as long as we are aware of our relatior.ship with him. This can be 
experienced through reciprocal rapprochemc_nt.§., founded on the dyadic inter-
action: in encounter and appeal on his part, and by availability and res-
ponse (through invocation) on ours. This intersubjective relationship 
tends towards culmination in an intimate union of love, first established 
on the human level where we welcome and are welcomed into the fellowship 
of being. Katural theology, Aquinas observes, is the last area of explorat-
, n tl " . d % 'f th h 't G l,on 101' . le enquIrJ.ng run. The beIng 0 0 el's, owever, 1S no' od, 
for tllCit would be p(J\lt.hci~,m. Being is dyl\[llllic~ it .is creative. Being: is 
a limited IlIanner lJY virtue of theil' finitudcQ Thus Being hides Llncl t'cvcids 
9 c' 
itself at the same time. J In t.heological terli1S ~ .o_~:~L~.r'.cY_~lg .. !~~I? i:~ at the 
sDme time Deus ahsconditus. Herein lies the Mystery of Being: its totality 
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is situated in transcendence. Be is, and is gradually revealed - in 
fact reveals itself - as the Absolute Transcendent "which we call God". 
God is. 
Marcel does not, however, completely reject the conceptualized attrib-
96 
utes of God. He even uses some himself, as his critics have pointed out. 
Moreover, he is by no means hesitant in applying himself to conside 
such theological questions, in this context, as the matters of revelation 
and miracles. 97 On the score of attributes~ he defends himself by assert-
that the attribution of supernatural powers and properties to God has 
value only if we can somehow use them to discover the qualities of the 
Absolute Thou without reducing the Thou to human proportions. 98 But the 
traditionalists have no intention of reducing the classical attributes of 
God to hUli1an pt'oportions, and Marcel
' 
s term IlAbsolute Thoui! certainly con-
tains elements of classical attributes, ~lal'cel is just unwill to recog-
nize that he i us the same approach. For if we are to of someone 
with a view to identifying and descdbing him, we cannot do without quali-
tative predicates. 
Marcel reminds us that the affirmation III am!! should be whispered in 
hu~ility, fear and wonder, since being is a gift granted to me so that I 
can walk in the of God. 99 My reaction to this awareness of my being 
as a gift should be itude, not the pride of an assumed self-sufficiency. 
Tlte more God is for me, the more I ~; herein lies the nexus of the intim-
ate relationsh between us. It seems to Marcel that if an advantage (by 
which he presumably means the advantage of Ilbeingll, considered in its pot-
ential) can ever be considered as °a gift, it is inasmuch as it comes to be 
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re d as a di cl form of the gift that God makes to me of himself. 
This is the 
of which I 
icance of the fellowship of being towards the realization 
impelled by the ontological need. My approach to God lies in 
the invocation of him as my Absolute Recourse. I do not count on my own 
s h (remembering that Christ said, "Without me you can do nothingll), 
but my r I accept the initiative and open an infinite credit to 
God. Thus my weakness is fortified and consolidated by his strength. 
Tlli 
Dflyth 
idea of 
Pour que s!accoffiplisse le renversement de perspective 
r,d nsabl e, pour que ce qui s ait une def icience 
infil1ie se revele une plenitude infinie, il faut que 
la conscience, par un mouvement de conversion d~cisive, 
stirnnole devant Celui qu'elle ne peut. qu!invoquer 
COlmnc son Pdncipe j Sel Fill" son Recours unique. (101) 
ft of ~;e If to God i C' ullcollcli tiOllUl; lily plOdsoer should 
1 ike a bribe as a vitiat cl ell:ent. There should be 
Itlf you grDnt llIe this fflvour 9 I sh'o'\J.I do such and such 
no t lk, ve 
no elfish 
for you lt , 
or' worse, llIf you wnnt me to do this for you, you will have to grant llle 
this favour". Praser must be clmrDcterized by Cl. loving, tl'ubting hU[J)iJl~y 
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~larcel sugge ts the following formula for a truly "existentiaP prayer 
Je te demande de te r~v~ler ~ moi. de te rendre 
present Et moi 5 en sorte qu' il me soit possibl e de 
me consacrer Et toi en reconnaissance de cause -
alors que dans ma situation presente, je ne puis 
t 'apel"cevoir a travers les nuees d'incertitude 
qui m!enveloppenL Je ne pretends d1ailleurs pas 
que tu doives attacher pour toi un prix quel-
conquc Et cette consecration qui ne peut en ajou-
ter fA ce que tu es; mais si tu m'aimes~ si tu me 
rege.ldes comIDe ton f ils I il me semble que tu dois 
vouloir~ non certes pour toi, Inais pour moi-meme. 
c[ue je te recormaisse et que te serve I puisque 
SI il ne mlest pas donn~ de te reconnaltre et de 
te servir, je suis voue Et la perdition. (103) 
While m2king allowance for the r81e of insight (an intuition not grat-
uitously instinctive but which arises from our initial awareness of the 
need that there be being) in the structure of his dialectic, Marcel none 
the less stresses the dHe of analogy through his enquiries into the signif-
icance of the experienceable presence. This is elicited by an appeal in 
the context of intersubjective encounter. It may well be objected that the 
pl'ecordition for' our acceptance of any appeal is that We already consider 
our situELtion favourable for communication. That is to say, only if we are 
conscious that an appeal is directed to US 9 can such an encounter be potent 
ially effica~ious. Marcel counters this by positil~ the prior affective 
attitude of which depends on our free choice to agre or 
refuse to open ourselves. But, as has been pointed out104 s this notion 
does not really answer th~ objection; it can be argued that lit~ 
iSc the predi"position .?n which depends our choice to acc or refuse. 
Wha t di t sl1es authentic existential presence is not the simple 
fact of the other be present in a purely spatio-temporal situation which 
coinc with ours. Rather it is the discovery of the other1s mutual res-
is so int 
totally prepared to establish a dyadic relationship which 
as to fuse the !1I~thou!! into a harmonious "we ", 105 What is 
important., therefore~ to constitute true presence is not the "what" but 
the "who ll of the other. 
~arcell position is that the interpersonal 
level ore analogue::; of the intcf'perHHwl relat ionsll 
ionships of the human 
between man and God 
on a subl il:latcd level where the natural and supernatural dimen ions of' being 
CUll subsi t in compatibility. The ~resence of be to h mircors the 
presence of being to Being; IIhUlE3n" iH~escnce I;; transcended in Absolute 
Pr'cscnce. If \v c arc to reach Goel, I\jar-eel affinns, it will be through 
by of regarded 10G If way .i3.~:i.C .. <::, as an grace IS 
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the 1!afflux of being!!, and if grace, in analogous language, is the sharing 
of God's "life", we can appreciate that the only valid identification of 
God is that which he himself supplied (through revelation) : I am who am. 
God, therefore, is Transcendent Being. God is. Now this statement is not 
necessarily incomplete, if we recall the thesis given in Chapter 1, that 
Being is Creativity. God is Being, therefore, because God is Creativity; 
God is Creator. We can perceive that Marcel has'a definite affinity, in 
this respect, with Augustine who proclaimed that God is Is. 107 We can also 
see that God is Presence (not ~ presence, just as God is not a being), for 
his Presence creat~s and sustains other beings who are for us in that they 
are present to us, as we are to them. 
In postulating his "presential analogy", Marcel is advocating no revol-
utionary theory about the humano-divine relationships. The notion of God 
as Presence, as understood in Marcel's terms, is a constantly recurring 
theme of the Bible. 10S He who effectively lives in the presence of God -
in both the scriptural and the Marcellian sense ~ understands so well the 
1 f 1 · f . th th t 1 d . t . f . t' f . t 109 va ue 0 1S' al' a 1e nee s no JUS 1 lca' Ion or 1 • The unbel iever 
is as yet not in the state (of mind - or of grace?) to understand fully this 
justificatio~ of the believer. We are led, on the behalf of the unbeliever, 
to consider the matter of faith, the nature and activity of the Act of Faith, 
and of faith itself on which depends, ultimately, the acceptance or reject-
ion of Gods regardless of the persue.sive power of the most elaborate apolo~ 
getics. This is the content of the next chapter. 
Conclusion 
So much has been made of Marcelts apparent anti-rationalism that it 
would seem that he is antipathetic to any form of reasoning. He is not. 
His enquiries into the modes of knowledge and experience, for example, 
reveal a keen sense of discursive reasoning, One objection that can be 
made, however, is that he does seem to rely rather heavily on what he calls 
"ontological revelation", This feature can be discerned in his dialectic 
of the ontological need and also in his circular argument for the "trium-
virate" (or !!troika") of grace-·freedom-disponibilite which leads to an 
----~--~ .. ~-
e] itist doctrine, that is to say th;:d: !lIa['ccl presents a dialectic which can 
really have veJlue only foe those pcrSOIlS who will be sYlllpathetic to lLi~; own 
approach. ~Iarcd wa:'; di~)~.;at isf ied \Vi 1.,11 the old<-fashioned rational i:;;m \I'hi ch 
would, in his view, enslave lIlan to i'llistractiom3, .impo;;ing human schernaUl on 
reality in an .~_P_l~~..?.~:J. fEu;hion. In his zeal to restore ontologicRI wei:.~llt 
to experience, lIlarcel scems to have allowed for too much weight; he appCill'S 
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to concentrate too much on phenomenological descriptions and linguistic 
cs at the expense of explanation by reason, In his desire to rectify 
the del nal tendency of rationalism, he has himself tended to 
the opposit extreme. Perhaps he would subscribe to Ren€ Le Sennels axiom 
10 
ThOIT!ist proo 
is the description of experience. His blunt rejection of 
of God1s existence came just at the time when he was determ-
ined to break conclusively with idealism. We may' suggest that his preoccup-
aUon with an e ential ontology obscured from him the possible latent 
existentialism of Aquinas l as interpreted in the modern context by such 
Thomist writer's as Jacques Maritain and William E. Carlo. 
~arcel's concern is to show that the individual in his situation-in-the-
world can be led to a personal encounter with God. In this respect he count-
ers the bland existentialism of He whose man is in a wor Id-wi thout-
God, Indeed$ as Marcel admits~ such a personalist approach as he adopts$ 
verges on nysti He us, on that score, that the spiritual part 
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of us is never wholly subdued. Our very faculties of mind, memory and 
conscience bear witness to that. The restoration of the spiritual awareness 
of our or'ientation to higher 
he calls econdary reflection. 
is made possible in the dimension of what 
1 '11 None the less, as has been pointed out 
there are some minds who do need a ratio~al proof of Godts existence. The 
discursive reasoning of these proofs does not necessarily harm the concrete 
enC{Uiry into Godls l'eality, or the non~'objeetified conception of God which 
Marcel demands" Troisfontaines declares in defence of Thomism : HDes doe-
trlnes comme le thomisme, par exemple, distinguent parfaitement, gr~ce ~ 
IlanaJogie, l'objet empirique j rep ent~ en sa forme propre et connu en 
lui""rHcme s et 110bjet transcendant simplement signif h~ dans et a travel'S le 
premier. SignifiE en tou~ Bete de raison, et done object 
d2ns liargument. Dieu nlest pourtant atteint en lui 
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atJ{·.orise 8. le traiter comme un tobjet' quelconque". 
en ce sens 
et rien ne nous 
ly decided that 
rationalism alone was not the meens of arriving at a knowledge of tent 
l' . , l' ea .. 1 t:) • For him~ the dichotomies between thought and be , self and God 
",ere epistemological rather than ontological. Nevertheless, he claims, 
the e epistemological distinctions presuppose an ontological unity. 
La connaissance se suspend ~ un mode de participation 
dont une epistemologie quelle quI eIle soit ne peut 
esperei~ rendre compte parce qu! ell e-mclPc 1 e suppo e. (113) 
",[dIe breaking [!'toe of the grip of rationalism and impcl'fionaJ. id(~rllisll1, 
~!arcel none the less strives to rctajn contact~ without cOlllpl'omi,;jng him-' 
self, with un cpi t.emology viable for his dialectic of the Ontologiced. 
{cry. 
Work through Cl rcali::;,t fnllnC\\'OI'k, he shows that epistemology and 
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ontology can be made compatible. His own vehicle for achieving this concil-
i 14 iation is what has been described as a "personalist epistemology" • 
According to this, we encounter reality only through communication with it. 
~Iarcel seeks to show a "corresponder:ce" between the eternal and personal 
exper'ience, But this method does not necessarily lead to subjectivism; it 
gives pre-eminence to real communication as the basis of personal experience. 
I cannot be cut off from others without being cut .off from myself. Kno~ledge 
is universal, and even self-knowledge - to be truly authentic - is not 
egocentric but heterocentric. The starting-point of Marcelts metaphysics 
is the communion of the "I-thou" relationship, not the "ego sum" of the 
c0l2'J~~o, It is through the phenomenological study of interpersonal relat ion-
ships that we can approach a hyperphenomenological appreoiation of the 
reality of God as Absolute Thou. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 
L EPe 266, cL EA I i2i ~ 151. 
(a) Concerning a priori proofs: Saint Anselm admits this prior accord-
ing of bel ief J m~kTng it clear in his Preface to the Proslogion that 
belief precedes his argument. For him, the purpose o~ument is not 
to give rise to belief but to make possible the comprehension of belief. 
"Credo ut intellegBm l1 , he confesses and describes his Proslogion as 
"fides quaei'ens intellectum l1. On this admission, Anselmts "argument" 
is disqualified for the purpose of helping an unbeliever "see the light", 
(b) Concerning a poste~'iori proofs: For his part, Saint Thomas Aquinas 
claims that faithi)re,-,upposes natural knowledge. Nevertheless, he says, 
there is nothing to prevent a man from accepting, as a matter of faith, 
something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and 
derronstrated. (Summa Theologiae, I, q. 2, ad 2m). Aquinas argues from 
causality : there are two types of demonstration - one from cause to 
effect, the other from effect to cause. From this principle come his 
five ways to God: God seen as prime mover, cause, and necessity, and 
Ulroughgrada tion and governance of be ing (Summ~lheol~. I, q. 2, 3 resp. L 
In his very interesting essay, itA Form of the Ontological Argument!!, 
Dom ~jark Pontifex writes, ItUltimately perhaps all arguments for God are 
variations of a single argument" (The c.;ew Scholasticism, vol. 90, No. 
298, Jan, '1972, p. 59). 
2, ME II -175. ef. EPC 266, EA I 121. 
3. JM 255. EA I 151, EPC 263. 
It'- ~lE II 177, EA I 151. 
5. EPe 260. cL ME II 175. 
6. EPC 267. The need, says ~larcel, is for a HOL"VO\) Tr.or vinculum 
tlqui est lui-Illeme concret, bieD qu!en un autre sens t.out ideaT-:-ii-"'-'"'''~ 
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7. EPC 262-270. cf. ~E 11 176. 
8. ST 256-257. He observes~ furthermore, that there are some so-ccdled 
believers who act iike atheists, living as if there were no God, yet uho 
would be astounded if they were accused of virtual atheism. cf. Chapter 
4~ fn 3,1;-, p, 130. 
9. [lIE I 19. He adds : "Notons bien la difference entre ces formules 
et celles de l'agnosticisme courant au XIX e si~cle : Je ne sais pas si 
Dieu existe ou non." We shall see in the next chapter, which deals with 
fai th 1 l\lal'cel t s distinction between libel iev ing" and libel iev ing in", 
which will help clarify his statement made here (p. -111 ). 
10. J;\1 65 j 77, 153-157. 223~224, 232, 255, ME II 75-76. As we shall see l 
this disqllalif ication of judgment lies at the root of Marcel ' s opposition 
to theodicy in the ma.tter of the "mystery" of evil and suffering. See 
Ch8pter 4, fn 65, pp. 133~134. 
11 < JM 230. 
13. e.g. La Sweeney, op. cito, loco cit., 1 03-1 O!I-. 
>l~.. cf < J~l 34-35 : "Nier Dieu comrne existant •• 0 Cl est refuser absolument 
de le traiter comme un objet empirique, crest en m@me temps par suite 
nier (et la nEgation se transforme en la n€gation de soi, clest~~-dire 
en la negation d'une negation) que rien dans l'experience, que rien dans 
cc qui existe puisse etre incompatible avec Dieu, puisse exclure Dieu,. 
La negation de 11 existence-de -Dieuseconvertit ainsi en 0affixmation 
de la puissance de Dieu comme transcendante par rapport ~ tout possible 
empirique,11 And again, JA! 35-36 : "La negation de Dieu comme existant 
en(.raine 1 'affirmation de Dieu comme tl'anscendant.1I See Chapter 4, fn 
n, p. 128. 
1.5. DH46. 
'16, EPC -i54, "La dominante existentielle dans mon oeuvre ll , loc. cit., 175, 
cL EA I '169, 178-179. See Chapter 2, fn 50 (P. 68). 
17. nlarcel has rema.ined obdurate in his resist.ance to Thomist reasoning. 
\'lriting in 1932 of the Thomist proofs, he says: "Ce ne sont pas, je 
crois, des clLemins j mais de faux chemins, comme il y a de fausses fenetreO''' 
(EA I 12'1), Twenty~three yec:rs later he has not mollified: IIll me semble 
qulil faudrait en fini0 Bvec l!id&e d'un Dieu Cause, d1un dieu concent-
rant en soi toute causalit~, ou encore. en un langage plus rigoureux, 
avec tout usage theologique de la notion de causalite, crest justement 
ici que Kant nous a 1l10ntre le chemin sans peut-@tre aller lui-"ITlerr,e 
jusqtl1au bout de sa decouverte. 11 se pourrait ••• que le Diet! dont 
Nietzsche a annoncE veridiquement la mort ffit le dieu de la tradition 
aristotelo~·t!lOrniste, le dieu premier 1l10t eur " (HP 63). 
18. Through interpersonal relationships between God and the existent being 
(creature) there is no need for any Kierkegaardian leaps from the finite 
to the infinite according to a dialectical process which could be invalid-
ated. Such is the negating aspect of the ontological proofs. Marcel 
sees his own approach, by the concrete experiences of fidelity, hope and 
love; as more acceptable philosophically than lUaritain's "sixth wayll -
the "eidetic visualization l! (see Chapter 2, fn 13, p. 64). In inter-
subjectivity freedom ie; 11I,)jnt.~ljned : it .1::, in the jntersubjcct.ive cncount. o , 
er tllQt love "llliikc:,;I! ("lct.s") the other' be free. This is the lIIutua) 
rdat.ion'illip between God clnd man. 
19. e.g. F. Cople,;ton, 11 !lj'itory of Philosophy, vo], 2, Pnrt 2, 27·,,21\; 
E. Gilson, Le TllOllJisfIIC ri941T: .... ·~1·.-·~1~rjt~lTi·l~--I~xj"tel1ce and the Existl~nt 
(tr), 12. S~~j\I;;;·~;~dj·x·j fOl~ furthcl' treCltllle-~t'-'~)-r"i\h;';:'~-~-i-'-~i'~!'~I--A;i~in~l':c';~ 
lIlflrcel l s aversion to Aqujnas is more 'pl'operly an aV(Tsion to dcveloped 
Thomi,;m. 
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20. Saint Thomas Aquinas~ ~:E:J_~1.heo}~.K~,ae, I, q. 3, a. 2 resp.; q. 4, 
ad 2 resp, God receives ~_se from ip'§2!-rn esse subs.~stens. 
2'10 Saint Thomas Aquinas, OPe cit., I, q. 13, a. 11 resp. Aquinas's 
words are: "Totum enirn in seipso cOIl'prehendens, habet ipsurn esse, 
velut quoddam pelagus substantiae infinitum et indeterminatuw7It can 
be said that Damascene's expression may be interpreted as a precursor 
of the rather dubious ontological argument for the existence of God. It 
ie: interest ing, however, to compare Aquinas! s translation .~ particularly 
h.\s u::;;e of "substantia" - with Darnascene's original: TO EI\Jen 
t '\ F4 it '\ SII' 
Ol,O\) "CL- TCE:/\O;YOC; OUOI.O:C; mISl,pO\J HexL aOpLGTO\J (De Fide Orthos!. 
I~ ix, PG 94-.). 
22. But, as will be noted in Appendix 1, Darnascene's use of OllG l,a 
would be understood differently by Augustine than it has been interpreted 
by Aquinasc See p. 218. For Mal'celts comments on "substance", see 
Chapter is fn ~123 (P. 40). 
23. EA I 181H 
24. J.E. Smith~ Experience and God, 118. These arguments seem to return 
to the "ontological~~rgumerit" alld, insofar as that terminology is ad-
hered to, Gabriel Marcel certainly appears to opt for that line of 
thought - despite his objections to Anselm's presentation - although he 
reformulates it within the frameworlc of a metaphysics of being. For this 
is pn.'cisely the point: Marcel is not all preoccupied with-~n ontolog-
ical argument for Godis existence. His "argument" (if such a word is 
applicable to Marcel l s appro';:~ETis for God l s bein_I:?' a more sound meta-
physical proposition, as far as he is concerned. 
25. FP 94, cf. DH 46. 
26. FP 65, cL JM 156 9 ME I 106-111, ME II 28-34. 
27. EA I 168. cf. P. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago, 1951), I, 
205 : "However it is def ined, the' exis(e~~fGod contradicts the 
idea of a creative ground of essence and existence. The ground of being 
cannot be found in the totality of beings ••• The Scholastics were right 
w~en they asserted that in God there is no difference between essence 
and existence. But they perverted their insight when in spite of this 
aSSel"tion they spoke of the existencE. of God and tried to argue in favour 
of it. Aclually they did not mean 'existence l • They meant the reality, 
the validity, the trutfi, the idea of God, an idea which did not carry 
the connotat.ion of something or someone who might or might not exist. 11 
[\!arcel may probCibly not-~g~-;;-e with TTITich on what the Scholastics 
l~eally meant by the "existence'l of God and he resists the expression 
"groui',d" (I' soubassement") of being. But he does inveigh against atheists 
who treat of God as "someone who lt (see Chapter ~., pp. 113-114). 
28,. J. ~Iacquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology, SCM, 1966 (London), 
99~'i 00. [\!acquarriefud·bermo-re- diSTIngl11SF\eSGQdTs being as "holy beingll, 
cf. his .Qg~d-Ia~k, London, SCAl, 1967, p. 101. 
29. FP 23-67 (ills XII). On the matter of aW81~eness of God and 'Iexperi-
enee 11 of God 1 P,larcel wri tes : "S Y i1 y a une experience de Dieu (et c I est 
seulement en ce sens que lion peut parler d1existence de Dieu) cette 
experience doit etre un point de depart, et den de plus" (JM 32). 
30. DlI 40. This :is thc C1']'or of suppoE:ing t.hat words mu~"t. denote t.hings, 
Lc" thjngs t1mt cxi~)L" Thi.s i:,;: of C()lll'Se~ the whole problefll with the 
ontologicill ul'(;\II1lt'nt et" we know it.. lllurcel recognize,; only too well 
the illadequacje~~ of' language to cOllvey CXDct meaning. 
31. FP 45. The phrase "concrete nbsLrLlction" is, to say the le[}~it.~ 
disconcert.ing. 
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.32. His assertion is supported by ~faritain (not that Maritain in any 
way had in mind a defence of ~larcel) : IlThe intui tion of be ing is not 
only. like the reality of the world and of things, the absolutely 
primary foundation of philosophy, It is the absolutely primary prin-
ciple of philosophy (when the latter is able to be totally faithf~l­
t~---It's elf and achieve all its dimensions) fI - The Peasant of the Garonne, 
pG 11'1, cL Chapter 2, fn 58 (P. 68) for thevT~;:-bYTl1e Ei=;gli~hool 
of philosophy of Marcel's metaphysics - in O'Malley's eyes. 
hlarcel's understanding of the term 
in the continuing script (pp. 79-81). 
belongs to the dimension of secondary 
crcestion, "Is there being?" (wbich is 
"What is being'?"), demands too high a 
(Jr,,! 173 L 
35. rIlE II 67. 
36 • EA I 147-148, 
"hyperphenomenology" is given 
The question of being itself 
reflection since the initial 
properly anterior to the question 
level of preliminary thought 
37. Ere '12'1-12.3. This is what, in effect, Pietro Prini calls the 
"methodology of the unverifiable" as seen in the title of his important 
work, .£~9riel Marcel et la m~tl:odologie de l'inverifiable. 
38. See Chapter 1, p. 21, 
39. L, Pamplume in "Gabriel ~Iarcel : Existence, Being, and Faith", 89 
in ':(al~J:rench Sty.dies, No. 12, 1965 -- IIGod and the Writer", 88-~00. 
40. EA I 152=15.3. 
4L Po Prini, OPe cit., 119. 
42. P. Prini, op" cit., 117. cL Pierre Colin in ExistentiaU~me c_~-
~~~ ~, Gabriel l\larce1, ed. Eo Gilson, 104. 
43. The phenomenologists express this rather simple fact in over-dressed 
terms. Following Husserlian terminology, we may say that at all levels 
human consciousness is "intentional '! in character (see Chapter 4-, p. 114) 
"noeticoc··noematic" in structure. :\oesis (V6'qcHC; ) is given by the 
Oxford English Dictionary as "the surn::tQtal of the mental action of man": 
noema (\)6rif.W:. ) as "thought, that which is perceived" or "understanding!!, 
and .!.12~-~Elli£ is given ,as "originating or existing in thought or the mind 
alone", To say that human consciousness is noetico··noematic in struct-
ure is to say that the act-of-the-consciousness (noesis) directs itself 
(intends) towards its object as the latter-is-presented-to that-
consciousness (noema). It would then follow that any analysis of a con-
scious experience would be described in terms of a noetico-noematic 
structure. 
44. Gabriel Marcel in his Lettre-Pr~face to Prini's work, op. cit., 8. 
The term is used and illustrated in ~arcelrs play~ leSigne de la croix: 
see Chapter 5, p. 
45. PAC~O 81. While Marcel is no doubt recognizing affinity, it can be 
objected that, applied in a spiritual context, this idea borders on 
identity of souls, i.e. that there is no separate identity (or indivi-
dUGlity) of souls. But this is not the case. Marcel does recognize 
separate identits : it. js of our hi:1Sic fl'cedom to choose, each hldivi-
dually, to reject or respond to the appci-Il emanating frolll the Ol:hfT to 
join fon:es, so to speak, t.hrough prc:')cncc' in Cl recognized ontological 
unity. Even aftel' union, we l'etain Oll), ~;epQI'ate and corporate identity. 
!1-6. The appeal mclY be ac\Llrcs,;ed, not sjlllply by wonl 01' print, by \\'dy of 
a slflile, an intonation of' the voice, an exchange of looks, 01' even by 
an inlnngible qUCll_lty of a period of silence ~ something similar to 
4·7, 
I!love at first sigiltl! (EA I 88, PACMO 83~ DH 95). cL Pascal 
experience (RPR 1/t-3); see Appendix 2, III B, p. 230. 
I!Dyadic ll : mean "between two parties H • Early in his invest 
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's 
ions into relationships, 1I1arcel ob~erves that any verification ( a form 
of objectification) presupposes a "triadicl! relationship (triadic 
threc'-sided) in which I treat the other in the I!third person", as a "hel< 0 
Even a l!you" can become a "hell (JM 160). But, Marcel affirms, as long 
as love is free from all appears on the level of 
the I!dyad", that is on re a "you l,' (more properly a "thou" -
t~) rather than ..Y2~i~) can r be conv~rted into a I!he" (Schg 69). On 
this point he welcomes r as agreeing with him (Schg 74, 78, 82, 87), 
cf. EA I 132-133, EPe 60. 
ME 11 12. Hocking notes that just as there is no "I think" that is 
not thinking something, HWe are!! is an unfinished statement; and later 
that liThe '\'le are t is the uni expression for all of human experience; 
or for none," (IlMarcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics" in Philo-
so and Phenome 10 i , vol. XIV. No. 4, pp. 452, 
P;\CfilO 83-84, EPC 22, DH 96. 
co-presenCE cannot be expressed 
in mind the ul timate cO'~presence 
Yet, Marcel warned earlier (EA I 101), 
in terms of co-existence. He had already 
in the Presence of God. 
cL le Dard 118, SC 159-160, 1 
92, '149 Ca-ncl~'in a lighter vein, L1-9 
P !\C;I!O 78 : "La presence est mys t 
presence", 
jans la mesure meme ou ell e est 
EPe 19. See Chapter 1, fn 119, p. 39. 
J~I 30!,. : IIll faudraH donc qu'il rut possible, sans attribuer au Toj 
alJsolu une objectivite qui ruinerait son es ence meme~ de sauver son 
existence, Et c'est ici que mes tentatives pour dissocier l'existence 
et 1 f obj ctivite prennent toute leur s ication." See Chapter 1, 
fn 1 p, 36. 
cf Ch. Widmer, Gabriel Marcel entiel, 121 
Hectte tll rie de I' s ence cOlllme enee '01' re au rnonde se 
prolonge, Bvons-nous ~tabli, dans la theorie de l'@tre ou de l'amour 
comme com.munion ou presence immediate El autruL 11 
Le 1 le Dc'wart uses' this idea of the presentia 1 "be ingll of God in 
his cont rO\ef'sial book~ The Future of Belief (1967) : liThe reality of 
huwan trDn,:; endence disc oses he presence El realit.y nd aLl 
actual and possible empirical intuition, i1 in the presence of myself 
to myself I find that over and above my own agency (and indeed as the 
ultimate condition of this agency) there is a presence which 'reveals 
me to myself! in a supcrerogatory and gratuitous way, that is, msk 
me !mor fully myself than I should be if I were not exposed to its 
tl.1l Commenting on that passage as the only valid "proof" for the 
existence of God that. lle knows, Dewart hastens to add: "l should under-
line that the 'proof! I have suggested above not only has no to 
say about God's 'exjstence f properly so called, but that it is 
a proof in the classical sense of the term. It concerns a real 
which is not the object of any actual or possible empirical intuition. 
Therefore~ it is an essentially unve:-ifiah](' nrgumenL It, is a 
po ible to look at thc! same f<lcL; and filld nolltin but the ah of' 
Cod. Thi J klvc ronnulnLcd tile Hf'gun:cnl in llypoth 
(pp. 1 We may not.e that God c_ nawed (lE God ~ is nbsent 
of". 
56. Saint l'.u(:1Js Line 9 XIII, 31) ;;6 (PL 32~ 865) : "(DCUIII) 
non aliquo modo c i, See Appendix 1 B, p. 2~~1 (rn ),' 
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ef. Hugh of St. Victor, :;;.S~u:;;;m;:.:n:.:;a~S=-=.:~.;;;.:;.:..;,.;....i.;,.a~r~u_m, tract. I, 4 (PL 176, 
C) : !IEst ergo Deus ubique per sive essentialIl; et aequal-
iter in omni loco, sed non est in id est, non est localis.!I 
e Et une e sur I! idee de Dieu", loc. cH 0, 39, cf. EPC 
EA 121ft : IlDieu ne peut que Ill' etre donne comme Presence 
sbsolue dans 1 'adoration; toute idee que je me forme de lui n'est 
qu1une exprE.ss.lon abstraite, une ,intellectualisation de cette presence; 
et ciest ce dont je dais toujours me souvenir lorsque je cherche Et mani-
er ces idees, sans quoi elles achevent de se denaturer elles-memes 
entre !TIes mains sacrHeges." republished in 
'1966 as 10 on !ldemonstrat~ 
ive phi 0;;00 p. 73). 
PI '1 7Q ; J -,. 
See p. 80. 
PACI\;O 90 
cf. Appendix 1 A. p. 213-214. 
62. PACMO : Bp our resumer ma position sur ce point particulierement 
rtant. et difficile, je dirai que la reconnaissance du mystere onto-
ique, DU jfaperyojs comme le reduit central de la metaphysique~ n! est 
doute possible en fait que par une sorte d'irradiation fecondante 
de la Oat,ion eIle·<-mE!me, qui peut parfaitement se au sein 
d f etr8ngeres a toute l'cli on podtive quelle qu! eIle soit que 
cette recollnaissance qui s'effectue a travers certaines modalit superi-
cure de llexp~rience humaine n'entralne d'autre part aucunement 
I! sion Et une religion determinee, mais qu'elle permet cependant a 
cclui qui lest €leve jusqu1a eIle d'entrevoir la possibilite d'une 
r tout autrement que ne pourrait le faire celui qui n'ayant pas 
d s e les bornes du probl ique l~este en de9~ dn point ou le mystere 
I! tre Peut etre aperc:;;u et proclam€. I1 , 
I 1 
s 
EA I 1 
TentaLion de 
ef, JI\l .3 04 .-
cf. PACMO 80. EPC 83, ME I 178. 
: HI} avo ir comme indice d I une indisponibil possible 
pens er que n r avo ii' plus den c! est n I etre plus I' ien. H 
s EA I 86 ~ 90, '155, PACi\IO SIt. 
67. Seymour Cain. op. ti to, 66. 
display i 
ne), (:ilC j 
those who are 
Werner chnee 
cli 2, IV. 
86, PI 122, 158, 165. Characters in Marcel's who 
nibilit~ include Perrine Champel (MTNPLV), Laurent Ches-
(CA), Ariane eur (CdC), and Moirans (PdS); 
open, permeable to others, include B~atrice Soreau and 
(le Dar~), Simon and Jean-Paul Bernauer (SC). See Appen-
69. t christianisme, vol. 4, 
7,1 I • 
2i 9,P.Pr ,OpeC • " 1191,and 
~larcel's comments on the revelatory myth of Orpheus (who symbolize man) 
ancl Eurydice (who symbolizes mystery). Orpheus was sustained by the 
prese,tce of ce yet. could not look upon her for fear of losing her. 
PI 55! 13 g81'd en arrierel! in 1 
1\:I.(jE.~_~_~,. -l See Chapter 6, p. 1 
PAC10 g~) I',IE 1 100. cL Cl Dude Lcmoyne i 
he treats ju L anoLher ttca~:eft (HelD cc 
In Cl. differ'en ways Etif:l1ne Jot'dan (le 
though for' the fil'::5t times 8:'.' they re 
PACf.lO 
atUtude to O~;lIIondC' whom 
p,,2:!~ ). 
secs his parents, a 
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73, ME I 
74. ;ilE 11 110, PI 115-116, HP 68, 70-71, HCH 187. See Chapter 1, p. 22, 
Ler 2, pp. cL DH 120,197, ME II 113--114, ST 226, nl I 
75. HP cf. EA I 90. 
76. HP It ••• clest ce que j'ai toujours appeltf It invocation, cette 
invocation dont la forrnule poufTait etre enoncce ainsi : toi qui seul 
p(is~'("cles le secret de ce que je suis et de ce que je suis apie a 
devenii,.11 
77, See Chapter 2, pp. 46'~47, 
78. Thi is an example of what Willialll James calls a Itlive, forced, and 
8'-v. 
momentous option ll Will to New York, Longrnans Green, 1909, 
pr, 3-'c~), But it no e s s wager (ibid~ pp. 5-6) so that 
onc m t say, ItWhat have you to lose if you don't believe in i t?!I (in 
this context, the ontological need). !l!arcel is not some !!little senU 
mentalist who comes blow hi voluntary smoke-wreaths and pretending 
to decide th from his own private dream" (ibid, .p. 7). As we have 
alreadY observed, Marcel does not appear to decide very much and, any-
way, assures Us that he will not force his private views on anyone. 
EA I 90, EPC 21 cf. J~l , PI 187, and SdI (l'Emissaire) 258 
I!Dieu notl'e seul Recours". 
Sic See Chapter 4~ p. 1 
J\l 277, HV 210 9 EPC 60-61, ME II 86, TR 87. cL HCR 187, ME I 167, 
EPC 19. In the present context of the recognition of presence, it 
is useful to quote the full passage, at the risk of repetition (s~e 
Chapter' "1, fn 119 p p. 39) : I1Au depart de toute creation, visible ou 
non, on d€couvre la m@me pr€sence, et, ajouterai-je, la m~me son~ation 
de lEEtre a l'ame ~J!il investit, mais aussi l'acte, identique en ses 
specifications infinies, par lequel I' rend tt~moignage a cette meme 
presence C[U1 il lui est au reste donne de pouvoir recuser, c1est-a-dire 
annuler, dans la rnesure meme DU tIle est ame, Cl est-a-dire liberU:.!l 
The significance of this pas age can be appreciated in the light of the 
identification made, in Chapter 1, of Being and the Spirit of Creativity. 
Perhaps it is in this passage that ~lar'cel comes very close to actually 
identifying Being and God. 
Ere 218. 
EFe 217-218. 
[IV 77. See Chapter 5, pp. 159·~160. 
cf. JM 153 t 157. 
J:i! 46. See Chapter 4, p. 116. 
Jiil Emphasis mine. This love, as we shall see in Chapter 6, 
precludes any at tempt at formulating j of the beloved. ~,larcel 
add : !iciest bien tant que lletre aime est pense comme participant a 
Dieu qu'il est place dans cet ordre transcendant par rapport a tout 
ement, ql.!! il est cOll(~m comme valeur absolue. 1l 
JM Epigraph to Chapter 2, p. 42. 
92. Reasoning i~~ none the lc;s Ilcccssilry, We still need. human thought, 
It:..nguage; undcr~~tantling and even, pcdmps, experience to intcl'pl'ct cUld 
COI!:pl'chend wlwt lws been di,-;c.losed. But left wi t11 the range and powers 
of hUlllan intellect. we could know only a little of God if he had not 
chosen to reveal himself. 
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93. HP 69. It has been objected that Marcel himself seems to leave 
philosophy behind in favour of the -mystical form of reflection. Marcel 
recognizes this tendency, even if it is "une e'vasion par en haut "(HCH 99). 
He immediately gives an illustration of his evasiveness by adding : 
"Tout en reconnaissant que le mystique selon toute vraisemblance accede 
a des regions qui lui sont impenetrables, le philosophe se doit, je 
pense, de maintenir, sans eclat de voix, sans demonstrations ostenta-
toires, la necessite du mode de pensee, et je dirai meme d'existence, 
qui est le sien." This is not a convincing argument, it is an example 
of !\larcel rationalizing in an attempt to justify himself. 
94. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles, I, iv. 
95. As Verneaux says, op. cit., 133, Being cannot be represented or 
demonstrated but experienced and attested; it cannot be inventoried or 
defined but recognized and approached. 
96. See Chapter 2, p. 60 and Chapter 4, p.115. 
97. See p. 84. Closely allied to the problem of revelation, in Marcel
' 
s 
view, is the element of the miraculous in religious history. (Marcel 
differentiates between religious history necessarily implied by the act 
of faith and the natural view of history as held by the critical histor-
ians, especially those of the German tradition.) For h1arcel, ~herever 
there is revelation, the miraculous is present in the deepest Sense of 
the term, while a miracle can only be understood as revelation (JM 78-
79). (H.H. Farmer, The World and God, pp. 109-110, disagrees. Farmer 
holds that while all miracles are revelations, not all revelations are 
miracles. It is only when "the experience of God as personal reaches 
its maximum concentration" that such a concept is really required.) Any 
encounter with God - and Marcel cites Fatima rather than Lourrles - can 
be regarded as miraculous, for the course of "becoming" has been inter-
rupted to show (and reassure us of) the abiding preSenCe of God. Accord-
ingly, as far as the notion of history is concerned, there is no inter-
pretation possible for miracles; the historian can only reduce them to 
the status of natural occurrences (JM 79; cf. FP 92). Miracie, Marcel 
asserts, can only be defined as a complex relationship of the spiritual 
order, and can be thought of as miracle only in terms of religious 
practice, that is of faith. "Si le miracle est pensable, ce n1est qu1en 
fonction de la foi, clest-a~ire par dela le dualisme de la matiere 
objective et de l'interpretation subjective, par dela aussi Itidee d'un 
ordre historique - dans le present absolu (qui n1est que pour la foi)." 
(JM 83, 82; cL EPC 15). 
98. EPC 61. See Chapter 4, p. 115. cL p. 76. 
99. ME II 34. cr. ME II 120-122. See Chapter 1, p. 15. This notion 
of God as the Light which illuminates us, a favourite with Marcel, is 
founded on the revelation of God by Christ, in the Scriptures and is 
also used by the great medieval thinkers. e.go i) in Scripture -
Job 3:23, Ps 4: 5-6, 36: 9 ("by your light we see the light"), Wisdom 7: 
26; John 1-:-7-9,8: 12,9: 5 ("I am the Light of the World"); Ephesians 
5: 8-14, Hebrews 1: .3 ("Christ is the radiant light of God's glory!!), 
James 1: 17, I John 1: 6-7, 2: 8-11; ii) in the Fathers of the Church 
- Saint Augustine, De Civitate Dei, XI, xxvii, 2, Soliloquiae I, vi, 12; 
Saint Anselm, Proslogion, I; Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 
Ill, q. v, a. 4, ad 2m ( "he is the light, the illuminating light of our 
illuminated light"); iii) in Gabricl Marcel ~ IIV 10, 369, IIClI 199, 
ME Il 178, 182, 188, PI 193, ST 213, TR 95. 
100. JM 206 : "Et sans doute suis-je dtautant plus que Dieu est davan-
tege pour moi : par la se laisse discerner le rapport intime qui HOUS 
unit. Ma reconnaissance ne saurait porter que sur le don que Dieu me 
fait de soi et il me semhle que si un <wantage peut jamais etre consi-
dere COlllllle un don, c'est en tant qu'il pcut et re rcgarde comllle une 
forme deguisee de ce don que Dieu me fait de lui-rneme." 
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101. EPC 61. See Chapter 4, p. 106. 
102. ME II 85-107. 
103. HV 152. 
104. See Chapter 2, pp. 46~7, and also pp. 86~87. 
105. cf. Schg 89, JM 169, PI 159-160, DH 62. 
106. HP 69. cf. TM 11 170. For this notion to be properly worthwhile, 
there is a need for concrete approaches situated in the intersubjective 
perspective. These concrete approaches, which will be considered more 
specifically in Chapter 5, are fidelity, hope and love. All of these 
are- to be found in Christ w'ho is the !!concretization!!, the incarnation, 
of God's presence. 
107. See above, fn 56 (p. 98). 
108. e.g. Genesis 5: 24, 28: 15-18, Exodus 13: 21-22, I Samuel 3, 
I Kings 8: 10~21, 2Chronicles 1: 6, Job 13-: 24, Psalms 11: 7, 27: 8, 
Ecclesiasticus 24: 4, Jeremiah 35: 19; Matthew 10: 22, Luke 1: 35, 
John 14; I Corinthians 12, Hebrews 9: 11, I John 3: 5~6,~elation 
~3-4. 
109. JM31, 37~38, 42~3, 45, 72, 99. 
110. cf. HCH 99. In this view Marcel is supported by Aquinas : "all know-
ing beings implicitly know God in any and every thing that they known 
(Quaestiones disputatae, tom. 3, De Veritate, q. xxii, a. 2, ad im.). 
111. TM II 378 and E. Sottiaux, Gabriel Marcel, philosophe et dramaturge, 
131. 
112. TM II 378. 
113. PACMO 57. 
114. See Chapter '2, fn 52 (p. 68). 
CHAPTER FOUR 
AFFIRMATION 
Faith 
La foi, ~vidence des choses non vues: 
constallullent je me r~pete cette 
formule lumineuse, mais qui ntest 
lumineuse qu'apres. 
- G. JIARCEL, Etre et avo i rI, 24. 
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Le seul Dieu en lequel je puisse croire 
est un Dieu qui accepte, dans un certain 
sens qui veut qu'il soit possible de 
douter de luL 
- G. MARCEL, Presence et Immortalite, 92. 
From the outset of his philosophical itinerary Gabriel Marcel concerned 
himself with the question of man's relationship with God. Because we are 
trying to establish that God's place is central in Marcel's thought, we 
must consider what he has to say about faith which is the expression of 
this interrelationship. Marcel's investigations, therefore, led him to 
consider the question of faith, a task which would daunt those philosophers 
who, like" him, do not profess to be theologians. Marcel, however, makes 
his enquiries more complex than would seem necessary by bringing out the 
relevance of practically every element of his dialectic of participation. 
These notions he applies in a manner which is more phenomenological than 
epistemological. When we examine what he considers as touching on faith, 
it will be appreciated that Marcel's activity is more that of a theologian 
trying to express his ideas than of a philosopher aiming for elucidation. 
All too often he starts with general a priori theories which he then extra-
polates into his Itconcretetl metaphysics. He provides a compilation of 
assertions, interspersed with aphoristic remarks1 , which are not always 
clear and which appear to lack evidential grounds. 
The extraordinary breadth of the areas into which he delves is shown 
when they are collated and listed: 1) thought on faith - unverifiability, 
the will and the intellect, freedom, participation, opinion, conviction, 
certitude, grace; 2) the act of faith - the fundamental option, evil and 
suffering, sin, miracles, temptations ("tests lt ), religion, prayer, the 
example of the faith of others, fideism and atheism. We can only examine 
what seem to be his key ideas (those which he treats with more than a pass-
ing interest) which bear directly upon his general thought. While some of 
his other notions and opinions will be considered where relevant, those 
areas which he develops more thoroughly and which seem, to me at least, to 
be useful to the purpose of this chapter are: i) the fundamental option, 
ii) freedom and grace, iii) thought on faith and the Act of Faith, iv) "bad 
faith lt , and v) faith a response. 
i. The fundamental option : to believe or not to believe 
Marcel agrees with some of his contemporaries that existential anguish 
does have a dialectical force, but only inasmuch as it awakens in us the 
realization that the ambiguities of our situation in the world can be 
resolved positively by our choice of positive action. This anguish, which 
he prefers to call uneasiness, should impel us to adopt a stance with 
respect to existence, whereby we use our freedom to make a deliberate 
choice which involves a pledge, correspondingly grave, to ourselves, to 
others, and to God. Each choice, then, implies an obligation of fidelity 
corresponding to the hierarchic[ll status of the commitment. We may there 
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fore take it that Marcel holds that each choice also involves a renunciat-
ion of values incorr.patible with the nature of the commitment. Since what 
is at stake is our very being,and since our being is the highest existent-
ial value for us, an absolute choice is involved. 
Because the risks and renunciations of self-interest are greater, the 
"authenticft existent may well be prudently hesitant; for he never commits 
himself lightly. Yet, Marcel claims, he is brought to realize, by reflect-
ing on the mystery involved in the affirmation of being, that the Absolute 
Thou, being more completely within the self than the self itself, can alone 
answer the fundarr.ental ontological question, "What am 11" The response of 
the "authentic" existent to this appeal in encounter with the Absolute Thou 
as his Absolute Recourse must be commitment, proportionately absolute and 
unconditional. This absolute commitment, as Marcel understands it, is faith. 
At this point we need to consider the role of the will in the recognit-
ion by the existent of the Absolute Thou as the sole repository of his 
knowledge of self. For, according to Marcel1s dialectic, the authentic 
existent should be conditioned by disponibilite which, in this context, 
seerr.s to mean not only his openness of mind but his disposition of will. 
Faith cannot be a matter for feeling alone; the will must come into play 
somewhere for consent to be fully accorded. It would seem, then, that this 
feature of Marcel's dialectic can only be described as voluntaristic. Marcel 
himself avows that he is not a voluntarist; faith, he insists, cannot be 
willed. He warns us of the gravity of any voluntarism, at least inasmuch as 
will is distinct from intelligence. A will without intelligence, he states, 
would be only a mere impulse, and an intelligence which lacked a will would 
be devitalized. 2 Marcel appears to have put himself in an awkward position. 
He explains his position by saying that as a soul approaches faith and 
becomes more conscious of the transcendence of its "object,,3, it sees more 
clearly that it is quite incapabl e of producing faith by itself. Faith, 
Marcel affirms, can only be an adherence, a response to an impalpable, silent 
invitation which puts pressure on the soul, without constraining it. We 
might note that this pressure is not irresistible. If it were, faith would 
no longer be faith. Faith, Marcel concludes, is only possible to a free 
crecture who has the mysterious and awful power of accepting or refusing 
the call (inv i ta tion). 4 
The ontological need, therefore, s~ems to work in more than one way. 
Besides being the awareness of the need "that there be being", we can only 
infer from Marce! that it also impels the "authentic" existent to take a 
stand and make a deliberate choice. This choice, the fundamental option, 
€nn then only be decided by the will but by a will enlightened by grace. 
(Obviously there are further ram.if icetions to this notion of the "correct" 
choice dictated by grace; these will be considered shortly.) The first 
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stage ia the recognition of God would therefore appear to be the affirmat-
ion of being. 
Marcel points out that this fundamental affirmation should not be 
regarded as the originator of the reality of being since the "I affirm it 
beco.use it .is" would seem to presuppose an ini tial aff irma tion. Are we to 
go round in circles, or .is it a matter of an infinite regression that can 
only be terminated if the affirmation is posited as the originating moment? 
Marcel's way out of this antimony is his notion of the ontological need: 
Admettons une sorte d'investissement pr~alable du moi 
'par I' etre. (5) 
The self nevertheless intervenes between being and the affirmation, in the 
role of mediator. We are involved in being because we are. It is still up 
to us to use our freedom, and hence our will as well, to opt for the recog-
nition of "being's grasp on us". Faith, the recognition of the divine 
freedom as source and guarantee of our freedom, and also of being, is in 
this way understood by Marcel as a matter for the will. 
But Goel. is the Principle of Being. 6 If we are to recognize "being's 
grasp on us" because we participate in being, we should then recognize 
that being has its source in Being. And that would in turn lead to the 
affirmation that we participate in God. Marcel declares that he is no pan-
theist but he does not satisfactorily elucidate the problem: he appears to 
evade the issue by changing tack. He directs our attention away from a con-
sideration of Being to that of the ontological status of the person who 
affirms that he is. "What am I?" is therefore the primary ontological 
question since it affects the personal existent. The answer to that quest-
ion, Marcel declares (and he does not presume to answer on our behalf), 
will enable us to find our position in relation to plenary Reality or Being; 
and this leads us back to where he left us : to the question of our 
relationship with God. 
ii. Freedom, grace, and sin 
Faith depends on a free choice by the individual existent : a personal 
decision is involved. At once the questions of freedom and free-will 
arise. 7 The interrelated roles of freedom and free-will were perceived by 
Marcel very early in his philosophica.l career when he was investigating 
the idea of thought as free. He decided that insofar as thought wants to 
be free, the particular experiences to which it is bound must seem to be 
in spiritu21 relation to it, that is to say that they have Leen wiJJed (or 
give.!:!). This, he concludes, lecds to the affirmation of a will, or "divj.ne 
freedom" which alone CQn account for the relation which the free mind 
establishes between itself and experience. R Speaking of divine freedom, 
he states that it can be affirmed or denied only Ly freedom (by which .it 
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would seem that he means human freedom, that is by a free individual). A 
question which arises at once is : what does Marcel mec:n by tldivine free-" 
dom"? If this means the freedom of God, it is quite irrelevant whether we 
accept or refuse (deny) it. It must be understood, in the light of Marcel t s 
comments on freedom (in the human dimension, by analogy), that he means 
s as they affect man. We can then affirm or deny that Godfs 
-----------------
freedom (free act) is manifested as "being f s grasp on us". 
Marcel goes on to note that, from a metaphysical point of view, free-
will cannot be denied, but that freedom has the power to deny itself if 
misunde ood. It is interesting to observe that what Marcel then has to 
say about the IIpositive" use of freedom finds theological approbation in 
Aquinas (whom he had not read at the time and whom he was later to misunder-
stand). Marcel asserts that a freedom which affirms itself positively is 
directed towards God since I affirm my will to be. Aquinas maintains that 
when man makes his first choice in favour of the good (i.e. when he uses 
freedom "positively"), he turns to God. Marcel joins forces with the great 
thinkers of the Christian tradition when he concludes that this affirmation 
of being can be valid only by including the affirmation that I have been 
willed and created, and the world with me. 9 
The recognition of our ontologiCal status as creatures is an important 
element of Marcel t s dialectic. Being crecctures means that we are radically 
dependent on God to support us. This support is provided by means of grace. 
Marcel's idea of grace is basically the same as that of theologians (of the 
Catholic persuasion). This grace ca.n "make good" our predisposition (dis-
ponibilit~) for further grace ("the afflux of being"). Marcel is translat-
ing into metaphysical terms the theological concept of lIactuaI" and "sanct-
ifying" grace. According to this interpretation we may infer that grace as 
operational in our relationships with others and witI) God ("sanctifying 
grace") combines with our disponibil i U; - injerent or "made good" by init-
ial (!!actual") grace10 - to arouse in us the aspiration for ontological 
communion (11 the Mystical Body") in the roma (the fulfilment of being in 
"heaven!!). 
But it is plain that this solution to the question of grace-freedom ... · 
disponibilite which bedevils Marcel' s ontology is dependent on the freely 
chosen activity of faith, of belief in God. Without this presupposition 
of faith, Marcel t s whole notion (of gra,ce-freedom-di ite is sterile 
and meaningless. In Marcel's metaphysical terminology, the fundamental 
option is dictated by the ontological need which stems from the realization 
that lIJan is a dynamic being moving ever forward and outward. (We recall 
the dynalllism that charc,ctcrizes being and the horizontal and vertical 
direction of participation.) The fundamental option lies between our 
affirmation of being (an affirmation animated by our willingness to accept 
1 ut) 
the vicissitudes of being) and our refusal to open ourselves to the influ-
ence of being in communion with others. By this refusal, Marcel declares, 
we shut ourselves off from our situation and claim an egocentric freedom 
(useity11) whereby we create our o,wn selves, our oVJn values and even our 
own destiny. This would seem to be the force of the notion of participat-
ion as Mar'cel uses it to clarify his interpretation of the question of 
faith. When the relationship of the subject to the Absolpte Thou is added 
to this argument, we can deduce the theologica.l implications in Marce! t s 
metaphysics with rega.rd to grace,. the individual and God. 
In the connection of grace, it is interesting to consider what Marcel 
has to say about sin, the "refusal" of the invitation to participate more 
lIau thenticallylt in being. 12 
In effect, Marcel has relatively little to say about sin. He deplores 
the obtuseness (in his view) of some contemporary thinkers who fail to 
recognize the problem of evil as the problem of sin when the evil concerned 
is not natural evil but moral evil. However, he himself leaves much unsaid 
on the same subject. Sin, for Marcel, is defined as a free act of the 
individual. It is an act which contradicts the individualts freedom, if we 
are to accept Marcelrs premiss that human freedom can only be defined in 
relation to the divine freedom. 13 He speaks of the "refusal to be" as the 
"ontological sinll, but does not help our understanding of personal, moral 
sin by asking : 
s l il est vrai que lep{ch~ crest Itacte dtune liberte 
se niant cOII'.me telle. (14) 
He offers no conclusion and, if he were to defend himself on the score that 
this is a theological question, he should not have first introduced the 
question. Sin, after all, is a term charged with theological connotations 
and, furthermore, is usually understood in personal terms (and not in terms 
of a personified abstraction 1 ike IIfreedom ll ). 
At best we can infer that, like grace, sin operates at all three levels 
of participation. At the first level, that of the personal existent, sin 
is mun's "refusal to bell, his refusal to recognize his ontological status 
as creature, created in the lIimage and likeness ll of God. At the second 
level of intersubjective relationships, sin is the rejection of others in 
favour of egocentrism. But while we could easily interpret sin on the third 
level as the denial of transcendent Reality, of God, Marcel does not explore 
the notion of sin as the refusal to recognize the Absolute Thou. This 
"other side of the (metaphysical) coin ll relfains unexplored by Mercel. It is 
a glaring deficiency and we can only say tha t this ondssion is in keeping 
with the fact that he also makes no provision for the opposites of the 
, the comlllunion of being, and of God. 
iii. Thought on faith and the Act of Faith 
From the outset it must be stated that Marcel understands faith as 
bearing on God: 
Penser la foi, c'est pens~r la foi en Dieu. (15) 
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While this may appear to be a self-evident truth, it is none the less an 
important point to make because, not only is it directly concerned with the 
subject of the thesis but, Marcel's treatment of the ques'tion leads him to 
introduce certain topics which belong more properly to the domain of theo·· 
logy. When he tried to come to grips with the question of faith - and indeed 
of reality itself - Marcel's thinking was still conditioned by idealism 
(e.g. Bradley) but already influenced by Bergson and Hocking. Accordingly, 
16 his thought process tends to be cumbersome. If this impression has 
already been gained from reading his preliminary enquiries, it will be re-
inforced by what follows. 
Faith, he says, appears as the act by which a thought, which denies 
itself as fixed and existing subject, reconstructs itself (as willed and 
created) by participation in God (who seems to be defined as the mysterious 
medium of this re-creation). Faith then appears to reflective thought as 
that which reflective thought turns into when it is negated; for inasmuch as 
self-negation is an object of reflection, it is destroyed and reflection is 
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"re-born from its own ashes". What Marcel is really saying in these terms, 
heavily influenced by Bradleyts rhetoric, is that the mind must somehow ab-
dicate itself when it thinks faith, and certainly when it consents to faith. 
It can also ~e seen that Marcel uses this argument in favour of his notion 
of the "recuperative" quality of secondary reflection. 
Marcel would appear to be a successor of the "existentialist" tradition 
in Christian thought through his exposition of the act of faith as both 
identical with and yet distinct from the thought of faith. He explains that 
the act of faith is identical with thought of faith inasmuch as the latter 
remains (as thought) implicit. It is distinct from it inasmuch as it recog-
nizes itself by making itself explicit as thought strictly speaking. iS He 
then proceeds to argue that if the reflective dialectic forfeits its valid-
ity, it is simply because the discussions on the relations between faith 
and thought regarding faith can only be sterile. After all his convoluted 
reasoning, Marcel concludes that there is really no difference between them: 
if we dissociate belief from thought bearing on it, we are involving our-
selves in a process without end or issueLi9 In this context it is useful 
to observe tJmt Augustine and Bonaventure both hold that faith cannot be 
external to the thought on faith (not the opposite, of course), but that 
faith coincides with its very reality. Augustine and Pascal recognize that 
the ambiguity of existence rests on the paradox of man's greatness which 
derives frOll. his insignificance. Both hold that man's self'-'realization is 
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to be found in God. That Marcel agrees can be seen in his assertion that 
the "fundamental option" of man is dictated by "being's grasp on us. 11 For 
Bonaventure, man aspires not to conclude that God exists but to see him. 
For all four (f\Ugust ine, Bonaventure, Pascal and Marcel), philosophy and 
the act of existing are inseparable; we exist to find our fulness of being:O 
Marcel, however, seems determined to break with anything that appears 
to be derived from idealism and cartesianism. He declares that the absol-
ute posi tion of human freedom is involved in the Act of Faith whereby I opt 
for the transcended reality of my being against the immediate, isolated 
individuality of the Cartesian cogito. It is, he asserts, the affirmation 
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of the superiority of je crois over e ense He stresses that this trans-
~--=---
ition, from I think to I believe, must be entirely free; it is constituted 
not so much by a sal s mortali as by a negation of thought when it ref lects 
upon itself. There must be, therefore, some measure of abdication by thought 
in the Act of Faith. Marcel asserts that when the act that thinks faith 
reflects upon itself (this is the force of secondary reflection), the cogito 
is revealed as still remaining. Just what he means is not clear, and he 
does not help us understand his argument by immediately affirming that faith 
cannot be thought except by being posited by a power that transcends all 
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reflection. This power Marcel calls grace. 
Here we must pause and take stock of just what Marcel is saying, to 
determine if it is anything of real value. The question which arises is: by 
what conceptual warrant does Marcel proclaim that grace is the power which 
transcends all reflection? As a phenomenologist he should know (and presum-
ably he does know) that I cannot really intend to do something which I know 
is impossible. No matter how much I may wish or pretend, if I cannot play 
the piano, for example, it is impossible for me to give immediate recitals of 
the works of the great composers. Similarly, I cannot intend another's act-
ions (and )larcel himself insists that I cannot put myself in another's place). 
And from a strictly philosophical point of view I cannot really claim that 
"grace transcends all reflection". For such a statement to have validity, 
I11arcel would have to transgress into the domain of theology and thereby ex-
ceed his self-imposed limitations. A person can only speak for himself in 
this matter. Perhaps, in my case, grace does transcend reflection; but I 
should then be claiming a superiority of reflection (with divine assistance) 
which is denied the other. The counter-objection may be made that faith is 
intersubjective, as Marcel claims. On this score he is supported by tradit-
ional theolo which holds that faith is an interpersonal relationship between 
me and God. But for any relationship to be truly intersubjective, there must 
be reciprocal activity. The other must act. In the context of faith the 
other is God, the Absolute Thou. Grace is then odmissible, for it is the 
activity of God, But in the ma er of fait , Marcel does 
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not bring out this point of the reciprocal activity of the Absolute Thou. 
He certainly does not deny it, but neither does he state it explicitly. He 
implies it in his comments on the appeal to the Absolute Recourse (in the 
connection of hope) and we may inter this activity of God operating in the 
ontological need. 23 But the fact remains that, in the matter of faith, 
~!arcel concentrates on the activity of the person, the individual, rather 
than on that of God. 
In an attempt to clarify his own thought on faith, Marcel distinguishes 
between "believing in" and "believing that". He declares that he is more 
concerned with "faith in" because, as far as he is concerned, "faith that" 
belongs more properly to the domain of theology.24 To explain this idea of 
"believing in" he makes use again of the notion of "extending credit" by 
which we put ourselves at the disposal of God. This notion is initially 
applicable to other beings to whom we relate in fidelity. We can only infer 
from Marcel that the highest limit of fidelity must be God. It would seem, 
then, that the disti{lction between "believing in" and "believing that" is 
the difference between surrendering to God, as Abraham responded to God, and 
accepting the mysteries of revelation. Both are involved in the Christian 
faith: "faith in" is the basis of "faith that" and, besides being fundament-
al, is more important. The believer's faith in Christ is the foundation for 
his believing that what Christ said and revealed is true. 
"Believing in", the opening of credit, implies confidence in that it is 
the trust that the other, seen as "thou", will never let me down. 25 This 
assurance, Marcel affirms, is safely established in the Absolute Thou; the 
limit of such trusting confidence is Faith itself. In an enlightening pass-
age which sums up most of what he has written on faith (and love) - and 
which also substantiates the thesis that Marcel at least implies that God is 
to be identified with Being - Marcel declares : 
Et voici a present l'autre limite: c'est la Foi elle-meme, 
l'assurance invincible fondee sur l'Etre meme. Ici et ici 
seulement, nous atteignons non seulement une incondition-
nalite de fait, mais une inconditionnalite intelligible; 
celle du Toi absolu, celle qui s'exprime dans le Fiat vol-
untas tua du Pater. 
Je ne demanderai pas ici quelle est l'obscure, la sou-
terraine connexion qui lie la Foi pure dans sa plenitude 
ontologique a cet amour inconditionne de la creature pour 
la creature ••• Je crois profondement cependant que cette 
connexion existe; et que cet amour n'est pensable, n'est 
possible que chez un etre capable de cette foi, mais en 
qui elle n'est pas encore eveillee; peut-@tre en est-ce 
comme la palpitation prenatale. (26) 
Marcel recognizes the antinomy which arises from positing the absolute 
independence of God it ties God in with immediate consciousness, and 
raises the question of stating the existence of God in terms of experience. 
He notes, as was pointed out in the last chapter, that on the plane of em-
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pirical verification that question is destined to be answered negatively.27 
Faith seems to be beyond all possible experimental confirmation or disproof; 
faith concerns the supra-empirical. God cannot be converted into an equat-
ion, he is unverifiable. Faith, therefore, refers to a transcendent reality 
which cannot be experienced. The experiential cannot be an object of faith 
28 but of knowledge. But there is no real opposition between science and 
faith, as Marcel at one 'time feared (so great was his desire to break with 
idealism). For everything in the physical universe, and within the spatio-
temporal dimension, is potentially knowable. Science, proceeding as it 
ought, will reveal more and more of these events which will then become known. 
When anything is known it is no longer an object of faith. The whole of the 
physical universe is explicable and, therefore, i~ not an object of faith. 29 
Philosophical enquiry can show the way to the reasonableness of faith, 
to recognize even the "intimate solidarity between my free act and the divine 
will".30 It can illuminate the choice but only I myself can make that chojce. 
The negation of the Act of Faith is defined by Marcel as being itself a free 
act : freedom self-affirming, self-actualizing. The act of believing is 
something I do, something I choose to do; it 1S neither a gratuitous nor a 
determined impulse. It is, Marcel suggests, a free act which is "supermotiv-
ated" (surmotive); a response freely given to an appeal founded in love for 
me to exercise my freedom - paradoxically - by abandoning it in favour of 
the Absolute Thou who assures me that I will discover it in all its fulness 
in the most intimate communion in Being. Between God and me, Marcel declares, 
there must be a relationship of the kind that love establishes bet.ween lovers. 
In fact, love and faith cannot be dissociated. When faith ceases to be love, 
Marcel asserts, it congeals into objective belief in a power that is con-
ceived more or less physically. I cease to believe in God the moment I 
cease to love him.31 
iv. "Bad faith" 
From a consideration of Marcel's treatment of the question of faith, we 
may conclude that he is not so much interested 1n epistemological questions 
as such concerning the nature of faith. This is the case insofar as he does 
not fully investigate questions of how we know ot.hers may think on the same 
matter. Marcel seemt, to be more interested in relating experience to the 
question of faith and in formulating a process of possible relations of ex-
perience. We may take this feature of his enquiry to be the nRture of his, 
"personalist episterr.ology" which is at the base of his "concrete" approaches 
to the mystery of being (in final analysis the Mystery of God). But he C8n 
be criticised for not providing any alternative "object" of belief. Further-' 
11) 
more, as we shall now see, he can be criticized for being as guilty of "bad 
faith", failing any explicit argument by way of apologia, as those unbeliev-
ers whom he accuses. This idea of lIbad faith ll , which he claims to have 
indicated long before Sartre32 , is interesting but can be as easily applied 
to Marcel himself. 
Because Marcel is so convinced of the importance of the idea of God that 
it is central to his whole thought, he must consider the claims and attitudes 
of those who are opposed to the idea of God and who therefore repudiate the 
need to consider faith in depth. Among the obstacles to faith which may pro-
mote "bad faith" Marcel singles out atheism and fideism. We shall attempt 
to cut a swathe through the profusion of his comments on both to reach the 
heart of what he really has to say and to determine if he has thought of 
elucidating his own position vis-a-vis these "inauthentic" attitudes. 
(a) Atheism. 
In absolute polarization to faith in God is atheism. It was perhaps due 
to the influence of Hocking who notes that atheism may be said to live on the 
perils anq dangers of theism33 , that Marcel has attempted to prune his notion 
of faith of anything that might appear to be tainted with heresy. With time 
he has arrived at a distinction between an atheism which is lived (atheisme 
vecu) and an atheism which is professed (atheisme professe). He defines the 
former as a certain way of life and of feeling which does not appear to have 
any reference to atheism considered as a doctrine. 34 It is, however, with 
the professed atheism that Marcel takes issue. Borrowing a phrase from Henri 
de Lubac, he describes this attitude as an anti-theism rather than an athei~~. 
Not only does atheistic philosophy deny God's existence, it sets out to 
prove that he cannot be. Marcel points out that if existence cannot be 
properly predicated of God, neither can his non-existence. Atheism cannot 
be objectively refuted, he allows, but neither can it be objectively demon-
strated. 36 
Marcel contends that what is denied by both those who profess to be 
atheists and those who live as though God did not exist, is not always God 
but a certain image or idea of him. To deny God one must first form some 
idea of him, and Marcel is inclined to think that the rejection of God by 
th "t " b d h d "37 H " d th t h" some a e1SS 1S ase on suc a man-ma e verS1on. e rem1n s us a 1S 
warning - when we speak of God it is not always of God that we speak -
applies to unbelievers equally.38 The atheists, of course, can object that 
Marcel's idea of God is also man-made (his own); Marcel does not seem to 
have concerned himself with answering that counter-objection. 
The philosopher-atheist's method, according to Mar-cel, is demystificat-
ion; he sets out to demonstrate that the believer is suffering from illus-
ions. But then the atheist fallf3 into the same trap as the Christian 
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apolo st: he too claims to possess facts denied to the person he is trying 
to convince. Marcel accuses the philosopher"-atheist of pretending to a 
lucidity which the believer lacks. Moreover, the atheist claims, more or 
less explicitly, that his own opinion is generally held. 39 Accordingly, 
Marcel charges the wilful unbeliever, who dismisses the believer's arguments 
as mere ratiocinations, as being just as guilty of the inauthentic behaviour 
of which he accuses the believer. His attitude, Marcel declares, is emotion-
al; :Lt is the same as that of the absolute pessimist who is disappointed 
that Godis ways are not his ways. Marcel concludes that the atheist cannot 
be regarded as the upholder of objective truth because his own attitude is 
the most insidiously subjective kind possible.40 
At this point it can be appreciated that Marcel is more phenomenological 
than philosophical in his trea.tment of atheism. In his con:ments on the un-
believer's of God, Marcel is expressing in his own way the more technic-
al notion of Intentionality - and Intentional Inexistence - as put forward by 
Brentano and which has definite affinities with the Husserlian notion of 
intentionalHy.41 According to Brentanofs thought, we may say that while "ex-
tentional" language refers to facts that can be verif ied, I! intentional" 
statements refer to mental phenomena which are presented to the mind but 
which do not necessarily admit of verification.42 I may say, for example, of 
an object on the table before me that I think or believe that it is a book. 
The object (if indeed it is there) may in fact be identified as a book. 43 
Again, I can think that unicorns exist, and the object of my thought is a 
unicorn; but that unicorn would have a mode of being that is short of actual-
ity and lasts only so long as I think of H. Intentional statements are con-
cerned with matters of thinking, feeling and belief. Any talk of God, then, 
can only be intentional.44 The question of whether God exists cannot be 
handled lIextentionally" (i.e. objectivley) : any God-'talk must refer to 
beliefs or thoughts. As far as Marcel is concerned, God is not an object in 
the phenomenological sense. In this respect Marcel agrees with both the 
classical tradition (represented by the medieval scholastics) and with Bren-
tano. 
But while Marcel is justified in disposing of the "idea of Godl! enter-
tained by the atheist, he does not appear to have come to terms with the 
corollary of his argument. Equally, to affirm God, one must first have an 
idea of him. This idea may coincide with reality so that ideas of God may 
coincide with Being who is God. But, of necessity, the coincidence must be 
mediated through an idea. In his comments on the atheist's view of God, 
Marcel is plainly implying that there is something wr"ong with that view. It 
is, therefore, incumbent on Marccl to show how that view is wrong. After all, 
he himself depends on his own view which can only belong to the domain of 
what Brentano calls "intentional inexistence". 
11~ 
This applies also to his talk of the int~rsubjective "Absolute Thou" 
which depends on "intentional" thought~ As much as for the atheist's con-
ception of God, there is a danger that there may be no reality corresponding 
to this idea. At the same time as attacking both atheists and theist ration-
alists on their approach to God, Marcel seems to be making God not only un-
verifiable but unfalsifiable. He follows Kant in his declaration that exist-
ence is not a predicate; existence is the presupposition of all predicates. 
To attach predicates to a subject presupposes the existence of the subject~5 
Marcel declares that predicates or attributes cannot be attached to God on 
the score that these presuppose Godts existence. Existence, he argues, is 
not predicatable of God but is a precondition of the attachment of predi-
cates. Now, if Marcel is to adhere to that princ,iple, he cannot say anything 
about God. The notion of God is then unfalsifiable. To say anything about 
God is to presuppose that God is a subject. But Marcel does say a great deal 
about God and does apply predicates by implication to God. The principal of 
these is lithe Absolute Thoutl who, we may infer from all that Marcel says, is 
a subject of love, thought, concern. But it stands to reason that God must 
have the power to do this : he must exist as a power. And this is in effect 
what ~~rcel does say, if we are to accept the thesis that his concept of 
B · . f P f C t·· t 46 e1ng 1S 0 ower, 0 rea 1V1 y. 
(b) Fideism. 
Belief, then, opens a credit in favour of the One in whom I believe. 
There is more to faith than just belief. This is what was recognized by the 
writers of both the Old and New Testaments.47 The ee.rly Christians were sus-
tained by more than faith as belief : faith without deeds is of little value. 
Marcel also recognizes this and, while giving so much attention to faith, 
cannot be accused of fideism. Nowhere does he posit faith as a value supreme 
in itself. Faith is neither objective nor subjective, but intersubjective 
participation. It is impossible, Mar'cel asserts, to think faith without 
participating in it, and this notion of participation in being involves the 
communion of fellow-existents, as well as Being (God) itself. The activity 
of believing in God given concrete manifestation in onefs fidelity to 
God in the persons of one's fellow-beings. 
Marcel's awareness of the snare'of fideism came to him more forcibly 
through one of his early plays, le Palais de sable (written fifteen years 
before his eventual conversion and baptism), than through his phj losophical 
enquiry. In fact, he refers to this play in his Journal rnctaphy~.;ique, 
written shortly afterwards, to Hconcretizel! some of his st.atements on faith. 
It was by bearing in mind the fideist attitude of the playts protagonist, 
Moirens, that Mercel assures us he was able to pinpoint the dangers of a 
subjectivist interpnd.ntion of any idea proposing that faith Cim be judged 
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from within. Such "sandcastles" built up to idealize faith by cutting it 
off from its "object" are to be rejected. 
Moirans's basic fault is pride: he claims to be free of the "illusion of 
the object". By steering clear of the Charybdis of objectivism, he is caught 
in the Scylla of subjectivism, and his wretclled fate served as a warning and 
a lesson to lIarce1. 48 "La veritable foi", Moirans proclaims, "surmonte 
l'illusion de l'objet; elle sait qu'il n'est pas de roc tangible auqucl les 
hautes pensees se heurtent. Nos pensees sont a elles-memes leur seule reali-
te, elles se refusent a se suspendre aux terraces interdites du monde.,,49 
God does not seem to figure at all; there is no apparent communication. 
Beliefs and their symbolic images are what count to the fideist, even if he 
has only illusions to which to cling. Moirans says of these "divine" imuges 
that they are to be loved and adored for themselves. faith or belief, for 
him, lice n'est que cela, l'adhesion de toute l'ame, l'adhesion fervente Et un 
beau reve qu10n sait n'i:!tre qu'un r{!ve.,,50 Moirans's idea of freedom is not 
far removed from that of Sartre it is a solitary freedom which entails the 
courage to accept it even if it holds on to nothing. Beyond a freedom which 
is exercised in the absolute, he is led to assert, there is no longer any-
thing but emptiness. To which his favourite daughter, Clarisse, retorts 
that one cannot believe either in the abstract or in the void. 51 
This reply contains the clue to Marcel's opposition to fideism. For, as 
he observes, as soon as faith ceases to appear to itself as absolutely bound 
up with its "object", it negates itself as faith. Marcel rejects fideism 
because when it affirms faith, it in fact suppresses it. Fideism, he explains 
suppresses faith insofar as it destroys the unity of faith and its "object": 
it establishes a dualism between faith and its "object". Marcel sees the 
mission and originality of faith as being to surmount this dualism. Faith 
has no truth that permits it to be isolated from the ideal realities upon 
which it depends. 52 By adopting this position Marcel is upholding the ortho-
dox view which teaches that the fideist is wrong by holding that the object 
of faith cannot be known or grasped by the understanding. Fideism sees faith 
as an act of the will rather than of the understanding; God is placed beyond 
human understanding. This priority given to the will leads to a divorce (a 
dualism) between the object of the will and God himself. Fideism is thus 
voluntaristic; furthermore, there is the possibility that the will can 
create its own object. 53 
The important thing about faith is that it depends on my action of 
choosing to give assent. We may then say that the mind is only created as 
mind by faith in God54 but, Marcel immediately points out, this faith in 
God involves the affirmation that it is itself conditioned by God. This 
means that the mind posits God as the positer. If so, Marcel asks, can the 
distinction between appearance and reality continue to subsist? That dis-
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tinction, he sayst is entirely relevant to the movement of thought and is 
rendered void (supprim~e) in the act of faith which restores to the world 
its reality.55 It would seem t thert that the act of faith posits God as 
independent of the act which posits him:56 Butt for all that abstruse 
reasoning s ~larcel does not seem to have considered whether the Absolute Thou 
is dependent on an act of personal decision. 
Faith is not situated in the acquisition by the intellect of the knowl-
edge of ?ivine things. The activity of believ is distinct from the con-
tent of faith which can be known without belief being accorded. An unbel-
iever is capable of directing his intellect to the content of a belief while 
withholding any believing activity. The intellectual activity is, in a 
sense, secondary because the primary dimension is choosing to give an assent 
to the real i ty of the non-experienceable. Now, while Marcel speaks of the 
"bad faith" of the unbeliever, the professed believer may himself be guilty 
of such bad faith if, in the name of Faith, he falls into the trap of think-
ing that faith is an end result of a rational enquiry. Such an enquiry may 
well be valuable and enlightening but of itself does not obtain or guarantee 
faith. Real assent of the whole person, in which the will is involved and 
not just the intellect, is required so that it truly becomes consent. It is 
not just assent of the intellect alone, for the intellect is constrained by 
evidence to give its assent. Again, it is neither assent of the will alone, 
for that is a 1I1eap in the dark" in the Kierkegaardian sense. Faith is not 
a blind choosing. The assent of belief is a fusion of both will and intell-
ect in a sort of "dialectical convergence" in which the "abstract and pers-
onal, incommunicable elements flow together into an upward stream".57 
Plainly, Marcel does not proclaim that faith contains its own guarantee, 
that faith is sui generis certainty. What he does insist on is the "realist 
aspect" of faith in that the believer never encloses God within the circle 
of the relations between God and himself. Faith t Marcel says,. is creative 
of the individual as who participates in God by affirming that God is 
the transcendent father of all men. This statement is not be interpreted as 
subjectivism or pantheism. 58 Faith is neither a datum of the mind nor an 
immanent act; it is the culmination of a dialectic oriented towards trans-
cendence. Faith is not an end in itself but an activity. Marcel tries to 
show this in his distinction, already mentioned, between je pense and k 
crois?9 To try to restrict faith within the limits of the je pense is to 
rule out of court the notion of bei (in its active sense of creativity). 
Just as the writers of the Scriptures do not provide a noun for the activity 
of believing, Marcel realizes the need to extend "faith" beyond the notion 
of "bel ief" i tsel f. The appropriate verbal expression which he uses through-
out his dialectic of individual yet reciprocal participation in being is flto 
open credit". This expression conveys the ideas of faith, trust, confidence, 
love and dependence.-
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Ye Faith as response 
(a) Faith and the trials of life (evil and suffering) 
Faith is dynamic, it is not passive; nor can it be regarded as secure 
once attained. It is not a talisman but life. In life joy and anguish 
continually "jostle each other,,60 for, since faith my being in relation-
ship with God and since my being is at stake, faith will constantly be 
menaced by temptations to despair and betrayal. Life is a battleground on 
which we. fight to save the "child of eternity" which is our being. Marcel 
assures us that it is of the essence of faith that it ought to be tried: 
61 it needs to be tested. But for there to be a testing, there must be a 
judgment of self, and Marcel declares that no-one knows his capaci ty to 
cope with te~ptation.62 Accordingly, if the temptation arises it will con-
stitute a test for the individual but only on condition that the judgment 
on self for which it affords the occasion is efficacious and has a trans-
forming value. The essence of the trial, as Marcel sees it, is to unite 
oneself more strongly both to the self and to God through fidelity which 
overCOffies death. To triumph in the trial, he declares, is to save oneself 
as soul, it is to save one's soul. 63 
Perhaps the greatest trial in life is the reality of evil and suffering 
in the world. Certainly it constitutes a temptation p in the spiritual 
sense, against the rationality of belief in a God who is said to be all-
good and all-powerful. The problem of evil and suffering is important as 
it affects belief in God. 
11 est trop clair· ••• que p en depit de toutes les argumen-
tations auxquelles ont eu recours theologiens et philosophes 
depuis les origines, crest dans Itexistence du mal et de la 
souffrance des innocents que Itath~isme trouve sa base perma-
nente de ravitaillement. (64) 
Marcelts solution to the problem is simple - and unsatisfactory. Bypassing 
the arguments of theodicy, he declares that, since suffering (and evil) 
affects the individual sufferer and not the "spectator", it is more proper-
ly a mystery to be lived through than a problem to be discoursed and ana-
lysed. 65 But Marcel overreaches himself p so it appears to me when he 
asserts that by viewing evil from the "outside", the spectator not only 
arrogates to himself immunity from the illness but, in the case of evils 
present in the world, assumes an exteriority to the universe by which he 
claims to be able to reconstruct it in its totality. Certainly, he should 
then adopt a position which is completely false and incompatible with his 
1 . t t . 66 . ~ . . 11 rea Sl 'ua lone Such a position is possible vlSr--'a-vls 1 ness but highly 
improbable - unless that person is a megalolllu.niac - with regard to the 
universeo 
Marcel goes on to affirm tlmt I can have the right to interpretanotherts 
suffering only if I share in them (through intersubjectivity) and only he 
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. ff' . t . 67 Th . d' t f who shares 1n my su er1ng can apprecla e m1ne. e 1mme 1a"e task 0 
the sufferer, and therefore of him who shares in the suffering, is to cope 
with the evil and maintain his spiritual existence against the dangers 
menacing himo For there can be evil only for a being capable of being 
menaced, and in fine, Marcel declares, having disposed of natural evil by 
way of rationalization 9 the only real evil is moral evil - sin - which 
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catches us out "en tra1 .. tre". It is, he believes, an integral aspect of 
the hazardous character of being to foster the salutary fear which is the 
beginnirrg of wisdom. Life is a constant trial; and Marcel understands 
"trial" as beering essentially on that which is in us capable of passing 
beyond nature. There is, of course, a risk inherent in any trial, and in 
the test of suffering the individual can refuse ~o treat suffering as a 
test69 or again he may suucumb to the danger of being obsessed by it, 
exposing the soul to the risk of having all its attention drawn to a part-
icular object. Should that object disappear, Marcel says, the soul is 
70 left attached to nothing, not even to itself, and thus may be lost. 
In principle, Marcel agrees, suffering is an evil; it is evil. Never-
theless he believes that the human soul, under certain favourable condit-
ions (animated by disponibilite and openness to others) can freely trans-
mute suffering - not exactly into something good - but into a principle 
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capable of radiating love, hope and charity. The driving impulse of this 
transformation is the predisposition of the soul, while yet suffering it-
self, to open itself up more to others and not to close in upon itself and 
its wound. 72 The man who is fully sharing in being will see suffering and 
evil as tests sent from the transcendent "other kingdom". He will accept 
these trials only if he maintains a personal relationship with God, a 
relationship which in the highest intersubjective order is between thou 
and the Absolute Thou. 73 Evil, Marcel concludes not very convincingly, 
remains in this world as a paradox, for it is real and yet unreal when con-
quered by grace. 
11 reste qu'en face du mystere du Mal, apres tant de possi-
bi! i tes se sont evanouies, la seule voie qui demeure ouverte 
est celle du paradoxe, au sens de Kierkegaard, celle dtune 
double affirmation qui doit '€!tre maintenue dans sa tension: 
le Mal est r€el, nous ne pouvons rEcuser cette rEalitE sans 
porter atteinte a ce serieux fondamental de liexistence qui 
ne peut e-tre conteste sans .qul elle degenere en un non-sens 
ou en une espece de bouffonnerie affreuse; et pourtant, le 
Mal nYest pas rEel, absolurnent parlant; nous avons ~ acc€der 
non a une certitude, mais a la foi en la possibilit€ de le 
surmonter, non pas abstraitement, certes, crest-~-dire en 
adherant il une thcoI'ie ou a une theodicee, mais hie et nunc; 
et cet te foi qui nous est proposee n 1 est pas sans-la -gri\ce , 
elle eo~t la grace; et que serions·-·nous, que serai t le hara8~ 
sant chcn;l~lem~~-qui est le notre, qui ed not.re f8\011 meme 
d'exister, suns cette Lumiere 'qui est si facile et de voir 
et de ne pas voir, et. qui eclaire tout hOlllnle venant au 
rnonde. (71,) . 
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Marcelts whole treatment of the subject is not as satisfactory as he 
might think, despite his claim that he has reflected considerably on the 
matter before which other thinkers have been "forced to show themselves 
powerless" in their attempts to explain it as an "irritating problem".75 
For instance, he makes the curious statement that evil ceases to be evil 
when it is purely stated or considered as eviL76 But surely a person who 
is suffering - from napalm burns, for example - experiences the evil as 
evil? F.urthermore, the spectator who is not sharing in the suffering 
which he is witnessing is not prevented from reflecting on the reasons or 
explanation of it. Although Marcel inveighs against theodicy, he is really 
advocating a theodicist proposition. Evil, he affirms, is not an academic 
question to be solved but a mystery to be experienced and lived through. 
This mystery, then, must be involved in the overall mystery of Being so 
that God as Absolute Thou must have a reason for permitting evil and suffer-
ing. If evil is a mystery it cannot be incompatible with God. This is 
theodicy. Through his remarks on creative fidelity, hope and immortality 
(as the pledge of the continued presence of the loved one), Marcel does 
imply that suffering can be made compatible with a God of love only if the 
fellow-sufferers can enter into another life or$' as he calls itp the "other 
kingdom". For all his avowed antipathy to "abstract" theodicy, this is 
what Marcel is in fact saying when he talks of acceding to a faith (which 
77 is grace) in the possibility of overcoming the paradox of evil. 
(b) The example of the faith of others. 
Faith is a personal act, it is the free commitment of the person to 
choose to believe in a transcendent reality which will assure his own being. 
Faith, then, is the "positive fl act of the individual who, declaring his 
status as dependent creature, wishes to enter into personal relationships 
with God in whom he professes to believe. While still in a neutral zone, 
i.e. without committing himself to believe, the individual can appreciate 
the example of others who either have faith or lack faith. This is what 
Gabriel Marcel claims was his own experience : he could understand the 
belief of others - he instances the conversions of Claudel and Maritain -
before he too crossed the invisible threshold of conversion into faith. 78 
It is in his first published play, la GrSce, that we can detect a 
similari ty - whj ch does not necessarily amount to identification - between 
Marcel t s attitude and that of Olivier, the younger brother of Fran'i0ise 
who is married to the hero, G6rard. Olivicr.is not a believer but, disen-
chanted with materialism, he hopes to find an answer to his frustration at 
not acquiring the faith to which he aspires from the example of the dying 
Gerard. (Gerardts faith would seem to be more mystical than practical.) 
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In the final scene Olivier receives G~rardts last words: 
0 •• La force de la croyance est sGrement la force de 
l'etre ••• Ta foi est reelle a mes yeux comme le 
r~ve et la vie ••• Ta foi est plus qu'une verite; 
elle est un acte et une creation, elle est llidee 
m~me qui realise et qui transforme eo 0 Dt avantage? 
Je sens toujours peser sur moi ton anxiete. 
Gerard, indistinctement H Et Lui? 
Olivier 11 est Itesprit qui affirme son unite. 11 est la 
foi qui se depasse et se projette ••• Davantage 
encore? Je ne peux pas ••• 11 n'est peut-etre 
que l'exigence suprgme des ~es. 
Gerard, se soulevant peniblement dans un cri - Dieu est libre. 
11 retombe pesarnment. 11 expire et 
Olivier, scrutant avec angoisse le mystere du visage pacifie, 
murmure ~ Plus rien qu'un regard, et maintenant sur 
la foi de ce regard ••• (79) 
other examples from Marcelts plays of characters seeking support or reassur-
ance in the faith of others include Osmonde in Un Homme de Dieu (she is 
talking to Claude) : 
Quand on est comme moi il faudrait pouvoir trouver un 
appui dans la foi des autres ••• Jusquta, present ta foi 
rot a soutenu, ta foi a toi. !vIais quand on est trop an-
goisse ~a ne suffit pas. (80) 
and Marc-Andre in Rome ntest plus da.ns Rome (he is talking to Pascal) 
Vous avez vecu, vous avez ecrit, vous avez aime, vous avez 
cru a des choses 009 je ne sais dfailleurs pas a quoi vous 
avez cru OGO Vous devez avoir au moins le sentiment d~avoir 
realise une certaine vocation 0 •• Avez-vous dit un seul mot 
qui soit de nature a me faire changer d'idee? Si vous avez 
pu me dire avec une sincerite absolue: la volonte de Dieu 
est que tu restes [he would have been convinced1. Peut-
etre si a travers ces paroles il etait passe de quoi me 
faire aimer ce Dieu exigeant s'il etait devenu en un clair 
notre Dieu a tous les deux. (81) 
In Un Juste, written well before Marcel t s conversion, Andre Blondville says: 
La foi des autres soutient peut-etre ceux m~mes qui 
ne la part agent pas. (82) 
An example of the lack of faith contributing to a person's bewilderment 
at being lost without religion is Laurence Vernoy in Marcel's radio play, 
la Fin des temps. Laurence had accepted in good faith an expatriate 
Hungarian whose claim to the authorship of a book is revealed by his wife 
as an imposture. Laurence had furthermore misjudged her own husband and 
her elder daughter. Her world is in ruins when her favourite son-in-law 
to whom she could relate and on whom she has leant for support retires 
from the world. Alone,she feels abandoned without knowing wherein lies 
her fault. If anything, Marcel observes, this sombre play shoWS that the 
reality of grace can be just as strongly experienced on account of the 
desolation brought about by its absence. 8} Laurence had so earnestly 
wished to believe and yet ut times has recoiled from the idea. In desper-
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ation she concedes, "11 aurait fallu avoir une religion, quelle quYell e 
soi t. ,,84 But she is too preoccupied wi th her own distress to reflect.85 
Benumbed by the destruction of conscience she is, like Ariane in le Chemin 
de crete, alone without any hope of seeing her way cl ear to having 
recourse in the Absolute Thou. On the matter of believing or not in the 
faith of another, Marcel concludes 
Je peux croire a la foi de llautre sans pourtant que 
cette foi devienne absolument la mienne; si je mtin-
stalle dans cette situation, elle risque de devenir 
fuensonge. Si au contraire je m'efforce d'en sortir, 
sans d1ailleurs y parvenir completement, elle se re-
vele susceptible de me faire progresser sur le chemin 
du salute (86) 
(c) Faith and love. 
As a result of his conversion, Marcel claims that he saw his way more 
clearly : his work took on metaphysical meaning in the fullest sense. 
Faith, Tillich says, is "the state of being grasped by the power of being-
itself. ,,87 Metaphysical need is a kind of appetite, which is the appetite 
for being. This appetite for being is whetted by faith through which, 
apparently and in metaphysical terms, the believer comes to realize the 
transcendental nature of the Source of being, which is Being itself. This 
entails an entirely new outlook on the whole question of being; it entails 
a re-birth into the life of faith and grace. 
L . t· 88 a fo~ est tout ensemble une mol' et une na~ssance. 
This re-birth is made .possible by the interaction of love and faith; 
for one cannot have faith in anyone unless he loves him. The same remains 
true f therefore, for religious faith in God. Love is at the basis of man's 
relationships with God. Marcelfs interest in this connection is reflected 
in the plays of the period leading up to his spiritual re-birth or "rejuven-
89 
a tion". Already in la Grace and in le Palais de sable he had explored 
the need for intercommunication since "no man is an island". This theme is 
continued in his post-war (World War I) plays, notably in le Quatuor en fa 
diese and in l'Iconoclaste. Of love he had written earlier: 
Ltamour est essentiellement Itacte dlune liberte qui 
en affirme une autre et qui n'est pas liberte que par 
cette affirmation meme. 11 y a la, a la racine de . 
ltamour, la croyance a llinexhaustible richesse et a 
l'imprevisible spontaneite de ll€tre aime. (90) 
Love is not an abstract but a concrete act and, being of the order of 
91 grace (as gift), IS gratuitous. While the love of God may be a conse-
quence of faith, it may be just as true that faith is the consequence of 
love. This latter possibility would seem to find preference with Marcel in 
his dialectic of the approach to God through the initial predisposition of 
openness (disponibilite-) which allows for the reciprocal response to the 
1 2.3 
appeal of the Absolute Thou. For just as God cannot be judged, faith 
cannot be judged; neither can love be judged. Once the notion of judgment 
enters, love is debased to desire. 92 It is because of love as the cement 
of the believer's relationship with God as Absolute Thou, that he is led 
to consider the Absolute Thou as his Absolute Recourse to guarantee his 
being. The recognition of the usefulness of prayer would validate faith 
for which an appeal or ~ecourse is a function~9.3 
(d) Faith in corr~unication - Prayer. 
Through faith the individual communicates with God; his act of belief 
is his response to God's welcoming invitation. rhe means of approaching 
God, in Marcel f s view, is the dyadic invocation of prayer. Faith needs 
prayer as a means of maintaining intercommunication. Whereas I reach faith 
alone insofar as my decision to believe is free and personal, I sustain my 
faith in union with God. I invoke God as Absolute Thou to be with me. 
Such is the essence, Marcel affirms, of true prayer and reveals the possi-
bility of an Absolute Presence. 94 
Marcel points out that prayer can be more or less pure. When it is 
self-centred it is less pure, but that does not detract from its quality 
as invocation of the Absolute Thou as Absolute Recourse. Prayer should not 
be regarded in any contractual sense but rather as the expression of mutual 
fidelity and trust in the humano-divine us. We should not, therefore, con-
cern ourselves with worrying whether our prayer is answered. Pure prayer 
cannot be conceived as remaining unanswered if it transcends the hypothesis 
"There is someone listening •• 0 there is no one." That attitude would ob-
jectify God and reduce him to a principle of causality. Those whose faith 
is shallow or superficial would soon yield to resentment and are shown to 
be in the same category as those who want God to show himself, to reassure 
them of their magnanimity in choosing Him. 95 Neither is prayer character-
ized by optimism: optimism, Marcel declares, equally implies a judgment 
of God. Instead, prayer is imbued with hope. 96 On a much lower level, 
prayer cannot be considered as a magical formula to be used in the direst 
straits when all else fails. 
Plainly, then; in his presentation of prayer as the invocation of God 
by the "authentic" existent who, conscious of his ontological status as 
creature, relies on the Absolute Thou as guarantor of his being, Marcel is 
dressing up the traditional (theological) doctrine in terms of his own 
existential metaphysics. These terms are thinly veiled and the content of 
his dialectic is so expressed that he does not even present familiar matter 
in any new light. Authentic prayer, he tells us, is not so much request 
and cannot be understood as contaiuing in itself its own guarantee. Rather 
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it should be thought of as depending on the mysterious will of a "power" 
wllose plans we cannot fathom. Authentic prayer, he concludes, is nothing 
if not a certain very humble, very patient and very fervent way of 
It is a receptive disposition towards everything 
that can detach me from myself and unite me to God. Prayer, in fact, is 
the only living relationship of the soul to God 
La vie spirituelle veritable ne s'ouvre qutavec 
l'affirmation d'une reciprocite en Dieu, d'une 
.reponse, et cette affirmation, c'est la priere. (97) 
Prayer is a duty, none the less, for it is the expression of my faith 
which involves my fellow existents. As the expression of my union with 
God, prayer manifests and sets the seal on my union with others. 98 Since 
1 have the capacity to pray, I have the right to appeal to God on behalf 
of another; we are all united in the fellowship of be ing. I am respons-
ible for what concerns the other in his being. To refuse to pray for him 
would be to forsake and betray him. 99 This duty, Marcel urges, is all 
the more imperative in our own age to care for the preservation of the 
souls (beings) of others and to hope for their salvation. The abbe Petit-
paul counsels Agnes and Thierry Courteuil in Croissez et multipliez 
11 n'y a pas de solution, chacun doit prier pour 
trouver sa vie, et je crois - mais cela, je le dis 
en tremblant - que le Souverain Pontife et ceux qui 
l'assistent doivent prier, eux aussi. 11 ne leur 
est pas permis non plus de sletablir dans des for-
mules. Imaginer, reflechir, prier, nul nlen est 
dispens~. (100) 
On the philosophical plane, therefore, prayer is only possible where 
intersubjectivity is recognized. The highest level of this is our relation-
ship with God, for prayer is more a matter of being - and of being-with -
than of "having" : 
La priere pour moi ne me semble pouvoir porter que 
sur ce qui est susceptible dtgtre regarde comme don 
divin, ou plus exactement, je veux prier pour ~tre 
davantage, non pour avoir davantage. (101) 
By prayer I transform my being through faith in the Source of all being, 
but I should not expect or demand that anything should be added to my 
"having". We find ourselves by finding God through the ineffable invoc-
ation of prayer •. The concrete approaches (prayer in action) to God are 
the acts of fidelity and love for others who share the same dangers, faiths 
and hopes as I. In the last analysis, therefore, I pray to God for 
just as the formula of hope (as we shall see in the next chapter) is III 
hope in Thee for USIl. Marcel shows the intersubjective dimension of prayer, 
which is also of hope, when he affirms : 
Je ne peux prier pour un autre' que In Oll il Y a entre 
cet autre et moi ceLte communaut6 spirituelle dont 
jlai tent6 dlexprimcr le caract~re essentiel [I cannot 
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truly pray for or regard the other as a he but as a 
thou., just as I can only truly consider God as Thou.] 
Prier pour mon ame, ou prier pour celui que j'aime, 
c'est sans doute un seul et meme acte. (102) 
Conclusion: Faith transmuted into Fidelity. 
Faith finds its expression as dynamic force in interpersonal relation-
ships - with myself, with others, and primarily with God. Through faith 
I truly become myself, I constitute myself as person by freely choosing to 
break out of the confines of self-centredness and to relate to others; and 
it is in others that the eternal is mirrored. 10} As I believe in others, 
I extend myself to them as credit to be drawn upon. Thus faith involves 
commitment without which there should be no genuine intersubjective failR~ 
There seems to be a hierarchy of commitments, at the summit of which is 
cow~itment to God. It is from this commitment to God that Marcel sees the 
way to elucidate the problem of fidelity if it is to be properly creative 
and faithful. 
Necessite de partir de l'@tre m~me de l'engagement 
envers Dieu. Acte de transcendance avec contrepartie 
ontologique qui est la prise de Dieu sur moi. Et 
c'est par rapport a cette prise que ma liberte meme 
s'ordonne et se definite (105) 
From this statement we can legitimately conclude that Marcel identifies 
the lIgrasp of being" (la prise de Ifetre) with manfs innate need to seek 
after God - the Good of the ancient philosophers - whose appeal can be felt 
as la prise de Dieu. Marcel, we recall, identifies the great need of the 
106 present times as the "need for God". This exigence de Dieu appears to 
be a translation on a higher (theological, or would Marcel say "meta-
philosophical"?) level of the philosophical "ontological need" (l'exigence 
de Itetre). This identification can also be seen in.his assertion concern-
ing man's relationship with God: 
Je dirais volontiers dogmatiquement que tout rapport 
d'gtre a @tre est personnel, et que le rapport entre 
Dieu et moi n'est rien s'il ntest pas rapport d'@tre 
a etre, ou a la rigueur de l'etre a soi. (107) 
Until his conversion, Gabriel Marcel's philosophical enquiries had 
been dominated by the question of faith, particularly of faith understood 
in the context of participation. But with his conversion Marcel shifts 
the emphasis towards a study of a "concl"ete" metaphysics through the equal-
ly "concrete" approaches of fidelity, hope and intersubjectivity. In fact, 
his pllilosophical enquiries are directed towards a study of the attestation 
108------
of God through the concrete approaches to the Mystery of God. This does 
not mean, however, that he no longer concerns himself with faith. The 
subject is taken up again in his later works but he is now prompted by 
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the desire to show to others in the situation once his own the means of 
reaching that invisible threshold. There are also elements of the notions 
of grace and immortality in his earlier works. But, starting from his 
Position et approches, he embarks on an enquiry into the central, unifying 
t . ft' f . d '1' t 1 09. t h . d t . no lon 0 crea lve 1 e 1 y Whlch opens on 0 suc conSl era lons as 
presence. (which is perpetuated by fidelity) and immortality (which is 
fidelity attested). Marcel1s studies are henceforth dominated by hope 
and inspired by love - yet this does not mean that he ignores the quest-
ions of betrayal and despair. 
In the following chapter we shall see how faith must not only be 
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affirmed but attested, for faith is unceasing attestation. Attestation 
in turn implies commitment which, to be authentic, can only be personal. 
To be incapable of committing oneself is to be incapable of bearing wit-
111 
ness. As there are levels of commitment, there is a hierarchy within 
fidelity and witness. At the highest human level is the martyr in whose 
sacrifice is affirmed not only the self but the Being to which the self 
becomes a witness in the very act of self-renunciation. 112 On the meta-
physical level, faith translated into fidelity is to be understood as 
witness perpetuated; ,and this witness bears on Being. 113 The archetype 
of witness is God himself, in the person of Christ, the living and personal 
God and not the god of the philosophers. He is in fact 
114 Celui que tout temoignage invoque explicitement ou non. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
1. eog. That grace is the power that transcends all reflection (JM 71). 
See p. 110. Also he asserts: "L'esperance nrest possible que dans un 
monde Oll il y a place pour le miracle" (EA I 94). Although he claims 
that on this point he "joins forces" with Kierkegaard (or at least, he 
adds cautiously, wi th some of his continuators), Marcel gives no explan-
ation of that flat claim. 
2. ME 11 179. Apparently Leslie Dewart, an admirer of Marcel, does 
not take sufficient note of Marcel's warning; he certainly can be 
charged with postulating voluntarism. 
3. Marcel is really inconsistent with his assertion that God cannot be 
objectifiec! (i.e. regarded as an object) when he refers consistently to 
the "object of faith". lIe himself does not place the word objet, when 
he uses it in this context, in inverted commas. ----
4-. EA II 66-67, HP 71, ST 128. 
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5. EA I 176. He adds, "par moi jtentends ici le sujet affirmant." 
6. EPC 61. 
7. Man is unique among other creatures in that he is free. This can 
only be what Marcel is saying when he resorts to linguistic analysis 
to declare that it is manls freedom which makes him stand out from the 
rest of creation in the "full" sense of ex-sistere. According to 
~1arcel, freedom is not essentially freedom of choice, especially when 
choice is conceived as indeterminate (JM 228, ME II 114-117, ST 127, 
PR..,.GM 85-87). Rather he sees it as a matter of a fundamental option 
to b~ or not to be; it is a matter of accepting or refusing such values 
as grace, existence, fidelity, the other as fellow-being (thou), and 
finally God (EA I 118, EPC 154-156, HP 71, ME II 179, ST 128). See 
Chapter 1, pp. 21-22. 
8. FP 104. Marcel proceeds to argue : "Par I' acte de la foi la pensee 
libre renonce donc definitivement soit a slabstraire, dans une solitude 
sterile, d'une experience qu'elle est impuissante a deduire de soi-m~me, 
soit a s'identifier a cette experience pour s'inserer dans l'integral-
ite du savoir. Et elle s'engendre elle-meme comme individuelle en se 
rapportant a une volonte qulelle est obligee dlaffirmer sous peine de 
se nier comme libre et comme concrete ••• Nous arrivons donc a cette 
conclusion paradoxale que Itindividualite libre ne peut se definir que 
par rapport a une liberte divine, et en pensant le monde comme produit 
de cet te liberttL 11 He adds guardedly, "La these a laquell e nous 
aboutissons nlest donc pas du tout celle d'apres la libert~ serait la 
necessite acceptee; car ceci ne vaut que pour un intellectualisme qui 
place Itindividualite dans la participation a la raison, et nous savons 
deja pourquoi cette position nlest pas tenable" (FP 105). 
9. Gabriel Marcel, FP 106 : fiLa liberte divine ne peut etre affirmee 
ou niee que librement, que par une libertc et en ce sens metaphysique 
le libre arbitre nlest pas niable (la negation du lihre arbitre le 
suppose d'ailleurs). 11 nly a donc rien dans la pensee qui ne soH 
liberte; mais la liberte qui se meconnait et en se meconnaissant se nie; 
et nous avons d~ja dit qu1elle est la racine du mal (see below, fn 14]; 
il y a une liberte qui staffirme et se veut - et nous savons que cette 
liberte ne peut etre que la foi en un Dieu qui la relie au monde. 11 
est donc en mon pouvoir d'gtre ou de ne pas ~tre; car je ne serai quten 
pensant et en voulant mon ~tre, en ayant foi en lui - et je ne pourrai 
penser mon etre (puisque ni comme forme ni comme contenu empirique je 
ne suis rien) quten affirmant que j'ai lte voulu et cree, et que 
l'univers a et~ voulu et crefi avec moi." 
Saint Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, tom. 3, De Veritate, 
qG xxiv, a o 12, ad 2m : "Ad secundum dicendum, quod non est possibile 
aliquem adultum esse in solo peccato originali absque gratia; quia 
statim cum usum liberi arbitrii acceperit, si se ad gratiam praepara-
verit, gratiam habebit; alias ipsa negligentia ei imputabitur ad 
peccatum mortale." See Conclusion for Marcel's treatment of creation 
(more properly creativity and manls awareness of his status as creature) 
and Appendix I A for a comparison and contrast of Marcel and Aquinas. 
10. cf. the phrase from Aquinas quoted in the preceding footnote: 
!!quia statim cum usum liberi arbitrii acceperit, si se ad gratiam prae-
paraverit, gratiam habebit." 
11. tlAseity't (from the Latin a se, by oneself) is given by the Oxford 
English Dictionary as mennin£llundcri ved or independent existencc lt • 
The term (spelled A .... seity) is used by S.T. Coleridge in his "Aphorisms" 
(Aids to Reflection and the Confessions of un In~liring Spirit, London, 
G. Bell & s-;-ils ;~'1913 ~P.224-Y:---lt-~~;us Cbe h-~-;:j;;-in 1;;-f~;d-thi:ltMarcel' s 
unpublished thesis concerned the spjrHual writ of Colcridge; no 
doubt he used an earlier edition of Colel'idge's "Aphorisms". 
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12. It is interesting, and perhaps significant, to observe that while 
Marcel refers to God, he has practically nothing to say about Satan 
or the Devil. In Marcel1s defence it can be argued that he is quite 
rightly restricting himself to metaphysics which traditionally can 
encompass such questions as God, the "Ground" of Being, and mano The 
notions of heaven and hell, sin and the Devil, on the other hand, may 
be termed more properly the concerns of theology, But Marcel does 
seem to be inconsistent; he does encroach into the theological domain, 
as we have seen. He speaks of the saints (who do not appear to qual~ 
ify for his guidelines to the threshold - they have already "made the 
grade lf ) and vaguely of sinners. He speaks of the ontological commun-
ion 'but not of the possibility of its opposite ("hell"), even though 
he spends considerable thought on despair and suicide. 
13. FP 105. See above, fn 8, for text. 
14. ibid. 
15. JM 40. Marcel adds, repeating what he has already said of the non-
objectif iabH ity of God : "J e n I ajoute rien a 11 id~e de la foi lorsque 
je dis que la foi porte sur Dieu. 11 y a l~ deux aspects que je dois 
poser comme solidaires; disons, si nous voulons, que Dieu est la v~rite 
de la foi, mais ~ condition de ne pas entendre ceci en un sens ob-
jectif. " 
16. Marcel recognizes that abstract reasoning can be a hindrance (yet 
it must be pointed out that it is really unavoidable) and in this res-
pect, while he claims that he remained sure of the direction of his 
thinking, these early investigations appear to be confused (Schg 94-95). 
We may add that Marcel shares with other lIexistential" thinkers the 
tendency to express themselves in terms of abstractions. He speaks of 
"freedom" and "thought" as the active agents when one would normally 
posit the free or thinking subject as the operative agent of reflection 
or action. 
17. JM 41--42,51. cf. FP 30,104,114. In the light of these apparent ... 
ly negative remarks, Marcelts stand on the question of attempting to 
prove God! s existence is explained (JM 34-35, cited Chapter 3. p. 95 ). 
God can be thought of as power only on condition that power is not 
thought of as an existing power susceptible of functioning among other 
causes (JM 36). Marcel avoids any doctrine of creationism which would 
posit God as an abstract idea. Creationism is transcended by Marce~ in 
the concept of divine fatherhood, a term comprehensible to phenomeno-
logy, which posits God as the centre and source of being. 
18. JM 71. Marce! proceeds to reason as follows. Inasmuch as reflect-
ion comprehends itself as free, it is free. But the free act (the 
apprehension of self as "freedom!!), when treated.as a particular moment, 
brings about a further moment which destroys it. In that way, by 
virtue of its ambiguous nature reflection negates itself as freedom. 
This apparent aporia was resolved by Marcel when he delved into the 
recuperative force of secondary reflection. These early investigations, 
awkwardly expressed as they are, serve to clarify for Marcel at least 
the intimate connection between faith as act and faith posited by 
thought. The free act ( intuitive thought) implies~ therefore, the 
negation of the dualism bewtween faith and reflection on faith. 
19. JM 70-73. 
20. See pp. 106-107, 125. Philosophy is seen by Bonaventur'e as wisdom 
which leads to Wisdom vested in God. See Appendix I B, p. 219 ,for 
Marcel
' 
s affinity with Augustine on the understanding of wisdom, an 
interpretation in line with Bonoventurels. 
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21. JM 40-46, 52-53. The act by which I think freedom is the very act 
by which freedom comes to be : this is the force of the cogito. But the 
subject of faith must be more than abstract, it must be concrete. It 
must also be pointed out in all fairness to Descartes that he would 
probably retort that je crois is an act of the mind. Any act of think-
ing, according to Descartes, will suffice to show that when I am en-
gaged in any thinking exercise I exist. 
22. JM 71. cf. below fn 85. 
23. It could be objected that the Absolute Thou (God) takes the initiat-
ive by appealing to the individual (through the ontolo 1 need). cf. 
Chapter 3, pp. 82, 87. This appeal is reinforced, as we have seen, by 
the grace-freedom-disponibilite "triangle" of predisposing the indivi-
dual in favour of a "positive" response (and there still remains the 
possibility of refusal). But what Marcel does not seem to have consid-
ered - to me at least - is that, granted this, initiative by the Absolute 
Thou, the individual has to wait. But what if the Absolute Thou does 
not choose to appeal to a particular individual? (One could bear in 
mind the Scriptural accounts of Godfs preferences - of Abel over Cain, 
Jacob over Esau.) This could lead to an objection of selective choice 
by the Absolute Thou and, besides being an elitist position, this in 
turn leads to predestination. Certainly, Marcel disavows predestination 
in the Jansenist sense (meaning the heresy), but he does seem to come 
close to advocating what could be called a "philosophical Jansenism" in 
his rather elitist doctrine of presence. The sign at the entrance to 
Marcel's path leading to the "other kingdom" could well read "Kindred 
spiri ts only need apply". For while I may be "present" to only one 
other in a crowded room, what happens to the others' chances for fidel-
ity and salvation? (cf. Chapter 3, pp. 81-82) Of course, we can clear 
Marcel of this charge of apparent predestination if the appeal sent by 
the Absolute Thou is universal. We recall that Marcel speaks of the 
"Universal" with reference to the Absolute Thou - or at least to the 
Communion of Being. But he does not make expl icit the fullsignif icance 
of the term, "Universa!!'. cf. EPC 18 (Chapter 1, fn 101, p. 38). 
24. EPC 201, ME II 78~ 
25. ME 11 79,81. cf. EPC 202. 
26. EPC 205-206. Empha.s mine. 
27. See Chapter 3, pp. 75-76. When the unverifiable descends into exist-
ence, it substitutes itself for existing causes, and when reflective 
thought comes back into play it is obliged to operate in an inverse way 
and reintroduce the causes. Rather, Marcel concludes, "(la veritable 
dialectique de llexistence divine) n'est que par le rapport irnrnediat a 
la conscience empirique; mais ce rapport dtautre part se determine pour 
la reflexion comme action d'un existant sur un existant, ctest-a-dire 
n'etant pas d'ordre divin" (JM 32). 
28. Marcel denounces a "religious Esperantism tt when he has recognized 
that faith cannot be treated as a modality of thought in general; there 
can be, he asserts, no glauben Uberhaupt (PE 119-120). 
29. It can be objected, of course, that if this conclusion is accepted, 
there can be no "religious experience" in the form of miracles. Marcel 
is rather vague about miracles. The act of faith, he says, seems to 
involve the recognition of a religious history which, by virtue of its 
relation to faith, must contain some miraculous elements (JM 77-78). 
Any reflection on a mif'acle would make it contradictory, certainly from 
the point of view of a nihilistic historian who is conccrned with inter-
preting and reducing such manifestations in nhstrDcto, cut off from 
their living source. The problem of the miril(;ulous elCIl/ent of religion 
will remain !I insolublel! as long as any IIscicntistic ll method of investig-
ation is allowed to intrude in the domain of the religjous and the 
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spiritual. True faith, however, does not need to be confirmed by 
miracles. Their reality, for Marcel at least, is seen as a sign of hope 
and the promise of fidelity. Marcel sees in miracles the dispensation 
of divine mercy, inconceivable in the order of pure reason (cf. EA I 28, 
94, FP 94; see Chapter 3, fn 97, p. 101). In view of what he says about 
presence and encounter (Chapter 3, pp. 81-82), it can be said that our 
sense of the presence of God is born and nurtured by encounter in certain 
experiences. But it must be noted that others experience the same situ-
ations which for the believer may be especially significant as revelat-
ory of the presence of God. There is nothing in any period of history 
that the believer can see what the unbeliever cannot. 
30. FP 108-109. 
31. JM 58. 
32. DH 141. In this passage Marcel claims that the example of Aline 
Fortier's tlmauvaise foi ll masquerading (unconsciously perhaps) as sin-
cerity in his play la anticipates Sartre's analyses 
by twenty years. --=--""""-:--::---~:----:--was written in 1919-1920 and 
published in 1931; le Nlant was published in 1943. 
For a commentary on the play see , p. 146 and Appendix 2, IV, 
p.232. cr. SdI (PEmissaire) 257 Antoine is speaking) "Sartre a 
raison : nous sommes cernfs par la mauvaise foie Elle est a l'origine 
de nos oublis chaque fois que nous avons interet a ne pas nous rappeler." 
33. W.E. Hocking, op. cit .. , 225. 
34. ST 253. Marcel explains: this feeling, which is basically one of 
satisfaction and exhilaration, stems from pride in human accomplishment, 
particularly in the light of man's technological advances (ST 245). It 
is Promethean defiance resulting from the complacent self-assurance that 
man can do all things and depends on none other. Marcel fears that this 
anthropocentric apotheosis is fostered in capitalist countries where 
technology is king and God is no longer needed to soothe the miseries 
of the unfortunate who are unfortunate because they do not enjoy the 
benefits of an opulent society. Certainly, the experience of suffering 
does not prevent faith in God: it would seem to encourage it (EA 11 74, 
nl II 262). This reaction would be regarded cynically by the self-
sufficient as a sign of some psychosomatic disorder remediable by pscho-
analysis or some other technique (ST 245). The atheist, particularly 
when glowing with pride at man's apparent independence of any spiritual 
power, tends to confuse the Christian!s humility in the face of his 
insignificance as masochism. In this connection of atheisme vecu, we 
may note that it is also possible for "professed" atheists to show 
by their actions that they do, in effect, believe. They are what Mari-
tain calls IIpseudo-atheistsll (Approaches to God, 81); Blondel points 
out that this does not mean that all atheists are unconscious believers 
(La Pensee, I, 392-393). This phenomenon is not unnatural nor new. 
Long ago, Augustine observed th2.t "there are many outside the Kingdom 
of God who appear to be ins.t le, and many inside who appear to be outside" 
(De baptismo contra Donatislas, V, cxxvii, n. 38). cf. Schg 21. 
35. ME 11 177j 86. See Chapter 2, p. 48. 
36. ST 257, 235-236, JM 33, 98. cf. J. Wisdom, Paradox and Discovery, 
Oxford, Blackwell, 1965, p. 14. 
37. At. times, Marcel concedes, atheism may be only an extreme form of 
anticlericnlislIl (ST 256). While there may be hope of "readjustment" 
in such a brand of a the j Bm or revol t (ST 75, 2I~6), Marccl none the lcss 
warns against playing with firc in matters of faith and religion. It 
is toward::; this position, he fears, that SOIllC leftist Christians arc 
veering; they sce a need for a renewal of religion without which it 
would run the i'isk of oecoming morally ossifjed. We should not, Mar'cel 
Warns us, turn a blilld eye to the deficiencies of an insLltutionalized 
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religion; nor should we ignore the grave imprudence of these revolution-
arjes (ST 242). Similarly, Marcelexpresses reservations about the view 
that atheism is a necessary purgative of faith. He instances (ST 252) 
the disastrous consequences to the growing faith of some students whose 
teacher (an unbeliever) demolished their beliefs in order to rebuild 
them so as to make religion more acceptable - for an unbeliever. There 
is a very real danger, especially in the contemporary religious atmos-
phere charged with an emotional desire for instant ecumenism that those 
who profess to be Christians become too willing to accommodate themselves 
to the points of view of unbelievers. Their own integrity is as much to 
be respected as that of the unbelievers. It is interesting and rather 
indiGative that atheism is not found in non-Christian cultures. We hear 
and read of plausible defences for "Christianity without religion" and 
even "Christian atheism". As Mascall warns, instead of converting the 
world to Christianity, we may be converting Christianity to the world 
(The Secularization of Christianity, London, Darton, Longman and Todd, 
1965) • 
39. ST 235. Marcel recalls a philosopher who once told him that if God 
existed, he (the philosopher) would have been made aware of His exist-
ence. It was implied that it was inconceivable that God should have been 
hidden from an eye so penetrating as his (ME II 73; cf. EPC 189, 192). 
In his treatise on Opinion and Faith (EPC 185-186) Marcel states that as 
long as opinion remains a "seeming", not a "claiming", we can safely 
remain within the limits of opinion, but we cannot make an affirmation. 
cf. HCH 44, ME 11 81. It must be pointed out, however, that opinion 
must involve an affirmation: how else can one express an opinion? Marcel 
does not show that a distinction between faith and opinion is that opin-
ion, in its initial stages at least, is compatible with doubt whereas 
true faith is not. The difference between opinion and conviction in 
relation to faith would seem to be more one involving different states 
of mind than of points on a scale as Marcel suggests. Marcelts main 
objection to conviction is that it implies a "closed" attitude ("une 
sorte de cloture interieure" - EPC 201). The hardened unbeliever's atti-
tude is certainly closed; Marcel sees more value in grace than in reason-
ed arguments in his case (HV 274). Conviction implies that all possible 
objections are considered as having been foreseen or even simply dis-
regarded (EPC 198, ME II 76-77). The "unshakeable" attitude of convict-
ion may approach faith only insofar as I am obliged to account for my 
believing in God. Faith, as an attitude, is "open". Although one "has" 
certainty in faith, one is nevertheless open to further confirmation. 
This can be the only meaning intended by Marcel when he says, "Le seul 
Dieu en lequel je puisse croire est un Dieu qui accepte, dans un certain 
sens qui veut, qu' il soit possible de douter de lui" (PI 92, epigraph to 
this chapterJ. Marcel prefers to speak of a distinction between the 
certitude and a certitude. He explains : a certitude which is proclaimed 
passes from an-act to a "having"; and what-is possessed may be lost (cf. 
SdI [1' Emissaire J 259, "Reponse a une enquete sur l'idee de Dieu", loco 
cit., 41). Certitude - the certitude - as belonging to the realm of 
being is so intimately involved in the knowledge and apprehension of 
Being as to be what Marcel call sa" concrete indubitable" subject to 
fusion in Bein~ precisely because it is not possessed. A certitude bears 
on a problematizable content (a content which can be treated as a problem 
and so is liable to analysis and solution) in that it can give rise to 
questions for anyone in a given situation. The certitude to which I 
aspire would seem to be indistinguishable from its "object" and so be 
situated in the domain of faith (PI 93, 135; cf. DH 133). 
40. EA II 54-62. Speaking for himself, Marcel claims thElt his fai th WElS 
aWDkencd at a time when he was in an exceptional state of rn-;;-riJl stabil-
i ty and personal happiness (EA II 59). 
If-1 • See C ha p t e I' 1, p. 22. 
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42. F. Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt (1874), vol. I, 
Book Ill, chap. 1, p. 63, and Wahrheit und Evidenz (1930), 17-18,31-32, 
87-89, 107-109, 117. Of particular interest in the present context is 
Brentano's observations on statements about God in the latter book, pp. 
107-108. 
43. That Marcel is at least familiar with this line of thought can be 
seen in his illustration of the impossibility of assuming the position 
of "normal conditions of experience" in the matter of faith. This 
stance, he holds, is valid only in the sphere of the objective ("extent-
iona1'1). I can, he says by way of example, verify an object on the 
horizon which has been equally by my companion and myself as a cloud or 
a mountain by reference to a topographical map or a telescope. Our situ-
ations are interchangeable in this instance. But the situation is diff-
erent on a spiritual plane because, as Brentano would say, it is a 
matter of "intentional" language. (JM 30}.) 
44. We can now see that Anselm's ontological argument was based on the 
45. 
assumption that, if God is thought about, he thereby "exists in the under-
standing". Anselm then proceeded to contrast the perfections of that 
which "exists in the understanding alone" with that which "exists in 
real i ty". 
In terms of logic this is expressed Fa J( 3x) (x=a). 
46. See Chapter 1, pp. 27-29. 
47. D.M. Baillie, in his scholarly work, Faith in God, notes (pP. 37-80) 
that there is no noun in the Old Testament to denote belief. Faith in 
God has a verbal force and implies confiding trust and activity indicat-
ive of such a notion. 
48. Marcel himself dallied with a pragmatist sUbjectivism for which the 
intended "purity", of faith would in effect deny the reality of God and 
of religious truths. This tentative was influenced by his early view of 
a dichotomy between knowledge and faith. 
49. PdS 263. 
50. PdS 264. cf. Antoine Sorgue in l'Emissaire speaking of the difficulty 
in describing faith. "Seulement, il n' y a pas que ces eaux inexplorables. 
11 yale monde et la lumiere; et la nous ne tirons plus, c'est nous qui 
sommes tires! Car ce monde est celui de la gr~ce; et il devient de plus 
en plus direct, de plus en plus consistant a me sure que nous y croyons 
dtavantage, et cette croyance ne peut pas etre illusoire car les images 
qu'elle utilise, elle les brise aussit&t pour en trouver d'autres." 
Antoine escapes the pitfalls of Moirans by proclaiming that the multi-
faceted images of faith can serve only as analogues of the reality which 
faith tries to depict. And when Sylvie asks him if this means that he is 
no longer troubled by anguish, that he is now free from temptation and 
safe in his conviction, Antoine replies: "Oui et non, Sylvie. C'est la 
seule reponse la Oll crest nous-memes qui sont en cause, nous croyons et 
nous ne croyons pas, nous aimons et nous n'aimons pas, nous sommes et nous 
ne sommes pas; mais s'il en est ainsi, c'est que nous sommes en marche 
vel'S un bout que tout ensemble nous voyons et que nous ne voyons pas" 
(SdI 267-268). 
51. PdS 268. 
52. JM 85. In repudiating the charge of fideism, Marcel declares that 
his philo~ophy is one of reflection; like Anselrn, in this respect, it is 
fides quaerens i!~~D,~ctulll (from a letter cited TM II 235). 
53. Although he djsavows both fideism and voluntarism, Marcel does n6t 
appear to have consjdered the question of the possible illusory actjvity 
of faith. One would expect it philosopher, especially a phenolllenologist 
with more than a pnssjng interest ill psychi~;lIl and p~ychology, to examine 
this possibility. As a phcnomcnologist, Mnrccl must he familinr witll 
133 
the psychological pheno~enon of the child who creates his own private 
world of fantasy, of how the child can cl ing tenaciously to his "secret". 
After all, Marcel himself indulged his reverie along these lines by 
peopling his lonely childhood with imaginary characters (PE 106, Schg 
97; this was the origin of his talent for writing plays). Whether he 
has thought of this feature of faith can be determined by a considerat-
ion of what he has to say about faith and the intellect, and the assent 
of the will to faith (p. 117). 
54. This is the point of Max Scheler's diagnosis of the mind as the dis-
tinguishing characteristic of the greatness of human reality. There is, 
however (and Marcel brings our attention to it), the snare of pantheism 
in this notion. Louis Lavelle has helped clarify the issue by pointing 
out that while it is true that the divine pierces through to created 
matter by the medium of the mind, mind itself is not a strictly indivi-
dual property of man. It is, in Lavelle's terms, a participation in 
the Absolute which communicates being. It is interesting to note that 
Marcel's thoughts on a theory of participatiori touched on this same 
point (FP 93-114). 
55. JM 46. 
56. In that case, the act of faith contains another act by which thought 
prohibits itself from reflecting the free act. Marcel argues that such 
a prohibition can be justified if faith does posit transcendence in the 
strictest sense. And, in fact, this transcendence is the "object" of 
faith understood as faith in God. Between me and this transcendence, 
God, is the relation of one freedom to another. That relation, Marcel 
concludes, is involved in the Act of Faith - as affirmation (JM 57-58). 
cf. FP 111. 
57. L.A. Blain, "Marcel' s Logic in Proving the Existence of God" in the 
International Philosophical Quarterly, IX, p. 204. The consent of the 
whole person is what Newman calls "illative consent" (A Grammar of 
Assent, New York, Longmans Green, 1947, ch. VIII, p. 252, ch. IX, p. 274). 
cf. FP 93 : "La foi en un certain sens est plus qu'un acte immanent 
puisqu' elle est 1 'achevement d' une dialectique tout entiere orientt~e vers 
la transcendance." It would appear, then, that Marcel does not admit 
the possibility of faith creating its own object, if faith is a fusion 
of will and intellect, supported by evidence of the reality of a trans-
cendent "object". It is for the reason just stated that Marcel critic-
izes the classical proofs : they have value only after the event for 
they serve as confirmation to the intellect of its choice. 
58. JM 58. 
59. In an exercise in linguistic analysis Marcel observes that the word 
"believe" has vague connotations: it may be taken to mean nothing more 
than to "presume" or even to "seem". To clarify the existential signif-
icance of the "open" aspect of faith, he recalls the idea of "opening 
credit", which involves a pledge and, since one's whole being is con-
cerned, this pledge affects not only what I have but also what I am 
(EPC 201, ~lE II 78-80). cf. p. 110. 
60. PI 9. 
61. 
62. 
6} • 
64-. 
JM 
JM 
JM 
ST 
198. cf. 
228. cf. 
198. cf. 
248. cL 
PI 92 (epigraph to this cha_pter, p. 103) • 
HdD 199, RPR 39, 49, 64. 
JM 282 (see Chapter 2, fn 80, p. 70) • 
EPC 265. 
65. Drief ly, Marccl' s argument against theodicy is as follows. God 'js 
a mystery in aSllluch as any attempt'to demonstrate him objectively would, 
ipso facto, reduce him to an object. Just as we cannot put ourselves 
in anybody's plnce (CM 49), still less can we dare pI'esume to put our-
selves in God's place. God cannot be judged -even from the best of 
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intentions; and theodicy (8soC; -OLJiry amounts to a judgment on God. 
In this attitude Marcel finds confirmation in Royce who holds that as 
soon as God is regarded as a power, he is either imperfect or account-
able (MR 16, 26, 98). Marcel goes further to repudiate theodicy as a 
form of atheism, just as atheism is "theodicy gone wrong" (JM 65,232, 
EA I 101, ME 11 177, Paix sur la terre [Un Juste] 115). Theology, 
Marcel warns, must take care not to turn the reality of evil and suffer-
ing into an "effigie abstraite", for that would serve only to reinforce 
atheism (ST 24S). 
66. EPC 10S. cf. HCH 69, ST 205. 
67. cf. PACMO 5S. The way to tackle the "problem" of evil and suffering 
is not to withdraw into oneself (e.g. Laurent Chesnay in le Monde casse 
and Vernoy in la Fin des temps) but to open oneself to a communion more 
vast, perhaps infinite, so that the evil becomes our evil. This infin-
ite communion is what the Church call s the Mystic~Body. The arche-
typal witness to whom we have recourse as having triumphed over evil by 
becoming incarnate, like us, is God in the person of Christ : he is our 
"Thou" (ST 211). cf. St Paul, Philippians 2: 6-7, 2 Cor. 5: 21. 
6S. Marcel identifies the double temptation to which we are exposed as 
despair and manicheism. Despair would appear to be the result of an 
acknowledgment of the meaninglessness of life and would in turn promote 
suicide as a solution. Manicheism, Marcel warns, is still as active 
today as it was in the time of Augustine. Today's practical manicheism 
of a technical age demands a dualism between the forces of good and evil. 
Marcel claims that he is not concerned with the theological attitude 
which was condemned as heresy, but with manicheism from a purely philo-
sophical point of view. Insofar as it is a metaphysical doctrine, he 
explains, manicheism implies a failure to recognize or interpret properly 
the nature of human experience at its heights (ST 195, 19S, 207-209, 211-
21 2, MR 1 06 ) • 
69. EPC 119 (in which case life is meaningless and existence. is absurd). 
70. JM 19S. 
71. For once Marcel does not follow Augustine; he fears that, in answer 
to the notion of a predestined selection by God at the heart of the 
mystery of evil, the non-privileged would object (ST 210). cf. fn 23. 
72. DH 142. cf. Schg 111 where Marcel claims that to appreciate suffer-
ing, one must have already experienced it. For examples from Marcel's 
theatre of different reactions to suffering, see Appendix 2, IV. 
73. cL JM 160-161 : fIll n'y a donc de mystere possible que dans l'ordre 
du toi" (Jan. 1919). Later (1923 and again in 1925), he expressed him-
self to be not so sure of the validity of this reasoning, but insofar as 
it affects suffering, we could (he says) say that· it is still valid. We 
may infer, then, that "genuine" existents see in these trials an appeal 
to share in the sufferings of God who, in the Incarnation, took on our 
human condition. Marcel quotes with approval Royce's encouragement: 
"To Job's lamentations we should reply: God in his ultimate essence is 
n6t·a being other than yourself. He is Absolute Being~ You are one 
with him. You are a part of his life. He is the soul of your soul. And 
here is the first truth: when you suffer, your sufferings are the suffer-
ings of God, not God's work which is exterior to him, not punishment in-
flicted by him from outside, not the fruit of his negligence, but his own 
personal woe" (J. Royce, Studies of Good and Evil, 14, cited MR 99-100). 
74. ST 212-213. 
75. ST 193. 
76. PACMO 58 : "Mais le lIlal purement constate ou contemple cesse d'etre 
le lIlal souffert : tout silllplement .il cec;se d' 8tre le mal." What Marcel 
is trying to stress is that we should not look upon evil as an academic 
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question which a psychoanalyst could ascribe to a defective functioning 
or a bad adaptation to a traumatic experience - especially since this 
could be given as a !!scientistic!f explanation of sin (ST 204-205) cf. 
EA I 125, 216. The question lIWhy is there evil?" has, for Marcel, no 
possibil i ty of an answer unless the questioner himself is involved. The 
individual recognizes the evil in himself only when he stops trying to 
explain it and recognizes that the evil is not only before him but 
w him (PI 176, HCH 95). 
77. See above, fn 74. cr. le Dard 118. If anything, Marcel's position 
on evil is aligned with that of the "Irenaicist school!! of theodicy as 
explained by John Hick in Evil and the God of Love (London, Macmillan, 
1966). According to this lIschool", there is a distinction between the 
I!image" and "likeness" of God after which created man is patterned. Man 
is first made in the "image" of God as a personal being who can be 
brought by his own free responses to his human condition towards the 
"likeness" of God which is his final perfecting by the Holy Spirit. Man, 
therefore, is created with the potentiality of perfection yet to be 
realized. (We recall Keats's expression that this world is a lIval e of 
soul-making", quoted by Marcel, EA II 44; see Chapter 2,p. 45). Evil, 
inevitably present in a "partially disorganized worldl! (cf. Teilhard de 
Chardin, le Milieu divin, 1957, pp. 89-90), is justified only as a means 
through which God wills us to achieve the moral maturity which will fit 
us for eternal happiness. For objections to Irenaean theodicy, see 
Clement Dore, "God, 'Soul-Making' and Apparently Useless Suffering" in 
The American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 7 (1970), No. 2, pp. 119-130. 
For interesting statements by characters in Marcel's plays, cf. Arnaud 
Chartrain in les Coeurs avides (135) - text given in Appendix 2, IV, 
p. 233 , and Claude Lemoyne, referring to his pardon of Edm~e : "(J'ai 
prie) pour nous deux que Dieu me donnat la force de t'@tre secourable, 
et petit a petit j'ai eu comme le sentiment que ma souffrance tendait 
a se changer en une force vivante et efficace!! (HdD 55). 
78. ST 265. cf. EA I 25 : "Je songeais aussi que la credibilite est 
absolument demontree par un fait comme le conversion d'un Claudel, d'un 
Maritain, etc. Il est absolument incontestable qu'on peut croire aces 
evenements. Or, personne ne peut admettre que crest faute dtinformation 
suffisante qu'ils ont cru. 11 faut alors, prenant cette croyance comme 
base, se demander a quelles conditions elle est possible, remonter du 
fait a ses conditions. Pente veritable, unique, de la reflexion religi-
euse,lI 
79. Le Seuil invisible (la Grace) 207-208. Commenting on this passage, 
Marcel says (DH L~8-49) that Olivier sums up in a few words what Marcel 
himself had been trying to develop along the lines of Participation. 
cf. FP 93,95, JM 7,73-74, EA I 42-43. Gerard's "God is free!" put him 
beyond the world of mere thinking. The dialogue between Olivier and 
Gerard transposes to the human level, in a context that can already be 
called existential, the sort of hesitation which Marcel' s philosophical 
writings then showed (on his own admission). 
80. HdD 68-69. 
81. RPR 44,52. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
SdI 2/f". 
SdI 326. 
117. 
85. The "recupcrative" dimension of r'cflection is shown up negatively, 
that is by its ahsence, a1o.;o in Marcel's second published play, le 
Pal is de sable in which Moirans is in a position somewhat similar to 
In le Pnlajs de sable reflection remains at the prim-
ary cri tieal) iev Mo runs t to reaLize that fai tit for 
him was a possession to be enjoyed for its aesthetic beauty and its 
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social utility. But when Clarisse decides to live her faith more fully, 
he understands with a shock that true faith is a very different matter. 
The stage is set for his conversion (as it was for Antoine Sorgue who 
reacted "positively" in l'Emissaire) but Moirans is still too self-
possessed and indisponible to make use of the corrective influence of 
secondary reflection. He resorts to spiritual blackmail for his own ends. 
destroys Clarisse' s faith and causes the atrophy of his own. Secondary 
reflection, Marcel reminds us, is not faith but can be useful in prepar-
ing or fostering the spiritual setting of faith (ME 11 67, see Chapter 3, 
p. 79). According to Marcel, secondary reflection shows that keeping 
faith within the limits of the cogito would denature faith by trying to 
make jt verifiable. This is what he means by his distinction between 
je pense and je crois (see p. 110). Inasmuch as genuine faith cannot be 
dissociated from Him whom it affirms, the "I think" cannot metamorphose 
itself, by its o\l'n power, into "I believe". It is when the "I think" 
reflects upon itself that it realizes the need to postulate an act which 
would transcend (primary) reflection, and thi~ act is one of grace. (But 
see the criticism of this assertion, p. 110.) Genuine faith, therefore, 
is characterized by an inner need, which is that of being. Such is the 
nature of the intervention of grace, as proposed by Marcel. All the time 
he insists that we remain free, and the act of faith must be a correspond-
ingly free act answering the invitation so that, by positing itself, it 
abolishes the dualism established by the primary "objectifying" reflect-
ion between faith and the thought of faith. 
86. ME 11 180. 
87. P. Tillich, The Courage to Be. cf. EA I 55, 66, see Chapter 4, P.125. 
88. FP 94. Faith effects a transformation of the believer into a new mode 
of being which necessitates a renewed Weltanschauung since it is a person-
al experience. This is also the spiritual experience of the Absolute 
Thou as experienc€;!d at the heart of all other" thous". Faith gives fresh 
meaning to the world, life and existence. Faith is a means of recovering, 
at a higher degree, existential immediacy. It is the grasp on being 
which is life and spiritual creation. 
89. cf. EA I 28 (see Chapter 1, fn 37, p. 33). Marcel considers (JM 
305) that his investigations into the relationship between the self and 
the body can serve as a useful comparison with faith. Despite his assert-
ion that the world only exists inasmuch as I act on it - for there is 
action only inasmuch as "je suis mon corps et cesse de le penser" - this 
seems to be a very dubious analogy. For one thing, the self cannot really 
be considered without a body; the notion of a disembodied self would be 
dismissed as irrational by some contemporary thinkers. Marcel asks, "La 
croyance n'est-elle pas toujours lracte par lequel, enjambant en quelque 
sorte une des series continues qui relient mon experience immediate a un 
fait quelconque, je traite ce fait comme s'il m'etait donne a la fa~on 
dont l'est mon propre corps." He hastens to agree that one's body is not 
an object of belief. "Toute croyance", he remarks enigmatically, "se 
construit sur le modele de ce qui n'est pas par soi-meme une croyance." 
Marcel argues that there is a very close liaison between existence and 
sensat ion. The individual "adheres" (belongs?) to his body as he "ad-
heres" to matter through sensation. The individual can also "adhere" to 
the "toi" of others through love, and also to the Absolute Thou in (super) 
natural progression through faith and love, and he "adheres" to himself 
through love. This total "adhesion" is then what constitutes an indivi-
dual's existence and at the same time denotes his active being without 
which any of these component parts would be inauthentic. Howcver, for all 
that abstruse reasoning it seems that Mar-cel is attempting an unwarrantcd 
"leap" from a theory of partic.ipntjon through COI'pol~eal sensaUon by 
means of "exisLentinl" nnalogy to a·considerntion of the noture of helief 
involving incorporeal, tram;cendellL Be.ing. The fundamental datum of all 
metaphys.ical reflection, .in Marcel's view, is that I alll a being who is 
not transparent to myself, whoc>c being is a mystery. He concludes his 
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Journal metaphysique by stating the need to recognize clearly the trans-
ition from existence from presence (a more intelligible analogy which he 
comes to use; see Chapter 3 f pp. 81-83, 91-92); he wonders if it is not 
by presence that one can effect the transition from existence to value : 
liCe qui a de valeur, n1est-ce pas ce qui accrott en nous le sentiment de 
la presence (qu'on dise qutil stagit de la notre ou de celle de l'univers-
cela nlimporte pas). 11 y a dans ces r~flexions ceci dtessentiel 
qulelles semblent rendre possible un passage de la metaphysique a 
11 ethique" (JM 306) •. 
90. FP 97. 
91. FP 99. 
92. cf. JM 217-218, 63. 
93. JM 279~ 281-282, 288, 257. 
94. EPC 60-61, JM 169, "Theism and Personal Relationships", loco cit .. , 
40-41. cf. J. Hick, Faith and Knowledge (1957), p. 132 on the notion of 
faith as the condition antecedent of the religious experience which is 
faith-knowledge of God. "There is in cognition of every kind an un-
resolved mystery. The knower-known relationship is in the last analysis 
sui generis : the mystery of cognition persists at the end of every 
enquiry - though its persistence does not prevent us from cognlzlng -
we cannot explain how we know ourselves to be responsible beings subject 
to moral obligations; we just find ourselves interpreting our .social ex-
perience in this way ••• The same is true of the apprehension of God. 
The theistic believer cannot explain how he knows the divine presence to 
be mediated through his human experience. He just finds himself inter-
preting his experience in this way. He lives in the presence of God, 
though he is unable to prove by any dialectical process that God exists.1f 
95. ME II 100-101 ,. JM 87-89, 157-159, 258. 
96. JM 89-90. cf. EA I 92. 
97. FP 90. cf. JM 169, 220, 287-288, EA I 37, EPC 54-55, HP 65, ME 11 
101-105. 
98. TM II 322. 
99. ME II 97. 
100. C)I194-195. cf. (1) Antoine Sorgue in l'Emissaire (SdI 239) : "Tout 
ce qui etait permis pendant ces affreuses annees (1940~1941t) ~ des hommes 
lucides et soucieux de le rester, ctetait d'abord de garder leur juge-
ment intact et de secourir des malheureux chaque fois qutils pouvaient -
Et aussi, et surtout, de prier." (ii) Werner Schneets parting advice to 
Beatrice Soreau in le Dard (117-118) : "Vous ne pouvez pas l'abandonner 
[ref to her husband, Eustache]. 11 faut vous rappeler toujours 
que vous etes la femme d'un pauvre •• , il ne guerira sans doute jamais de 
sa pauvrete. Cl est le plus grand mal de n<fre temps, il se repand comme 
une peste; on nla pas encore trouve de medecin pour le soigner. On ne 
sait meme pas le reconnaitre. Ltartiste y echappera sans doute, m&me 
slil ne mange pas a sa faim. Et aussi le fidele qui a la priere. Tous 
les autres sont menaces, I! 
101. JM 219. 
102. ibid. cf. PACMO 82. 
103. Marcel relates (EPe 220) how much he was impressed by a passage from 
E~M. Forster which enlightened him on this cardinal matter: "It is 
private life which holds out the mirror to infinity; personul intercourse, 
and that alone, thut ever hints at a personality beyond our daily vision." 
MarceJ. used thi!3 text fcolll llownrd
' 
s . as his epigraph to the second 
part of his ;[~ur!!.al (JM 127. 
104. EA I 51, 73. 
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105. EA I 66. Marcel once defined metaphysics as the logic of freedom. 
He recognizes that such a definition is not flawless but argues that it 
serves to throw light on the essential truth that metaphysical progress 
consists in the overall spectrum of the successive steps by which a 
freedom (which understands itself first as the simple power of yes and 
no) is constituted as a real power by conferring upon itself a content 
in which it is discovered and recognized. Such a philosophy of free-
dom, Marcel claims, cannot be thought to be in opposition to the philo-
sophy of being (EPC 45). 
106. !!Reponse a une enquete sur Ifidee de Dieu", loco cit., 39. see 
Chapter 2, p. 43. In this sense we can appreciate Marcel's affinity 
with Augustine and Anselm : that through the creative fidelity of faith 
our souls are restless until they rest in God, and that faith, on the 
philosophical level, is essentially fides quaerens intellectum. cf. 
Chapter 3, fn 1, p. 94, Chapter 4 fn 52, p. 132, Appendix 1 B, p. 216. 
107. J1\1 137. 
108. The role of religion in such a metaphysics as envisaged by Marcel 
109. 
110. 
111. 
112. 
113. 
114. 
can be understood, he says, as playing an important "parenetic" (exhort-
atory) part. The metaphysician, according to Marcel, has a mission -
not as a !!man of congresses" seeking fame and adulation - as a persuader, 
in exhorting his fellow men to take a more active part in the fellowship 
of being through creative testimony of fidelity, hope and love. (We may 
be tempted to detect an element of elitism in this claim of a "paren-
etic!! mission.) Faith, for Marcel, must be a loving witness if it is 
to be authentic. The "true!! nature of religion in this exhortatory 
sense occurred to him as far back as 1912 when he wrote: "La religion 
n!est quia condition qulon ferme les yeux a tout ce qui se passe em-
piriquement comme religion. Nous devons donc nous en tenir a l'idee 
que la metaphysique est bien en derniere analyse une parenetique trans-
cendante se fondant sur une critique" (FP ). The structure of this 
"transcendent exhortation" (i.e. presumably oriented towards the Trans-
cendent) is not, he assures us, to be taken as a deductive process, for 
religion is not and cannot be contained only in ideas. The dialectic 
reveals that the affirmation of the contingency of on~ts relation with 
the empirical denies freedom. Instead, it shows the way to real free-
dom and individuality. It can, therefore, be called a logic of freedom 
(see above, fn 105) : "lfensemble des demarches par lesquelles une pen-
s en general se const Hue comme indi v iduelle" (FP 74-75). This 
IItranscendent parenetic" can be seen to be the driving impulse of second-
ary reflection which is also established on preliminary critical reflect-
ion, towards awareness of the ontological need which in turn helps 
reveal to us the reality of the Mystery of Being, which is God. 
the 
PACMO 77-78, 80. 
EA II 73. 
ST 61, PE 92-93. 
EA I 1 ,185, ME II 132. This will lead to a distinction between 
attitudes of the suicide and the martyr (Chapter 6, pp. 186-188). 
EA II 118-119. 
ST 211. cf. ME 11 133. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
ATTESTATION 
Creative Fidelity in Hope and Love 
Therefore, since we are judged righteous by faith, 
we are at peace with God, through our Lord Jesus 
Christ. Through him we have entered this state of 
grace and we rejoice in our hope of sharing the 
glory of God. More than that, we rejoice in our 
sufferings, knowing that these sufferings bring 
patience, and patience brings perseverance, and 
perseverance brings hope, and this hope is not 
deceptive, because this love of God has been poured 
into our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been 
given to us. 
- SAINT PAUL, Roma.ns, 5 : 1-5. 
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Vivre dans la lumiere de la fidelite, 
c'est progresser dans une direction 
qui est celle m~me de ItEtre. 
- G. MARCEL, !:~,!ignite hurnaine, 93. 
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By now it is clear that Gabriel Marcel's whole dialectic is oriented 
towards the possibility of arriving at an experiential knowledge of the 
Absolute who is seen as the goal of an innate human impulse (the onto-
logical need). Marcel agrees with Sartre that man's ultimate fulfilment 
of self is situated in his own "project"; Marcel urges that this exist-
ential "project" can be sublimated through attachment to the transcend-
ent. He proposes to show that it is by commitment to others and funda-
mental~y by commitment in a transcendent dimension to the Absolute 
(personalized as Thou) that man can achieve his personal "project". It 
is, he asserts, in our relationships with our fellOW-beings that the 
seeds of the promise of fulfilment, of pleroma1 , are sown insofar as 
these relationships are shown to be the vehicle and mirror of our relat-
ions to the Transcendent. It is, then, by virtue of relationships that 
man witnesses to his "authentic project" of knowing and fulfilling him-
self. The genuine existent, Marcel insists, must witness to being, that 
is to the fact that not only he is but that his status is that of creat-
ure who depends on a Creator for the gift of his being. 
In this chapter we shall be considering Marcel's presentation of the 
means by which man can (and must) witness to being. In order to create 
an awareness of man's ontological orientation - that man is directed 
towards God "in whom we live and move and have our being,,2 - Marcel has 
recourse to analyses of experience since man is basically, from even a 
biological point of view, a sentient being. I propose to give examples 
from Marcel's plays to illustrate his phenomenological studies of experi-
ence, in the context of his "concrete" approaches. For, to pursue his 
aim of restoring to experience its ontological weight in a manner intell-
igible to all, Marcel has had to move from idealism to realism,from the 
abstract to the concrete. He maintains that the concrete can never be 
completely objectified because it is inexhaustible), as Being itself is 
inexhaustible. His favourite concrete approaches to the inexhaustible 
mystery of Being are the human yet supra-sensual experiences of fidelity, 
hope and love. It can be stated that Marcel's dialectic of these concrete 
approaches as the means of ontological attestation is a translation into 
metaphysical language of the "evangelical counsels" to practise the three 
main theological virtues of faith, h"ope and charity. 
Prominence will be given to Marcel's treatment of hope, a virtue 
which he claims has been largely neglected by contemporary thinkers. 
Certainly its significance seems to have been minimized by the Anglo-
Saxon schools of philosophy. As will be noted, Morcel shares with Sartre, 
for different reasons, an appreciation of the importance of hope. 
At the core of these interrelated experiences (fidelity, hope and love) 
is the creative presence of the fellowship of Being. This creative 
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presence is the permeating spirit of Marcel's philosophy and is establish-
ed in the Absolute Thou as source of being. These interrelated experient-
ial approaches are the concrete manifestations of witness whereby the 
authentic participant attests the foundation of the self in an ontological 
communion which is itself established in Being. Once the existent realizes 
that his being is oriented towards transcendence, he becomes aware that the 
transcendental presence which illuminates his whole being and the meaning-
ful purpQse of his existence is no less than the Presence of God. Accord-
ing to IIlarcel, presence at any level cannot be grasped but is evoked 
through direct and unchallengeable experiences which do not rise from the 
conceptual apparatus of which we make use in order to reach objects. 4 
These experiences, which are given to us all by reason of our situation in 
the world, are deepened according to the degrees of intimacy with our own 
selves and with our fellow travellers through life. To be fruitful, pres-
ence depends, lIlarcel claims, on one's willingness to make oneself available, 
to be spent in a loving, selfless union with the other. And that is the 
quintessence of fidelity. 
I. Fidelity as Witness. 
i. Establishing the quality of commitment 
Fidelity, Marcel proclaims, presupposes commitment because one must 
5 initially be faithful to one's own commitment. Fidelity is a response in 
commitment to an appeal; it is not a mere act of the will or a desire to 
hold on to a possession. In this light we can distinguish between fidelity 
and constancy. Constancy, Marcel says, is characterized by an idea, more 
or less evidently self-centred, of immutability in attitude. Fidelity 
interpreted as constancy would be too passive and stagnant for Marcel, and 
certainly reducible to a version of being faithful to oneself only.6 The 
other would be seen only as a useful specimen on which to practise an 
assumed virtue. This would not be true fidelity according to Marcel's 
underlying notion of participation since the relationship is not properly 
dyadic : the other is treated as a third party. Presence would be missing 
or at most conceived only as an idea." If presence were only an idea, we 
are assured, the most we could intend to do would be to maintain this idea 
before us as one keeps a photograph on a mantclpiece or in a cupboard. It 
is, however, of the nature of presence to be uncircumscribed since it lics 
beyond the zone of the prohlematical. Presence, Marcel insists, is mystery 
in thc exact mcusure in which it is prescncc, tImt is to say insofar as it 
is understood us Marccl himself undef'sLands the tef'm. Fidelity is basic-
ally the perpetuation of' intersubjective presence und as such is also 
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"mysterious" inasmuch as it is closely involved in the being we ourselves 
are. 
7 
ii. Fidelity is creative 
(a) Fidelity to self. 
Fidelity to oneself, Marcel warns, is both difficult to achieve and to 
discern. Self-fidelity may be nothing more than a stubbornly maintained 
agreement between the self and certain impressions, ideas or ways of living 
which the person has labelled as his own. Although it is personal, such a 
view of fidelity is false because it is self-centred; it belongs to the 
order of "having" and serves only to strengthen the obduracy of one's in-
disponibilite. True fidelity, Marcel stipulates, is intersubjective; it 
is humble and patient. All three virtues - patience, humility and fidelity 
form as it were a "community" 
qui m'appara1t comme un etre dont il n'appartient pas ~ 
la psychologie de reconnaltre la mouvante structure; 
this "community" 
ne saurait exister, ne se laisse meme pas penser dans un 
systeme qui concentrerait en moi les racines, et cornrne 
les attaches reelles - des engagements que la vie peut 
m
'
inciter a souscrire. (8) 
As for the fixed element of constancy, true fidelity on the other hand is 
active and spontaneous. This element of spontaneity is in itself radically 
independent of the will. Fidelity is by no means an inert conformism, an 
inward resolution to preserve the status quo. Understood more positively, 
Marcel suggests, fidelity is the active recognition of something permanent 
in the ontological order which can be ignored or betrayed just as it can be 
attested or safeguarded. 9 This "something permanent" in the ontological 
order can be only taken to mean God, as we shall proceed to see in the 
following section. Fidelity is creative of the person, Marcel argues, 
because it possesses the mysterious power of renewing both donor and recip-
ient, no ma.tter how unworthy the latter may have been at first: it gives 
him the chance to open himself in communion to that spirit which animates 
the consecrated soul o True fidelity can only be creative fidelity which 
safeguards itself by creating; its true nature is revealed as evidence, an 
attestation. 10 
(b) Fidelity to God. 
Underpinning any fidelity is absolute fidelity by which Marcel means 
fidelity to the Absolute (Thou). Such fidelity is indeed humble and 
patient. Fidelity centred on God (and this is what Marcel implies) is the 
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humble, active confidence in Him, for of myself I can do nothing. To 
assume that I can be faithful to myself without reference to God is to 
offend against the first commandmeDt by claiming aseity. Fidelity is also 
patient because its dependence on God is such that it makes no demands for 
instant recognition of its faithful services. At the same time absolute 
fidelity is implied as being reciprocal : the Absolute Thou is invoked as 
Absolute Recourse who will never betray one's trust. At the root of 
fidelitYr Marcel asserts, there is a "grasp" of Being upon us, a total 
demand of an absolute Presence who is given to us as Absolute Thou. From 
this premiss ~ surely presupposing faith ~ we can understand how Marcel 
reasons that, deriving from Absolute Fidelity, other fidelities become 
11 possible, finding in it their guarantee. 
Fidelity is, accordingly, attestation to Being. "Fidelity to being" 
must then find its ultimate expression as fidelity to God because an appeal 
of a genuine ontological order can only come from a "thou", so that the 
absolute appeal must emanate from an Absolute Thou. At least this is what 
we must infer unless Marcel is to proclaim an unverifiable and unfalsifiable 
"one-way" appeal addressed to the Absolute Thou. It,is a point that he does 
not make clear : Marcel does not enunciate categorically the reciprocal 
activity of the Absolute Thou. 12 If we do accept God as the source of the 
absolute appeal, fidelity bears witness to God, acknowledging his absolute 
Presence. We can now the very close connection between faith and fidelity 
in their highest expression. For, as Marcel observes, in the end tmre 
must be an absolute commitment, entered upon by the whole of my being, or 
at least by something real in myself which could not be repudiated without 
repudiating the whole ~ and which would be addressed to the whole of Being 
and be made in the presence of that whole. Such an absolute commitment, 
Marcel declares flatly, is faith. 13 Now since Marcel points out that faith 
means "faith in God,,1 4 , the "whole of Being" must be taken to mean God. 
While Marcel may not proclaim that identif ication in specific terms, he 
certainly admits the close connection between faith and fidelity : 
En simplifiant beaucoup, mais sans, je crois, fausser 
Ifessentiel, je dirai dfune part que la foi sfest eclairee 
pour moi a partir du moment ou jfai pense directement 
la fidelite; et dfautre part, que la fidelite sfest 
eclairee a mes yeux a partir du tqi, a padir de la presence 
elle-meme interpretee en fonction du toi. (15) 
In fact, Marcel does identify the repository of absolute fidelity as God 
and, furthermore, a God 50 that, in the light of his comments on ~.~~.....;::.. 
absolute commitment, we can only infer that God is Being : 
Une fidC'lite absolue enveloppe une personIlC absoluc. (16) 
Une fidelite ab501ue, vouee .... non point tt un etre 
particulier, 'a tine creature, mais aDieu ltii=;;;emc. (17) 
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(c) Human fidelity mirrors the divine. 
Genuine commitment may be said to be never unilateral. Of course it may 
at once be objected that this cannot be a factual statement since it is not 
an empirical matter. A may be committed to B, and B to A. Now if B becomes 
unfaithful, A is not necessarily unfaithful. A, then, can remain faithful 
while B is not. This situation is easily shown in human relationships and 
can be applied to the relationships between man and God (God remaining 
faithful~. Again, it may be possible for people to be committed to an idea, 
even if that idea is unreal (e.g. the extirpation of witchcraft or a Marxist 
class-less society). To the objection that my fidelity to another person 
can be reduced to an idea which I have formed of him, an idea which is really 
a projection of myself, Marcel replies that such an opinion has been arrived 
at a priori and is disproved by experience. But Marcel's latter claim is a 
dangerous one and certainly appears to be fallible. It all depends, appar-
ently, on his interpretation of fidelity. In his view, fidelity is rather 
like an oath, a vow never to forsake the other, and accordingly implies the 
·18 
consciousness of something sacred. From this very personal opinion 
Marcel may well proceed to show that marriage is an apt illustration of 
fidelity to commitment on the level ·of huma.n relationships.19 But marriage is 
by no means universally seen in this light, and his continuing argument is 
accordingly weakened. 
To show that true fidelity is creative Marcel uses the analo~y of the 
creativity of human fatherhood. A desirable awareness of its potential in 
improving interpersonal relationships and also of recognizing the "sacral" 
character of life (which is what he means by "piety" in this context) can be 
aided, he suggests, by a consideration of the revealed dogma of the Trinity 
seen in the unfathomable wealth of its concrete manifestations. 20 Human 
fatherhood t he goes on to say, should be conceived as the model of divine 
21 fatherhood and not conversely. It is through procreation, with an aware-
ness of its "true" purpose, that man can share in the creativity of God. 
Such is the particular vocation of fatherhood, a vocation which itself pre-
supposes regard for life and fosters the recognition of man's ontological 
status as creature. 
(The vocation of fatherho·od) includes the corollary (of which 
we are perhaps all too unaware) that the words "to impart life" 
have to be interpreted in their truest sense, namely, that 
life is an infinitely precious gift, and that the father him-
self is only a mediator between God as the author of all 
creation and the child as a creature of God. (22) 
It is by means of what Mar'cel calls the ~?~~_~·ycat~~.£ that we enter 
into t.his commitment which is not necessarily nor solely restricted to 
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fatherhood. The voeu crEateur is by no means unconditional but on the 
contrary is formulated rather as a prayer in which I beg God as Absolute 
Thou to accept my life in order to know and love him and thereby ensure 
my salvation. 23 It is, as Marcel recognizes, defined in relation to an 
organism which, while spiritual, is yet carnally established in the etern-
ity of God, insofar as fidelity is embodied: 
une fidelite elle-meme creatrice, la fidelite a une 
e9perance qui va au-dela de toute ambition, de toute 
pretent ion personnel! e. (24) 
Fidelity thus expressed gives meaning to life and existence. For this 
voeu createur - the concrete expression of any true fidelity - is the 
"quivering anticipation" of a pleromatic self-fulfilment in which life, no 
longer an endless improvisation of disappointing variations on a few given 
themes, will be satisfied, concentrated and reassembled around the Absolute 
Person who alone can give it the unbreakable seal of unity.25 
Fidelity cannot, being mystery, be appreciated from outside. Now,while, 
theoretically in order to commit myself, I should first know myself, in 
fact I come to know myself only if I have first made my act of commitment. 26 
Through my absolute fidelity to God as Being I come to know myself and so 
find the answer to the primary ontological question "What am 11" Fidelity 
is established on a certain relationship between myself and Being which is 
experienced and as such is indefectible. From this realization flows my 
conf idence. This is a resumption of the "pr,imitive assurance" of' being 
which gives impetus to the ontological need. And as Being cannot be an 
abstraction, absolute fidelity transcended involves an Absolute Person. 
Ontological fidelity, Marcel states firmly, can only be shown to a person 
and never to an ideal or a notion. 27 If it were, fidelity would be degraded 
into an objectifiable idea. Now as we can love and be faithful only to one 
whom we know, our fidelity - at its most creative and absolute - cannot be 
vested in another whom we do not know, but in one who is for us a thou. 
This, then, is the Absolute Thou by whom Marcel must mean God. 
iii. Concrete examples from Marcel's theatre 
Despite his debt to Bergson who was his teacher, Mar"Cel seems to owe 
any inspiration for his notion of fidelite creatrice more to Josiah Roycets 
philosophy of loyalty than to Bergson 1 s evolution creatrice. Marcel, how-
ever,directs his investigations into all experiential thought instead of 
the empirical. Since the' notion of f ideli ty plays Hun role axial It in his 
28 
whole wOI'k ,it is interesting to Ilote'the development of his thought 
along this line by compDring and contrasting the plays written before and 
after his conversion. 
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Fidelity, being the perpetuation and attestation of presence, is pre-
served in creativity which in turn is to be found wherever there is being. 
Now being is fostered and developed in communion with oneself and others, 
and de~ives from God as Source of all being. At each level there is inter-
action which can be expressed negatively by rejection and isolation, posi ... 
ti vely by l'esponse and intersubjecti vity. At the highest 1 evel f ideli ty 
to God means to have faith in God. Faith in God is, of course, a free act 
and as such does not have to be, imposed on him who is unwilling. But it 
dOes not follow that faith in God cannot be attested. The witness of 
faith in God is borne by the human activity of fidelityo 29 
Two of Marcel's earlier plays, la Chapelle ardente and l'Iconoclaste 
(he significantly describes the latter play as "la tragedie de la fide ... 
lite,,30 ), reveal the possibility of a mistaken sense of fidelity to a 
person. In each case the person is dead - a man in the first, a woman in 
the second. Each play shows that what was the cause of the tragedy was 
the lack of openness on the part of those concerned to others similarly 
affected by the absence. Therein lies the reason the person to whom the 
"fidelity" is attested is treated objectively, as an absence, and not "mys-
teriously", as presence. 
(a) La Chapelle ardente. 
Aline Fortier jealously keeps the memory of her son Raymond killed in 
the last days of the Great War as more than just a photograph on the mantel-
piece. (An indication of. the extent of her blinded grief is her refusal to 
allow her grandchildren the use of Raymond's childhood toys.) Aline's 
agony is self-inflicted and self-centred: she identifies herself with her 
deceased son, unconsciously belittling his character. Her "fidelity" is 
nothing more than an egoistic love of self, as her husband recognizes. He 
accuses her of thriving on misery and sorrow (she visits only those fami-
lies who have suffered like losses, relishing their admiration). Don't 
pretend that you are doing all this for Raymond, oct~ve tells her, it is 
for yourself. Determined to keep things as they were when Raymond was 
alive, Aline succeeds in discouraging his bereaved fiancee, Mireille, from 
marrying according to her desire. Instead Aline urges Mireille to offer 
her own sacrifice as befitting the memory of the departed Raymond by 
marrying the sickly Andr~ Verdet. Even when Mireille eventually sees 
through her "mother-·in-law's" machinations, Aline still contrives to retain 
her hold over the unfortunate girl who is of sufficiently good heart to 
recognize that Aline is not to be hated but pitied. 31 Aline's tragedy 
springs from the fact that she loved her son too much not to see the 
rights of others. She is unable to open herself to others, unable to recog-
nize their equal right to live and love as they wish. 
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(b) L'Iconoclaste. 
Similarly mistaken is Abel Renaudier who identifies himself with Vivi-
ane, the dead wife of his friend, Jacques Delorme. Abel had passionately 
loved Viviane but when she had preferred Jacques he had respected her 
choice, accepting his friend as the more deserving of her hand. Jacques's 
subsequent remarriage appeared to Abel as a betrayal of Viviane's memory. 
As a result of his crusade to avenge her, Abel succeeds in demolishing 
Jacques's very fidelity to his dead wife. For Jacques had been on the 
verge of a suicidal despair when, after a psychic experience, he had re-
married at the behest of the spirit (as he believed it to be) of Viviane. 
Abel, of course, had been unaware of the state of his friend's mind. Al-
though Jacques's notion of fidelity is vitiated by objectivity, Abel's is 
no less. Abel, the iconoclast, is at fault because he, too, objectifies 
fidelity as much as Jacques who wants tangible evidence. What Abel should 
have done was to treat Jacques as a thou (just as Aline should have res-
pected Mireille) to show his confidence in him, by opening in his favour 
"le credit illimite que s'ouvrent l'un a l'autre des amis veritables.,,3 2 
There is, however, no commitment purely from one side. It always im-
plies that the other being has a hold over me33 if my fidelity is inspired 
by the sense of an intersubjective presence. This sense is awakened and 
fostered by the conditional antecedent of availability, as exemplified in 
Mon Temps nlest pas le v8tre. This play serves as the bridge between the 
two groups; the heroine, Marie-Henriette Champel, changes her outlook to-
war'ds her father from indifference to authentic fidelity. 
(c) Mon Temps n'est pas le v8tre. 
In this play which treats of the "generation gap", Alfred Champel can 
no longer communicate with his "modern, liberal-minded" wife and still less 
with his two daughters of relaxed morality, Marie-Henriette and Perrine. 
Whereas the latter remains obdurate, indifferent to his feelings as to any-
body's, Marie-Henriette changes in attitude towards her father after a real 
"open" encounter with him shortly before his death which is occasioned by 
Perrine's outrageous contempt. Thereafter Marie-Henriette remains faithful 
to his presence and can appreciat.e Flavio's affirmation that grace is the 
medium for fidelity to the dead. 34 
The outcome of this play prepares us for the proposition that there can 
be self-creation, and a corresponding fidelity to self, only insofar as one 
is prepared to open oneself to others. This is illustrated in two of Marcells 
later plays, ~ Di1r~ and l~~gne .::~_l~S;;ro i~ (both of which, co incident-
ally, have the "Jewish pr'oblem" of the Nazi era as common denominator). 
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(d) Le Signe de la Croix. 
The theme of this play is the fruition of faith through the awareness 
of a transcendental reality affirmed by personal witness. Simon Bernauer 
has taken his family to the South of France hopefully out of the reach of 
the Gestapo, for they are of Jewish origin. Their danger is heightened 
with the news of the arrest and presumed death of Simon's eldest son, 
David, who had remained in Paris. For Simon, this event, stemming from 
David's public wearing of the star of David, is a turning-point in his 
attitude to Judaism. Hitherto he had not cared to recognize his affili-
ations with the French Jewish community and now regrets his earlier dis-
paraging treatment of David's religious consciousness. 55 Simon1s openness 
to the enlightenment of the course of his duty is due to his predisposit-
ion to the influence of Madame Lilienthal (Tante Li~na). The epitome of 
tolerance and selfless consideration for others, she accepts with serene 
resignation the failure of the abbe Schweigsam1s efforts to obtain sanct-
uary for her; she belongs already, she affirms, to lIanother kingdom l1 • 36 
Like Nicodemus, Simon comes by night - to the abbe and reveals that he 
has made his decision. Whereas before he would have avoided contact with 
his fellow Jews, he cannot turn his back on them now that they are perse-
cuted but must share their plight as one shares the blessed bread. This 
revelation he owes to Aunt Lena. He sees her as having been sent like an 
angel, bearing a message of which she herself is unaware since she urges 
him to leave for America with the rest of his family. In awe at this mys-
terious appeal, he asks if it is not his right to think that she has been 
sent to enlighten his way. After all, 
Pourquoi certains etres ne seraient-ils pas places sur 
notre chemin comme des lumieres? Cn) 
As far aE he is concerned, his way is clear. Since David1s death cannot be 
simply ttwiped away" into forgetfulness, he can at least give himself as an 
oblation, to unite himself in solidarity with his fellow suffering Jews. 
When Au.nt Lena wonders if he is acting in this way because he sees a light 
which she cannot, Simon replies tenderly, 
Et cependant, tante L~na, cette lumiere c1est en vous et 
autour de vous qufell e nla cesse de briller depuis que 
nous nous sommes rencontres. (38) 
Simon has taken up the torch of faith handed on by Aunt Lena. His 
example transforms the squalid concentration camp to which he is doomed 
and his last wish is not for himself but for the collaborator Reveilhac 
who had been instrumental in sHving the rest of Simonls family. Simon 
remains with his loved ones, afler his death, like a living presencc39 
which finds a response in the hec)rt of his younger son, Jean-,Pnul. This 
young man (who incjdentf~lly has been converted to Catholicism) is open to 
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the action of grace, whereas Pauline, Simon's widow, has long since shut 
herself in on her bitterness. She cBnnot understand that. forgiveness is 
not forgetfulness4C but the free response, in chad ty, to the operation 
of grace o As Simon had forgiven Reveilhac, the latter in turn forgave 
those who cor.demned him. It is left to the abbe and Jean-Paul to recall 
to the others that 
l'injustice est partout parce que le peche est partout ••• 
Mais si le peche est partout, la Gr~ce elle aussi sur-
aI50nde : la Gr~ce de Dieu. (41 ) 
It is for that reason that the abbe Schweigsam believes that it was through 
the intercession of Simon Bernauer that Xavier Reveilhac received the 
strength and lucidity to pardon his executioners. Grace, Marcel asserts, 
belongs to the supernatural order and as such can be called miraculous, in 
spite of and all the more reason because of - a world which sees no need 
for God. The abbe affirms, 
Sans le miracle perpetuellement renouvele de la gr~ce 
divine, nous savons aujourdthui ce qulil adviendrait 
des hommes et de la societe humaine. (42) 
(e) Le Dard. 
A similar selfless commitment to his persecuted countrymen is given by 
Werner Schnee in le Dard. Eustache Soreau, his co-protagonist, is a second-
ary schoolteacher who, having married a wealthy politician's daughter, is 
tormented by the barb of a guilty conscience. Eustache cannot forget his 
lower middle-class origins nor his former aggressiVe Socialist idealism. In 
line with his desire not to betray his socialist precepts, his every judg-
ment is dictated according to a set ideology. Consequently he reproaches 
Werner, and old University acquaintance who has fled Nazi Germany, with not 
identifying himself with his fellow expatriates. But Werner, who has no 
political inclinations, accuses Eustache of judging others not on their 
intrinsic qualities but according to the category into which they fall. 4.3 
In turn Werner becomes a prey to guilty conscience, which he describes 
as "une espece de grippe infectieuse".44 His very success in France does 
not blind him to the reality of the sufferings of those at home in Germany. 
The barb of guilty conscience reinforces the "partisan commitmentu45 of 
Eustache who betrays his own ideals when he betrays his friend just as much 
as conscience urges Werner to show his soljdarity with his compatriots 
still languishing in concentration camps, and particularly with his Jewish 
pianist, RUGolf SchonLl:al, who is dying in a Swiss hospice as a result of 
his trea tmcnt at the hands of the Nazis. Wer·ner resolves to act in accord-· 
ance with his inner urgings of fidelity; he decides. to return to Germany 
even though imprisonment and possible death await him. Before he leaves, 
he explains to B~atrice, the wife of Eustache, that he is taking this act-
ion, not for any cause like the Underground movement, but for the sake of 
his fellow countrymen. Furthermore, he realizes what Eustache suspects, 
that if he remained he would fall in love wi th her; and she is alreadY very 
much attracted to him. If, then, he stayed, he would encourage an incip-
ient betrayal of her conjugal fidelity. 
With deep insight Werner stigmatizes the greatest evil of the time as 
poverty Qf spirit. But he reassures Bcatrice that grace - more properly a 
viaticum - is given to the few rich in spirit to care for the many tainted~6 
Poverty of the ontological order is not only to have received less but to 
h t k h t t ' . t h t h b . d 47 ave no nown ow 0 cen re one s eXIS ence on w a as een receIve • 
Werner Schnee manages, therefore, to remain faithful to himself and at the 
same time, by withdrawing in his freely committed act of self-sacrificing 
fidelity to others, allows Beatrice to be faithful to herself and to her 
husband. Werner will not, however, leave her alone to face the future. He 
assures her that he will remain for her as a living presence, just as his 
friend Rudolf is always present in his thoughts and prompts his fidelity.48 
11. Hope and Love. 
i. Marcel traditionalist but cont 
Clearly, presence is the key theme to Marcel's notion of fidelity. It 
is the channel of the "authentic" ontological virtues of hope and love which 
sustain fidelity and give it its true character. It is necessary to note 
here that, while I may appear to concentrate on Marcel's treatment of hope, 
there can be no possible exclusion of love in a consideration of his dia-
lectic. Love will be appreciated as the melding agent of fidelity and hope; 
according to Marcel's presentation love is the Ground of Hope and the Main-
spring of Fidelity. Where there is true participative fidelity there must 
be love. Marcel firmly believes that creative fidelity is of little value 
if not inspired by a hope for the continuing presence of the loved one. 
From what has already been indicated of Marcel's investigations into a 
theory of participation which finds its expression in an ascending hierarchy 
of I-thou relationships, it should be evident that love is the major theme 
running, like a leitmotiv, throughout his dialectic. Of particular interest 
is the importance he attaches to the "almost forgotten" virtue of hope. ,In 
this part of the present chapter I propose to show the relevance of hope, 
with love, to the :,;ubject of the thesis. 
In the matter of hope, it can be said that Gabriel Murcel stands at the 
151 
junction of contemporary European thought and Christian tradition. Through 
his valuable contributions towards a phenomenology of hope he appeals to 
contemporary thinkers (outside the Anglo-Saxon school) with whom he can be 
related. Hope is central in theology, existentialism - and Marxism. We 
may say (although he himself may not be prepared to admit it) that Sartre 
was "redeemed" from absolute despair by a combination of Marxism and his ex-
periences during the Second World War. For his part, Marcel was "converted" 
during t!1e First World War, but ,his "conversion" was of an entirely differ ... 
ent kind. Long before his own private harrowing experiences with the Red 
Cross bureau for missing persons, Marcel had considered, and been assured 
of, the value of love. There lies the difference between the two. Whereas 
Sartre still sees the other as a potential enemy, Marcel emphasizes love 
which led him to faith and from there to postulate his notion of creative 
fidelity. While he might share with Sartre an appreciation of hope, his 
whole outlook is characteristically different because he shares with Martin 
Buber, for example, the realization of the overall importance of love. And 
it is precisely because of his belief in the transcendental orientation of 
man, of belief in God as Absolute Thou, that both hope and love are vindic-
ated and guaranteed of perpetuation in a supra-temporal ("eternal tl ) dimen-
sion. 
ii. The central position of hope in Marcel's metaphysics 
In his analyses of ho~e Marcel points the way for man to achieve the 
fulfilment of his being. Hope is, in fact, at the very centre of the onto-
logical mystery49; for the exigency of being which impels man to fulf il him-
self is essentially active. This is represented by Marcel as an urgent 
activity since what is at stake is one's own being. This is, in reality, 
the soul which is the very core of being and so the innermost and most 
intimate element of one's ontological unity. Marcel ventures to suggest 
Je ne serais pas eloigne de croire que l'esperance est a 
l~ame ce que la respiration est a l'organisme vivant, la 
00 l'esperance fait defaut, l'ame se desseche et stextenue, 
elle n1 est plus que fonction, elle est toute pr~te a ser-
vir dfobjet d'etude a une psychologie qui ne reperera 
jamais que son emplacement ou son defaut. Mais c'est l'gme, 
precisement, qui est une voyageuse, crest de lY ame , et 
dlelle seule, quYil est supremement vrai de dire quretre, 
cYest &tre en route. (50) 
The creativity of tile ontological need is translated, therefore, into a 
concrete dynamism which is hope. Hope is the irradiation of the ontological 
attestation. My whole heing, in MarcePs terms, is "invocation", a calling-
for--God, an orientation iowards transcendence. Hope finds its source not 
only in our situation ("etre-au-mollde") but in transcending it. Marcel pro-
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poses that it is reflection on hope that is perhaps our most direct way of 
apprehending "transcendence". He describes "transcendence" as 
ce tte espece d' intervallc absolu, infranchissable qui 
se crellse entre l'ame et l'etre, en tant que celle~'ci 
se derobe Et ses prises. (51 ) 
This gulf of transcendence can be cleared, not with astride but with a leap. 
This implies the need to spring above the earth-bound materialism, to escape 
the danger of depersonalization in a world of technology, to aim for some-
thing higher in order to land safely in "the other kingdom". 
L'esperance est un elan, elle est un bond. 
Since hope is so central to Marcel's notion of the ontological mystery, it 
can be stated that his metaphysics, in its "intentional" nature, is a meta-
physics of hope. 
iii. Hope is necessary to combat despair 
Surrounded by a world of "technics", man can react negatively in three 
ways. He may claim total independence of God, he may withdraw into himself 
and foster his own alienation, or he may deny himself in despair. Marcel 
sees the urge to betray oneself, to "unmake" oneself (se defaire), as com-
pelling as that which seeks expression in self-fulfilling creation. It would 
appear that by his postulation of "invocation" and "refus" as polarized 
extremes of man's activity in response ,to his situation, Marcel is proclaim-
ing, at least implicitly, a kind of ontological manicheism. But, as we shall 
shortly see, there is a salutary kind of despair which can lead us to make 
the more "posit ive acceptance" of creative sel f-ful f ilment. 
Despair is possible in any form, at any moment, and to any degree. This 
temptation to despair, which is self-·betrayal as Marcel understands the term, 
is all around us. 53 Its first weapon is fascination which freezes the creat-
ive impulse of being; the fascination of despair is baleful, he asserts, 
pour autant quteUe tente a creer une immobilisation et 
COITEie une congelation de la vie de l'gme. (54) 
Having stopped the outgoing activity of the soul aspiring to pleromatic 
communion in God, despair cuts the person off from all else, and particularly 
from others and, in final analysis, from God. This is the effect of the 
"closed" attitude of despair. In a c~rtain sense, Marcel affirms, despair 
is the consciousn~ss of time as closed, of time as a prison. 
Le temps clos du d~sespoir est corrooe une contre-~ternite, 
une eternite retollrrH~c contre elle-·mcme, celle de l' enfer. (55) 
We may now understand the isolating agency of despair. Since it cripples 
being by working for its gradual demolition, despair iITllllobilizes being in a 
form of spiritual suicide. This spiritual suicide ITlay in turn lead to 
physical suicide as the f insl com;cquence of despair. Thj s is what happens 
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when he who despairs no longer depends on Being nor on the being of others 
but identifies himself only with his acute loneliness. By shutting himself 
off completely from Being, Marcel asserts, he who despairs has already cast 
himself into the hell of his own making. 56 
From this argument we can see that Marcel is giving a philosophical 
interpretation of the theological expression "to lose onets soul". We are 
also free, Marcel warns, to "unmake ourselves ll (se defaire) - that is, we 
are free to reject our being as creativity and cut all links with the Source 
of Being. In theological terms, this would amount to the soul's (self-) 
privation of God. Marcel believes that at the root of despair lies an 
affirmation that there is nothing in reality to which credit can be given; 
there is no such guarantee. It is, he concludes, a statement of complete 
insolvency.57 He who despairs is bankrupt of being. 
iv. Through salutary "despair'; to absolute hope 
Yet it is precisely where despair is possible that there is the like 
possibility of hope. Hope can only be when there is reason for despair. The 
two are inseparable, and their correlation subsists to the end. He explains: 
Je veux dire que la structure du monde ou nous vivons 
permet et en quelque fa~on peut sembleI' conseiller un 
desespoir absolu : mais ce n'est que dans un monde 
semblable qu1une esperance invincible peut surgir. (58) 
When Marcel affirms our indebtedness to the great pessimists in the history 
of thought, in that they have prepared our minds to understand that despair 
Can be (as it was for Nietzsche) the springboard of the loftiest affirmation, 
he recalls Kierkegaard1s third s of existence. This is that of religion 
in which man denies himself in the presence of God. This apparent despair 
is indeed mortal, but in the Paul ine sense of "dying to Christ.". 59 Through 
the most mysterious paradox this mortal illness does not lead to (ontologic-
al) death. On the contrary, it is through "despair" of this kind that the 
self is saved. 
However, Marcel expresses some reservations on Kie·rkegaard I s use of the 
notion of a "mortal leap" to describe the transition from despair to faith~O 
As for himself, Marcel writes that the believer is he who will meet with no 
insurmountable obstacle on his way towards transcendence. Such obstacles, 
he explains, will be put forward by a hope which is conditional and there-
fore not genuine. Anguish, as provided for by Kierk , has a role to 
play, but in such a way that it serves to reinforce hope. Even so, Marcel 
sees a taint of conditionality in this kind of hope whereby despair is im-
plied as otherwise inevitable. Marcel admit this "impure" kind of hope 
but suggests that we can conceive, theoretically at least, an absolute or 
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pure hope. This pure hope springs fro~ the inner disposition of one who 
sets no conditions but who abandons himself in absolute confidence; he 
would thereby transcend all possible disappointment and yet experience a 
security in his being?1 This is what determines the ontological status of 
hope: it is an absolute hope, inseparable from a faith which is likewise 
absolute, transcending 'all laying-down of conditions. This is how Marcel 
sees the role of metaphysics as the "exorcisation du desesPoir".62 
Absolute hope, he goes on to say, appears as a response of the creature 
to the infinite Being to whom it is conscious of owing everything that it 
has, and upon whom it cannot impose any condition whatever, "sans scandaleR~ 
It would appear, then, that Marcel is here postulating Being as God, the 
Source of life. Now if, proceeding from that affirmation, we propose that 
despair is really a declaration that God has withdrawn himself, we are 
formulating an accusation which is incompatible with the nature of the 
Absolute Thou. We are, in effect, having recourse to the psychological 
device of rationalization by which we try to cast the responsibility of our 
own dispositions upon Another. Despair, however, is our own freely chosen 
activi ty; it is like the consequence of our own withholding of absolute 
faith and hope. We are not prepared to abandon ourselves entirely to God. 
v. Towards a phenomenological description of hope 
Hope, as Marcel has found out, is very difficult to define •. This diffi-
culty arises precisely because hope is intimately associated with one's 
whole being as oriented towards transcendence. To attempt to define hope 
would be to run the risk of problematizing it by drawing up an inventory of 
its characteristics. Yet, at the same time, not to attempt a description, 
at least, would be to ignore an essential dimension of the whole ontological 
mystery. In effect, Marcel does provide a list of characteristics which 
are similar to those qualities which characterize fidelity, faith and love. 
He approaches hope in a. "concrete" manner, through phenomenological analyses 
of its forms as manifested in human experience. He is led from these to an 
appreciation of their corresponding hyperphenomenological origins. Hope is 
more evidently linked directly to the transcendental appeal than the other 
concrete approaches and serves as the spiritual factor par excellence by 
which they all cohere. 
Marcel presents a number of studies of hope as evinced within the human 
context: the man suffering from an incurable illness, the mother hopin¥ 
for the return of a son from war, or h.oping in a wayward son, the patriot 
hoping for the liberation of his country. While we may cast "le filet de 
nos interpretntions dnns ces profondcurs impcnctrnbles" and draw up halluci-
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nations, we can still let ourselves be drawn towards the "Light" which is 
God himself. It may well prove that our path towards the Light will be 
tracked along a constantly changing series of images. 64 All of these images, 
Marcel declares, serve to show that he who truly hopes does not count on 
possibilities. It is, he explains, as though hope carried with it as postul-
ate the assertion that reality overflows all possible reCkOnings. 65 It is 
in the matter of one's conduct in trials and sufferings that MarceI's notions 
of hope and love come together. 'He tries to illustrate the powerful dynamism 
of hope with reference to one's love for a friend who is suffering. 
He who loves, Marcel asserts, expresses his invincible hope in terms 
which are tantamount to saying : It is impossible that I should be alone in 
willing this cure. It is impossible that reality in its inward depth should 
be hostile or so much as indifferent to what I assert is in itself a good. 66 
It seems to me that in this strenuous assertion Marcel leaves himself open 
t ' 't"67 h'h Id k h' hI tt' fth o serlOUS crl lClsm ,w lC wou wea en lS woe presen a lon 0 e 
indefectibility of true ontological hope. 
How is it impossible that "reality in its inward depth" should be hostile 
or indiffe~ent? What does he mean by "reality"? These are two important 
questions which Marcel does not appear to have answered satisfactorily, let 
alone considered. He affirms that absolute hope will not countenance dis-
couraging cases or examples and does not heed statistics. But it would seem 
that, according to Marcel, to hope against all hope that a person I hope will 
recover from an incurable illness is to refuse to face facts more than to 
refuse to accept possibilities. If by "reality" he means God - and here he 
seems to be closer to Plato than to Augustine - it is nevertheless an 
unwarranted leap to proceed from affirming that God is Creator to asserting 
the !I miraculous 1t element of God's activity on behalf of the believer. The 
fundamental problem here is that of the reality of evil and suffering. Marcel 
appears - to me at least to be in danger of contradicting himself. On the 
one hand he says that evil and suffering are realities which cannot be 
thought away after the manner of Christian Scientists; yet, on the other 
h d h d 1 th t th 1 t f f ' , . tb' t . 1 68 an, e ec ares a e on y answer 0 su erlng lS ln ersu Jec lve ove, 
He does, however, return to comparatively safer ground when he declares that 
absolute hope asserts, prophetically, that a given order shall be re-estab-
lished. 69 Immortality is the locus of"absolute hope; such is the infinite 
credit hope places in God as Thou who, somehow, will not disappoint me, if 
not in this life, certainly in the next. 70 
(a) 
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Hope, being the Bustaining force of fidelity, is characterized by the 
,Same qualities which distinguish its expression. Whereas despair is a 
.statement of spiritual bankruptcy,. hope implies openness or credit. Hope 
:is primarily open and available to the permeation of intersubjective pres-
~nce. Hope is ~xpansive : it resists all attempts at restriction within 
Jheengulf iog s.ircJe .of the self. Hope is closely united to being for it 
i.s (cpneerned with the welfare of being, not of having. Hope looks forward 
Jo ,whati :shall .be,not to what I shall have. 71 
:J:n (Oneofhi.s :ra.re .attempts at definition, Marcel offers, somewhat 
@;p.ho:rj.s tj call y : 
:Lt~:sperance ,cflnsiste a aff irmer qu f il y a dans l' Hre 
@.u-cteJa d.e t~)Ut cc qui est donne, de tout ce qui peut 
fpurnir J~ mati~re d'un inventaire ou servir de base 
a. ·unepuppos.ition quelconque, un principe mysterieux 
tqUi ce.st d!"!cpnnivence avec moi, qui ne peut pas ne pas 
\v(j)ulflir :au:Spi ce que je veux, du moins si ce que je 
Wa;:sl)(me:rite ·:effectivement d!etre voulu et est en fait 
w<9!ll.upar tPllt moi-meme. (72) 
lD~.sp:iJ~M!'lr.Celt.:S reluctance to be explicit, this "mysterious principle!! can 
reflected in the !!ontological need". The 
~:Q.tpJp3ical need j,s then seen as the resul t of God! s free act and leads to 
~&l:r @:W9:rf:!n~SS glod J'cccO gni tion of God. When I hope, Marcel adds, I strength-
~n - ©ond 'when 1 despair or simply doubt I weaken or let go of - a certain 
Po:ni1 'I!~ui :mtunit a ce qui est en cause".73 And this matter (lice qui est en 
&#us~'I!) .is t.hat ,pf :my ,salvation, or speaking more metaphysically, of our 
~ust!'lined fidelity in the fellowship of being. 
The persOn who hopes for the welfare of his own being is not alone - he 
;is 'lIhe.1d1! by the "conniving, mysterious principle" - nor is his hope res-
tr.iJ::ted to .him,sclf. Hope must be intersubjective. Because he comes to 
~fHJW .himself through his relations with others, he knows that his hope will 
b~ t.h~ pl,lrer if includes all others. This presupposes an attitude of 
PPen:n~,ss by which hope is differentiated from despair. Thus it is that 
when Marcel does proffer a more acceptable definition of hope, he includes 
the essential notions of openness, communion, and an eschatological aspir-
ttt.ion to ultimate union with its Transcendent "object". 
L1esperance est essentiellement, pourrait-on dire, 
.1a disponibili te dtune rune assez intimement engagee 
dans une experience de communion pour accomplir lfacte 
transcendant a 1 f opposition du vouloir et du connaltre, 
dont cette experience offre b la fols le gage et les 
premices. (7/t-) 
(b) Patience and eoure 
It is in the matter of suffering unci tr.ial that hope is shown to be 
characterized by patience. Hope, says Marcel, is situuted within the frame-
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work of trial; it accepts trials as an integral element of the human con-
dition. In this way hope is linked to an experience of captivity, which 
is also a form of the captivity of time. Hope's mission is to reply to 
the soul's signal of distress. The soul, Marcel affirms, always turns to-
wards a lights which it may not yet perceive, in the hope of being deliver-
ed from its present darkness, the darkness of waiting, and of being brought 
out by conversion into the Light of Being. This Light of Being, as we have 
already noted, can only be God. 75 
Hope endures the present trial in a positive manner and is not to be 
considered as synonymous with passive acceptance or a distorted type of 
stoicism. Marcel rejects equally the objection that he is postulating a 
kind of moral quietism : the idea of inert hope seems to him to be a contra-
diction in terms. Hope is a non-acceptance distinguishable from revolt on 
account of its positive, dynamic character. Marce! considers that both 
quietism, which leads to fatalism, and revolt tend to despair. 76 Patience, 
by introducing a sense of relaxation (but not of slackening) into this non-
acceptance, brings us closer to an appreciation of this true quality of hope. 
In this context, Marcel suggests that the everyday expression "to take onels 
time" is of help. The easing-off of tension counselled by patience allows 
for recollection both of the mind and of the soul's energies to struggle 
against urgent despair. The detente of patient hope is, therefore, creative. 
Thus hope has affinities, not with desire but with the will. The will im-
plies the same refusal to calculate possibilities, or at any rate it sus-
pends this calculation. 
Ne pourrait-on des lors definir l'esperance comme une volont€ 
s'appliquant a ce qui ne depend pas d'elle? (77) 
In its active endurance of trial and suffering hope has also certain 
affinities with courage, providing we understand clearly the nature of true 
ontological courage (what Tillich calls the Courage to Be). ~t is not just 
the self-affirmation of the individual to counteract the deadening, dehuman-
izing influence of collectivism and materialism. Marcel maintains that 
this kind of courage can lead to nihilism, or the seeking of refuge in 
nothingness or the illusory claim to asei ty on account of man I s arrogated 
absolute freedom. 78 still less is courage to be confused with bravado or 
reckless irresponsibility. Courage recognizes the risks inherent in the 
action to overcome the present dangers which, for our purpose, are those 
that threaten man's soul, the core of his very being. The most courageous 
person, in an ontological sense, is he who knows his weaknesses but never~ 
theless, trusting in God as his Absolute Recourse, is determined to act so 
as to achieve his salvation. True ontological courage does not count on 
its own strength but on a greater strength, who is God, the fulness of the 
creative power of Being. 79 In the same way as not being self-reliant or 
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self-centred, courage consists in affirming its own being by participation 
in condition as shared in the world and related to other beings. 
(c) 
Hope, then, in Marcel's view, is not egocentric. But besides being never 
for the self alone, hope does not count solely on the self. To the possible 
prote~t that the optimism of technical progress is animat~d by a great hope, 
Marcel replies firmly : 
Metaphysiquement parlant, la seule esperance authentique 
est celle qui va a ce qui ne depend pas de nous, celle 
dont le res sort est l'humilite, non l'orgueil. (80) 
Pride, a metaphysical problem perceived by the Greeks, recognized as an 
essential theme in Christian theology, and (according to Marcel) almost com-
pletely ignored by modern philosophers other than theologians, is a great 
danger to any metaphysics of being - or certainly as Marcel understands meta-
physics. It cuts off the subject from communion, and so acts as a principle 
of destruction. 
The Christian, who is counselled to practise humility, is warned by 
Marcel to be constantly on his guard against yielding to the temptation of 
pa ternal ism towards the "non .... privileged" unbel iever. That attitude would 
result in his placing himself on the plane of having. At the root of Christ-
ian humility there is an assurance that, in his quality as Christian, the 
believer acts neither on his own account nor through the power of a virtue 
which is his property. He cannot claim to be more worthy than the "disin-
herited brother!! to whom he is speak 81 Humil ity must not be self-centred 
but should be situated entirely in God whom I invoke. Marcel gets somewhat 
carried away by his determination not to objectify God by affirming that, 
in humility, I concentrate in the Other (God) as Thee all the "reasons" for 
which thou art thou for me. In this light I exclude belief in, my own merits 
or resources to cope with my unbounded commitment. The theocentric nature 
of Marcel~s dialectic of these concrete approaches to the mystery of Being 
is evident when he asserts that through hope I extend an infinite credit to 
the Absolute Thou. The humble appeal to God (the Absolute Thou) as Recourse 
is the substance of Marcelts voeu crEateur : 
Cet appel suppose une humilite radicale du sujet; humili-
te polarisee par la transcendance meme de Celui qutelle 
invoc"rue. Noue sommes lci comme a la jonction de 1 t engage-
ment le plus strict et de l'attente la plus 6perdue. 11 
ne saurait s'agir de compteI' sur soi, sur ses pr~pres 
forces, pour fClil'e face il cet engagement demeSllJ'(~; mals 
dans lracte par lequcl je contracte, jfouvre en m<!me 
temps un credit infinj fl Celui envcr's qui je la prends, 
et 1 rEsperance nt e,,;t pas autre chose. (82) 
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vii. "I hope in Thee for us" 
Mareel proposes "I hope in thee for us" as perhaps the most adequate and 
the most elaborate expression of the activity of hOPing,83 In this formula 
emphasis is given to the intersubjective charisma of hope; it can, none the 
less, be applied to the individual person. Hope can legitimately be consid-
ered as a virtue inasmuch as it is the particularization of a certain inter-
ior force. In this instance this interior force is the strength to remain 
faithful,.in the hours of trial and darkness, to the impulse of our being 
which is oriented towards transcendence. Each person's personal reality is 
itself intersubjective in that each finds within himself another "self" that 
is only too ea ily inclined to give up the struggle and succumb to despair. 
It is in his own interior citadel that he has to strive with as much energy 
as in his relations with others, But it is in his relations with the indivi-
dual self, the first level of Marcel's theory of participation, that safe-
guards his own being and gives value to his hope. The second level of part-
icipation is naturally involved once we recognize that hope is not simply 
hope for one's self; it needs to be "spread out". 
The religious implications of Marcel! s presentation of hope and love 
become increasingly evident. The "thee!! of the formula is initially the one 
whom I love, the other to whom I extend my credit. This credit, while kept 
on the human level, may be exhausted; it cannot be exhausted if I transcend 
my activity by placing my trust in the Absolute Thou (Thee) on our account. 
The Absolute Thou Can only be God - or the Whole notion is meaningless - so 
that Marcelts concept of intersubjective hope is seen to be as theocentric 
as that of faith. Accordingly, we can state that he incorporates the three 
main theological virtues into his whole metaphysics of being. The human 
relationship of the combined first and second levels of participation is 
transformed (even "transfigured") to a higher level so that the formula 
becomes "I hope in Thee for us". Between the "thou" and the "us" of the 
original expression the link, Marcel explains, "Thou" which serves not 
only as guarantee but the very "cement" of the union 'which binds us together 
in unity.84 It is God as Absolute Thou in whom absolute hope is entrusted. 
Bearing this acknowledgment in mind, Marcel encourages us to hope in the 
Absol ute Thou for ·our own welfare and that of others, for peace, justice 
and wisdom in this world, for the perpetuity of individual fidelity and the 
pledge of our immortality in the "other kingdom" where we shall be reunited 
. 85 in the fulness of Belng. 
Love is evidently at the root of Mareel t s notion of hope : the othe r IS 
inseparable from my thoughts (and what is not for him cannot be for mc, 
either).86 While he states that he would prefer t.o 11a as the 
expression of love, followjng Nygren's distinction, becDuse there is a tri-
angular (self-others-·God) character in ~"' Mareel none the less admits 
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that intersubjectivity is in fact charity. 8~ The beloved, to be truly 
loved, is beyond judgment; the beloved is to be considered not as a he but 
in his being as a co-·presence with me. Love is creative of fidelity and 
hope : it is in the union of true ontological love that personalities are 
fused in 
une sorte de milieu vital de l'ame Oll celle-ci puise 
sa force, Oll elle se renouvelle en sleprouvant. (88) 
Love creates the lover. Again, ,like hope, love should not be self-centred, 
as it can so easily become. We can degrade our love into an expectation 
of something from the beloved. Rather, Marcel suggests, while maintaining 
the other as presence, we must avoid considering him as a "that", an object 
in our experience. This is the same attitude we should adopt in our relat-
ionship with God; the transcendental orientation of the concrete approaches 
to the mystery of being reveals God as the source and guarantee of our love. 
L'amour ne s'adresse quIa ce qui est eternel, il 
immobilise l'~tre aime au-dessus du monde des 
gen~ses et des vicissitudes. (89) 
viii. Prayer as inspired by hope and love 
From what has been said of hope as appeal to the Absolute Thou as 
Absolute Recourse, we can see the connection between hope and prayer in 
~1arcells dialectic. Throughout this section, the theological implications 
in Marcel' s work become more manifest. He aff irms : 
La zone de l'esperance est aussi celle de la priere. (90) 
Hope; for him, is not only "a protestation inspired by love" but an appeal 
to an ally "who is Himself also Love". 91 Thus, when I proclaim my hope in 
God for us, I pray to God for us. 
Au fond je prie Dieu pour nous .ge Prier pour mon ~me, 
ou prier pour celui que j'aime, c1est sans doute un 
seul et meme acte. (92) 
I pray for us in union with all my fellows in being, because prayer is a 
"uniting with". 93 I may pray alone or in union wi th the Church in its 
official liturgy; the aim and intention are still the same. 
As with all ontological mysteries, prayer can be degraded to the inter-
ests of self, but, Marcel affirms, prayer of an authentic ontological 
nature has nothing of the egocentric "about it. Now, since Marcel protests 
that he is no pantheist, the Being involved in "ontological" prayer can 
only be God. Prayer is then the invocation of God in union with our fellow 
beings (the "ontological corrmunion" or "Mystical Body of Christ" embodied 
in the Church) on our COlIllllon behalf. The authentic existent does not pray, 
Marcel declares, for the salee of any person(ll amL.ition or success; those 
are the concerns of a world in which, he states cat.egorically and rather 
aphorist.ically, there is no room for hope because it has ceased to pray. 
iove and hope are inseparable in prayer. 
La priere n'est possible que la OU l'intersubjectivite 
est reconnue, 18. oil eUe ,est un acte. (94) 
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For a person without love, hope is not possible ~ only lust and ambition. 
Every ambition, Marcel claims, seeks to acquire some satisfaction. But of 
what good will such material possessions be, even if one ,has "gained the 
whole world"? Hope looks beyond the terrestrial, and therein lies the 
secret, for Marcel, or even the proof of its transcendental quality.95 
ix. A "prophetic assurance" 
But while it might seem that everything today is pointing towards the 
impending end of the world, Marcel warns against succumbing to what he calls 
"eschatological quietismll • 96 Hope is vital, reassuring us that the present 
frustrations of our human condition are not final. Precisely because we are 
hemmed in by despair, there is greater scope and need to practise the virtue 
of hope. For the sake of preserving intact our ontological values - which 
are also those of religion in this context - hope assures us that there is 
lIanother kingdom" whose reality, Marcel asserts, is pledged by our intersub-
jective appeal to absolute Transcendence. Hope is "choral,,97, it is united 
with love in its prophetic assurance that a given order shall be re-estab-
lished, and this order is that of ontological fulfilment. 
Je ne souhaite pas: j'affirme; et crest ce que 
j'appellerai la resonance prophetique de Itesperance 
veritable. (98) 
This, then, is the final characteristic of ontological hope, and it leads 
us to study, in the next chapter, Marcelts claim that the archetypal hope 
. th t fit' 99 IS a 0 sa va Ion. 
Marcel warns, nevertheless, that while it is valid, from a Christian 
point of view at least, for a man who has hopes of the coming.of a world in 
which justice and peace will be. restored to proclaim that this new world 
100 
shall arrive, it is not given to any man to prophesy rashly. The proph-
etic nature of hope, according to Marcel, lies more in man1s awareness of 
his condition as a traveller (homo viator) who must be prepared to cut him-
If d th III bl t' d' . effondrel'1I101 se a angerous pa across es ocs erra lques un unlvers 
towards "another kingdom" established firmly in pleromatic Being. 
Nous aurons 
dans le 
,'-----;-_. 
notre des 
a nous retrouver et comme a nous rassembler 
~li est l'~trc et, dans la ligne de 
e, nOllS avons a dire a la fois qu I il n test 
et qu'il cst de toute 6ternite. (102) pas encore 
In the light of these rcmarks, Marcel's philosophy is more evidently 
"coloured"by natural theology_ He borrows the term "pleroma" from Scrip-
ture 103 and it as meaning not just "fulf ilmentt! but "ontol 1 f1l1-
fHrnerd;" which docf; not belong to this life but to eternity. The rnmifi 
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cations of this notion will be shown in the next chapter. 
x. Witness in intersubjective communion 
At this point we return to the central notion of witness. This is the 
principle which, for Marcel, gives meaning to life as to be understood 
if not appreciated - by·those who may be wilting under the pressure to 
despair. My witness (a very personal matter) will be infused with joy and 
hope in love once I align my commitment to being in the spirit of brotherly 
communion as has just been described. My living witness will thereby be a 
source of encouragement to those oppressed by the apparent absurdity of life. 
Yet at the same time my witness does not deny the' reality of evil, pain and 
suffering in the world. My hope, as Marcel presents its character, is ult-
imately hope of salvation but not of the Spinozistic or stoic kind which 
negates suffering to render salvation and immortality destitute of their 
full meaning. Ours is, in all reality, a suffering world, and it is because 
of this fact that salvation gains its full significance. As Marcel says: 
11 nfy a place pour le salut que dans un univers 
qui comporte des lesions reelles. (10~.) 
He suggests that only hope in immortality and eternity can overcome this 
temptation to yield, and that, because of such hope, my witness is the more 
creative. The last word in our existential situation, Marcel believes, is 
not anguish and despair but love and jOy.105 
To understand how this can be, we need to have faith to give substance 
to our hope. My witness is a guarantee of my own hope and love established 
in the Absolute Thou, and as such does indeed bear on "something" independ-
ent of me and yet in which my whole being is committed. As with everything 
within an existential frame of reference, it all depends on my freedom. I 
am free to choose to bear witness or to reject it. The first activity is a 
positive response and is characteristic of the authentic participant, the 
second activity is negative and characteristic of the spectator. It is, 
says Marcel, not just a question of whether we are merely onlookers or 
actually involved wit6 this as the first and only choice. The essential 
point is that we are situated in our lives and in the world here and now, 
that we are witnes'ses, one way or another, and that this is the expression 
of our mode of belonging to the world. 106 
Conclusion 
107 As has been noted ,MaTcd began his philosophical enquiries wi th the 
notion of participation which in turn led hjlll to the study of the I-thou 
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relationships. These studies were not abandoned but incorporated and trans-
formed into his "concrete" philosophy of being through analyses of the 
approaches of fidelity, hope and love. These approaches are not only inter-
related but serve as positive counterbalances to the negative elements of 
betrayal, despair and suicide in radical existentialism. Hope and fidelity, 
so closely associated as to be inseparable, merge and are given their guaran-
tee in love. Marcel asserts that it is the sustaining presence of the loved 
one in ontological communion which gives meaning to fidelity and is the firm 
guarantee of hope. 
All three are integral elements of our witness to faith - in ourselves, 
in others through the Fellowship of Being, and, on a sublimated level where 
it assumes the dimension of religious belief, in God as the source of all 
being. 
Au depart de toute creation, visible ou non? on decouvre 
la m@me presence, et, ajouterai-je, la m~me sommation de 
IfEtre a Itame qulil investit, mais aussi Itacte, iden-
tique en ses specifications intimes, par lequel Itarne rend 
temoignage a cette mgme presence. (108) 
Recalling this key passage, we can understand, in the present context, that 
for Marcel metaphysics» religion and life are forms of creative witness. All 
the more so because, since there can be no objective judgment of being or of 
the subject, witness is creative insofar as it creates the subject. Witness 
is not the act of an autonomou~ subject but helps the subject come to fulfil 
himself. Marcel agrees with theologians that the most sublime form of wit-
ness is that of the martyr; this is a notion which shall be considered in 
the next chapter. In the connection of the "I-thou" relationship, of pres-
ence and communion, it is worth'~hile to recall here that Marcel affirms that 
it is the !f we !! (~) which really establishes the foundation of the "I" (1~) 
and the "thou" (tu). Being is so intimately bound up with each of us as to 
be inalienable and unpredicatable. Once again the dichotomy between being 
and having is revealed. Marcelts notion of true love as being true because 
it is of the ontological order may be summed up in the expression of itself 
as : ItI love you, not for what you have, nor even for what you are, but 
because you are you". 
In final analysis, the three main concrete approaches (fidelity, hope 
and love) to the ontological mystery gre metaphysical translations of the 
three main theocentric ("theologicaJU) virtues of faith, hope and charity 
which are at the heart of the Christian's approach to self·-fulfilment and 
union in God. We can relate Marcel's philosophy, which in this matter of 
faith, hope and love borders very closely on natural theology to orthodox 
(classical) theology, particularly when he notes that j ntersubject ivi ty is 
becolll,ing increasingly more evident as the cornerstone of a concrete onto-
, 109 
logy. God is not an ubstraction; he is a personnl God, the Absolute Thou 
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wilo is the transcendent epitome of all I-thou relationships. Marcel may 
well have borne in mind Saint Peter's allusion to Christ as the (rejected) 
cornerstone of the citadel of God among men and certainly also the Johannine 
definition of God as Love. 110 Given the central position of God in Marcel's 
111 thought and the thesis, although it is unexpressed explicitly by Marcel , 
that God is Being, we can elucidate the key to the ontolo~ical mystery. 
If we share in being and are impelled to recognize this participation 
by sometning which is deep within us and "in connivance with being", our 
fellowship can be seen to be what theologians call the Mystical Body. Marcel 
himself admits this : 
Vne metaphysique de Itamour 0._ ne peut que culminer 
dans la doctrine du Corps Mystique. (112) 
He hesitates to make this liaison more explicit, because, despite his own 
frequent incursions, he deems himself ill-equipped to proceed into the realm 
of theology. Nevertheless and notwithstanding his "evasions par en haut,,113, 
we can conclude that, through his attempted correlation of philosophical and 
theological concepts, Marcel endeavours to dissolve the divorce between 
philosophy and theology which he seems to blame on the humanistic pressures 
of the Renaissance and on Rationalism in particular114 , and to restore a 
working compatibility of the two disciplines within the framework of a 
theistic metaphysics. 
In the following chapter we shall see how Marcel deals with the paradox-
ical truth of Christianity : that we are in this life to gain access to 
another, a higher form of existence - or more precisely (since existence im-
pI ies f initude and temporality) a more complete form of being. in fact its 
fulfilment, the "Pleroma". To arrive at this Marcel declares that we must 
postulate eternity, immortality and the possibility Of salvation which all 
motivate hope and are the pledge of fidelity. And the gateway to this 
"other kingdom" is death. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER FIVE 
1. pleroma (JtA,~p(}Jp.cx, ), meaning "filling, fulness, or plenitUde" 
(Oxford English Dictionary), is inlerpreted by Mercel in the last-given 
sense. It is also the sense in which the term is employed in the New 
Testament. In Saint Paul f s EpisJl:~_~!~ Colossial~ (2: 9) '~pler()matl 
i~ tsanslated i}) the s of the "fulness" of the Godhead : 01; t.. sv 
O:Ut;{D Hen 0 t.. HS I. nuv 1;0 11:A,l1PWflcx, 'rIle; GSOTr]1:0C; oWflo::r l, HWe;. 
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2. Saint Paul to the Athenians, Acts 17: 28. The expression was 
suggested by the poet Epimenides of.Cnossos who "flourished ll in the sixth 
ccntur-y B.C. (Note from the Jerusalem Bible, London, Darton, Longman and 
Todd, 1966. lI, 231). 
3. It is. as Gallagher comments (op. cito, 120), at the point of our 
participation in the Inexhaustible. This Inexhaustible is Being itself, 
that is to say, God. The abstract study of anything involves subdivid-
ing the object for clinical analysis; when this object is the self, there 
is "objectification". The concrete, on the other hand, is "that which is 
apprehended by a self in which the faculties are not dissociated." Marcel 
calls for a study of the self in its unity; this is therefore a study of 
the self in its most intimate, inalienable relations with its essence, 
which is being. 
4. DB 94. 
5. EA I 51. 
6. See EPC 229-231 for Marcel t s phenomenological studies of constancy. 
Further to his comments on constancy and fidelity, Marcel considers the 
matter of promise. He notes that Nietzsche has observed that man is the 
only being who may make promises. We cannot, Marcel concludes, really 
foresee or foretell our future dispositions. We should be inauthentic 
if we claim that all our promises are unconditional. In order to avoid 
compromising ourselves, he explains, we attach - implicitly or explicitly 
- a proviso to our promise: IIlfl haven't by then changed my ideas, my 
feel t! We should beware of a frivolous commitment. If we claim 
to be perfectly sincere, we have no right to enter upon such a kind of 
commitment, particularly when we know that it is materially impossible 
to keep it. (EA I 54-55). cf. Chapter 4, p. 105. 
7. PAO~O 78. For the same reason fidelity cannot be prescribed within 
limits (HV 176). cf. HV 31 (see Chapter 2, p. 51). 
8. EA I 69. 
9. PACMO 77, HV 116,169-170, EPC 232. 
10. HV 176 : "C' est par la que la fidHite revHe sa vraie nature qui 
est dtetre un temoignage, une attestation." He concludes by way of pre-
paring for what is to follow in the script: "crest par Hl aussi qu'une 
ethique qui la prend pour centre est irresistiblement conduite a se sus-
pendre au plus quI humain, a une volonte d l inconditionnalite qui· est en 
nous Ifexigence et la marque meme de l'Absolu." 
11. EPC 250. If, then, faith is one aspect of "being's grasp on us" 
(cf. Chapter 4, p. 125), fidelity is another aspect of the grasp of 
Being. Fidelity is faith translated into action. Again, we recall.that 
God's freedom - in the sense of his free act - is manifested as "being's 
grasp on us" (cf. Chapter 4, p. 107). Fidelity could then be seen as 
dependent on Godrs invitation, through grace; and this notion entails 
that of prevenience (cf. Chapter 3, p. 87) and can lead to the objection 
of predestination as given in the context of faith (cf. Chapter 4, fn 23, 
p. 129). Concerning the recognition of God as Absolute Presence, in the 
context of faith, see Chapter 3, pp. 82-83, 92, Chapter 4, p. 123. 
12. cf. Chapter 4, pp. 110-111. 
13. EA I 55. cf. Chapter 4, p. 105. 
14. JM 40. See Chapter 4, p. 109. Gallagher hastens to note Marcel's 
reluctance to delve too deeply into a natural-theological form of philo-
sophy. "In no case, however," Gallagher points out, "is fidelity tied 
to a specific dogmatized version of the Absolute: in so far as it remains 
adherence to a presence, it always overruns our attempts to delineate 
its object, for 'the more effectively I pDrticipaLe in heing. the less 
I am able t.o know or- lo sny Iw I particjpate' (In 80 [EPC 91] )." -
Gallagher. op. cH., 73. This is, of course, the reason for Marcel's 
avoiding the proposHion of any objective-type def inition of God. 
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15. EPC 222. cf. EPC 254-257, Chapter 4, p. 123. 
16. EA I 119. 
17. EPe 21t-8. Emphasis mine (cf. Chapter 3, pp. 83, 92) •. 
18. HV 174. 
19. HV 116 : "Le myst~re familial est un myst~re de fid~lit~ et dtesp~­
ranee; la fideIite la plus authentique est une fideIite creatrice." 
Marriage can, then, in a religious context, be considered as a sacrament, 
a sign (witness) of a grace by which creati~e fidelity achieves its sub-
lime expression as a commitment made in the presence of the Transcendent 
Thou who is called upon as the Witness par excellence of the union. Such 
a commitment, however, will be degraded if it assumes a contractual 
character - in that case Marcel dismisses it as being no better than a 
bribe. In his view fatherhood is not synonymous with procreation; to 
create, he remarks often, is never to produce (HV 30, 132~ PI 114, HP 56, 
ME II 46, Schg 45-46). He comments further: "11 y a quelque chose 
d'outrageant pour la dignite meme de la personne dans le fait pour un 
etre dtenvisager son conjoint comme simple instrument de reproduction. 
L'oeuvre de chair se degrade lci, et de terribles revanches se preparent 
pour le temps ou les puissances meconnues et opprimees qui sont au fond 
de ll~me humaine secoueront le joug qui leur a ete tyranniquement impose. 
Il n l est donc certainement pas vraide dire que la procreation eat la fin 
du mariage" (HV 113). cf. EPe 120. 
20. HV 131. He adds: !TEn effetf contrairement a ce que suppose un 
humanisme incapable de d~gager ses propres implications metaphysiques, 
il y a tout lieu de pens er que le rapport entre Oieu le Pere et Dieu 
le Fils n1est aucunement le produit d'une sublimation qui se s-erait 
exercee sur les rapports strictement humains, mais que ce sont bien plu-
tot ces rapports humains eux-memes qui, au COurs de l'histoire, se sont 
approfondis et renouveles sous Itactlon dCune Idee transcendante, sans 
laquelle ce que nous appelons notre nature n'aurait jamais pu se deployer 
tout entiere." Marcel devotes a chapter of Etre et avoir (1I, 79-121) 
to a consideration of Peter Wustlg expression of life-piety. 
21 • ME II 141. 
22. S chg 48. 
23. HV 152. 
24. HV 159. 
25. HV 160-161. This passage prepares us for the content of Chapter 6. 
26. EPe 243. For an illustra tive example of this apparent paradox, see 
the experience of Pascal Laumiere in Rome n1est plus dans Rome (Appendix 
2t III B). 
27. EA I 119. Werner Schnee is ontologically faithful when he declares: 
"La cause ne m'interesse pas; les hommes mqnteressent" (le Dard 115). 
Marcel explains by distinguishing between obedience and fidelity in a 
phenomenological study of a soldier's relationship with his commander. 
"La fonction du chef est de commander, la fonction du sous-ordre est 
dlexecuter, c'est-a-dire dtobeir., La fonction, dis-je : il suit de la 
que le devoir dlobeissance n'engage pas foncierement et necessairement 
P~tre de celui qui obeit '00 (Je serais porte Et croire que) l'obeissance 
en tant que telle va au chef en tant qu'hOlllrne, en tant qu t il est un tel 
et non tel autre; la ou la qunlit€ humaine du chef intervient, c'est la 
f idH ite qu i apparalt" (llV 168--169). 
28. PR-GM 46. 
29. Seyrnour Ca.in (op. cit., 89) sUlIImarizes Marccl l s intention : "You may 
not understand what it lIle,lIlS to believc in God, but you may have some 
sense of wliat it meaIl!:i to trust a fr'iend 01- be faithful to a wife." 
Marcel devotes two chaptcrs of Homo Vintor to a phenomenological study 
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of "the mystery of the family", and of fatherhood in particular. He 
shows how, by sharing in creation, man can share in the essence of Being, 
which is reflected in theology where God's essential activity is under-
stood as creation. 
30. EPC 223. 
31. CA 135. cf. DH 142, Schg 110. See Appendix 2, IV, pp. 232,236. 
32. Commenting on their mutual misapprehension of fidelity, Marcel wrote 
in the Revue hebdomadaire (1923, p. 496) : "Comment la fideIite dlun 
autre, c!est-~-dire sa foi, son ~tre m~me, pourrait-elle @tre jugee? Ne 
sommes-nous pas la en dehors de lletroit domaine ou le jugement moral 
peut'legitimement sfexercer? La conduite seulepeut ~tre jugee, cl est-
a.-dire confronb~e avec des normes socialement utiles, pratiquement in-
contestables. La fidelit€ d'un @tre a un ~tre ne peut pas etre appreciee, 
il n'en existe pas de critere : il n'y a rien la, au surplus, dont nous 
puissions avoir a rendre compte a un tiers. Abel traite Jacques en 
debiteur insolvable, sans prendre garde que dans Itordre de l'amour et 
de la foi il ne saurait y avoir de dette ni de creance.,i 
33. EA I 55. 
34. MTNPLV 203-204, 208. See Chapter 6, pp. 185-186. 
35. SC 61-69, 73, 125-127. 
36. SC 118. cf. Edith Lechevallier in l'Insondable (PI 229). For in-
sights into the character of Aunt Lena, see SC 116, 118-119, 126, 129, 
154-158. 
37. SC 151-152. cf. le Monde casse in which Genevieve, the sister of 
the late Dom Maurice, is also unaware of the effect of her message (see 
Appendix 2, II, p. 226). 
38. SC 157-158. 
39. SC 175. cf. le Dard 118. 
40. SC 169. cf. the situation of both Claude and Edmee Lemoyne in Un 
Homme de Dieu (Appendix 2, I). 
41. SC 178. 
42. SC 179. 
43. DH 158. cf. le Dard 49-52, 64, 83. 
44. Le Dard 111. 
45. PR-GM 108. 
46. Le Dard 117-118. cL l'Emissaire (SdI 239). 
47. This is not to say that Marcel is postulating quietism. See below, 
fn 76. 
48. Le Dard 118. (Werner is speaking to Beatrice) : "Vous penserez a 
moi comme je pense a Rudolf. Plus tard je vous habiterai comme Rudolf 
m'habite ••• Et vous vous rappellerez alors ce que je vous ai dit il y 
a quelques semaines : [actually he was then speaking to his wife Gisela, 
le Dard 87J S'il n'y avait que les vivants, (je pense que la terre 
serait tout a fait inhabitable)." 
49. PACMO 69. 
50. HV 10. cr. EA I 100 : "L'gme n'est que par esperance; l'esperance 
est peut-8tre l'6toffe m~~e dont notre Sme est faite"; and Saint Paul, 
Hebrews 6: 17-·20 - "In the same way, when God wanted to make the he irs 
to the promise thoroughly realize thnt his purpose was unalterable, he 
conveyed thi" I,y nn oath; so that there would be two unalterable things 
in whjch it was illl[Jos~·;ible for God to be lying, and so that we, now that 
we have found safety, should hcJve a strong encouragement to Lake a finn 
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grip on the hope that is held out to us. Here we have an anchor for our 
soul, as sure as it is firm, and reaching right through beyond the veil 
where Jesus has entered before us and on our behalf." 
51. .EA 11 28. Generally, it would appear that Marcel interprets "soul" 
as the innermost, indivisible and inseparable element of our being. But 
in the light of this passage, he would seem also to understand a poss-
ible cleavage between n~tre" and !fame" which is "transcendance tl • This 
can only mean, as I see it, that the soul, which is the more spiritual 
component of our beihg, aspiring to rejoin the transcendental communion 
where soul and being are truly conjoined indissolubly, provides just 
that .impetus which is manifested in the "ontological need". It also in-
dicates the orientation towards transcendence of the ontological need. 
There can be seen, I think, slight traces of a "residue of Platonismtl in 
Marcel's concept of the soul. These can be seen in his later remarks on 
the l'mysterious principle" which is tlat connivance with my beingtl (see 
p. 156 and, below, fn 72) and which may be id~ntified as "reality" by 
which he must mean God, bearing in mind his lingering preference for 
'tl:> QV bV to denote "being" (see Chapter 3, p. 78). 
52. 
53. 
1 
EA I 98. 
PI 181. cf. EA I 118, 137, PACMO 66, 69, HCH 71-72, SdI 241, 267, 
91. 
54. "Structure de l'Esperance" (in Dieu Vivant, No. 19, 1951), 74. cf. 
HV 54. ~!ore than the basilisk stare of the Baudelairean houka-smoking 
personification of Ennui or Satan Trismegistes who "knows the power of 
dissolving the precious metal of our wills", Marcel refers to the Medusa 
myth as a symbol of this aspect of despair. For Sartre,the mythologic-
al hero-type is Orestes; for Marcel it is Perseus (PI 181). The male-
volent action of despair is directed against the flame of enthusiasm for 
life, so characteristic of the young. It is against this urge to "prey 
upon himself" that Marc-Andre in Rome n'est plus dans Rome rebels, even 
if he finds little scope for communication with his uncle Pascal who 
represents the "Estahlishment". Marcel comments on the frustration 
arising from the conflict of generations which can lead so easily to 
despair. He indicates that much of the blame can be apportioned to the 
sense of superiority which, rIghtly or wrongly, fills those people who 
Imagine that they represent universal wisdom to the young people whose 
"wild presumption" needs to be mortifIed as much as possible. cf. RPR 
40-41, 50, 52, ,54, 58, MTNPLV 44, 54, 132, HV 67. 
55. nStructure de If Esperance" , loc. cH., 76. As we shall see (p. 156), 
hope is "open". On the "captivity of time ll , cf. ME II 160, HV 41. 
56. M~lanie, In la Fin des temps, says: "On nla pas le droit de deses-
perer. Le desespoIr, Cl est dlU.l le suicide." She adds, "Il me semble 
que celui-ci qui desespere c'est comme lorsque avant de desesperer on 
bouche soigneusement toutes les fentes pour que llair n'entre pas. Crest 
une action, crest un peche" (SdI 297-298). cf. "structure de l'Esperance t,' 
loc .. cH. 76 : "Le desespoir c'est l'enfer. Et il me semble qulon 
pourrait ajouter que c'est la solitude. Rien ne seraIt dtailleurs plus 
important que de faIre ressortir la conjonctIon tres rarement aper~ue, 
il me semble, entre le temps clos et la rupture de toute communIcatIon 
avec autruI. Etre enferme dans ce temps immobilise, crest du m~me coup 
perdre avec le prochain ces commu,pications jaIllIssantes qui sont ce 
quI il y a de plus prc:cic\lx duns la vIe, qui sont la vic mcme. Je nthesi-
teraI guere a user plutot dans cC' contexte du terme d'amit que de 
celui d'amour dont 11 a 6t6 fait de tels abus ••• Dans ce temps (clos) 
11 nly a plus d'am.iU6 possihle; ct invcrsement, cc qui est plus impor-
tant encore, l~ o~ surgit IIDmiti~, le temps commence ~ bouger, et d~ 
merr.e coup, si indistincl:ement que c'e soiL, I! se reveille 
comme une melodie emcut au fond de la memoire." 
57. P ACMO 68. 
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58. PACMO 69-70. cr. EA I 112-113. 
59. Saint Paul, Romans 6: 8, 14: 8. 
60. HP 133-136. Marcel is referring to KierkegaardVs concept of anguish 
which seems to stamp itself upon the whole of the Danish philosopher's 
thought. At first glance, Marcel says, this is a fact which appears dis-
concerting and is not satisfactorily explained by reference to Kierke-
gaard's private life (HP 131). As for Kierkegaardts proposition of the 
"mortal leap of faith", Marcel comments: "Seulement, aux yeux de la 
reflexion, ce saut risquera toujours de para1tre aventur~ ou ill~gitime, 
et en m~me temps du point de vue chr~tien qui, lui, se tient de l'autre 
cote du fosse, il est obligatoire. D'oll quelque chose comme une breche 
qui semble bien s'ouvrir au milieu de ce qu'on pourrait appeler le champs 
de IVexperience humaine. Tout se passe en realite comme sur une terre 
bouleversee par une secousse sismique. Nous vivons depuis la venue du 
Christ dans un monde lezarde" (HP 135-136). 
61. HV 59. 
62. EA I 108. 
63. HV 60. This phrase seems to be an unnecessary value judgment by 
Marcel and is charged with emotional overtones. Perhaps he is too 
sensitive to the feelings of those "incroyants" whom he is trying to 
encourage. 
64. SdI 267 : "Car ce monde est celui de la grace; et il devient de plus 
en plus direct, de plus en plus constant ~ mesure que nous y croyons 
davantage, et cette croyance ne peut pas etre illusoire car les images 
qu'elle utilise, elle les brise aussitot pour en trouver d'autres". 
(Antoine is speaking to Roger and Sylvie.) cf. Chapter 1, p. 15, Chap-
ter 2, p. 55, Chapter 3, pp. 81,90,101 (fn 99), Chapter 4, fn 50, 
p. 132. 
65. EA I 98. He adds, "comme si (l' esperance) prHendait rejoindre, a 
la faveur de je ne sais quelle affinite secrete, un principe cache au 
fond des choses, ou plutot au fond des ev~nements, qui se rit des 
supputations." 
66. PAC~!O 69. 
67. Marcel recognizes this objection: "On me dira, 'Dans l'immense 
majorite des cas, il y a neanmoins la une illusion'." However, he is 
determined to give an indication of the unconquerable quality of absol-
ute hope. He continues: "Mais outre qu'il est de llessence de l'acte 
dtesperer d'exclure la consideration des cas, il faudrait montrer ici 
qulil existe une dialectique ascendante de l'esperance, par laquelle 
celle-ci est amenee a se transferer sUr un plan transcendant par rapport 
a tous les dementis empiriques possibles, le plan du salut, par oppo-
sition a celui du sucd~s sous quelque forme quI il se presente"(PACMO 69). 
It can be seen that Marcel has not really countered the objection. 
68. HCH 94-95, PI 176, ST 248 et seq. cf. PACMO 58, DH 142. See 
Chapter 1, fn 58, p. 34, Chapter 4, pp. 118-120. 
69. PACMO 69. 
70. The problems which arise fro~ Marcel's treatment of immortality will 
be considered in Chapter 6. It will be seen that, as in this context, 
Marcel's solution is quite often to disregard the possible objections 
and questions. 
71. There can be no collusion between the self seeking its own interests 
and a hope appealing to a cre[ltive power beyond its resources. Hope is 
not correlated to desire which is found instead in the domain of having 
and the autonomy of self. Rather, Marcel declares somewhat lyrically, 
hope is ")'anne des desarmeCi" (EA 1 9Ir); in some cases, he al'gues, the 
efficacy of hope lies in its disarming value. It would seem that hope 
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has the unusual virtue of somehow putting in a false predicament the 
powers over which it claims to triumph, not by fighting them but in 
transcending them (EA I 96-97). 
72. PACMO 68"-69. cf. HV 46. Once more, I must express some reservations 
on what Marcel has to say about this "ontological conspiracy". He seems 
to be begging the question, for what deserves to be willed? There would 
appear to be an element of circularity in Marcel's quasi-psychological 
descriptions of a rationalization of the activity of hope. 
73. HV 62. 
74. 
75. 
HV 86, 9. 
HV 38-40, 50, DH 185, HCH 95. 
notes in passing the analogy of a 
literally inhabited by hope. 
cf. Chapter 3, fn 99, p. 101. Marcel 
woman expecting a child : she is 
76. E. Sottiaux, op. cit., 75, calls revolt "la superstructure du d~ses-
poir." Marcel's philosophy is not quietist; see Chapter 2, fn 40, p. 66. 
While man is not totally free to create his own values irrespective of 
the other, his freedom none the less retains its value in its entirety. 
Man is free to create his developing being through fidelity which is 
active and sustained by the "mysterious" presence of others, and primar-
ily by the all-pervading Presence of God. Man must act to achieve his 
potential and in this way life is a constant service, being of its nature 
consecrated to God or some high ideal. By freeing itself of the cocoon 
of selfishness, the human spirit strengthens the "nuptial bond" between 
man and life and by a creative vow of fidelity undertakes to put all its 
energies at the service of its innate potential which, by virtue of its 
orientation, is directed towards fulness of Being (cf. HV 118-119,109, 
152-153). By this, man at tains a renewed reverence for 1 ife which sets 
the seal of eternity on each perpetually renewed act of creation. Herein 
lies the necessity of manfs recognition of his dependence on a sustain-
ing Presence who is God. "Lorsque l' homme, en niant Dieu, se renie lui-
m~me, les puissances spirituellesque son reniement dissocie gardent 
leur vitalite primitive mais, disjointes, desunies, elles ne peuvent 
plus que retourner desesperemment contre eux-memes les etres de chair et 
dtame que leur unite sauvegardee eGt achemines vers la vie €ternelle" 
(HV 124). 
77. PAChlO 75. cf. HV 49-50, DH 186, and Chapter 2, p. 56. 
78. There have been attempts at living such couraBe, but in every case 
the liberation from the mass has cost dearly. Max Weber argues that 
Protestantism, in its attacks on the power, ritual and even the dogma 
of the Universal Church (as it was then called), helped free man from 
worldly activities - but provided moral support for capitalism. Separ-
ated from the community of the medieval Church, man was made to face 
God alone, conscious of his (man!s) own fundamental sin-prone nature and 
his powerlessness. This sense of isolation and progressive alienation 
was continued in other less spiritual spheres of human activity by 
capitalism and has brought us to the present-day situation which is the 
cause of Marcel's existential uneasiness. cf. Erich Fromm, Escape from 
Freedom. 
79. See Chapter 1, pp. 27-29. cf. J. Royce, Studies of Good and Evil, 
23 (cited AIR 102) : "It is not those naturally ignorant of fear or those 
who, like Siegfried, h[Jve never silivered, wilo possess the genuine ex-
perience of courage; but the brave are those who have fears, but control 
their fears. Such know the genuine virtues of the hero. Were it other-
wise, only the stupid could be perfcct heroes." We may take an example 
from Marcel's play, l'Emiss[Jire. AntoiIle Sorgue admits that he would not 
have declined the Ch;-;'l-~e-i~esZape frolIl his prison camp even if he had 
known t1wt his unexpected relcase had bcen arranged by a collaiJor[Jtor 
who had hoped to will him over. Antojne states, ill all simpl.icity, that 
for all his wC[Jknesses, he is not a hypocrite; he would not act out of 
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regard for public opinion. Any such action would not be, for him, cour-
ageous (SdI 234). In Rome ntest plus dans Rome Renee jibes at her hus-
band Pascal, reminding him that his only resistance during the war had 
been to keep away from the Occupied Zone, "Mais peut-on appeler ~a du 
courage? La peur de la peur est-elle du courage?" (RPR 65). Troisfon'" 
taines shows how courage and hope are interpreted according to Christian 
ethics (nl II 182). cr. ME II 159-160, ST 128, 130. 
80. PACMO 73. Hope is not to be confused with optimism. As Hocking has 
pointed out, optimism is possible only with some kind of monism. For, 
in order to think well of one's world and expect good from it, that 
worlg must at least have a character. Every optimism, he adds, involves 
a judgment about Reality which has a character and is therefore One 
(Hocking, OPe cit., 167-168). Marcel defines the optimist as a spectat-
or who is not involved; moreover he claims a superior "view" of matters 
than his interlocutor and, professing to see things better from a dis-
tance, is not aware that distance can distort, reality. Finally, he is 
(like the pessimist) only a maker of speeches, tending to substitute 
"l flatter myself ll for "I hope" (HV 44-45). 
81. Jl\i 277-278. 
82. EPC 250. See pp. 144-145. cf. HV 41,71, DH 185. Humility, like 
all ontological mysteries, can be degraded into a sado-masochistic 
craving for humiliation. It is in this light, Marcel claims, that some 
opponents of Christianity interpret humility. cf. ME 11 85-86, HCH 187, 
Chapter 1, fn 112, p. 39, Chapter 3, p. 90. 
83. ME II 160, HV 80-81. Just as there is a difference between "I be-
lieve (in)" and "I believe that" (see Chapter 4, p. 111), there is a 
parallel distinction between "I hope (in)" and "I hope that". Hope does 
not impose conditions on God as may be implied by "I hope that". EVen 
"I hope in" can e,asily slip to "I expect from" to "I count on something 
due to me" and finally to "I claimll or "I demand" (HV 71). Marcel recog-
nizes that the perpetually recurring difficulties which a philosophy of 
hope encounters are, for the most part, owing to the fact that we have 
a tendency to substitute for an initial relationship (which is both pure 
and mysterious since it is between being and Being) subsequent relation-
ships which, while they are more intelligible, are more and more defic-
ient in ontological content. This unhappy phenomenon is no doubt owing 
to our finite, human intellects which are more at home grappling with 
(soluble) problems. According to this process we tend to reduce the 
higher mysteries (of being) to the level of problems (and of having) so 
that they may become more comprehensible. 
84. HV 77. A striking example of this metamorphosis of intersubjective 
hope is provided by Pascal Laumiere in Rome nlest plus dans Rome (see 
Appendix 2, III B, pp. 229-231. 
85. Pa ix sur la terre 59. Marce! is replying to the allocution of Carlo 
Scoolid on the occasion of the presentation to the French philosopher of 
the German Booksellers l Federation's Peace Prize, 20 September 1964 : 
"Si dans mon oeuvre il est un concept qui surclasse tous les autres, 
ctest sans doute celui de Itesperance con¥ue comme mystere •• 0 J1espere 
en Toi pour nous, ai-je ecrit, c1est encore aujourd'hui la seule 
formulation qui me satisfasse. Mais nous pouvons expliciter davantage: 
j'espere en toi qui es la paix vivante pour nous tous qui sommes encore 
en lutte avec nous·~I@mes et les uns avec les autres, afin qu'il nous 
soit donnc un jour d' entrcr en toi et de participer ;>1 ta plenitude. 11 
er. the "Questionnaire Marcel Pl'Otlsttl (Biblio 33/7). In that year (1965) 
---7 he gave as his motto the same formula: "Esperer en Toi pour nous tous.tI 
86. PI 145. cf. DII 192, ME n 172, ST 7/~. We are reminded of the words 
of Wcrner Sclmce to neatrice Sorcau at the end of le Dard when he refers 
to his friend Rudolf ilnd by which he gives her t.heclU-e-To tl'ue inter-
subjective hope in fidelity. See above, fn 48. 
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87. ME II 171-172. cL HCH 141, 166, PI 186, PR-GM 123-124. See also 
Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros (Eng. tr. 1932), I, 83 ff. 
88. EPC 59. This is the message of his play, le Quatuor en fa di~se. 
Marcel is commenting on the insight of one of the main characters, 
Claire, who asks: "Toi-meme ••• lui-meme •• 0 Ou commence une person-
nalit~? c'etait bien toi tout de meme; ne crois-tu pas que chacun de 
nous se prolonge dans tout ce qut il suscite?" 
89. JM 63. 
90. EA I 92. 
91. EA I 99. 
92. JM 219. 
93. ME II 103. cL JM 169, PACMO 82, EPC 230, DH 62-63, 95, ME I 36. 
94. ME Il 106. 
95. Schg 65-66. 
96. HCH 162. 
97. ST 209. 
98. PACMO 69. cL HV 201-202, PI 183. See p. 155. 
99. EA I 99, 93. 
100. ME 11 160. 
101. HV 202. cf. HV 343-344. 
102. DH121. 
103. See above, fn 1 (P. 164). The affinity between Marcelts philosophy 
and Christian theology based on revelation is plain. Christ himself 
announced the promise of immortality when he said that he had arrived 
to fill t~e gap in being :"the time is fulfilled" - 3'TL n:En:A~pW'TCi.1. 
o XCi.LpOC; (Mark 1: 14, see J. Baillie, The Sense of the Presence 
104. 
105. 
106. 
107. 
108. 
109. 
110. 
111 • 
112. 
113. 
11!~ • 
of God, London, 1962, p. 136, for a cOIT'Jnentary on Mark 1: 14-15). 
cf. Saint Paul, Colossians 2: 9 (given in fn 1, qv) and Ephesians 1:9 -
EtC; o!xovo~(Ci.V 'ToO TIX~p~~Ci.'TOC; 'TWV XCi.LP~V. 
Christ's announcement is a prophecy which gives believers hope for 
immortality. For as Marcel asserts that there is no human love worthy 
of the name that does not represent for him who exercizes it both a 
"pledge and the seed" of immortality (HV 200), we may say by inference 
that hope is no less an affirmation of eternity. Both hope and love 
are founded on, and mutually reciprocate in establishing, a universal. 
communion which itself can only be centred upon God as Absolute Thou. 
p. 
EA I 93. 
ME II 178. 
PE 97. 
See Chapter 1, pp. 22-24. 
EPC 19. See Chapter 1, fn 11.9, p. 39, Chapter 3, p. 82 and fn 83, 
100. 
ME II 171. 
PI 80, nCH 58, HP 117, EA I 99, .!..2ohn !~:8, Acts_ 4: 11. See p. 160. 
cf. HCH 14-1. See Chapter 6, pp. 195-197. 
HCH 14·1. 
Hcn 99. See Chapter 3, fn 93, Po 101. 
cf. ST 166, ME II 12. See Chapter 1, fn 46, p. }I~. 
CHAPTER SIX 
ULTIMATE UNION 
Death and Immortality 
Beatus qui amat te, et amicum in te, 
et inimicum propter te: Solus enim 
nullum carum amittit, cui omnes in 
illo cari sunt, qui non amittuntur. 
- SAINT AUGUSTINE, _C_o_n_fe ___ _ IV, 9. 
Le probleme de Itimmortalit~ de ltSme , 
pivot de la metaphysi'que. 
- G. MARCEL, Etre et avoir I, 10. 
Le chr~tien dans le ciel de Sa foi 
sent palpiter la Toussaint de tous 
ses fr~res vivants • 
.... P. CLAUDEL, Cinq GrandcF. Odes 
(Ill : flI8.t,:nificat) 
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We have now reached the culminating point of Marcelts whole dialectic 
of participation in an ontological communion established and guaranteed 
in God as Source and Principle of Being. A metaphysics of being based on 
presence and oriented towards the recognition of God as Transcendent Being 
is of little value without the possibility of individual self-fulfilment 
in ul timate union wi th God. The "concrete" approaches to the Mystery of 
Goo s> grounded in faith, hope and love, and attested in fidelity, are of no 
value unless they lead to God and the assurance of individual perpetuation. 
In this chapter I propose to examine closely Marcel t s treatment of the 
questions which immediately arise. The two main topics which he considers 
are death and immortality. 
It will be seen, however, that he does not discuss - he even disregards 
- a number of issues which could be thought of as traditionally central in 
a philosophical consideration of the survival of death. As for the notion 
of immortality, it can be argued that it belongs more properly to the 
domain of theology and presupposes faith; certainly in the light of Gnbriel 
Marcelfs general metaphysics, theology seems to obtrude in practically every 
mon!ent of his dialectic. In a general way, :Marcel's whole argument in his 
discussion of death and immortality is the expression of an : there 
is a meaning to life or there is no meaning to life. The characteristic 
of his approach to the meaning of death is, therefore, his affirmation of 
the value and "sacral ll character of life. His claim to show that there is 
a positive meaning in life is the basis of the further perspective of 
immortality. But Marceldoes not appear to have anticipated any objections 
against the "positive meaning of life" as a satisfactory notion by which 
to postulate the necessity, or the reasonableness, of eternity; nor has he 
bothered to consider some of the problems raised by the postulation of 
eternity or survival of death. 
I. The Place of Death in a Philosophy of Being. 
i. Marcel al!!!.. other contemporary !I existential !I thin~ 
One of the sa.lient features of Gabriel Marcel fS philosophy is the im-· 
1 portance he attaches to death. But while he has even been accused of 
pessimism on account of the space he devotes to such morbid subjects as 
betrayal, despair and suicide, Marcel differs in outlook from the general 
run of existentialist thinkers in the matter of death. He highlights the 
dangers of OUI' modern teChnological age which seems to have provided man 
with the weapons of his 0\)0 self·-dcstruction. The game of life has become 
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2 the game of death. Too often, however, Marcel warns, man's enquiries, 
when of a "speleological" nature have led him on a descent into a Baudel .... 
airean IIgouffrell.3 
For those who see this life as a Kafkaesque situation in which man is 
sentenced without any reason given, death is the definitive end. Death 
is one's personal "completion" as postulated by Heidegger whose interpret-
ation of being and existence as Sein zum Tode leads to anguish and despair~ 
A purely- naturalistic view of li'fe, as proposed by Nietzsche, would posit 
death as the end. There could be no transcending it and the adherents of 
Camusts "absurdisme" would be vindicated. Marcel insists that we must 
resist the temptation to interpret death as a purely physical modification, 
and in this respect he charges that neither Heidegger nor Sartre has delved 
deeply enough into the problem. As we shall see, neither has Marcel, 
despite his declared purpose to postulate the phenomenon of death as a 
participation in an entirely different order. 5 
This is not to say that Marcel does not recognize the problem of fini-
tude. But he declares himself not preoccupied with directing oners attent-
ion to a consideration of finitude and death in a social perspective 
whereby they can be conveniently pigeon-holed as mere biological functions 
within the framework of society. He does not regard finitude as the limit-
ation of intersubjective functions, nor does he consider death as the 
extinction of all possibilities. In this respect he escapes Coplestonts 
criticism of existentialist thinkers at large. 6 Many contemporary exist-
entialist thinkers have opted for "absurdisme", and Marcel does admit, 
necessarily, that the thought of inevitable death can be a source of the 
gravest anxiety and a temptation to despair. He himself has opted in the 
other direction by asserting that for the "genuine" existent (he who truly 
participates in the Fellowship of Being), death is the greatest test of 
the mysterious union between body and personality. On a more properly 
metaphysical plane, he says, death is the test, supreme and sublime, of 
faith, hope and love, of fidelity to the universal ontological communion. 7 
He argues that this is a viable option, but the question remains whether 
he makes sense of this option. 
ii. Marcel' s initial investigations into an ontology of death 
Marcel's own realization of the mysterious character of death CBmc at 
a very early age. It could be said to be his first metaphysical experi-
ence. His mother died when he was only four years old yet sufficiently 
sensitive to feel ller loss most keenly. To this day he retains not just 
the memory of her but the strong sense of her abiding presence. lIe recalls 
that when he Was about eight years old he was walking one day with his 
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aunt in the Parc Monceau in Paris. When his aunt told him that no one 
could know if the dead were completely annihilated or lived on in some 
way, the little boy, already showing signs of perspicacity rat.her than 
precocity, exclaimed, "Plus tard, moi, je chercherai Et y voir clair. It 
This pronouncement, he claims, was no childish outburst. In some way it 
determined the course he was to take, and may have influenced his readi-
ness to study philosophy, not as a burden or to please his father and aunt 
but as an absorbing interest. He recognizes that the question of death 
appears as a watermark in practically everything that he has written, 
above all in his dramatic work: 9 
It would be naive to dismiss Marcel as a sentimentally gloomy philo-
sopher. His contributions to a phenomenology of hope are enough to counter 
that allegation. As we shall see, his study of death is always infused 
with the virtue of hope. It is only natural that in his investigation of 
existential phenomena he has had to come to grips with this last great 
human experience of which even the idealists cannot presume to gain any 
data of verification. Death remains 
arily inv~ncible. For a time Marcel 
avenue for exploration of the depths 
a mystery, challenging but not necess-
dallied with psychism as a possible 
. 10 
of this "problem"; but he turned 
al\'ay from this unprofessional approach to redirect his enquiries within 
the framework of metaphysics. 
Can we construct an ontology of death? Marcel asks. If death is viewed 
solely by the self which is bound up with the question, Marcel considers 
such a venture impracticeble. 11 That view, he states, would be dictated 
by the fear of losing oners dearest possession, onets body and life. Be-
longing as it does to the realm of "havingll, this attitude, he alleges, 
is a distortion of the primal instinct of self-preservation. It remains 
on the level of primary reflection, principally because I can have no 
experi ential knowledge of any future state once the link between self and 
12 body is broken by death. Thus it would seem that the passage into death 
leads into a metaphysical blind alley. 
When death is considered as a purely natural an physical phenomenon 
(the only future event we can acknowledge with certainty through both 
induction and deduction), the mere thought of it can exercise a terrible 
fascination over us, deadening our i~pulses and expectations, and urging 
us to admit the futili ty of life. This fascination is only natural but 
can easily degenerate into a fatalistic obsession. Man can be so hypnot··, 
ized into petrif iention that, in at tempting to come to terms with his 
death, he will see no way out but. to find in his very despair a source of 
consolation. In a very vivid metaphor, Marcel recognizes that. man, capDble 
of despair, is capable of "hugging" deat.h, of hugging his ~ death.i3 
But, he asserts, it is precisely because of Cl Hmctaproblernatic of no"·,longer'-
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being" (the "return to the neant" in Sartre!s terms), that we can appreci .... 
ate the equal possibility of a transcendent metaproblematic dimension. It 
is wi th this option of the meaningfulness of life posited in a transcend-· 
ent fulfilment of being that Marcel concerns himself as an alternative 
"solution". 
iii. Towards the possible transcendence of death 
It would be an illusion to try to dissipate one's death as only an 
idea; the ipea refuses to go away. 
La mort pensee sfoppose a la mort sentie, elle est au 
contraire transcendee ensemble, mais ceci'veut dire 
ici escamotee. (14) 
As long as I think of death as mine, Marcel says, even by putting myself 
in anotherts place so that my death becomes IIhis", death cannot be trans-
cended. However, Marcel reasons that this transcendence can be shown to 
be possible through a study of the rSle of individual freedom, through 
experience, and by the postulation of survival in imrnortalityo 
(a) The role of freedom. 
His analysis of freedom in this respect differs from that of Heidegger. 
I do not really have the right to think of myself as destined for death, 
Mareel asserts in opposition to Heidegger (as he understands hirn15 ). 
Mareel proposes that we can look upon death either as the abyss of the 
unknown yawning before us, or as the test of our love, fidelity and hope. 
If we use our freedom to opt for the first alternative, Marcel declares 
that, in reality, (our) freedom betrays itself by conniving with deathts 
claim to a power of annihilation. But, as far as Marcel is concerned, 
the ontological counterpoise of death can be seen to be not so much life 
as a "positive" use of freedom. This approach would counter and reject 
the self-deception of life which transfers to death a power that only life 
can use. Positively applied, freedom becomes affirmation and is imbued 
with hope and love. In 'this way, he claims, death is transcended. 16 
Marcelts IIlogic of freedom", couched in terms of abstractions, can be 
simply stated as the freedom of the individual to make his choice with 
respect to the question of life and death. Marcel would advise that we 
should make our choice and live in the terms of that choice. If the choice 
is "positive" in the sense Marcel gives it, and this is the expression of 
a purely religious attitud~, my life will be affected so that I may free 
myself from submission to death in its nihilistic or fatalistic aspect •. 
But ~arcelts approach does not really provide any solution to the problem. 
Ile would colI it a mystery, anywily, and that virtually means that we can 
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say nothing about it.. What Marcel is saying iS t "I cannot prove survival 
of death; I only ask you to see this question my way. I! He hopes that his 
analyses of an experiential approach will be more intelligible. 
(1) !he approach through experience. 
Although transcendence is possible through experience in every exist-
ential (Le" ontological) mystery, the objection may be raised that tlID.is 
does not seem possible in death which is surely a very important event in 
individual existence. I cannot assure myself of the possibility of 
cOffimunicating the experiential phenomena of my own death. If there were 
an unequivocal relationship, known to all, between the individual and 
de&th, it could only be for the body considered as an object. Such an 
attitude involves isolating the body from its mysterious ties with the 
subject, who is myself. And even if I proceed from myself as subject, sub-
tracting myself from my body, I still cannot unequivocally determine the 
relationship towards my own death. The "I" which considers its own death 
cannot be thought away as an abstraction. The relationship between my-
self and my body is something I have to establish. Marcel goes so far as 
to declare that, if need be, I have to originate and even invent that 
1 t o hO 17 re a Ions Ip. 
Marcel insists that we have to get away from the notion of personal 
death as an event. 
La mort en elle-m~me ne peut sGrement pas ~tre assimilee 
a un evenement, ce qui reviendrait a dire quten tant que 
telle ma mort nfest pas quelque chose qui mtarriverao (18) 
My death, then, can only be an event for others inasmuch as for them it is 
"his ll death. I cannot really anticipate my death by asking what will 
become of the machine that is my body when it no longer functions. 19 Now, 
some philosophers of the Anglo .... Saxon school hold that death is not an 
event but that it sets the boundary or limitation of event. The notion 
of an event is that it is something through which I live. So conception 
(but not birth) and death are "boundary-limits" of event. Marcel does 
not appear to have considered the problem which arises for him. If he 
would agree with such thinkers that death is not an event, he must face 
the objection of the impossibility of survival after death. For if death 
is not an event, it cannot be lived througho But Marcel does postulate 
survi val. The question of the form which this survival takes is one which 
Marcel does not seem to have considered in any great depth. tfhis can be 
seen in his postulation of ioonortality as the perpetuation of fidelity in 
union with Cod Q 
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«(t) The pos tulation of survival in immorLali t1:. 
From within an idealist framework Marcel had pursued a line of enquiry 
into the possibility of the survival of consciousness in a new mode which 
would subsist even when the habitual mode ceases to apply. He rejects 
this hypothesis as well as the idealist attempt to rescue immortality by 
asserting that the thinking subject, of its very nature, cannot die. Such 
a subject, he states flatly, cannot even live. 20 He then went on to con-
sider the idea of continued communication, which suggests the continued 
Itbeing" of others since the idea of communication implies reciprocity 
while that of a solitary after-life may well be unintelligible. In this 
line of thinking he was led to conclude that any real survival of con-
sciousness is only conceivable if in the after-life communications by 
means of messages are still possible; that is, as he says, 
si la mort ntest pas une des incarnation. (21) 
While death is indeed the abolition of the usual type of instrumental medi·· 
ation, Marcel sees it more as what J. Middleton Murry calls "the point of 
transference from the world of Time to the world of Eternity".22 It would 
seem that-eternity, towards which time flows irresistibly, is a supra-
temporal dimension of the act by which I understand the transitory nature 
of my situation-in .... the-world. According to Marcelts metaphysics, we have 
to postUlate eternity if we are to transcend death, and survival after 
death involves positing immortality. But here we encounter objections 
which Marcel himself does not seem to have considered. 
Some thinkers hold that immortality is not necessarily entailed in the 
question of the transcendence of death. They may argue for such theories 
as reincarnation or the Utransmigration of souls", or that we live for a 
while, die, live for another while, and so on. Further problems not dis-
cussed by hlarcel concern the nature of this survival : in bodily resurrect-
ion or disembodied after-life?23 Again, the question of personal identity 
arise.!:' : does Marcel exclude the notion of bodily resurrection24 and how 
is one person to be individuated from another in this after-life? Is this 
"other kingdom!! in this life as we know it, or is it the "next" ("other") 
world? What are the characteristics of this "other kingdom"? and what 
form of life (not "existence" apparently) is involved - is it intellectual, 
cognitive or just "spiritual"? There are, then, many questions which 
Marcel does not discuss. The lack of answers makes for large gaps in the 
dialectic of a philosopher who professes to be deeply concerned about the 
perpetuation of intersubjective fidelity and ultimate, pleromatic union 
with God. We should expect more from a philosopher who stresses the im-
portance of survival after death to give meanillg to life. 
Marcel's d! rf icul ti ('s deri vc, in great part, from the quasi-theological 
2e" 
cltaracter of his enquiry" ,) He declares that despair in the face of 
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annihila tion in death can be countered by hope, and that hope must find 
its guarantee in immortality. But immortality can be based only on faith; 
t.he que:::,tion of immortality, as Marcel presents it, belongs to theology 
rather than to philosophy. He himself has recognized the connection 
between immortality and faith when he wrote : 
Cette foi porte bien sur llimmortalite personnelle en ce 
sens qu'elle est' liee ~ Itacte d'une liberte qui est 
If individu lui-m~me dans ce qu'il a de plus profond ••• 
L.' immortalite affirmee par la foi ntest pas un fait Et 
proprement parler, elle ne se ramene pas a une survie 
empirique (car rien de ce qui a rapport a l'existence 
au sens empirique ne peut etre implique dans l'ordre de 
la liberte). La liberte ne peut que staffirmer par la 
foi comme etranger'e Et la mort, comme elle ,es t etrangere 
au temps. (26) 
The postulation of eternity and immortality is necessary in Marcelts dia-
lectic if being is a continual process of becoming (creativity) in union 
with others through the fellowship of Being. The mystery of Being is un~ 
folded in the process of transcendence and is known only after death as 
God himself. But Marcel seems to transgress his own boundary between 
philosophy and theology by the way in which he directs his enquiries into 
immortali ty. 
In so doing he virtually admits the identification of Being as God, 
for immortality is bound up with faith, and faith is .centred in God. 27 
Without this recognition, hope in eternity is empty of meaning., By con~ 
centrating on immortality Marcel hopes to show that death can be seen in 
its "proper" perspec tive .: 
Nous devons vivre et travailler a chaque instant comme si 
nous avions Iteternite devant nous. (28) 
The measure of man's transitoriness is God's eternityo With the prospect 
of eternity before us, Marcel encourages us, life will have a meaning : 
it is a period of trial before ultimate union with God. God is the expect-
ation of ontological communion, for God is Being 
Ltetre crest lYattente comblee. (29) 
But Marcel cannot (evenif he wanted to) prove the reality of immortality; 
his "solution" to the transcendence of death can only remain, at best, a 
viable option. 
11. Immortality - the transcendence of death and guarantee of ultimate 
union. 
The whole not.ion of survival of death is a strange and mysterious (not 
in the ~Iarcellian sense) one which has exercised Jl1nny thinkers. Given 
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religious belief, however, this notion is no longer strange, provided the 
philosopher admits his belief in God who assures this survival.. Gabriel 
Marcel is reluctant to acknowledge that his religious persuasion obtrudes 
in his philosophical thought. Yet, in this matter of immortality which 
he presents in many other contexts besides his "PrEsence et immortalit~!I, 
he takes religious faith for granted. His application of the concrete 
approaches to the ontological mystery is based on his own acknowledgment 
of the r~ality of God - which he leaves unexpressed N and is simply the 
elaboration of his suggested option of the meaningfulness of life as 
opposed to the nihilistic rationale of "absurdisme". The religious element 
in Marcelts own rationale is revealed in his discussion of such theological 
notions as resurrection and salvation. 
But in the discussion of resurrection, for example, he does not come 
to grips with the question. For a materialist the question of survival 
after death, let alone of resurrection, is meaningless. On account of his 
denunciations of technolatry, "having" and "functionalization", Marcel is 
evidently no materialist o He is left with two main alternatives : the 
Aristotelian notion of the souP s perennity. adopt ed and "Christianized" 
by Aquinas; or the traditional view of a mind""l'body dualism, propounded by 
Descartes, according to which the notion of survival makes sense. Marcel's 
dilemma stems from his aversion to both Thomism and Cartesianism. The 
end-result of his endeavours to effect an "acceptable!! compromise within 
the framework of an existential metaphysics is an almost total disregard 
of the problems involved. We shall proceed, therefore, to consider his 
treatment of the notion of survival in immortality according to his general 
dialectic of the Mystery of Being. The only way in which his ontology can 
make sense in relation to this properly theological concept of immortality 
is by recognizing and admitting that Being must be identified with God. 
~. Application of the concrete approaches to the ontological mystery 
(a) Love (and faith). 
In terms of Aiarcel!s metaphysics, love is the key by which the problem 
of death is transformed into transcendental mystery. Love is recognized 
by Marcel as stronger than death. Absolute Love is God30 to whom we 
aspire through our love of our fellow beings. Love is the creative force 
which sets us free from the mortal obsession of death. In the light of 
this optional view of the meaning of death ,~ and of life .... Marcel 
that we sce that, while death is an invitation to despair, it can equally 
71 be !Ithe springboc:rd of hope",/ Thus bel.ief ~n the immortality of the 
loved one is the transcendentnl prolongation of our earthly love. 
s 
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To believe in the survival of love is to confide ourselves to a loving 
God. Indeed, belief in immortality can only be an act of faith and love 
in God by the "consecrated" soul. Marcel understands the soul as "consec-
rated" once it recognizes that God is its goal and source of worth and 
being. Consecration, therefore, presupposes conversion. A perversion of 
the soulls relationship with God will ensue as soon as the notion of con-
tract for service is entertained. Marcel warns against any attempt to 
treat oneself as a creditor of God who mayor may not pay his due. In this 
respect, 
11 y a la, il me semble, les elements dlune criteriologie 
qui permet de reconnaltre si la foi en Itimmortalite pr€-
sente ou non une valeur religieuse : il slagit uniquement 
de savoir si elle se pr~sente comme un acte d'esperance 
et dfamour, ou comme une revendication qui prend sa racine 
dans Itattachement ~ soi-m~me. (32) 
This attitude is imbued with the spirit of possession, of "having", and 
shows up an ambiguity in the very notion of loss. The soul, we are told 
by theologians, may be !llost". As far as Marcel is concerned, on the level 
f b · l' 1 k . d . t . 33 o elng, oss lS, proper y spea lng, per l lone 
This attitude of "having" can be seen operating in a possible reaction 
to the death of one who is loved. If we mourn the death of the loved one 
as loss, we are mourning, in a way, the loss of somebody - or even of some-
thing, if we have objectified that person ... who, as it were,!lbelonged" to 
us. This is an indication, not of true love, but of egocentrism because 
we have regarded the other as somebody at our disposal. The more the loss 
is related to possession the more our grief appears as a protest asserting 
a right over the "lost" one, even over oneself. (We shall return to this 
idea shortly when we consider the behaviour, authentic or inauthentic, of 
the martyr and the suicide.) 
(b) Hope. 
Countering this ontologically self-destructive attitude is hope which, 
Marcel declares, can only take root where perdition is possible. Hope at 
its highest level is centred in entire dependence on God; at its lowest 
hope is centred in the consciousness of self and its pretended dues. Hope 
does not wait on Godts goodness : 
11 se pourrait en somme que Itesperance authentique con-
sist~t toujours ~ attendre une certaine gr~ce dtune 
puissance dont on ne se precise ncces~miremcnt a soi-m2me 
la nature, nmis a la munificence de laquelle on ne juge 
pas pouvoir assigner des limites. (34) 
None the less, it may be said that the grace awaited is eternal salvation 
III the ultimate completeness of the ontological union. 
From a purely philosophical point of view, Marcel insists, it is the 
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death of those we have loved, or more correctly of those we love, which is 
of paramount importance, since they alone can be comprehended by our 
spiritual sight. At least that is what Marcel claims as his own attitude 
towards death. 35 Those we love, he affirms, have been given to us to long 
for, even if we care little for any "proclamation that love, light and 
Being are everywhere". He asks us, then, to adopt his attitude as a "posi-
tive" solution to the problem of death. He suggests that, given our agree-
ment$ we can appreciate the ferv~nt cry of a character in one of his plays: 
Aimer un etre, ctest dire: tu ne mourras pas. 36 
If, on the other hand, we opt for the recognition that with death those 
whom we love no longer exist, Marcel Warns darkly that we betray and deny 
not only them but ourselves as well, for we all share in the same being. 
Dire: "ils ne sont plus", crest non seulement les renier, 
mais se renier soi-rneme, et peut-etre renier absolument 
pari an t. (37 ) 
If we take up his suggested option, we believe and hope in the sustained 
presence of those we love, an indefectible presence which is always there 
as we are to ourselves. 
(c) Fidel Hy. 
It is with respect to the central notion of indefectible presence that 
we can run into diffi'culties of objectification. The "indefectible" can be 
covered (not transformed) by memories. Marcel has often insisted that our 
fidelity to the dead should not be compared with the memory we have of the 
departed which is kept li~e a picture on the mantelpiece. It is a diffi-
cult temptation to avoid yielding to since the more I have loved someone 
the less I can succeed in freeing myself of the haunting memory of his last 
state.38 But fidelity, as Marcel postulates it, is not directed towards 
anything like a carefully preserved effigy which can at best be only a 
likeness and which metaphysically is less than the object. Presence is 
more than an object, it goes beyond the object in every dimension; such is 
the transcendental quality of presence as mystery. Presence is "wrapped" 
in being so that the loved one is not a "thing lost" but a being who 
remains present to my thought and to my heart, a being who has not been 
dissolved. There 1s, Marcel notes 
(un) ecartelement entre Itimage de la chose et des mutations 
qu'elle subit dtune part, la vision interieure de l'@tre 
pose dE.ns sa mysterieuse permanence, dtautre part. (39) 
Marce! takes note of the objection that what is involved in this 
approach is pure subjectivism highly coloured by psychological moods 
which seek to avoid admitting the real~ty of death. Death is a phenomenon 
definable in biological terms and cannot be stated as a test. Marcel re-
plies that death i~; what it signifie5 p especially to a being who has risen 
to the highest spiritual level to which it is possible to attain. There 
is more than a strong hint that Marcel suggests that such a spiritual 
level can be the more easily reached by following and accepting his argu-
ment for his option. There is, therefore, an element of elitism once more 
discernible in his theory. Again it can be argued that his is virtually 
a mystical view. Marce! accepts this latter opinion, since he would 
suggest that "there are many things in heaven and earth of which (your) 
philosophy knows nothing ll • This' same phenomenon, however, even of a semi-
mystical nature, is not unknown to us all : we just cannot reduce the real-
ity of death to terms of a biological process. Marcel cites the manner in 
which we speak of the great men who have gone before us, like Moli~re, 
Mozart or Rembrandt (all artists, it is to be noted40 ) in the present 
tense. We do not think, he argues, of their bodies which have long decayed; 
nor is it so much their material works, but their spirit and thought which 
endure and survive. To this, however, we can point out that their spirit 
and thought survive only because of the material works through which their 
spirit (presence?) perdures. 
Accordingly, Marcel explains, while I may read, without evincing any 
great feeling, the announcement of the death of somebody who may at best be 
only a name for me, it quite another thing in the case of a being 
(person) who has been !Igranted!! to me as a "presence". Marcel continue~1) 
to say that this is just an unnecessary metaphysical expression of a common 
psychological fact is to obscure the truth which is altogether different 
and infinitely mysterious. To say that it all depends on us that the dead 
should live on in our memory is to revert to the conception of the other as 
an effigy or visible reminder. A presence, Marcel claims, is a reality and 
it depends on us to be permeable to this influx of presence which is the 
essence of being. 
La fid~lite crtatrice consiste a se maintenir activement 
en etat de permeabilite; et nous voyons ici s'operer une 
sorte dfechange mysterieux entre Itacte li~re et le don 
par lequel il lui est repondu. (41) 
This, so far, is the argument Marcel provides to validate his option. 
Before we proceed to ascertain the key role of disponibilite, which is 
effectively this IIstate of permeability", in creating an awareness of the 
reasonableness of immortality, we sh';11 consider some examples from Marcel's 
plays. Although he expressly declares that his plays are not vehicles for 
propagating his philosophy, it can be seen that the characters involved 
are all examples of those who. we may say, have "accepted" this option of 
the positive meaning of life extending into the beyond where it is given 
its guarantee. These characters become aware, in greater or lesser degree, 
of the presential character of being. While it is evident that Marcel 
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points to these plays (and others) in defence of his notion of fidelity 
to an immortal presence, we should bear in mind the observation made 
earlier42 that this notion is onl~ an The examples are taken 
from le Fanal and Mon Temps ntest pas le vStre with a passing reference to 
le Signe de la Croix. 
ii. Examples from Marcel's theatre 
In the first play (le Fanal) Chaviere comes to realize just how much 
his wife really meant for him only after her death. Although her passing 
had seemed to him and his son, Raymond, to be a beacon (un fanal), the sign 
of liberation43 from her dominance, she continues to live on through her 
presence. When at the end father and son are reunited, after their dis~ 
appointments in projected liaisons, Chavi~re declares, "Nous serons tous 
les deux," Raymond corrects him, "Non, papa. Tous les trois. comme autre-
fois, comme jamais.u44 While that declaration may not be appreciated as 
greatly significant, the theme is taken up again in le Signe de la Croix. 
Simon Bernauerts presence is still felt by those who truly love him; it 
finds a response in his surviving son, Jean-Paul.45 Here, and more partic-
ularly in the third play as we shall see, we can understand what Marcel 
means when he says of the indefectible quali ty of presence: 
Lt indefectible, cfest ce qui ne peut pas fa ire defaut la 
ou une fidHite radicale est maintenue; ceci revient a 
dire qulil est une reponse. (46) 
Marie-Henriette, in Mon TemEs ntest pas le v8tre, has not really been 
able to communicate with her father, Alfred Champel. At last, however, he 
opens himself to her in a scene which is reminiscent of that in Homme 
de Dieu between Claude Lemoyne and Osmonde. He regretfully assures his 
daughter that he is not in fact the father of a very personable young man, 
Flavio Romanelli.47 Champel has become embittered with life. He dismisses 
happiness as an illusion when seen in the perspective of approaching death; 
life for him is a disaster.48 Sensing that Marie-Henriette is more suscep-
tible to a change in attitude than her sister, Perrine, he points this 
possibility out to her almost by way of an appeal. 
The force of the call to a "transformation" is brought home to Marie .... 
Henriette only after the death of her father. She f~els that now a part 
of her is compelled to take his place as if it had received a sacred deleg-
ation. What she is trying to express 1S the need for the survival of his 
presence. What is certain, she tells the abbe; ,Tourdaine, her motherts con-
" 
", , ,,49 fessor, is je suis aujourtJlhui le seul etre encore relic a mon pere.' 
But neither the abbe nor~ later, flavio is of much, help to Marie-llenriette 
in her perplexity. She does, however y find one of the "chre'ticns veri-
186 
tables,,50 in the person of Flavio's mother, Sibilla, who had been, many 
years before, the lover of Alfred Champel. It is to her that Marie-
Henriette can confide: "Est-ce que vous savez que nos rapports avec nos 
proches ne cessent pas avec ce qulon appelle leur mort, et que, parfois, 
au contraire, ils se renouvellent et s'approfondlssent?" To which Sibilla 
replies, significantly for Marcel since it is what he claims, "Oui, je sais 
cela, mais crest un grand secret que presque tout le monde ignore.,,51 
Hi. "Disponibilitt~" and disposability (of the body) ... the martyr 
as wi tness of immortal ity 
According to Marcel, the permanence of love and fidelity can be main-
tained only by the will which has chosen this line of action. It is, how-
ever, always possible for an individual to adopt a contrary view and 
regard death as the deprivation of the physical presence of the loved one, 
while yet claiming to remain faithful. The possibility of this option is 
provided for by Marcel in his theatre. It is the "error" of Aline Fortier 
in la Chapelle ardente and also of Jacques Delorme in l'Iconoclaste. 
Jacques went further by hoping to transpose the "spiritual" Viviane into 
the physical. This temptation, his friend Abel points out, is beyond the 
reach of oners "purest part".52 We must not be duped by our imagination, 
Marcel warns, if we are to preserve our ontological communion •. By ridding 
ourselves of the vestiges of "having", the other can still be for us. 
It follows, Marcel argues, that this same outlook applies to my atti-
tude to my own death as being what I make for myself. The basic criterion 
is disponibilit€, or its opposite, according as I consider my power over 
myself. If I think that I have the right to dispose of my body as being 
my own, I remain on the level of "having". On the level of "being", Marcel 
claims, I can see, with the help of secondary reflection, that I have not 
the freedom to dispose arbitrarily of my being. This, he suggests, can be 
seen from the examples of the suicide and the martyr who, at first glance, 
have this in common that they voluntarily dispose of themselves. 
(a) The suicide. 
The difference lies in the motivation of their acts; this involves 
their degree of openness and availability to others. A person who is so 
preoccupied with himself and his fate, who succumbs to a Nietzschean alllor 
fati .~ wi thout reference to others .- denies the reali ty of their co-
presence. Ultimately, if not initially, such a person denies the presence 
of God; God, for him, is only "someone (el~;e) who ••• " If his attitude 
were otherwise, he would not arrogate to himself the right to dispose free-
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ly of himself, for he thereby rules himself out and is no longer avail-
able. Suicide, Marcel concludes, is a rejection of others; it is a 
radical denial of the Fellowship of Being. 53 
(b) The martyr. 
Yet~ we may ask, does not the martyr act in a similar manner? He who 
gives his life, whether it be for an idea, an ideal, or for God, gets 
nothing out of it for himself. ,This, of course, as Marcel points out, is 
an indication of the selfish tenacity of a "having" complex. Heroism and 
martyrdom seem to be pure folly. Marcel would seem to rely on Saint Paul 
to reply that, in that case, it is a worthy madness; in the case of the 
(Christian) martyr - and Marcel seems to understand martyrdom only in the 
context of religious belief - the persecuted Christian is one of the "fools 
for Christ I s sake". Marcel declares that we have to distinguish carefully 
between the physical effect of the self-sacrifice and the actts inner 
significance. 54 
By his availability pushed to its ultimate consequence, the martyr 
attests that being can transcend "having"; for Marcel, therein lies the 
reality and social function of sacrifice. It is the giving up of every-
thing to be more. It is not the'abandoning of life but its offering at the 
disposal of a higher reality. In his interpretation of martyrdom Marcel 
shows that he belongs to the Christian tradition. For the early Christians 
martyrdom had, as its special charism, the abiding presence of Christ who 
suffered with them. They in turn shared in his salvific passion so that, 
by their supreme consecration, they attained Christ and their salvation. 
In following Christ even to the sacrifice of their lives they brought the 
process of their spiritual growth to a sudden maturity by their sublime 
consecration which stamped with love (f .. e., "sanctified") their potential-' 
ities. But because man is a mat~rial as well as a spiritual entity, death 
can be imposed from without in a way which could prevent conscious self-
fulfilment. The martyr, like Christ, summons all his self, his being, and 
offers it to God while yet suffering death to be imposed from without. This 
properly existential view of sacrifice was expressed by Clement of Alex-
andria in describing the martyr as teleiosis (perfection, fulfilment) - not 
just because he has reached the end (~elos) of his life, but because he 
has created a work of perfect love (teleion).55 
Evidently, there is not and cannot be any sacrifice, certainly of this 
kind, without hope. In terms of Marcel's dialectic, the martyr is respond-
ing in hope to a call from the Absolute Thou who can never fail him. All 
hope, ~Iarcel says~ is "suspended" in the ontological realm;56 the martyr 
hopes in God for his (accelerated) self~fulfillllent. He shows that he has 
placed his being beyond his life and so he attests the true place of pcr-
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fection which is not centred in the self alone but in God. While the 
example of the martyr may be forbidding and even embarrassing, we can 
appreciate how death for him who is so available to the disposition of 
God can be regarded as a release. It is a release from the temptation to 
betrayal, a release to sacrificial consecration. In this sense, Marcel 
observes, mortification takes on a new meaning as "releasing a little of 
death", it is the apprenticeship to a more than human freedom. 57 
Finally, the martyr points the way to hope in a loving God who holds 
us in Being once we have consecrated ourselves to him through faith. God 
will not allow those he loves to be "annihilated" (an~antis), whence it 
follows that neither will he allow those whom we love to perish eternally. 
All true intersubjectivity, which of its nature lays claim to an enduring 
immortality, is established in God. Marcel concludes: 
A la racine du sacrifice absolu on trouve, disons non seule-
ment un "Je meurs" mais un "toi, tu ne mourras pas" ou 
encore un "parce que je meurs, tu seras sauve", ou plus 
rigoureusement, "ma mort accroit tes chances de vie." 11 
semble bien que le sacrifice ne prenne sens que par rapport 
a une realite susceptible d'~tre menacee; c'est-a-dire une 
realite donnee historiquement et par consequent exposee aux 
forces de destruction qui s'exercent sur tout ce qui dure. (58) 
The objection, however, to Marcel's analysis of martyrdom is : what 
significance has this for the "ordinary" experience of death, that is for 
the experience of "ordinary" people? Evidently, Marcel presupposes faith 
as a condition antecedent. But even communist martyrs can be said to be 
willing to die - not for themselves, but for the future ideal of world-
wide communism. Marcel's description of the martyr is valid, therefore, 
only within the context of Christian religion. 
iv. Joyous confidence in the immortality of love 
From the example of the martyr, Marcel goes on to argue, we can appreci-
ate that death can be seen as a release and that there are "deaths which are 
graces".59 These are deaths which inspire us with hope and joy because 
those whom we have loved have gained the victory over the possessive fear 
of death. It is on this point that Marcel takes issue with contemporary 
existent ial thinkers of the school of "absurdisme". It is the basic idea 
of his whole dialectic of the possible transcendence of death as a viable 
option. The last word, he firmly believes, lies not with anguish but with 
joy and love; joy is not just the mark of being but its very up~;urge. Joy, 
he proclaims, is fulness. When we act out of joy everything we do is 
invested with a .£.~"!J.gi.9"'!:!'~ value since if that which is done in joy is done 
with the totality of our being, it is done in relation to God. Any sepnr-
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ation of the soul from itself, alienates it from God. 60 According to 
Marcel p the central deficiency of existential philosophies of anguish is 
the arbitrary neglect of what may be called the "gaudium essendi".61 
Itis this mysterious joy which animates the martyrt s consecrative 
self~immolation which he sees as the baptism into a new life, an eternal 
life of communion in the plenitude of Being. Marcel believes that we tOOlf 
the "ordinary" people, can arrive at this joyous victory over death when 
we reach the "pleroma", the fulfilment of being t as the martyr reaches 
his "teleion". What has to be borne in mind t of course, is that the 
"pleroma" is not situated in this life as we know it. We shall be able 
to accede to this !Iother kingdom" provided we are disponible so that we 
constantly make ourselves more actively permeabl e' to "the Light by which 
we are in this world". This hope, he says, aims at using death in a posi-
tive sense to tear us from ourselves in order to better establish us in 
.62 Belng. In that way we can share in the martyr's joyous welcoming of 
death as the gateway to eternity, having merited immortality and salvation 
through a life-time of fidelity. 
La mort, apres la vie, ne sera-t-elle pas celle que nous 
avons meritee suivant que nous avons succombe a la mort 
dans la vie ou que nous en aurons au contraire triomphe? (6) 
Whatever the answer, apparently disponibilit6 is the criterion of our love. 
This is the basis of ,Arnaud Chartraints act of faith: "Par la mort, nous 
nous ouvrirons a ce dont nous avons vecu sur la terre."64 
Activating this joyous confidence in ultimate communion is love which 
gives hope its prophetic assurance of survival. 65 Marcel likens this love 
to a protective arch which enfolds us as a guarantee of our sustained 
fidelity in the name of the Fellowship of Being. This analogy is expressed 
by one of his characters, Antoine Sorgue (lfEmissaire), but may well be an 
echo of Marcelts own experience after the death of his mother: 
11 y a une chose que jtai decouverte apres la mort de mes 
parents, ctest que ce que nous appelons survivre en verite 
c'est sous-vivre 9 et ceux que nous ntavons pas cesse 
dtaimer avec le meilleur de nous-memes voici qufils devien-
nent comme une voute palpitantep invisible, mais pressen-
tie et meme effleuree, sous laquelle nous avan90ns 
toujours plus courbes t plus arraches Et nous-mernes, vers 
llinstant ou tout sera englouti dans Itamour. (66) 
Commenting on this passage (which is really an elaboration of a rather 
dubious linguistic juggle ... "~vivren becoming "~vivrel!), Marcel 
asserts that that significant Itinstant lt has nothing about it of the tempor-
al event .... quali ty evenementiel but that it ]s alreDdy sited in the beyond. 
(Mm'cel borrows rfs expression Itjenseitig ll • 67 ) Therein lies the 
secret of the transcendence of death a~ postulated by Marcel. It is a 
transcendence which, for him, necessarily involves the postulation of 
immortality through the medium of intcrsubjective fidelity, first estab-· 
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lished in our fidelity to God. We shall return to this notion in the con-
cluding section of this chapter. 
Death is seen, therefore, by Marcel, as the test of fidelity; true 
fidelity defies absence, particularly that of death, and triumphs over it~8 
Too often we appreciate the worth of those closest to us only after their 
death. 69 This admission serves to show up the lack of true fidelity but 
can still be the source and impetus of a change of heart, a "transformat-
ion" of the kind effected by Marie-Henriette Champel. One striking example 
of a character in one of Marcel's plays who comes to understand the dangers 
of judging too hastily is Edith Lechevallier in l'Insondable. She concludes, 
in one of those "flashes of inspiration" to which Marcel refers, that 
les vrais morts, .les seuls morts sont ceux que nous nfaimons 
plus. (70) 
As we have noted, love is the key to the mystery of death in Marcelts meta-
physics. It is also the key to immortality. His argument is that just as 
death cannot be thought of directly without encompassing my very being, 
neither can immortality. I can think of myself as immortal only insofar 
as I myself am the creation of an act of love. Love itself does not create 
the survival, it envelops its affirmation and negates the demand for mater-
ial verification. The more we rise to generous love , the more we approach 
a dyadic level (the I-thou tThou) relationship) where all control of veri-
fication is superseded and becomes superfluous. 
A partir du moment ou la survie est posee comme fait 
objectif elle devient une pure imagination qui ne 
releve plus de la metaphysique. (71) 
v. Faith and hope for resurrection and salvation 
Immortality depends on faith. It is faith inasmuch as faith is essent~ 
ially an act which refuses to be subordinated to any process of verificat-
ion. Marcel's difficulties in this area derive from the fact that we can-
not really pretend to describe the beyond or the after-life, because such 
is our existence that the beyond must remain in the beyond. This is the 
paradox: it is only on this condition that the beyond can become present 
and yet remain a mystery. Marcelfs ?olution is simple. He does not 
attempt to describe the beyond. But he raises the questions of resurrect-
ion and salvation. As with the matter of evil and suffering, his whole 
approach is unsati5factory in that it is incomplete because any problems 
and objections are brushed aside. Having mentioned resurrection, he does 
not make any definite stutcment on what will be its manner .... whether 
. bodily or disembodied resUtTection. lIe a~~~. for example, if death is not 
a "desincarnation,,72 and speaks of fidelity perpetuated in presence, and 
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cl that he finds the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice m9st revealing in 
th ' t' th t 't· 'd' t' f h' h 73 et' 1 ~s mat er ~n a ~ g~ves an ~n ~ca ~on 0 ~s approac • er a~n y 
if by that he means that his treatment is ever near and yet unattainable 
for want of explicitation, that it will disappear on closer ("face-to-
face") scrutiny, then Marcel has provided an apt allusion. 
(a) 
Beca~se the very idea of immortality goes far beyond that of survival, 
it is impossible, in the terms of Marcel1s presentation, not to go into 
theology properly so called, to appeal to God as a source of all light and 
revelation. lIIarcel, however, would claim that to attempt a study of immort ... 
ality is to pass from phenomenology to hyperphenomenology. One finds oneself 
committed well beyond a philosophy of presence as such. We are then at 
the very heart of Being itself, and the metaphysics of Being gives place 
to the higher theology of God. Our faith in personal immortality, which 
is linked to the act of our individual freedom positing it in the first 
place bears on the inseparable and ultimate union of God and our own inter-
subjective unity. This union is formed by beings who love one another and 
who live in and by one another. Is God capable of ignoring our love or 
even of decreeing its annihilation?74 The answer to this question, Marcel 
asserts, lies in the mystery of the redemption and of our salvation. This 
implies the doctrine of the Resurrection which involves the possibility of 
our own resurrection. 
Belief and hope in resurrection would seem inescapable for those whose 
eschatological consciousness has reached apocalyptic dimensions. Yet while 
we may well agree that our times are dangerous it is not necessary to 
belabour the perils and incitements to anguish and de,spair. On this score 
Marcel is guilty, even if he wishes to achieve his aim of shocking us into 
a spiritual perspective of life and its ultimate meaning. He does not, 
however, make the mistake of interpreting hope as an attitude which we 
have to adopt. We do not have to act as though we were hoping for all of 
us.
75 We do not have to make up for the deficiencies of those who do not 
believe or who do not see the need to rush into salvation. Neither hope 
nor faith is to be interpreted in a purely voluntarist sense o The funda-
mental datum is that of our freedom : it depends on us to make our own 
decision in respect of our attitude to and conduct of life. 
Freedom can, however, be enlightened by truth; in the context of death 
and immortality the import of the Resurrection, Marcel believes, can shed 
some light. It is what he calls the "spirit of truth" t. de vcrHe) 
which is to be placed above every other valllC because it animates them all. 
It is not an easily definable notion for that reason: it lies p Marcel 
says, at the root of any kind of definition ( or more accurately, he adds p 
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at the root of the requirement for total honesty). If anything, Marcel 
proposes, the spirit of truth is "a light seeking the Light",76 the Un-
created Light which is in effect Being. Since the more I move towards 
this Light the more I advance in faith, this Light is God whose Son de-
clared "I am the Light of the World". The Resurrection is the cardinal 
tenet of the Christian Faith; it is, therefore, from the Resurrection that 
we may appreciate the relevance of death and the hope for immortality. 
As a. practising Christian, Marcel believes in the Mystery of the 
Resurrection;77 as a philosopher he declares that he does not intend to 
proceed with any exposition of this mystery which, he considers, belongs 
78 properly to the domain of theology. The qUestion, however~ which he 
does not seem to consider is : if resurrection is' a matter for theology, 
to what extent is reason involved? Furthermore, just what is the signifi-
cance of Resurrection for us? Does Marcel propose that we,too, who share 
in the same being as God when he was incarnate in the person of Christ, 
will also share in the resurrection? He himself does not follow through 
this question to explain why he raised it in the first place. At the most 
he urges an investigation into the harmony between death and resurrection; 
but. he himself shies away from constructing anything like a philosophical 
prolegomenon to a metaphysics of resurrection. Such a project, he feels, 
can only be realized ,by a poet or a dramatist, preferably of humble origins, 
who has not read Hegel, Kierkegaard or Sartre, but who feels in his heart, 
thanks to a special grace, an urgent need to proclaim this harmony.79 It 
will be only at the dramatic level, he claims, that this harmony can be 
realized. 
This claim, of course, will have the grave disadvantage of being con-
demned as yet one more sUbjectivist attitude easily open to criticism and 
refutation. Perhaps he hopes that his humble dramatist will have at least 
read the plays of Gabriel Marcel in which the notion of intersubjective 
hope and continued f ideli ty is propounded in exemplif ication. For in spite 
of his respect for the impregnable rights of theology, Marcel does not 
hesitate to postulate that the ultimate aim of hope lies in salvation 
which implies the need for our resurrection. 80 
11 ne s~agit jamais tant de ma resurrection Et moi, personne 
singuliere, qui ne suis que trop fonde Et mettre en doute 
mes titres a une plrennite substantielle - que de notre 
resurrection, celle de tous les etres qui forment avec moi 
une constellation Et laquelle je ne puis en verite assigner 
de limites, sinon avec le genre humain, pure abstraction 
positiviste, du moins avec le Corps mystique. (81) 
But, for all the lyrical expression, Marcel has still not committed hims,elf 
to explaining just what he means by "our" resurrection, the form it will 
take, or if, since my resurrection is not so much in que!Stion, how our 
resurrected beings (whelher body-and·-·soul 01' spirit is not clear) will 
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retain their individuality. 
(b) Sal va tion. 
It is in such a communion of a mystical body, which is of the same 
order as the union of beings brought together in their plenitude, that 
Marcel believes that the peace of salvation is to be realized. 82 Access 
to the "other kingdom" is not to be found in any ilnguished Baudelairean 
flight irom the world of reillity, as Pascal Laumiere discovered,83 but 
by the passage through the gateway of death into the great "symphony" of 
beings. A reflection of the harmony of this transcendent symphony can 
be found, Marcel suggests, in our present life through interpersonal re-
lationships ("co-presences"). In this way, he adds, referring to the 
views of the Greek Fathers (in particular Saint Gregory of Nyssa), sal-
viltion can be better conceived as a way, a road, rather than a state. 84 
In a manner of speaking, it is a state - a state of being : the final 
achieved state of pleromil. 
To save others and thereby to save oneself is to die to oneself, it 
is to die to everything in this world. Yet, on the ontological level it 
is nevertheless sacrifice thilt is the positive counterbalance of the 
attitude of an "I" encumbered with self. Sacrifice, he explains, is both 
detachment and attachment (adhesion) to a higher mode of being, whereas 
the negative action of suicide is refusal and resignation (d~mission). 
Sacrifice, he says, is complete and utter attachment to the value of a 
higher reillity of being. Milrcel proposes that, by accepting absolute in-
security and even death, I may more easily embark on the road to that 
"other kingdom" where my hope will be fulfilled. 
Mes freres ont besoin de moi; il se peut fort bien que 
je ne puisse repondre a 1 tappel qu'ils m'adressent 
qu'en consentant a mourir. (85) 
If we try to hold fast to the palpable presence of the body in order to 
reach the soul, we are only showing how misguided is our appreciation of 
the mystery of being and in particular of the ontological communion. 
The last word, Marcel concludes not altogether helpfully, belongs to 
the saints. They are the perfect witnesses of Christ who attached them-
selves to the creative source of the world and could yet come to terms 
with the world through the divine perspective. 
Surtout le fait de la saintet€ rialis~e en certain~ €tres 
est l~ pour nous rcveler que ce que nous appclons l'ordre 
normal ntest aprt·s tout, d'un point de vue superieur, du 
point de vue d'unc ame enr(lcirtt!e dans le mystcre onto-
logique, que la subversion d'un ordre oppose. (86) 
Marcel's idea of the saint is somewhat coloured by idealism in that the 
saint appears to be more an abstraction titan a real person whose quality 
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of sainthood can be attained by anyone fully conscious of his ontological 
value. The saint would seem to be in a class of humanity superior to any 
other, if not beyond the reach of the ordinary mortal. Marcel does not 
really consider the saint as encompassed within the perspective of his 
dialectic : the saint has already attained the desired union in its high-
est possible human dimension. This is all very well, but the impression 
remains that the saint is a person apart - a super-person who does not 
belong to the same class as us. 87 
Death, then, is an encounter. As such it icncludes an appeal from the 
Transcendent Thou to whom we address our invocations through prayer on 
behalf of those whom we love. Marcel proclaim,s that immortality is the 
guaranteed and indefectible response of Him wJico wishes us to be reunited 
with Him and our loved ones in the pleromatic symphony of spirits, of co-
presences. Marcel's concluding remarks of his Gifford Lectures, which 
were supposed to be an investigation into the ~ystery of Being are rather 
vague and too lyrical to convey any worthwhile: message: 
A partir du moment ou nous nous rendor-cs nous-memes perme-
abIes a ces infiltrations de l'invisibI!.e, nous qui n'etions 
peut-etre au depart que des solistes iEexerces et pourtant 
pretentieux, nous tendons a devenir peu a peu les membres 
fraternels et emerveilles d'un orchest~e ou ceux que nous 
appelons indecemment les morts sont sans doute bien plus 
prt!S que nous de Celui dont il ne faut peut-etre pas dire 
quI il conduit la symphonie mais qu' il test la symphonie dans 
son unite profonde et intelligible, urre-Unite a laquelle 
nous ne pouvons esperer acceder qu' ins(ens iblement it travers 
des epreuves indiv iduell es dont I' ensemble ~ imprev is ible 
pour chacun de nous, est pourtant inseparable de sa vocation 
propre. (88) 
Conclusion 
Even at the end of his investigations int.o the meaning of Being, ~!arcel 
still evades a positive definition of Being. As Trethowan has noted, "M. 
Marcel ••• shows an almost morbid dislike of reaching definite conclusion~?1I 
While this may well be a "reaction against false abstractions and false 
general izat ions" which he alleges dist inguish ideal ism and to some extent 
neo-scholasticism, it is nevertheless an unsatisfactory lack of purpose from 
a philosopher who places so much emphasis on c'l',mmitment and reflection. 
Perhaps Marcel is reluctant to use phrases and formulae already adopted 
by thinkers, like Lavelle, Le Senne and Blondel, who have also considered 
the meaning of Being and have proceeded from reflection rather than from in-
duction or deduction to formulate some kind of conclusion. Marcel remains 
loath to commit himself with the result that he uses only vague terms like 
"symphony of Being" which may equally well be construed as abstractions. 
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Besides being inconsistent with regard to generalizations, which he 
freely makes, Marcel is inconsistent in his attitude to the separation of 
philosophy and theology. This feature of his work is evident in his treat-
ment of the questions concerning death'and immortality. He observes his 
own restrictions when it suits him to ignore certain problems associated 
with the matter of survival - of consciousness after death, of individual~ 
ity in eternity, of the person in resurrection. He seems to be begging 
the question by referring to the martyr and the saint as exemplars par ex-
cellence of beings who have somehow graduated well beyond the scope of 
Marcel fS metaphysics. He gives little really concrete guidance to the 
Hordinary mortals" (homines viatores, we might call them) to whom he claims 
his dialectic is addressed. 
His whole philosophy is based on his statement in Position et approches, 
the tl~eprint of his religious ontology, that life must have a meaning if 
it is not to be a IItale told by an idiot".90 Marcel is both a traditional-
ist in that he continues the themes familiar to the classical theologian-
philosophers and a contemporary in that he formulat.es his philosophy wi thin 
the framework of existentialism. His whole dialectic is the expression of 
an option: that life can find its meaning as "sacral" and as service91 , 
in opposition to the philosophies of fatalistic anguish"-'dread and absurd-
isme. This option has value only if it is grounded on the recognition of 
God as the Source of Being so that the notions of presence, fidelity, grace, 
prayer, immortality and salvation make sense, being properly couched in 
the context or religion to which they belong. 
The fundamental option is, on the ontological plane, to be or not to be. 
In terms of Marcel's dialectic this is translated into the option: to 
believe or not to believe in God. 92 If God indeed Being, this funda-
I 
mental option can be expressed as : to be, to participate in being "authent-
ically" so that we realize that our being is oriented towards pleromatic 
communion with God; or not to be, to refuse to recognize the meaning of 
life because there is no God, no Transcendent or Absolute Thou in whom 
eternity (the locus of perpetuated f ideli ty in presence) is guaranteed. 
This option is at the root of Marcel's dichotomy between "refus" and Itinvoc-
ation." 
By drawing together those texts indicated in the course of the thesis, 
we can shO\\ the connection bet.ween God and Being in Marcel t s dialectic. It 
may be argued thut there are not a great. many, hut to that possible ot'ject-
ion I would point out that Marcel is very wary of formulating any pronounce-
ments which can be construed as statements of a definitive position. Never-
theless, I claim, he has I1let sliptl sufficient material upon which to bc~se 
my thesis that God is so central in his ontology as to be identified with 
Be ing o 
Although Marcel stops "at the threshold,,93 of proclaiming that Being 
is God, he does say 
Au depart de toute creation, visible ou non, on decouvre 
la meme presence, et, ajouterai-je, la meme sommation de 
l'ame qu'il investit (94) 
(de) Celui que nous sommes tenus dtappeler le createur 
ou le pere, ou dans un langage plus metaphysique, a par-
tir de lletre irrepresentable et incaracterisable qui 
nous constitue comme existants. (95) 
If we are to find the answer to the primary ontological question, "What 
am 11", there is 
Necessite de partir de l'etre meme, de Itengagement envers 
Dieu. Acte de transcendance aveccontrepartie ontologique 
qui est la prise de Dieu sur nous. Et c'est par rapport cl 
cette prise que ma liberte meme s'ordonne et se d~finit. (96) 
Faith~ then, depends on the act of my individual freedom97 : 
La Foi elle-meme, l'assurance invincible fondee sur 
l'Etre meme. (98) 
Penser la foi, crest penser la foi en Dieu. (99) 
This is the basis of all intersubjective relationships; they have their 
origin and guarantee in Faith: 
Je dirais volontiers dogmatiquement que tout rapport 
d'etre a ~tre est personnel, et que le rapport entre 
Dieu et moi n'est rien s'il n'est pas rapport d'~tre 
a etre, ou a la rigueur de It~tre a soi. (100) 
(Ce que jtentrevois) 0 •• a la limite il existerait un 
engagement absolu qui serait contrscte par la totalit~ 
de moi--meme 0.0 et qui s'adresserait a la totalite de 
1 t~tre et serait pris en presence de cette tot.alite meme. 
crest la foie (101) 
This faith is ultimately expressed in hope for salvation in immortality, 
or the pleromatic communion of beings founded in God as Being. 
l 
Ltetre crest llattente comblee. (102) 
Nous aurons ~ nous retrouver et comme ~ nous rassembler 
dans le plerome qui est lr~tre et 00. nous avons a dire 
qulil est de toute eternite. (103) 
L'esperance archetype, crest l'espoir du salute (104) 
Uamour ne stadresse quta ce qui est eternel. (105) 
(L'amour est) a la fois un gage et une semence 
dtimmortalite o (106) 
Une metaphysique de Itamour ne peut que culminer dans 
une doctrine du Corps Mystique. (107) 
Certainly, from Marcelts discussion of immortality, we can only con-
clude that he does in fact identify God. with Being. Since f~.i~.!!: in God 
is primarily involved in the possible transcendence of death108 , hlarcelfs 
whole argument is based on the option that the individual chooses to 
believe in God. The question which remains unanswered is how is it pOS5~ 
ible for one who does not believe in God to arrive at a transcendence of 
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death? Evidently, for such a person - who is not necessarily an atheist 
nor an antitheist (he may, for example, adhere strictly to the Buddhist 
idea of Nirvana which does not take into account the personal, immortal 
soul) - the whole question of immortality may be meaningless and discuss-
ion upon it fruitless. Even if Marcel is not prepared to admit it, his 
philosophy is tinged with elitism and definitely theocentric - not just 
an "applied theocentrism". His basic dialectic is oriented towards 
transcendence which is vested in Transcendent Being. This Transcendent 
Being can only be God. 
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 
i. It was, in fact, in this connection (of death) that the English .... 
speaking philosophical community first came into personal contact with 
the French thinker. Unfortunately, a lack of acquaintance with his 
peculiar style of self-examination and his non-idealist presentation 
led to a misapprehension of his address on the sinister possibilities 
in mants obsession with the thought of death. These factors did not 
make for a happy encounter. Marcel recalls, with some amusement, how 
on that occasion the members of the prestigious Oxford Philosophical 
Society condemned his attitude as reprehensible and shameful. In his 
defence ~ Marcel points out that his hearers overlooked the fact that 
he was not rendering a value judgment but only enunciating the poss~ 
ibil ity that one t 5 situation could conceivably involve inescapable 
despair (DH 188, Schg 59; cf. EPC 114). 
20 Marcel himself has likened life to a lottery : I am handed a ticket, 
which is in effect my death sentence, on which the dat.e, place and 
manner of my death are left blaru( (EPC 210~212, ST 182). This ineluct-
able process of dying, common to all finite creatures, is set in motion 
from birth so that, as'Rilke has expressed it, our life and death keep 
pace with each other in growth and maturity (R.M. Rilke, Die Aufzeich-
!lungen des Malte Laurids Brigge, Zlirichp 1948 11 pp. 1.3-14) • 
.30 PI 650 cf" ST 208 : HTriomphe du Mal - triomphe de la Mort ... 
triomphe du Desespoir : ce sont en verite les modalites diverses dtune 
possibilit€ unique et redoutable qui s~inscrit a Ithorison de ItHomo 
Viator, de 1 t homme acheminant sur cet te voie tres etroite qui est la 
sienne, le "chemin de cr~tell entre les gouffres." 
4Q Heidegger himself recognizes this : "Das Sein zum Tode ist wesen-
schaft Angst'! (Sein und Zeit .... originally published in Jahrbuch fUr 
Philosophie und phtlnomenologische Forschung, VIII, pp. 1-438, Halle, 
'1927 ::-pp. 265 ... 266, ~oted HV 332. Marcel is only too aware of the in-
adequacies of language, especially in translating from the original. 
In ST 175~81, repeated in Schg 61, he attempts a 1 tic analysis 
of Heideggerfs terminology as represented by IIEin existenzielles Sein 
zum Tode II( SZ 245 Fr) ~ flGcnzheit 11 (SZ 233.~25!~, 372·~373), and IIFreiheH 
zum Todell(SZ 266, 309 H 311p 326'''327). Of the first he notes that the 
preposition flZU It cunnot be ade~ately translated into French, either 
by "pourtl (which connotes a practical purpose or condemnation) or by 
tlversll (which presupposes a verb of motion, which "etre!l is not). 
Heide s tlGa.nzheitlt cannot be equated with Marcelfs tlPl~r$me!l. The 
Heideggerian expression is ambiguous, according to Marcel; it implies 
the notion of COlrpletion (HcompI6tu,deH as Mar-cel calls it) which could 
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finish at death whereas Marcel's "plGrome" belongs to the "other king-
dom tl or, presuambly, eternity (cf. Chapter 4, fn 1). As will be seen in 
the continuing script, Marcel runs into difficulties on the score of 
death as an "event" or not. Again, "Freiheit zum Tode" is charged with 
ambiguity, he says, for the same reason as "Sein zum Tode"; the prepos-
ition "zu" would seem to denote "destined for". Marcel's own views of 
the role of freedom is considered shortly, in section iii of this first 
part of the chapter. For Marcel, death does not change the interior 
completeness as implied by Heidegger. Rather,death can be considered a 
termination only when viewed from the "outside tl , when I detach myself 
from my body. J.M. Demske summarises Heidegger1s dialectic as follows: 
"The being of Dasein turns out to be concern, the meaning of which con-
sists in the three-dimensional structured temporality. The concrete 
expressions of the three time dimensions are death (future), guilt (past), 
and situation (present), all of which are to be understood existentially 
and ontologically. Death as the existential of totality, the extreme 
and all-embracing power .... to-be of Dasein, represents tne fullness of the 
entire structure, so that it contains the full implications of the fini-
tude of Dasein" (Being, Man & Death, p. 179). 
5. PI 65, 58. 
6. Frederick Copleston, Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 205-206 : "The 
death of someone who is dear to someone who is dear to me may obviously 
affect me deeply; but preoccupation with my own death naturally tends to 
appear to me as something disordered, something "morbid~ as a derelict-
ion of duty, a withdrawal from society and a retreat from the proper dis-
charge of my social function. oD As a member of society, I look on fini-
tude and death in a social perspective •• o The existentialist, it seems to 
me, changes or tries to change the perspective in which we see certain 
facts of which we are already aware. He directs my attention to limits 
which are normally marginal to my consciousness and focuses my gaze on 
my finitude s on my limitations, on my death as the extinction of my poss-
ibilities. co He .0 tries to make me focus my attention on the fundament-
al existential situation of the human individual as such, a free finite 
being, condemned p as it were, to .act in the world and to commit himself 
in the world, and then to perish." 
70 PACMO 79. cL EA I 115, 119-120, 137-138, 148-149, 154-155, PI 152, 
8. 
280 (l'Insondable). For Christians and for those who believe in an after-
life, the game of life is no less a waiting game. "Our time is a time of 
waiting; waiting is its special destiny. Time itself is waiting, waiting 
not for another time, but for that which is eternal" (P. Tillich, The 
Shaking of the Foundations, 154). 
D • 0 who was now his step-mother, although Marcel has never referred 
to her as such. 
9. DH 43, PE 113, PI 133, 182, ST 41, 186. The only plays ih which 
death does not feature prominently (apart frore his comedies) are 
le Palals de sable, le Coeur des autres, Croissez et multipliez and 
la Prune et la prunelle. cf. Appendix 2, IV. 
10. ~!arcel wondered, for example. if dreams could be a sort of rehearsal 
for the "interior transmigration" to which he thought of reducing death. 
Moreover, he says, the dream may become spontaneously prophetical at a 
certain depth when the sleeper passes into a consciousness of another 
type, on another scale, and participates in its life, without entering 
in to communica t ion with it (JM 248). 
11 • ME II 147. 
12. ~!E I 11/~. 
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-
13. EA I129. cf. EPC 257-258, DH 187. This is a Romantic view, later 
espoused by Sartre and his followers, and is expressed succinctly by 
Byron : 
"At last men came to set me free; 
I ask'd not why, and reck'd not where; 
It was at length the same to me, 
Fetter'd or fetterless to be, 
1 learnfd to love despair." 
~ George Cordon, Lord Byron, The Prisoner of Chillon, lines 370-374, 
(from Byron's Poetical Works, vol •. Ill, London, Murray, 1879). The em-
phases are mine. cf. the expression of Eustache Soreau : "J t aspire au 
sordide comme a une delivrance lf (le Dard 106). 
14. PI 73. 
15. See above, fn 4 of this chapter. 
16. Schg 60. cf. ST 73 .... 74. 
17. Schg 62, 67. This phrase is not particularly satisfactory. What 
:'Iarcel seems to be saying is that, in order to understand the mystery of 
death, we need to be aware of the relationship between myself and my 
body. 
18. ST 184. 
19. EA I 12. cf. JM 199. Marcel notes that in trying to think of "my" 
death, he is breaking the rules of the (philosophical) game. To consider 
my body as a mechanism is to consider it as an instrument for my use or 
disposal. This attitude would justify suicide, murder, and such forms 
of homicide as abortion and euthanasia (cf. PACMO 48, HV 116, 136-137). 
As has been noted in Chapter 1 (p.23), in MarceIfs dialectic I am my 
body; it is not even just the instrument for my soul. Any notion of 
death as the destruction of the body as a receptive instrument of messages 
involves the negation of a life which is only maintained through the 
interchange of messages. 
20. Schg 57. 
21. JM 235-236. Here we run up against the li.ngering conception of the 
body as instrument. Beings who are insensitive to one another could not 
communicate, but they are not necessarily dead. Death is not the cess-
ation or "suppression" of feelings but a transformation in the of 
feeling. The instrumen,tal mediation of the body in the dimens of 
knowl and awareness of one! s situation as being-in-the-world is nec-
essary for what Marcel called at first "sympathetic mediation". This 
sympathetic mediation is apparently the means of intercommunication 
between kindred spirits as souls, that is as the essence of their indi-
vidual be The notion of "sympathetic mediation" evolved into that· 
of "presence fl • 
22. J. Middleton Murry, Not as the Scribes: lay sermons (London, SCM, 
1959), 174. cf. JM 245. 
23. See above, fn 21 of this chapter. 
Yr, But see his further comments on resurrection, pp. 181, 191-192. 
25. Death appears to involve absence, loss and suffering, if it is con-
sidered naturalist ically and from the standpoint of "having". But within 
the positive metaphysical structure, Marcel suggests, dea.th is seen as 
the great test of presence, fidelity, hope and love. Because he points 
out that a phenomenolo consideration of death as absolute is a 
denial of of the possibility of looking beyond the immediate, Marcel 
wonders if such a representation of death is compatible with a hyper-
phenomenological po iUon of immodality which, while including such 
quasi-theological concepts as grace, is yet possible in the philosophical 
context (PI 39-40, Schg ; et'. EPe 121-123). 
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26. FP 82-83. cr. FP 84- : "Pour la foi la mort n' est pas. 10 Mort, 
ou est ta victoire?" See Chapter 4, fn 63. 
27. JM 40 (Chapter 4, p. 109). 
28. EPC 120. 
29. JM 202. cr. JM 177, ME II 46, ST 95. See Chapter 1, p. 27. 
30. I John 4 : 8, EA I 99. See Chapter 5, p. 160. cf. P. Tillich 
"Death is given.power over everything finite t but death is given no 
power over love. Love is stronger. It creat-es something new out of 
the destruction caused by death" (The New Being, London, SCM, 1963, 
pp. 173-174. 
31. EA I 115. cf. PACMO 70. 
32. EA I 111 n. Emphasis mine to show the connection, in Marcelts 
view, of immortality and religious belief. 
33. EA I 112 n. While we may infer that the identification of soul as 
belonging to the level of being is an admission of the place of God in 
Marcel's ontologYt we must point out that Marcel is really playing with 
words - as existentialist thinkers seem to do .... when he speaks of "loss" 
and "perdition" (perte and perdi tion). 
34. EA I 113 n. 
35. He asserts that his attitude to his own death becomes more intell-
igible when he considers his attitude to the death of others t particu-
larly of those he loves (Schg 62). This is another way of expressing 
his proposed option. It was this attitude, which he presented at the 
1937 International Philosophical Congress in Paris, which led to what 
he styles as ttl a controverse breve mais profondement significative 1t 
between himself and Leon Brunschvicg. The latter accused Marcel (very 
courteously) of laying much more stress on the fact of his own death 
than Brunschvicg would put on his. Marcel replied that the correct 
setting of the question was different: it is the death of the beloved 
which preoccupies Marcel. cr. HV 194, EPe 227-228, ME II 152, PI 182, 
ST 190-191, Schg 67-68. 
36. MdD 161, quoted HV 194 and ME II 154. The character in question, 
Jeanne Framont is, however, not expressing herself with quite the 
motive which Marcel sees as the ttcorrect" one. Jeanne is referring to 
her husband whom she wishes to retain, like a possession, against the 
fear that he will surely die if he returns to the battlefront. See 
Appendix 2, IV, pp. 232, 235. 
37. EA I 1 21 • cr. HCH 54, ME II 149. 
38. PI 59-60. 
39. PI 62-63,. cr. PI 68-69,131,151-152, PACMO 79. See Appendix.2, IV, 
for examples of pseudo-f ideli ty from Marcel l s theatre, pp. 235-237. 
40. cf. Chapter 1, p. 15. 
41. PACMO 79-81, Schg 63-64. The passage quoted is from PACMO 80-81. 
42. See above, pp. 174-175, 177-178. 
43. Le Fanal 39-40. 
44. Le Fanal 62. 
45. SC 175. For a fuller treatment of this play, see Chapter 5, pp. 
148-149. Werner Schnee, in le Dard, promises the same abiding 
pre sence to sus tain Beutrice--Tkli£d 117-1-18). 
46. PI 152. 
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47. MTNPLV 154. cf. HdD 140-141. In Un Homme de Dieu Claude reveals, 
also regretfully, to Osmonde that he is not her father. The contrast 
in the reactions of the two girls is that while Marie-Henriette is 
drawn closer to her father, Osmonde eventually rejects Claude. See 
Appendix 2, 1. 
48. MTNPLV 178-179. Shortly after, he says of the world: "Les person-
nages eux-memes se disloquent: voici le temps des phantasmesl! (181). 
We are reminded (by Marcel) of a phrase from Gerhardt Hauptmannfs work, 
l\1ichael Kramer : "Death, the most merciful form of life. fI This phrase, 
quo ted in Rilke r s S tundenbuch (19 Dec. 1900); is ci ted al so by Marcel, 
HV 293. Champel would appear to be presented by Marcel as the type-
character rather similar to Besme in Claudelts La Ville and more famil-
iar as the hero in the works of Camus, in particular. cf. PACMO 52, 
EPe 257, HV 347-369, ST 83. 
49. MTNPLV 193. Marie ... Henriette resembles Sylvie Ferrier in her sympa .... 
thetic attitude to her father (ltEmissaire, SdI 166, see Appendix 2, 
III A). Like Simon Bernauer (Se) and Pascal Laumiere (RPR), she too 
will shortly be rewarded by being given a light to enlighten her on the 
way to true fidelity. 
50. MTNPLV 198. 
51. MTNPLV 216. 
52. Lflconoclaste 46. For the character of Aline, see Chapter 5, Po146. 
and Appendix 2, IV. 
53. EA I 97-98, 101,135, 161, EPe 121. 
54. ME I 180-182. cf. st Paul, I Corinthians 4 : 10, HdD 138. Our 
lives should be creative if we are to make use of our freedom but, 
Marcel argues, .no life is really creative except to the degree that it 
is consecrated. It is from this consecration that the gift of one's 
life can be truly possible since the gift itself realizes one more step 
on the way to consecration (PI 37; cf. Chapter 1, po 20). In this way, 
for example, religious life of its consecrated nature is a continuous, 
life-long martyrdom and in this respect martyrdom assumes its primal 
meaning of witness. But the authentic being; whether consecrated to 
religious life or not, is no less a witness; he bears testimony to the 
ontological communion and so is consecrated to Being, to God. The con-
secrated people, Marcel affirms, are the most available because the 
consecrated person has renounced himself (EA I 154, 158) in the inter-
ests of another, or of a cause, or of God. 
55. Saint Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis, I, iv (PG 8, 1227) 
A I'" t, ,.. .. , .... , J:.' , 
56 .. 
57 .. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
61. 
62. 
UT~xa TE~ELWaLV TO ~ap~up~OV xaf\OU~EV. OUX uTL TEAor ~ p (11 e ", e '( .." t ":> 
"COU tJ ~OU 0 av pumoC; Ef\a EV, Wc;, aAO vn:o ~ aAA eT L TEAE !,OV' 
1/ " , EpyOV cxyo:;n;l1C; EVEOE Ll;aTO. 
cf. ME II 50-51 where Marcel considers the notions of the theologians 
concerning perfection and of the "ancients" concerning the nature of 
'tt-AE ~ov as distinct. It would seem that he is not familiar with 
Clement!s lIexistential ll interpretation as given. 
EPC 1 21 • 
EA I 155. 
PI 38. 
RPR 22. 
ME II 178, JM 230. cf. EA II 74-75. 
ST 73. cf. Schg 39. 
EPe 259. 
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63. PI 105. 
64. Les Coeurs avides 151. 
65. See Chapter 5, p. 161. 
66. SdI 269. 
67. S T 190. 
68. EPe 228. cf. PI 105 (fn 63 above). Besides the examples of 
Werner Schnee, Simon Bernauer and others already noted of hope in 
abiding presence, compare that of Stella Chartrain in les Coeurs 
avides. While she does not have the strong faith of her brother 
Arnaud who has God watching over him (92) ... and who appears indiffer-
ent to those who do not have a divine protector - she nevertheless 
needs the assurance of a like protection and believes that her step-
mother, Eveline, has been sent by her (Stellats) mother. "Eveline, 
j1aj He sure que ctetait maman qui me t'envoyait. Je me suis crue 
gardee ••• Je pense que je ne peux vivre si je n'ai pas le sentiment 
quion veille sur mol. Pas Dieu; je ne suis pas comme Arnaud" (les 
Coeurs avides 91-92). ---
69. cf. Pascal Laumiere in Rome n'est plus dans Rome who confesses 
"Ciest terrible, Esther, cette lumiere qui ne nous eclaire sur les 
Hres que lorsqut ils sont morts" (RPR 126). We may take from Script-
ure the example of the Apostles who did not really know Christ until 
after his Ascension when they were infused with the Spirit of Wisdom. 
70. PI 228. See Appendix 2, IV, p. 234. cf. I John 3 : 14, "We know 
that we have passed out of death into life, because we love our 
brothers. He who does not love remains in death." 
71. FP 85. cf. FP 84-88, Schg 70. 
72. JM 235-236. See above, fn 21 of this chapter. Marcel seems to 
imply that he, at least, believes in "life after death" when he says, 
somewhat enigmatically, "00. si pour des motifs dlordre au fond reli-
gieux, ou plutot en lesquels slexprime une religion retournee, j'en 
viens a proclamer qu'il nly a pas de vie apres la mort, je serai 
presque fatalement amene a deprecier ou a devaloriser une existence 
qui debouche sur le non-sens absolu de la dissolution" (EPC 144-145). 
But he does not give any indication of what kind this after-life will 
be. 
73. PI 35, 132, Schg 70. cf. JM 132 ... 133. 
74-. ME II 156. cf. FP 82-84. 
75. ME II 173. 
76c ME II 178, RV 194, "Some Reflections on Existentialism" in Philo-
sophy Today, vol. 8,4/4, (1964). 
77. In a letter, dated 2 June 1951, to Troisfontaines (cited TM II 300), 
Marcel affirms : "Le fait de la Resurrection de Notre-Seigneur conserve 
pour moi une primaute absolue. De tout moi-meme, je mtassocie a la 
parole de St Paul: 'si le Christ n'est pas ressuscite notre foi est 
vaine'. Jlai horreur de toutes les tentatives qui ont pu gtre faites 
du c6te d'un certain protestantisme, d'ailleurs degrade et infidele a 
ses origines, pour amenager un christianisme ob la R6surrection ne 
serai t plus que symbole. c~ est·-a·-dire fonction." cf. RPR 43. Trois~' 
fontaines goes on to mention that Marcel had ~Ioted Schelling in an 
article on "Jugement par ItHistoire et Jugcment sur l:Histoire" to 
assert that the promise of resurrection is the soul of history (which 
latter term has nothing in common with that used by the Hegelians). 
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78. The Resurrection is more than a symbol of hope, it is the guarantee 
of our hope and at the same time dissipates man's natural fear of death. 
(Even Christ in Gethsemane was overwhelmed by natural fear.) Our fear 
of death is a heritage of sin which has entered the world (cf. ME 11 
182). We fear, not so much because we have to die as because we deserve 
to die. Yet there is a correlation between sin and salvation; it is 
through the consciousness of sin opening out upon that of a necessary 
Recourse, that salvation is possible. This we can realize when we 
become aware that our condition as sinners binds us together in a commun-
ion of appeal to the Absolute Thou (PI 85, 87.). 
79. TR 93-94. See Chapter 1, p. 15. 
80. "Structure de l'Esperancel1, loco cit., 80 : "11 n'y a d'esperance 
qu 1 en la surrection; en meme temps que la resurrection ne peut etre 
donne qu ten esperance." 
M. Pontifex and I. Trethowan, 
See Chapter 1 , p. 18. 
See Chapter 1 , pp. 18-20. 
See Chapter 4, pP. 104-106. 
PACMO 63. See Chapter 2, p. 56. 
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100. JM 137. See Chapter 4, p. 125. cL ME II 20. See Chapter 1, 
fn 124, p. 40. 
101- EA I 55. See Chapter 5, p. 143. 
102. J~f 202. cf. JM 177. See above in the present chapter, p. 180. 
103. DH 121. See Chapter 5, p. 161. 
104. EA I 99. See Chapter 5, p. 161. 
105. JM 63. See Chapter 5, p. 160. 
106. HV 200. See Chapter 1 , p. 25. 
107. HCH 141. See Chapter 5, p. 164. 
108. See above in the present chapter, p. 190. 
CONCLUSION 
La th~orie de la participation a If@tre dont 
nous avons reconnus des ~lements importants 
chez Royce et qui se precisera chez W. 
Hocking permet de depasser les alternatives 
que nous venons de definir en ce qufell e 
storiente vers la rupture definitive avec 
des categories inadequates a Ifobjet propre 
de la metaphysique et vers une interpretat-
ion moins systematique, mais plus fidele et 
plus profonde de la vie spirituelle: une 
philosophie de ce type, renon9ant a exiger 
du reel des garanties qui se changent inevi ... 
tablement en contraintes, tend a reconnaitre 
expressement un ordre de la liberte et de 
llamour ou les rapports dletre a @tre, loin 
de s'integrer en un systeme rationnel unique 
qui apres tout ne sera jarnais qu'une nature, 
demeureraient les expressions dtindividuali-
tes solidaires et distinct'es qui participent 
aDieu dans la me sure m~me 00 elles croient 
en lui. 
- G. MARCEL, La Metaphysique de Royce, 22}-224. 
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In final analysis, Gabriel Marcel1s whole thought is to be understood 
as having its axis in a renewed "applied theocentrism ll • It is on this 
score that his general metaphysics is seen to be oriented towards the 
recognition and affirmation of God. His dialectic is based on principles 
similar to those which were used as criteria by the Christian pre-Renaiss-
ance thinkers. Marcel defends the alleged "ridiculous anthropocentric 
attitude" of Augustine, Aquinas and Bonaventure, for example, as being 
precisely an "applied theocentrism" which is, in' his view, of greater 
ontological value than what he describes as the modern dehumanized tlanthro-
1 pocentrism" of tlapplied technolatryll. At least for those earlier, Christ-
ian, thi~(ers God alone is the centre towards which all thought and knowl-
edge is to be directed. The theocentrism in Marcel's thought is based on 
the identification of Being as the Power of Creativity. There is also the 
fundamental recognition by the "authentic" existent of his status as 
creature, an awareness which presupposes the affirmation of a Creator. 
Creation, it has been observed, is the touchstone of medieval metaphys-
ics 2, and the same criterion can be applied to Marcel1s contemporary meta-
physics. One of his more recent commentators, Widmer, has expressed 
reservations about a lacuna, as he sees it, in Marcel's affirmation of God. 
This, Widmer claims, is that uMarcel n'arrive pas suffisamment a €tabli'r 
la cr€ation sur le plan de la raison.,,3 Widmer has grounds for this object-
ion if, by establishing creation on the plane of reason, he means a ration-
al exposition of God's creative influence on the universe and all things 
in it which have being and existence. But Widmer seems to forget that any 
kind of 1I0bjective" presentation of a Divine Cause after the mode of the 
traditional philosopher-theologians is foreign to Marcelfs adopted manner 
of thi~ing. A lack of schematic orderliness in a philosopher may well be 
a deficiency but, in Marcel's case at least, it does not follow that he is 
any less intelligible in what he means by creation. Marcel does recognize, 
at least implicitly, the truth of Creation: 
La connaissance d'un ~tre individuel n!est pas separable 
de l'acte d1amour ou de charite par lequel cet ~tre est 
pose dans ce qui le constitue comme creature unique, ou 
si lion veut, comme image de Dieu. (4) 
Tout ce qu10n peut se proposer, c'est peut-etre en der-
ni~re analyse d'~veiller chez l'autre la conscience de 
ce qulil est, disons pour preciser, de sa filiation 
divine, lui apprendre ~ se reconnaitre comme enfant de 
Dieu h. travel's }tamour qui lu1 est te'moigne. (5) 
Llamour de l'~tre ne rr€sente-t-il pas toujours un carac-
t~rc r~v6rentiel? N'est-ce pas l'amour du cr~€ en lant 
qu I expression vo iH~e ou que gnge de la presence du crea-
teur? (G) 
The whole notion of creation as it affects man in his tripartite relation-
ship (with self, others, God) is essentially integral to Marcel's whole 
concept of the being-becoming of man. 
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Creativi ty (man's participation in creation) is the mainspring of 
Marcel's metaphysics of being. Not only must life be dynamic but also 
thought must be creative if it is not to lapse into abstraction for 
want of IIvital tension".7 We have already noted Marcel's important 
statement that as soon as there is creation~ in whatever degree, we are 
in the realm of being so that we cannot really talk of "being" except 
where creation (and therefore, we infer, the Cr~ator) is involved. 8 
It is on this premiss that his argument for a "positive" option with 
regard to life is based. It is, he claims~ in the eternal source of 
creation that we shall discover a sense of a certain fundamental rever-
ence towards life. This recognition of not ®nly the meaningfulness of 
life but of its "sacral" character derives f'Jrom an affirmation 
qui va bien au-del~ de toutes les ma,dalites empiriques 
et objectivement discernobles de la vie, (et qui) peut 
non seulement conferer son sens pleruier, mais apposer 
le sceau de l'eternite ~ l'acte de creation perpe'tu-
ellement renouvele. (9) 
It is, Marcel affirms, only through a theocentric perspective that we 
may discover the "sacral" qualities of life" particularly those of con-
secration and service. 10 If instead we treat life, not as a gift, but 
as a power to be controlled, Marcel warns that we can too easily succumb 
to a pessimistic, and hence desacralized, attitude to our life and 
11 
existence. It is not a question of power, but of love. The key to 
the questions of suffering and evil, of perpetuated fidelity after death 
is love. Marcel concludes that man IS ult imate seIf-fulf ilment will only 
be completed in the plenitude of being whicb is itself the ground and 
locus of our relationships with God. 12 This realization (in both the 
cognitive and volitional senses of the word) can only be effected with 
the freely accorded recognition of God as the Source of the uni ty, 
community, and continuity of our interpersonal (i.e. intersubjective) 
love. 
The whole presentation of Marcel's ontology can 'therefore be rendered 
intelligible as existential theism. We have by now established that the 
place of God is central in Marcel1s thought; his whole dialectic of 
creative participation is "une theocentrisme applique". We can likewise 
conclude that God must be identifiable with Being, as both terms are 
understood by Marcel. This does not mean, however, that God-Being is to 
be construed as a "theoretical construct". )\Tarcel is not interested in 
answering the question "What i God like?" But while he may claim that 
he has no time for any doctrine of analogy attribution he does in 
fact postulate nn "analogy of presentiality" and use::: the terms ItAbsol-
1-
ute Thou!! and "Absolute Recourse" in speak of God.) At bes t we mLlY 
say tlmt Yarcel prefers not to get lost in a proliferation of attributes. 
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As far as Gabriel Marcel js concerned, God is a very personal God; God is 
the Absolute Thou who is ever-present to those who choose to believe in 
Him. 
Marcel would probably deny vehemently that, he is advancing anything 
like an "existential ontological argument" for God's "existence". But it 
does seem that, from his insistence on man's recognition of self as 
creature "made in the image of God" and from his phenomenological descript-
ions of the relations of the "I" and the "thou" as mirroring the relations 
of the "I" and the "(Absolute) Thou", Marcel's approach could be construed 
as a variation of the cosmological argument for the reality of God. 
The necessary precondition to the adoption of Marcel's metaphysical 
option is faith. It is only in the light of faith, the recognition and 
acknowledgment of God as Creator, and as the Absolute Thou who is the 
cement of all intersubjective relations, that Marcel's interpretation of 
ontology makes sense. Metaphysics, for Marcel, begins with the recognition 
of mystery in being;14 it leads, not to the solution of mystery, but to 
the awareness of the transcendental orientation of participative man and 
therefore of Transcendent Being. Faith, then, is at the root of Marcel's 
dialectic; despite his convoluted reasoning about the interconnection of 
freedom-grace-disponibilite, the fundamental option is revealed as the 
choice to believe or not to believe. 
This, then, is the desired result of "conversion" as stipulated by 
Marcel. But, despite his avowal that this "conversion" is of a philosoph-
ical kind,15 it can only be understood as both intelligible and efficacious 
within a religious context. Certainly, on the initial level, Marcel advoc-
ates a "conversion" from egocentrism to availability, from the "closed" 
attitudes of the self (mo~) and of primary reflection (pensee pensee) to 
the "openness" of intersubjectivity ("I-thou" relationship) and secondary 
reflection (pens€e pensante). But, in the light of the religious element 
in Marcel's thought, this conversion must be seen as the first step, the 
"fore-shadowing" as it were, to that religious conversion which was his 
own experience. Mention has been made of the rather excessive religious 
element in Marcel's writings, and how Marcel recognizes that, from a Christ-
, t d 't h' h'l h' I 't' , f I 16 I lan s an pOln, IS p 1 osop lca proposl Ions are more meanIng u • n 
reality, however, the conversion which Marcel would like to see effected 
in his readers is a conversion to his way of t,hinking. But since he recog-
nizes freedom as the fundamental existential value, he realizes that his 
way may not be acceptable lo all. AccordingJy, his dialectic is tainted 
occasionally by a measure of elitism and tllis is particularly noticeable 
17 In his key term of presenc~ upon which depends his "prescntial analogy" 
of the reality of God. 
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Gabriel Marcel has much of value to say about man's existential situ-
ation. He provides valuable insights into the ways and means of improving 
man's self-knowledge and his relations with his fellow-existents. But we 
have to conclude that, when he addresses himself to the important matter 
of man1s relations with God, whom he places at the centre of his meta-
physics, he attempts to "wed" philosophy and theology, and satisfies the 
requirements of neither. He holds his place as an important "philosopher 
of existence" but he is not a success as a "religious philosopher" or as 
a "philosophical theologian", 
FOOTNOTES TO THE CONCLUSION 
1. EA 11 18. Furthermore, in Marcel's view, Kant's nCopernican revolut-
ion" in philosophy degenerated for many into an anthropocentrism where 
pride dominates and reason is not counterbalanced by the theocentric 
affirmation. Apropos Kant, we may observe that, while Marcel seems to 
base his rejection of Anselm's "ontological argument'l on Kant's criticism, 
he himself became dissatisfied at an early stage with Kant's "transcend-
ental idealism" (cf. JM 207). Nevertheless, he seems to have accepted 
the Kantian position as a starting-point for his investigations into 
man's degree and scope of apperception. However, on the other hand, he 
does not follow Kant too closely. For example, he does not accept 
Kant's distinction between phenorr.enon and "noumenon" (Ding-an-sich). 
cL JM 315-316, ME II 155. Rather, Marcel appears to agree with Heid-
egger, who is more explicit, in his interpretation of "phenomenon". 
Heidegger (Sein und Zeit, loco cit., 27-31) does not accept Kant's inter-
preta tion of phenomenon in the sense of appearance contrasted with the 
thing-in-itself; he understands phenomenon in the original Greek sense 
of something coming into view, showing itself, and emerging into the 
light. cf. ME I 103. We may say that Marcel preferred to elaborate 
his own "concrete" philosophy of a "realist" type, leaving the adaptat-
ion of Kantian transcendental idealism to Joseph Marechal whose first 
volume of Le point de depart de la metaphysique (1927) heralded what 
was to become "transcendental Thomism
" 
,-anyway. 
2. W.E. Carlo, op. cit., 18, 81. 
3. Ch. Widmer, Gabriel Marcel et le thEisme existentiel, 228. 
4. HV 28. He adds immediately: "cette expression emprunb~e au langage 
reli eux est sans doute celle qui traduit le plus exactement la verite 
que j I ai en vue en ce moment" (IIV 28--29). cf. EPC 222 : "Le rapport a 
Dieu, la posjtion de la transcendance divine permettent seuls de penser 
l' individualite; ceci veut dire non pas ::;eulement que l'individu se 
r~alise lui-m&me comme individu en se po::;ant comme ture, mais 
encore que, par la mediation du croyant, ccux-Ia Iilemes qui restent domi-
nes par ce que Cl;udel-;-;I~I;;;-le l-;-;;-;pr{t de la terre peuvent graduelle-
men t assumer peut-etre une indivi dual i te. 11 (Emphasis mine.) cr. also 
EPe 173, 178. 180. ME II 1'j 9, HCH 54, TM II 46. 
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5. HV 211. Marcel adds : "De ce point de vue je serais assez tente de 
dire que, contrairement a ce quIa proclame Kierkegaard, il existe 
probablement une ma!i.eutique chr~tienne, mais don: l'essence est bien 
entendu tres differente de celle que presente une ma!i.eutique plato-
nicienne : clest en traitant l'autre comme enfant de Dieu que je peux, 
me semble-t-il, a la limite, eveiller en lui la conscience de sa filia-
tion divine. Mais en r~alite je ne lui donne rien, je ne lui apporte 
rien; je me borne a reporter sur cette creature qui originellement 
ignore sa vraie nature, et il 11 ignore meme d'autant plus qu'elle se 
compla1t plus vaniteusement en elle-meme, - et cette adoration dont 
Dieu evoque dans sa Vie est l'objet unique" (HV 211-212). cf. Schg 48. 
6. ~IE I 84. For references in the script to man! s ontological status 
as creature, see Chapter 1, pp. 12, 20, 29; Chapter 2, pp. 43, 51; 
Chapter 4, p. 107; Chapter 5, p. 140. 
7. Ms XV (1912-1913), quoted by L.A. Blain, art. cit., loco cit., 187. 
8. EA I 88, Foreword to Gallagher's work, xiii. See Chapter 1, p. 27 
and fn 120 (Geiger's objection), pp. 39-40. 
9. HV 124. Closely associated with this renewal of the appreciation of 
the "sacral" element of life is its "authentic" response (by the individ-
ual, of course) in commitment by what Marcel calls the "voeu createur". 
This "voeu", as has been noted (Chapter 5, pp. 145, 158), is carnally 
rooted in the eternity of God and is animated by a strong hope for ultim-
ate realization in "l'unite supraconsciente et suprahistorique de tous 
en tous - cette unite en laquelle seule la creation peut trouver son 
sens plenier" (HV 159-160). cf. "Theism and Personal Relationships", 
1 oc 0 ci t., 35-42 and EPC 249-250 where Marcel notes that the ground of 
our fidelity is based on a certain appeal delivered from the depths of 
our own insufficiency to the "highest" (ad summam altitudinem) - who, 
we can only infer, is God. This appeal, which is characterized by 
humilitY9 is an act of hope whereby I extend an infinite credit to God 
as Absolute Thou. Our fidelity is not so much based on a distinct 
apprehension of God as someone other; it is the highest level of the 
I-thou relationships. 
10. Schg 49, EA I 23. 
11. EPC 155. 
12. "Theism and Person Relationships", loco cit., 37-42. cf. PI 89 : 
"Dieu etant le lieu d'une communion infinie." 
13. For comments on the possibility of God as a "theoretical construct", 
see J. Richmond, Theology and Metaphysics, pp. 147-148; on "analogy of 
at tribution", see E.L. Mascall, The Openness of Being, p. 33; for 
Marcel I s "analogy of presentiality", see pp. 81-84, 91-92; for refer-
ences to God as "Absolute Thou" see pp. 11,24,52,60,81,86,87,89, 
94,112,115,119,143,145,158-159. 
14. The recognition of mystery against problem in philosophical enquiry 
is involved in Marcel's option of "meaningfulness" against "absurdisme". 
Perhaps he would agree with Daly!s pronouncement: "The true alternative 
is not mystery or clarity, but mystery or absurdity" (C.B. Daly, "~!eta­
physics and theLimits of Langua.ge" in Prospect for Metaphysics, ed. 
I. Ramsey, London, 1961, p. 204). 
15. See Chapter 1, p. 19 and Chapter 2, pp. 46-47. 
16. EPC 121+-125. Hc adds that while the recognition of the ontological 
mystery does not of necessity imply the adherence to any religious per-
suasion, "une telle philosopllie (of the "concrete") se port.e ••• dlun 
mouvement irresistible ~ la rencontre d'une lumi~re qu'elle pressent et 
dont ell e subi t au fond de soi la stimulation secrete et COllUlle la 
brGlure prevenante" (PAC~IO 91)0 His own preference is marked when he 
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asserts that the l'concrete" response of the authentic existent is accept-
ance, because the a-religious man is "un homme de refus ll (BCH 196), The 
reI man, he who "accepts", can yet retain his inviolable freedom 
and will be led, Marcel suggests, to realize that he belongs to God who 
is his Absolute Thou and Indefectible Resort. God is not to be consid-
ered as a Power in the sense of Efficient Cause but as Freedom address-
Himself to the existent as freedom. IlNon seulement," Marcel 
flTu es liberte, mais Tu me veux, Tu me suscites moi aussi comme 
Tu m1appelles ~ me creer, Tu es cet appel meme. Et si je me refuse a 
lui, crest-a.-dire Et Toi, si je m'obstine Et d'eclarer que je ntappartiens 
quIa moi-meme, clest pour autant comme je me murais; ctest comme si je 
m1attachais a etrangler de mes mains cette realite au nom de laquelle 
je crois Te resisterl! (EPC 155). That passage, by itself, is an indic-
ation of the theocentrism evident in Marcel. But for all its lyrical 
quality and strong personal belief, it can hardly be called a philosoph-
ical affirmation which can pass unchallenged by other philosophers. It 
is on account of that, and the bland quasi-theological, semi-mystical 
statements of its kind, that I present my conclusion.in the final para-
graph (P. 209). 
17. See Chapter 4, fn 23, p. 129. cf. Chapter 1, pp. 15,34 (fn 55); 
Chapter 2; p. 50, Chapter 3, pp. 84, 92; Chapter 4, p. 110; Chapter 6, 
p. 184. 
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APPENDIX 1 
MARCEL, 
AQUINAS AND AUGUSTINE 
For all the speculative mysticism imputed to him by Etienne Gilson1 , 
Gabriel Marcel strives to restrict his activity to philosophy. But his 
avowed determination not to transgress into a domain (theology) where he 
claims no competence can only remain an ideal. Reality dictates other-
wise if his dialectic is to be so closely associated with the tenets of 
Christian belief. Marcel hopes to distinguish ·the r~les of the philo-
sopher and theologian in much the same way as the great medieval think~ 
el's. We have already concluded that his attempt proGuces an unsatisfact-
ory compromise. Marcel, however, considers that his philosophy is 
situated at a juncture of Aristotle and Plato. 2 In the course of the 
thesis occasional reference has been made to interesting parallels in his 
thought and that of bot.h AQuinas and Au.gustine who may be taken as the 
Christian "interpreters" of Arist.otle and Plato, respectively. 
A. ~Iarcel anc'. Aquinas 
Hoc nomen, qui est, •• 0 est maxime proprium nomen Dei. 
Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. 
Unde cum esse Dei sit ipsa ejus essentia, et hoc nulli 
alii conveniat, me.nifestum est. quod inter alia nomina 
hoc maxime proprie nominat Deum. (3) 
Marcel de Corte4 instances as Marcel t s tlChristian Arist.otelianism": 
1) his studies of the body-soul relationship, 2) his refusal to identify 
reception and passivity, 3) his renunciation of any arbitrary cleavage 
beb\een the "vital" and the" intellectual", 4) "I' inal terable conf iance 
dans la vie con~ue non point comme un agent naturel, mais comme une 
" .. d bl t d' . . . ,,5 economle Inson a e e IVIne en son prlnClpe , 5) his wonderment 
before "bein Gl6 to , and 6) his refu.sal to substit.ute the idea for the reQJ.~ 
the abstract for the concrete. But, faced with this catalogue, we should 
not immediately declare any secret affinity of ~larcel and Aquinaso The 
French thinker's dismiSf';QI of Aqui lli:l~; I S prime concept of divine causali ty 
should be sufficient to discourage such a notion of complete harmony. 
21.3 
Marcel
' 
s realism is more Aristotelian than Thomist. 7 While he agrees that 
thought is made for being, and that the jud6~ent of existence is the most 
properly metaphysical judgment, he nevertheless wonders whether intell ect 
should not be considered as a mode of being. 
Marcel will not subscribe to the Thomist principle of self-identity 
unless Being is distinguishable from the Anaximandrian &.TI:E ~pOV • But if 
u 
the aTIE LpOV is unthinkable, and Marcel holds that it is, the principle 
of identity is inapplicable : it ceases to apply once thought itself can no 
8 longer work. Marcel suggests that, if the principle of identity is to be 
made compatible with the identity of Being, there is the possibility for it 
to be made t.he principle of a finite (ioe. determinate) world. There can 
still be the possibility of a transcendent thought which "overleaps" the 
finite world and is ther~fore not subject to the principle of identity. A 
second possibility would be to deny the first and admit that there is no 
thought except in the finite order; the indeterminate and the infinite 
would then be identified as one. A third po ity would be to refuse 
the second and separate the infinite and the indeterminate so as to affirm 
the existence of an absolute structure which would be at the same time an 
absolute life; and this could be identified as the ens realissimum. This 
last solution, Marcel claims~ is that adopted by the Thomists. He rejects 
their hypothesis since, as Kant has shown to Marcelts satisfaction, exist-
ence (and therefore Being) cannot be considered as a structure; it cannot be 
a predicate. 9 
Al thou Marcel disagrees with the Thomists on this matter of the prin-
ciple of identity, there are other areas in which the thinking of Marcel 
and Aquinas seems to converge. 
(1) 
Men tion has already been made of Marcel! s preference for !!ontological 
revelation tl10 which appears to stem from the same source as "theological" 
revelation. argues that revelation was morally necessary in order 
that man! s mir.d might be raised to higher flights of apperception than man· 
could attain by his own reason. Revelation accelerates man! s awareness of 
God, but it can be received only in the context of finite realities. 
Marcel appears to follow Kant who says that our knowl of all ideals is 
a priori, not prior in time to our knowledge of the real but a precondition 
of ouI' ability to ascribe to the actual such characters as good and bad. 
AGuinas affirms that when Illan makes his first choice in favour of the good 
11 he turns to God. There is, then, a connection between revelation and 
grace in that the first deliberate act of the will, the first of the moral 
life, in a "positive" (.i.e. IIgood ll ) sense is steeped in the mystery of 
grace. Marcel agrees, for speakinl'; of the n<:.f~.ve act, the choice for sin, 
he says 
-11 semble qu'il soit de Itessence du peche de ne pouvoir 
€tre que revele, ctest-a-dire au fond de nrapparaitre 
qut~ la lumi'ere de la grflce. (12) 
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God who reveals himself implicitly to the man of good will (he who is dis-
ponible) - who as yet cannot name God'" does not oblige him, but draws him 
to himself. ~larcel agrees wi th Aquinas, therefore, when he asserts that 
we are drawn towards the Light. 13 
In theological terms, the revelation of God occurs in encounter through 
a medium capable of acting as an intermediary between God and mankind. The 
medium serves to point to what is beyond; God is hidden in the very media 
which reveal him. Christian theologians belong to two schools of thought 
concerning revelation. The one holds to the mystical view : that God is 
known immediately, that his existence and activity can be known only by a 
spiritual insight (granted by divine revelation). The other stands by the 
rationalistic view as propounded by Aquinas : that the knowledge of God is 
inferential through analogy, that the knowledge of God is not intuitive. 
Marcel himself is wary of both yet appears to use each. He endeavours 
to synthesize those aspects and elements of each which can be acceptable, 
in his view, to philosophy. Divine revelation (which is the sense in 
which the word IIrevelationlt is to be understood in this context) seems to 
be beyond the competence of philosophy, bearing as it does on theology. 
Revelation, and the miraculous element which is its correlative, implies a 
suspension of nature, which is the "suppression" of the dualism of matter 
and interpretation according to the order of nature. 14 Revelation, Marcel 
continues, is of the order of grace: it manifests itself only in the 
light of grace because it transcends the immediate awareness that we may 
have of it.15 i\larcel r s interpretation of the meaning of revelation is 
eschatological in character, 
that shall be revealed in uslt. 
ling Saint Pe.uPs hope for lithe glory 
Je me demande o •• si la revelation ne porte pas essentielle~ 
ment sur mon insertion dans une communaute infinie, ou 
encore sur ma dependance par rapport a Dieu,ce qui revient 
au m@me, Dieu ~tant le lieu d1une communaute infinie. (16) 
The ul timate revelation, then, will be the pler-omatic communion 'of Being 
to which ~larcel t s philosophy tends and he aspires. 17 
Through his comments on participation in being as an approach to God -
apart from faith itself - Marcel's dialectic has certajn -affinities with 
the gist of what Aquinas has to say about tile human intcl1ect9 gn:1cc s 
participation, and the primacy of Being. It is useful for' our purposes to 
consider their corresponding statements. 
Aquinas says: nIt is impossible for any created intellect to see the 
essence of God by its own natural power. For knowledge is regulated 
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according as the thing known is in the knower. Hence the knowledge of 
every knower is ruled according to the mode of its own nature. If there ... 
fore the mode of being of a given thing exceeds the mode of the knower, it 
must follow that the knowledge of that thing is above the nature of the 
knower. Now the mode of being of things is manifold. For some things have 
being only in this one individual matter, such are all bodies. There are 
other beings whose natures are themselves subsisting, not residing in 
matter at all, which, however, are not their own "being, but receive it 
and these are the incorporeal beings called angels. But to God alone does 
it belong to be his own subsistent being ••• It follows, therefore, that to 
know self-subsistent being (ipsum esse sUbsistens) is natural to the 
divine intellect alone, and that it is beyond the power of any created 
intellect; for no creature is its own being (~), since its being is 
participated. Therefore, a created intellect cannot see the existence of 
God unless God by his grace unites himself to the created intellect, as an 
object mc~de intelligible to it. !!18 
For his part, Gabriel Marcel had at first considered that if the way to 
GOG is by faith and love, and if God is objectively unverifiable, there 
would appear to be an opposition between knowledge and love, so that faith 
is a mystery beyond the level of primary reflection. 
Nous avons vu que Dieu est au .... dela meme de Itessence, ce 
qui revient a dire qu'il nVy a pas a la rigueur de nature 
divine; mais alors nlen faisons-nous pes un indetermine? 
~tre, n! est-ce pas etre quelque chose? ••• Je crois qui il 
faut reconnaltre ce qui est absolument vrai chez Plotin : 
Ifidee de Dieu n'est veritablement pour nous qulen tant 
que nous participons a lui. Seulement il importe de trans-
poser dans llordre de ltesprit, dans llordre subjectif 
tout ce qui subsiste chez Plotin dtemanatisme objectif. (19) 
Faith, according to Marcel, is not an act by which we approximate to a 
judgment of existence; only if it transcends human knowledge can faith 
justify itself. 20 During his early enquiries Marcel was unwilling to 
ascribe existence to God because as yet he had not differentiated between 
existence and objectivity. To credit God with tehce would be to 
reduce him to an object. Even after he had found his solution to the 
antinomy of existence and objectivity, Marcel nevertheless maintains his 
opposition. There is more to being than existence; God does not so much 
exist, God is. 
Just as before his !!conversion!! to a reeJist and "concrete!! philosoJ::hy, 
so after his religious conversion, faith remains, for Marcel, the only 
thinkable link between Gori and his creation. 
La seule liaison (~'il soit possible de pens er entre Dieu 
et le monde ne s'etablit que dans la fol et. par dIe, c'est-
~-dire qu1elle r~side dans la m[diution perpetuelle du 
croyant. Mals ne faisons-nous pas dependre la realite 
divine de ltacte qui le pense? J)icu ne slepuise-t-il pas 
dans les affirmations subjectives qui semblent P engendrer? 
Ceci est important, et il faut y insister. Ltesprit, avone-
nous dit, ne se crte comme esprit que par la fei en Dieu. 
Mais cette foi en Dieu se ram~ne a Paffirmation qu'il est 
lui~lJd~me condi tionne par Dieu, Cl est ... fi-dire '8. 11 affirmation 
de la paternite divine. C2 est-a-dire que Itesprit pose 
Dieu comme 1 e posant. (21 ) 
(Hi) Freedom. 
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A further interesting exercise is to compare what Aquinas and Marcel 
say about freedom, potentiality and being. It would appear that Marcel 
has concentrated so much on Aquinas r s principl e of causali ty that he has 
eHher misunderstood the import of these insights basic to Aquinas, or, 
fearing any form of abstraction consequent on systematization, declined 
to be "snared" by Thomist reasoning. For Marcel, mants freedom is re-
ceived. and at the same time is determined by the self, since man is a being 
who shares in reality and is according to his mode of self-determination. 
Marcel t s notion of freedom is closely connected with his notion of being: 
his philosophy is one of both being and freedom. It is man I s freedom and 
his use of it which determines his "becoming", his self··creation. Both 
being and freedom are creative. In this context we can appreciate how 
Marcel's notion of being-becoming is corr.patibl e wi th the Thomist notion of 
potentiality. Man! s powers are his potential and as such need to be activ-
ated. While Aquinas says expressly that essence is !!that through which 
22 
the ~ has~!! ,he none the less asserts that esse gives rise to 
eseence
23
, that being is denominated by ~24, and that every essence is 
25 
actualized by its esse. 
B. Marcel and Augustine 
O D . d . ? E t d . . t 26 -eus, qul vocarlS. s vocor lXl. 
In style ~Iarcel is more closely related to Saint Augustine : the meta-
h . 1 . f th' - 1 . 1 27 P YSICc enqulry 0 bo lS dla oglca in character. There are, besides, 
areas of close agreement in their thought. 
28 Mention has already been made of Marcel's view that there is a posi-
tive value in existential uneasiness its leavening effect on the soul 
leads to conversion so that the soul may find its true centre in ontolog-
ical communion. Marcel claims kinship with Augustine on this score and 
recognizes that a. similar restle~,sness has animated his own life and philo--
I · 1 . 29 SO}; 11 CB. enqU.lry. " Marcel accommodates the contemporary existential prin-
ciple of !Ianguish" within a religious context by proclaiming that uncesi-
ness is salutary when it reveal s the need fOl' closer dependence on Him in 
whom the restless soul f jnds its peace even if it must first pass through 
"the dark night of the soul". 
On pourrait dire que l'inquietude n1est pas seulement 
inevitable mais quI elle est proprement salutaire, en ce 
qu'elle correspond a l'impatience de :Pame croyante qui, 
parce qu'elle vit encore dans l'obscurite de la foi, 
souffre df~tre encore priv6e de la Vision. (30) 
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Marcel mayor may not have been influence€l!by Augustine's "proof from 
within". But he does linger over the phrase Il'self-consciousness" in a 
slightly different context, that of the mind IS; .ap·perception of being. We 
may state firmly that Augustine?s metaphysics (Of personal and "religious" 
experience, originating from the indubitable nmture of self-consciousness 
is remarkably similar to Marce! I s approach. /{.recording to August ine, the 
immediate self··consciousness envelops more tham the self. I know that I am, 
but from common knowledge I also know that onc~ I was noi. 31 This, says 
Augustine, leads to my consciousness of status; as creature, of having been 
created, and therefore my self-consciousness imcludes an immediate appre-
hension of the Creator. My self-consciousness is also consciousness of God. 
This is not, however, pure ontologism for the starting-point is conscious-
ness of self. l1In order to know God, tI AugusLii;ne advises, "do not go outside 
yourself, but return into yourself. The dwelling-place of truth is in the 
inner man. And if you discover your own natur,e as subject to change, then 
go beyond that change. Press on, therefore, tlOwards the source from which 
the light of reason itself is kindled. ,,32 
In his metaphysics of being Marcel, like }!.1lgustine, is in no way a Neo-
Platonist. The Neo-Platonists place the One or the Good above Being. For 
Augustine God is the limit, God is Being and B€ing is God. While Marcel 
may consider the Platonic 'to OVTWC; QV as fit reasonably adequate approx-
imation of the ontological import of Bein~3, be does not follow Plato or 
his followers in interpreting Being as subordinate to any Idea or Good. 
Like Gregory of Nyssa, Marcel adapts Platols idea of the possible ascent of 
man to the Form of the Beautiful. Whereas Plato used the analogy of a 
ladder, Marcel adopts the Cappadocian Gregory's notion of a three-tiered 
participation.34 The element of Platonism in Mercel is not as marked as it 
is in Augustine. For example, Marcel does not attempt to interpret every-
thing, like creation, in terms of Greek philosophy. MarcePs notion of 
supra-temporal fidelity cannot be construed a5 an off-shoot of the Platonic 
theory of immortality. Marce! aff irms that U~~e real core of the person as 
participating in intersubjective communion is indestructible; but he is not 
saying that the soul is someth which will perpetuated. He repudiates 
any attempt to objectify either the individuu.0 or Being. He declares that 
it is impossible to love a person "authentica 
perishable value of the loved one. 
without affirming the im-
It is not so much, then, a matter of how P'latonist Mal'cel is, as of deter-
mining to what extent his thought is sympatheic to thnt of Augustine. 
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hlarcel would no doubt have agreed with Augustine's understanding of "essence!! 
had not the word been given a different "coloration!! by Aquinas. For August-
ine, "essentia!! was a 
... 35 the Greek ova LCX • 
G 'l 36, b 1 son IS ased on a 
Latinized neologism which does not exactly translate 
The charge of Platonism levelled at Augustine by 
Thomist interpretation. According to that interpret-
ation, Marcel's notion of Being could be considered as Platonic as August-
ine's. But nobody has accused Marcel of Neo-Platonism on that score. 
Marcel's affinity with Augustine can be seen in their appreciation of 
the Biblical self-identification of God. In introducing himself to mankind 
(through the intermediary of Moses) as JHVH, God does not add any predicat-
ive adjectives. He identif ies himself solely in terms of unqual if ied Being. 
Any predicative attributes, in Augustinets view, follow from the initial 
fact of his being. 37 Marcel' s complaint that classical ontology - wi th 
reference to God - has been devitalized by static attributes has already 
been indicated. But whereas Augustine's metaphysics centres on God who is 
Being, on God who is Is38 , Marcel is reluctant to proclaim that the identity 
of Being with God (as he understands the terms) can be taken for granted. 
It is, after all, always possible to reach a philosophical conception of 
Being which does not satisfy the believer, or which is even incompatible 
with what the believer means by God. 39 Both Being and God are dynamic 
notions; where there is being there is creativity, God is characterized by 
creation. Marcel tries to sidestep the issue by concentrating on the exist-
ential implications rather than on an academic issue. If we are to seek the 
Eternal Presence of God, he tells us, it will be not so much by philosoph-
izing about the nature of Being or of God, as in our own creative, lived 
relations with others. It is through the analogy of our loving communion 
in being that we can come to appreciate the unity in the Trinity of God. 
On this matter of participation, Marcel is close to Augustine. Both 
hold that to participate in being is to possess esse (being) by receiving 
it (from God).40 Thus Marcel repeats that we receive our being, our life, 
our existence. On this point he agrees also with Aquinas : participation 
meE:ns to have esse without being it, a claim which is exclusive to God. 
For Marcel, the nature of existence is the clue to the nature of being. 
The more my existence participates in that of others, the closer it comes 
to Being and the more I am. The more I restrict myself in the "crispation" 
of egocentrism the less I am.41 
One important area in which Marcel does not follow Augustine is the 
question of evil and suffering, Augustine's at tempt at theodicy verges on 
predestination. His argumellt is based on the Pauline exegesis of the Fall 
as related in Genesis.42 Marccl's attitude towards theodicy in general, 
and his own "solution!! by converting the problem of evil and suffering into 
mystery has already been discussed. 43 
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Finally, however, Marcel would seem to agree with Augustine that philo-
sophy, being the love of wisdom, is ultimately oriented towards God. As far 
as Augustine is concerned, the "true l1 philosopher is a lover of God;44- for 
Marcel, wisdom appears at least as a tributary to an action of the Holy 
Spirit. He claims that this sense of wisdom has permeated his thought not 
only since his religious conversion but before it as well. For those who do 
not prefer such a theological expression as "Holy Spirit", he suggests -
once again not altogether helpfully -
de puissances spirituelles qui ne se trouvent point 
placees dans l' orbite du monde humain. (45) 
The Wise Man is not a lay transposition of the Saint. Marcel berates such 
an attitude as derisory because, in his view, holiness is not a possession 
but a special grace which must be constantly safeguarded.. Arising from the 
awareness of our absolute insecurity, wisdom is coupled with humility and 
It ,. t b .. 't t . " ,,46 0 . t se presen e len mOlns comme un e a que comme une Vlsee. ne ~s no 
wise, he declares, but one tends to become wise47 , attaining complete wisdom 
only in ultimate union with Wisdom. It would appeal', then, that Marcel is 
reinforcing the accusation that his language is emotive and poetical, his 
content religious. He describes wisdom in the contemporary situation as 
"tragic", and it is in this negative sense he gives the word that he differs 
from Augustine's sense of joyful peace. Yet Marcel holds out the hope that 
an appreciation of wisdom as IItragic" can safeguard the meaning of life (as 
he sees it) and help prevent man from yielding to a "technological" brand 
of idolatry.48 
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX 1 
1. E. Gilson, "Un exemple", loco cit., 8, Marcel1s "mysticism" is at 
least not of a negative kind. He avoids the close affinity, as he sees 
it, of nihilism (represented by Sartre) and negative mysticism. Nihilism, 
he explains, holds that there is no transcendent Being to which man can 
be related 5 while negative mysticism envisages the individual being as 
engulfed in the reality of transcendent Being. Marcel, however, insists 
that the real core of the person, while participating in intersubjectivity, 
is indissoluble and indestructible. 
2. "Au fond, c'est a la jonction d1Aristote et de Platon que ma pensee 
tend, je crois, et slarticule, cette jonction qu'on risque de ne plus 
voir si on s'hypnotise sur des donnees strictement terminologiquesi! 
(Letter to M. de Carte, 29 Sept.ember 1948). De Corte cOfrmcnts, "Taus 
Ies grands philosophes se situcnt au point de jonction de Platon et 
dtAdstote ll (Introd,-:.£!ion, PACillO 39). 
3. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Th~ologia!., I~ q. xiii, a. xi, responsio. 
4. M. de Carte, Introduction, PAcm 40-43. 
HV 156. 
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, 6. HV 91 ~ EPC 76"'77. 
70 cf. Ch. Widmer, OPe cit., 121. 
8. EA I 32-}}. 
9. EA I 38-45. cf. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. ii, 
a. 1 resp. : "Dico ergo quod haec propositio
,l Deus est, quantum in se 
est, per se nota est; quia praedicatum est idem cum subjecto." Never-
theless, as has been considered (Chapter 1, pp. 17, 27, Chapter}, p. 
83; cf. EA I 152), to say "Being is" is , by itself, unsatisfactory and 
inadequate; it is complete. Similarly, to say "God is" does not really 
help us any further in our enquiries. 
iO. See Chapter }, pp. 8}-84. 
11. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, tom. }., De Veritate, 
qo xxiv, a. 12, ad 2m; ibid., tom. 1., De Mal~9 q. v, a. 2. 
12. PI 89. cf. J. Maritain (on Aquinas), Neuf le ons sur les notions 
premieres de la philosophie morale (colI. "Cours et documents", 1951 , 
123, 127. 
13. cf. ~lE II 178. Exampl es from Marcel's plays are S imon Bernauer 
(Chapter 5, pp. 148-149) and Pascal Laumiere (Appendix 2, III B, Pp. 
229-2}1 ). 
14. JM 79. He adds: "Negativement la revelation n' est que l' interpre-
tEltion supprimee. La n[velation est par essence ce qui ne peut ~tre 
reflechi (dissoci€), et le probleme du monde se ramene en derniere ana-
lyse au probleme de la revelation." 
15. PI 89. 
16. ibid. And he adds, "De ce point de vue, la conscience, braquee sur 
elle-meme et peut-etre se voulant comme close, serait dressee contre la 
revelation. It (cf. Chapter }, p. 84). The reason for his reluctance to 
rely on the unverifiable phenomena of revelation may be due to the in-
fluence of Royce. Royce postulates the "paradox" of revelation. The 
paradox arises, Royce claims, at the point where we see that the criter-
ia by which we evaluate or judge the disclosure must be supplied by the 
disclosure itself. 
17. ME II 188. cf. HCH 199, and "Theism and Personal Relationships", 
loco ciL, 42 : "There is ••• every reason to believe that Revelation 
is the crowning of an immense cosmic travail which at one and the same 
time calls it forth and implies it as its internal source. I should 
therefore reach the conclusion that if Theism is considered in the 
abstract and in terms of objectivity, the question of personal relation-
ships will in the end prove insoluble; yet, on the contrary, the elements 
of a solution will be all the more numerous and illuminating if Theism 
is considered in the only light possible, the light of Revelation." 
18. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theo~ogiae, I, q. xii, a. 4. W.E. Carlo, 
OPe ciL, -110, notes that contemporary Scholastics still use "essence" 
and esse as counters in a system of multiplication which serves to dis-
tinguish God from creatures as Unity from plurality, the One and the 
many, rather than Infinite Being from finite being. This latter dis-
tinction, he claims, was Aquinas's own notion: "These are not their esse 
but are 'composed' of essence and esse. It is because creatures are --
composite we can distinguish from the-perfect simplicity of Ipsum esse 
.?~Jbsis.10~.'" It would appear that ~larcel understands "css~-i~-y 
louch in the same way as that alleged by Carlo of the Nco-Scholastics. 
Such an interpretation based on theirs would explain Marcelts antipathy 
to "philosophies founded on essences alone". "Pour dire le fond de ma 
pcnsee, j e pense cl' une part que la. personne n! es t pas et ne peut pas 
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chateau de cartes" (EPC 174). 
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APPENDIX 2 
MORE DETAILED RESUMES 
OF SOME OF MARCEL'S PLAYS WHICH ILLUSTRATE 
PHILOSOPHICAL INSIGHTS PRESENTED IN THE THESIS 
1. The Primary O~ological Question ("What am I?") 
Mon th6~tre est le th~fttre de l'ame en exil, de 
lf ame qui souffre du manque de communion avec 
elle-rneme et avec les autres. Le mensonge int€-
rieur y joue un role preponderant. (1 ) 
Un Homme de Dieu. 
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In his theatre Gabriel Marcel provides many examples of characters in 
search of their identity who, through asking "What/am I?", are forced to 
reconsider themselves in the light of the ambigui ty of existence. One of 
the early plays which studies possible reactions to this primary ontolog-
ical question is Un Homme de Dieu (written in 1922). The protagonists are 
Claude Lemoyne, a Protestant pastor, and Edmee, ~is righteous wife. By 
questioning the motives of their actions in the not-forgotten past, they 
are shocked out of their complacency and come to realize that they Can 
neither judge each other nor be sure even of themselves. 
Edmee, who had been unfaithful to her husband more than twenty years 
before the action takes place, discovers that Claude had, at the time, 
divulged to his mother the secret of her affair which ,he had sworn to keep 
after forgiv her. While she accuses him of self-interest and rejects 
his forgiveness as "cheap", Edmee does not escape the nemesis of the past. 
She is led to suspect her own motives by her former lover, Michel Sandier. 
This man, who unexpectedly returns, is suffering from an incurable disease. 
His last wish is to see his child Osmonde who has been brought up as 
Claude's natural daughter. Sandier charges Edmee with mauvaise....!?i in not 
2 
accepting her responsibllities but instead counting on Claude's pardon. 
For his part, Claude if) revealed to himseJf as a Cornelian E.~I2~:!.:eu_:::: 
gone awry. lIe had used his pardoning of Edmee as a palliative for his own 
interior tension at that tilIle and as a means for practising charity. Now, 
naively, he had interpreted Sandier's projected visit us a further trial 
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from whicb he would emerge further strengthened.') He proves to be a 
when, clinging in desperation to any straw to bolster his 
wavering self-justification, he resorts to a lie. He tells Osmonde of 
her real parentage but claims that he has only discovered this truth him-
self. By this deception he hopes to retain her esteem and divert the 
blame on But Claude is not to escape : truth must out, and Osmonde 
abandons him, running away with tithe man upstairs". 
Claude is left to doubt himself. Faced with 'his earlier conduct, he 
now doubts his status as husband and even his manhood. (He has learnt 
neither to hate nor to 10ve. 4 ) Finally, he doubts his vocation. In desper-
aUon he turns for reassurance that he is at least a "man of God" first to 
his brother (a doctor), but receives only a professional view, then to his 
mother. But she misunderstands his anguish; her efforts to assuage it 
serve only to aggravate his condition. His formation in the ministry, he 
realizes, had been mechanical, his style of life "tout fait", patterned on 
the tradition of his forefathers. He is no more than a religious function-
ary, albeit zealous and conscientious but devoid of authentic significance. 
Tt:.ere is no solution to the play, but only the public esteem of his 
congregation - who judge by externals ... as a salve to the tragic catharsis? 
"What am I?1t remains the only metaphysical protlem which may induce des-
pairing anguish if there is no religion or supreme Recourse to whom to 
6 
appeal. At least, in this respect, Claude does have that one plank. His 
final words, IlEtre connu tel quton estll, are addressed as an appeal to the 
One who does know us as we really are. 7 It all depends, therefore, on 
faith - not in a someone but in a You (toi)- in the Absolute Thou, if we 
are to be saved from a meaningless existence. 
Que suis-je, moi qui questionne, dans ce monde ou en 
dehors de lui? En ce sens il faudra dire que l'esprit 
philosophique est celui qui en pr~sence du donne 
eprouve une sorte d f impo,tience qui peut devenir anxiete. (8) 
We lOa.y note that the true "man of God" is t.he saint whose quality of saint-
liness is not to be felt as an unnatural or out.rageous anomaly by a weak 
humanity. Saintliness, Marcel hopes, will arouse certain echoes in our own 
hearts and stimulate us, too, to hope. For the saint is 
l!intercesseur aupres de Celui que nul progres de la 
technique et de la connaissance et de ce qu'on appelle 
la lOoralite ne rapprochera jamais de qui llimplore 
du fond de sa chambre de torture. (9) 
II. Towards Ontological Communion 
Plus mon existence affecte un caract~re inclusif, plus 
IYintervalle qui la separe de l'etre tend a se-retrecir, 
en d1autres termes plus je suis. (10) 
Cette communion universelle elle-meme ne peut se sus-
pendre qu'au Toi absolu. (11) 
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Disappointed when the young man on whom she had set her heart entered 
a Benedictine monastery, Christiane had married Laurent Chesnay who has at 
least an assured career in the world. But from the outset it would appear 
that they are incompatible. Christiane, still suffering from her wounded 
heart, has been frigid to Laurent's first advances and, having no faith, 
has abandoned herself to ing solace in the diversions of the social 
scene. For his part, Laurent has retired into the shell of a solitude of 
his own making, reali that Christianets attitude towards him is more 
dictated from a sense of duty than inspired by love. But Christiane, 
while being worldly, is not flighty. She is acutely aware that her world, 
at least, is broken. In a Marcellian metaphor, she compares it to a broken 
watch, intact according to external appearances but whose internal mechan-
, 1ft' 12 lsm no onger unc 10ns. 
She tries to draw Laurent back to her by offering to make various sac-
rifices; she humbles herself, ask his pardon for not having reciprocated 
his love at the outset of their marriage. Laurent, however, is too pre-
occupied with his carefully nurtured suffering ego ,(moi. Preferring to 
remain obstinately indisponible, he does not heed her appeal. There has 
been no cOITnf.union, not even on a physical plane. In frustration Cr.ristiane 
cries, "Le silence de notre vie m'accable. 1113 Her husband is unmoved. She 
does achieve some success in defrosting Laurent, but it is through the sub-
terfuge of "confessing tl to having an affair with an expatriate Russian 
musician, the boorish Antonov. This !trevelation" gives the somewhat maso-
chistic Laurent some satisfaction in that he can, with more justification, 
play the part of the cuckolded husband who none the less forgives his wife 
out of the greatness of his soul. 14 
But Christiane is still no nearer to her husband. His assumed pity, 
she has to admit, is just another facet of his self-love. 15 She is on the 
point of making her lie a reality by giving herself to the younger, seduct-
ive Gilbert. She is impelled to take this step all the more so after she 
receives the crushing news of the prenmture death of Dom hlaurice whom, as 
Jacques Decroy, she had loved unbeknown to him. Yet it is precisely at 
this point where there seems no alternative to her despair that she is 
saved through the intervention of grace. This is not the irresistible grace 
of the Jansenists, but that which we are free to accept or refuse. Chris-
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tiane is able to accept it for, although without religious faith as yet, 
she is already disposed to open herself to its operations by first open-
ing herself to her husband, even if he is still unresponsive. The key, 
therefore, to the possible fructification of grace in the soul is dispon-
ibilit~, the ready availability of one's being to welcome such infusions. 
The occasion for this invitation to the Ilinvisible world" which counter-
balances our IIbroken world" is, in Christianets case, the unexpected vi t 
of Genevieve, the sister of the late and lamented Dom Maurice. 
Genevi~ve tells the astonished Christiane that, in the fastness of his 
monastic cell, her brother had known of Ctristiane!s love. Christiane's 
first reaction is eevolt at this apparently heartless lack on his part to 
remedy the situation. If Jacques knew she loved him, why did he turn his 
back on her? And if he found out later, as Dom Maurice, how could he have 
found out? Genevi~ve is unaware of the importance of her message and does 
not comprehend the significance of Christiane f s awed question, "Who sent 
you, Genevieve?" Indeed, she herself does not apply the message to her 
oVln si tua tion : she has secretly longed for the death of her own impotent 
husband. She tells Christiane that her brother, feeling somehow respons-
ible for Christianets state of soul, had prayed for her. 
After a slow start, grace acts swiftly. Chris tiane feels Jacques t s 
presence; rather she rediscovers it since it has never left her. As earlier, 
in Un Homme de Dieu, this is a drama of the "soul in exile", the drama of 
a being which does not know itself and so does not live fully. This, Chris-
tiane now sees, is what she has been guil ty of, as much as Laurent. Both 
have strayed from living in reality - she by taking refuge in frivolous 
amusements, he by sheltering in a self-centred subjectivity. In this way, 
she points out to her husband, they have both sinned t Reality 
. . f' tl' . f . t 16 lS a communlon 0 Slnners as lere lS a communlon 0 saln s. 
Therein lies the way for them to true communion in intersubjective 
love. In answer to the appeal inherent in Genevievets unconscious revel-
ation, Christiane sees that there is something in this life which makes 
sense. Thus she proceeds from the first (aesthetic) stage of existence 
through the second (ethical) to the third (religious); she discovers the 
source of the answer to the primary ontological question. A part of the 
totality of her being has already been illumined by the new light irrad-
iating through the mists of Being itself. Laurent can also appreciate 
this wonderful new discovery, which is the Mystery of Being. He has seen 
tt-rough the falsity of objectification on the level of "having". He has 
already glimpsed the truth that there remains something hidden and unable 
1-
to be grasped, an inventory beyond the scope of ordinary language. ' At 
the end of the play Christiane and Laurent are reunited through the new 
faith which has been awakened in them, 0 faith sustained by their fidelity, 
hope and love. 
Ill. The-Salvific Properties of Openness to the Influence of Grace 
Ces lignes (l'Emissaire, Ill, v) pourraient etre mises 
en exergue de tout mon theatre et plus generalement 
encore de toute mon oeuvre. Elles la caracterisent dans 
ce qu'elle a de foncH:!rement anti-dogmatique, c1est a 
partir de la qulon peut entrevoir ce que je veux dire 
quand je parle de ce secret qui est dans les tIes, un 
secret dont on peut dire jusqula un certain point qu'll 
en est un pour moi-meme. 11 m'est arrive souvent de 
dire que la plupart de mes pieces etaient" ecrites sous 
les 1 s du Oui-Mais ••• Je voulais dire par 18. quI elles 
marquent une protestation contre toutes les formules 
dans lesquelles on cherche a emprisonner la vie. (18) 
A. L I ssaire ~~--=-..;...;;.....;;. 
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Clement Ferrier, the eponymous character of this play which was written 
in 1949$ is, like Genevi~ve, the bearer of a message of which he himself is 
unaware. His daughter, Syl vie, who has not yet reached the threshold of 
faith, proves herself receptive to the operations of grace when she sees 
that there is something sacred in her father's sufferings on his return 
frcm a German concentration camp.19 To those of her family circle who urge 
her to adopt a more "reasonable H approach to the broken man, she protests: 
'ICe que vous appelez raisonner ce n'est qu!un moyen de se fermer soi-m~me ~ 
20 
une evidence ou a un appel." In her eyes even Antoine Sorgue, her fianc~, 
is Itrefus" since he judges Clement's condition as the result of brain-
21 
washing and can see no evidence of an appeal. Though she is deterred 
from embracing religion so long as Antoine regards his faith as an exclusive 
possession, Sylvie strengthens her it€ "by not despairing of him • ..;;.;...~:-.::----....... 
Foreseeing only darkness and private "dark night of 
the soul" when she hesitates to commit herself by taking the decisive step 
to conversion, she nevertheless senses an ever-increasingly strong appeal 
to help Antoine. Together they accede to the threshold of that other king-
dom, mysteriously distant and near, which "we see and we do not seell, 
through the mutual discovery of a love which surpasses natural love. 
Antoine is redeemed from egocentrism through Sylvie's charity in not 
doubting him. In the same moment of appeal and response in which he is 
closer to her than before, Sylvie also access to faith, paradoxically 
because he begins to doubt his. 23 It is this weakness in his armour of 
"having", which would have impelled him to despair, that is the source of 
the vital appeal fo[' Sylvie to save him. In a mysterious exchange, An--
toine's resuscitated faith finds an echo in Sylvie's soul whereby slle 
glimpses the Light "qui deconcerte Et 1 I infini tout jugement".2Lr Sylvie at 
last finds her true self by answering the call for which site was ini tially 
responsible, because it was motivated by her love for Antoine. 
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B. Rome ni est plus dans Rome •. 
This theme is taken up in greater depth in Rome n'est plus dans Rome 
which was written two years later (1951) at a time of domestic crisis in 
France. Pascal Laumi~re and his nephew 1Ilarc-Andre help each other to find 
the source of the appeal to fulfil themselves. They both try to escape 
from their separate appeals but are drawn towards the awareness of the mys-
terious bond which unites them to each other and to the world, and which 
gives life its meaning. 
( i) ~Iarc-Andre 
Like Sylvie, Marc-Andre is disillusioned with religion. After a dis-
concerting experience with a Protestant minister who did not believe in 
the Resurrection, he had considered communism as an alternative. 25 But, 
still unsure of himself, he appeals to his uncle to shed some light on the 
meaning of life and repair the breached credibility gap between life and 
religion. He hopes that if Pascal believes and has lived, there may be a 
God for both of them. Yet, while gaining no such assurance, Marc ... Andre 
. t t h t· t . 26 does not despalr; he wan s no so muc 0 Ilve as 0 surVlve. 
The first glimmer of hope, and evidence that the boy is responsive to 
appeal, is his admission of having been greatly impressed by the example 
of the father of one of his friends. This man had refused to leave France 
for Mexico and, while admitting his own weakness, relied on the strength 
of God who, he was calmly sure, would not abandon him. The words of this 
"true believer" find an echo in Marc-Andre
' 
s soul it is the initial 
27 
appeal. This appeal is intensified later when he receives a letter from 
a soldier-friend in Indo-China which explains the desperate situation of 
the writer and his comrades-in-arms. Marc-Andre acts. Repelled by his 
communistic friends l fanatical extremism, and responding to this appeal 
from his distant friend, he refuses to sign a petition which, if successful, 
would mean certain death for those fighting abroad. 
Again like Sylvie, Marc-Andre is brought to realize that the way to the 
"other kingdom" is dark and beset by danger and the possibility of despair. 
Even hope is terrifyingly silent and involves risk and sacrifice. In his 
uncertainty, he feels himself torn between the "easy way out" of passive 
resignation and the more demanding and more active approach of self-commit-
ment. He says to Pascal who cOIrunends him for his courage, 
Je ne crois pas que je croie en Dieu, mais je pense continu-
ellement aux morts. crest peut-ctre parce quiils me tirent 
a eux tout le temps que je l"esist.e si pi:lc,~;ionnernent, que je 
veux si ~pcrdumcnt survivre. Je suis double, oncle Pascal, 
double et pourtant le rn~me. (28) 
~Iarc<-Andre eventually meets a Brazilian girl, Teresa, who reawakens in hjrn 
the beauty and freshness of youthful enthusiasm. Marc~-Andre is saved, f ind--
ing joy in life. lie has now left the road which would leGd to "le rond·· 
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point de la desolation".29 In all likelihood, Marcel suggests, after a 
recuperative process like restful sleep following the insomnia of turbu-
lent youth. lIlarc-rAndre will awaken to the world of his new-found Brazil-
ian friends who are "des ~tres sans probleme; des etres qui refusent des 
, 30 problemes." 
(ii) Pascal 
Pascal!s redemption is more important and of a higher order, for it 
involves a more far-reaching conversion. Pascalts grave inadequacy he feels 
before ~larc-Andre is complete lack of faith. He believes in nothing ar.d is 
therefore powerless to help his groping nephew in that respect. Aware of 
his deficiency, he exclaims 
Mon enfant, jamais, je te le jure, mon manque de'foi ne 
m!a €t€ plus cruellement sensible car si jietais relie, 
relie au Christ, il me semble qu1une certaine lumiere 
me serait accordee et je ne vois rien. (31) 
Pascal is a lost soul, knowing neither his own real self nor that of others. 
Fearing how he will react to possible torture if his enemies seize powers 
he decides to flee the country and lose himself and his conscience in South 
, 32 Amerlca. His sister-in-law, Esther, in whom he finds a welcoming sym-
pathy, suspects that by this action Pascal will be heeding a false appeal. 
With great insight she warns him 
11 ne peut pas nous ~tre donne de qui t ter ce pays le coeur 
leger et de voguer plein d1esperance vers je ne sais quel 
mirage: 1!id6e d'une vie nouvelle dans un monde nouveau. 
Si un tel depart est possible - et comment le saurions-nous? 
- ce ne peut pas gtre qu I apres la mort. De, ce c6te'-ci 
nous ~li ne sommes pas purifi~s, nous~avons h attendre 
que la justice: Nous sommes irnpurs, Pascal, et ce depart 
lui-merne nt est qu 'une impuret~. Cette vcrite, je vous 
demande a moi-meme de vous en penetrer jusquYau fond. 
Cfest le commencement de la mort. (33) 
Prophetic words indeedl 
Pascal, like Sylvie, is redeemed through his engagement towards another, 
In this case it is his nephew Marc-Andre whom he sees as belonging to a 
most unprovided-for generation. 34 Out of his friendship for Esther, Pascal 
feels re spons ible for Marc-Andre whom he promises earnestly - even if he is 
unaware of the cost or the sacrifice entailed - never to abandon. 35 In 
effect, he hopes for Marc-Andre. Because of his selfless love for another, 
Pascal shows himself to be receptive to the operation of grace and perme-
able to the Light he seeks. As yet he lacks faith and does not know in 
whom to hope. "I hope in .•• for us," The blank is filled in later, in 
Brazil t by means of two successive encounters - the first negative f the 
second positive - which complement Q~d confirm each other to effect his con-
version. ' 
The first encounter IS with PRdre Rieardo. This priest!s aggresslve, 
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insolent and even "pagan" clericalism revolts Pascal - all the more when 
Padre Ricardo suggests that Pascal must have fled the liberalizing atmos-
phere in France in order to join the arch-conservatives in their fight to 
36 ' 
champion orthodoxy. This assumption has an effect contrary to that 
desired. Pascal construes this "insult" to Christ by one of His chosen 
ministers as an appeal. He explains to Esther : 
crest en effet un mouvement de It~me bien mysterieux ••• 
ou plut8t clest comme si avec un etrange regard derriere 
les paroles impies de ce religieux j'avais cru entendre 
un appel infiniment discret ••• une reponse a ma quest-
ion 000 Pas avec les sens; clest inexprimable. (37) 
Pascal!s desire to rectify the harmful influence of Padre Ricardo is a pro-
longation of the responsibility he feels towards his nephew. This sense 
of responsibility has now been sublimated towards God. And almost at once 
grace accelerates his disposition when, on the same day, he experiences a 
second encounter which is to leave more than a lasting impression and con-
firm his faith. 38 He meets unexpectedly a young ascetic monk whose very 
facial expression stirs the depths of Pascal's eager soul. Although he is 
not in the habit of speaking to strangers, he cannot help exchanging a few 
words. As he tells Esther, 
Vous niimaginez pas la purete du sourire qui illumina 
ce visage emacie ••• c'€tait le sourire du Christ. (39) 
Pascal has met Christ, in the person of the young monk; he recognizes 
him at once in that smile. This encounter and appeal is more like that 
experienced by the disciples of Christ at Emmaus40 than like Saint Paul's 
encounter on the road to Damascus. As Claudel says, "connaissance est co-
naissance"; at once Pascal is bathed in the light of his spiritual rebirth. 
He recalls Esther's words concerning the futility of escapism, admits his 
fault and realizes that the access to the "other kingdom" is not to be 
located in earthly things. He recalls also the words of the father of 
i;larc-Andre!s friend about God giving strength to the weak. As all commit-
ment is response41 , Pascal makes his decision and acts upon it. He declines 
the offer of a teaching post which would have compromised his principles. 
To show how far he spurns the materialistic world of "having", he accepts 
absolute insecurity, throwing himself in absolute dependence on the gener-
osity of God. 
Ce refus de me plier a des exigences que ma conscience 
eprouve~ crest vraiment le Dieu veritable qui me lla 
dicte .,. et de ce jour je le reconnais, je mtengage 
vers lui, et il me semble que dans sa condescendance 
ou dcms sa genero"ite •• 0 car ce ne peut pas ~t.re un 
Dieu sans honneur. (42) 
At last Pascal has found himself in finding God. By accepting the 
risks of total insecurity, Pascal proves he is indeed a man. 43 In complete 
dependence on and hope in God, he is playing for the stake which is worth 
the loss of everything else. This is the full impact of the ontological 
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need; as Antoine Sorgue tells Sylvie, ItLe seul risque qui compte est le 
risque interieur. ,,44 The less a being has, the more he is; the more 
closely he is united to God, the more he fulfils himself. It would appear 
that Pascal's double discovery is to recehr,e eternal confirmation. When 
he collapses at the microphone, having confessed his inauthentic behaviour 
and pleading to his countrymen that they stand fast, it is the young monk 
who suddenly (miraculously?) appears and goes to his side. The monk says 
to the anguished Esther, "Madame, laissez-moi all.er jusquta lui. Je sais 
quI il m!attend. ,,45 
IV. Suffering and Death 
Le role de la mort dans mon theatre est absolument premier, 
et aussi d'une certaine mani~re celle de la maladie; crest 
U. que nous sommes au coeur m~me de notre destinee et de 
notre mystere. (46) 
Examples of situations involving the realities of suffering and death 
abound in Marcel's theatre. Indeed it would seem that death plays a more 
dominant role than life. Among the characters who die in the course of 
the action are C16ment Ferrier , Vernoy (la Fin des temps)~ 
David and Simon Bernauer and de la Croix , Alfred 
Champel (Mor, Temps n'est pas le vetre), l'Horizon and presumably, 
shortly after the final curtain has fallen, Pascal Laumiere (Rome nrest 
plus dans Rome). Those "characters" who, while a~ready dead, influence the 
attitudes of the survivors include Viviane Delorme llIcono , Madame 
Chavi~re (le Fanal), Raymond Fortier (la Caapelle ardente), Maurice Le-
chevallier (1 t Insondable) and Jacques Decroy __ ~~ ___ ,. The thought 
of death affects the attitude to each other (a) negatively of Jeanne and 
NoE!1 Framont (le Mort de demain) and of Germain and Therese Lestrade 
(I !Horizon); (b) positively 
- of Christiane and Laurent Chesnay 
s ) and of Werner Schnee and Beatrice Soreau (le Dard); it also influ-
ences Bernard Groult (Un Juste) into adopting a pacifist position. Of 
those suffering either physically or mentally (i.e. spiritually) the more 
important characters are Stella and Amedee Ct,artrain 
Jacques Delorme (l I Iconoclaste), Eustache Soreau (le Dard), Aline Fortier 
(la Chapelle arEcnte), and the enigmatic Arianc Leprieur le Chemin de 
Bas ly, thc difference between positive and negative reactions to 
tile mysteries of suffering and death _. at least in the way Marcel under--
stands authentic and inauthentic behaviour - is a reflection of the dis'd 
Unctions between being and having, .ii~::.p~~.!:..L!j.t§ and _i_n_d __ i_,-'-____ i._l_i~t_€, 
fidelity and pseudo-fidelity. 
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(a) being and having 
The ontologically debilitating effects of too great a preoccupation 
wi th what one has can be seen in the characters of Jeanne Framont (le MoIJ::. 
de demain), Germain Lestrade (l'Horizon) and Aline Fortier (la Chapelle 
ardente). Because they are worried about the possible loss of what they 
have, they are blind to the greater peril: the possible loss of what they 
are. This is made all the more acute when they include within the compass 
of their possessions the persons nearest to them; 
Jeanne has so convinced herself of the impending death in battle of 
her husband Nogl that she treats him as if he were already a lifeless ob-
jecL Her reverence to the "idol", which, as her brother-in-law observes, 
has no sacred character but is made from the debris of the man,47 is shown 
in her refusal to allow anyone else to see his letters from the front. 
They have already become "relics", objects in her possession. Germain is 
also convinced of an impending death - his owno He is over-practical in 
his concern for the future of his wife and chil~ren.48 They become objects 
for an auction. He dissuades his friend Bernard from marrting the young 
widow who really loves him in favour of his own wife. Germain is prevent-
ed from bequea thing Th~rese (his wife) only by the death of his friend 
whose is the death forecast by the medium they had both visi ted. Aline, 
too f treats the memory of her dead son as a possession. No longer able to 
possess him in this life, she will at least retain not only his childhood 
objects as IIrelics" but succeeds further than Germain in that she asserts 
her influence on Mireille, her son's fianc~e, so far as to dissuade her 
from marrying the young man of her choice. Appe;:tling to the girlis sense 
of duty as a f ellO\v-sufferer, Aline arranges a marriage of he.!:, choice and 
so keeps Mireille as a "possession" in the family (but loses her own hus~ 
band). Aline uses her grief as a weapon to continue her domination. Her 
husband, Octave, repelled by her morbid obsession ("ce gofit du malheur et 
de la mort"), accuses her of constraining Mirellle in the stranglehold of 
tyranny by exploi ting the girl t S personal sorrow and her admiration for 
Al ' 49 Ine. 
Characters who, from the outset, have established properly authentic 
(according to Marcelts view) existential priorities are rare. The only 
principal characters with an initial view of suffering and death accord-
ing to the order of being rather than of having are Tante U!'na (le Signe 
de la Croix) and Arnaud Chartrain Cle~._g~~UJ::.~_.;:~.Ldes). 50 
" 51 Mention has already been made of Tante Lelw. Now nearing the end of 
her days she has been purified by her own personal sufferings and is 
alreadY prepared for the "other kingdom" where oneis possessions no lonzer 
count. Arnaud, too, is preparing to give himself in consecration to the 
anticipation on earth of the eternal ontological communion: he will become 
a priest. He alone seems to understand the nature and cause of his father1s 
suffering. Am(;dee may be a preposterous character, self-opinionated and 
hypersensitive. But he is really very lonely and, while this loneliness 
may be brought upon himself by his extravagant amour propre which estranges 
him from others, he needs sympathy.52 Arnaud recognizes that his fatherfs 
tt'ouble derives from his inability to communicate either wi th others or 
even with himself as to the source and remedy for his "thirst" for mean~' 
ingful existence. Amedee is unaware of the ontological nature of this 
"thirst" which is devouring him. In an enlightening passage Arnaud ad-
vises Madame de Puyguerland (whose son Stella Chartrain consents to marry 
in conditions similar to Mireillets acceptance of Andrf Verdet) on the mys-
terious nature of suffering which has its roots in the soul t s thirst fOI' 
being. 
Cette souffrance dont vous 
ce que la nature admet ••• 
pas une faute, mais 
doit staccompagner un cer 
parlez et qui va au-dela de 
je m'imagine qu'elle est non 
1 IOUI'd et qulelle 
eIle est une complaisance Et soi-men,e. 
rice. Pas seulement pour soi : surtout 
• Autrement 
Illicite. Destruct-
pour les autres. <'54) 
An interesting study of a person who has been greatly affected by the 
sufferings of others - and particularly by their example - is afforded by 
Edith Lechevallier in the play It e which Marcel began shortly 
-=-.,...;..;.;.,.....;...;.;..;;;.:.;.,.;.......;;.. 
after the cessation of hostilities in 1918. Although accused by her sister-
in-law (who alone does not presume that her husband is dead) of not having 
strong enough hope, Edith has profited more from their shared experiences. 
She brings her husband, Robert, who has returned from a prisoner-of ..... war 
can~9 to realize that he has greatly misjudged hi brother, Maurice. 55 In 
her conversation with the abbe S€veilhac, who was Maurice l s army chaplain, 
Edith anticipates not only Tante Lena but also Pascal Laumi'ere. It is in-· 
teresting to note that Marcel wrote thi~ play ten years before his convers-
ion and that, years later, when he did publi h it as an appendix to his 
philosophical diary ..... cum-trea ti se ~ Presence et immortalit f he left it un-
finished. By then he had discovered the reality of the faith still lack-
ing in Edith; nevertheless he considers the scene between Edith and the 
abbe as one of the most significant that he has written. 56 
From the opening small-talk it appears that there will be little real 
dialogue between either of them. 57 The abbf approaches Edith as a case for 
his professional advice while she yearns to communicate her anxieties about 
the meaning of love and fidelity botll in this world and beyond it. His 
strictly theological interpretation of prayer seems, to her, to ignore the 
personal element. When the abbe says, "Prier machinalement, cela a sa 
valeur," Edith pierces to the kernel of the problem in her reply 
Cette priere Et laquelle vous m'invitez, il me semble 
quteUe exile Et Itinfini ceux pour lesquels elle slexerce; 
entre eux et nous, elle met plus que ltespacet elle met 
Dieu lui-meme. On ne peut prier que pour ceux qui sont 
vraiment absents ••• mais vous ne pouvez pourtant pas 
pretendre que la mort est une absence! 11 y a des moments, 
monsieur ltabbe, o~ il mlest plus immediatement prfsent 
qulil ne le fut jamais de son vivant! (59) 
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Edith tries to explain how Maurice, though missing, is so near to her 
more than ever before while her own husband, Robert, al though returned, 
is tlabsent". He (Robert) is not w her, they are not together. Because 
the abbe has seen so many die, he may have been reduced to little more 
than a religious functionary who washes his hands at each death so that 
they are indeed gone. But for Edith, the truly dead, 
les seuls morts sc-nt ceux C[I:le nous ntaimons plus •. (60) 
Bhe becomes so impassioned as to proclaim that the only religion worth 
the name is that which can open out to "another world" where the objeCt-
ive barriers separating beings who truly love each other vanish in love. 
This is how she feels the sublimated union between herself and Maurice. 
It is not sinful in her eyes and she rejects the charges of heresy and 
supersti tion 9 as well as the suggestion that she might be advocating spirit-
ualism. Religion should not be an ethereal ethic but something living. 
That is why she earnestly tries to give expression to her kind of nentre~' 
Lien sans pa.roles" with Maurice 
Oui, lui et moi, nous sommes intimement unis; oui, je 
le sens avec moi - toujours plus pr~s de moi ••• Lors-
que je pense ~ lui dtune certaine fa~on ... avec tend-
resse, avec recueillement .... il Si err,eut en moi comme 
une vie plus riche, plus profonde, a laquelle je sais 
qutil participe. Cette vie, ce ntest pas moi, ce n'est 
pas lui non plus: c'est nous deux. (61) 
(b) !ldisponibilit~1I and "indisponibilit{;" 
Pe Edith may come closer to Robert, but the prospect is not 
promising. By the end of the play (as we have it) they are in a position 
similar to that of Christiane and Laurent long before their mutual enlight-
enment. Edith has shown herself permeable to the light from beyond this 
world of the I but she has yet to open herself as freely and whole-
heartedly to Robert. And he still prefers her "cruel mouth and silence~~ 
It is this compl openness, therefore, this indefinable quality of dis-
w[,1ch is the prerequisite for a shared understanding of sorrow, 
suffering, and the meaning of death. Thus it is that Sylvie Ferrier who 
acknowledges tbe "Sacred" ChGTacter of her fRther1s suffering is helped on 
the way to fai tll. Thus it i that Werner Schnee and Sirnon Bel'nauer wl:o 
appreciate the need to shcH'e in anotilel,f s sufferings find their ways to 
this l10ther kingdornll for which Edith longs. Also, this respect for the 
hun:an suffering of her father brings about the conversion of Marie-Henri-
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ette Champel just as the realization of the need to abdicate all claims 
to possessions and to live in absolute insecurity is the guarantee of 
Pascal LQumi~rets first steps towards his defence of the persecuted 
Christ and would seem to be a pledge of his sharing in the eternal corr;mun-
ion of being. 
It is because Jeanne Framont is so obsessed with the present moment -
'1'l1ich is a symptom of indisponibil i te - that she does not quite make the 
grade as an authentic existent. Jeanne does not "appreciate the tremend-
ous significance of her own phrase: "Aimer un etre, clest lui dire: toi, 
tu ne mourras paso,,63 This saying, which Marcel recognizes as the clue to 
true fidelity, was yet wrenched from Jeanne out of her anguish at the fear 
of losing someone she desired for herself alone. Jeannets basic fault is 
that she is not open, she is not disl2onible. Her own being is hidden 
from her eyes, it is veiled in the opa.city of her self-centredness. !tCe 
qui sloppose ici," Marcel wrote of the initial situation in another play 
but it applies as much with Jeanne, "crest bien plutot Itetre opaque et 
11 etre transpsrent.,,64 It is this same measure of indisponibilit~ which 
blights the attitude towards suffering and death of the other characters 
we have considered in the previous section. 
(c) fidelity and pseudo-fidelity 
It may happen that, arising from this egocentrism, a character uncon-
sciously imagines that he is pra.ctising charity on behalf of the afflicted 
or giving witness to his fidelity towards the dead a Should this attitude 
be tainted by self-interest, the fidelity will be objectified and rendered 
false. This is the pitfall into which fall both Abel Renaudier and JacQles 
Delorme in llIconoclaste, and also Aline Fortier in la Chapelle ardente 
and Germain Lestrade in liHorizon. 65 Perhaps the most complex and at the 
same time the most ambiguous character in Marcel!s theatre who, wilfully 
or not, suffers from a falsifLied ideal of fidelity and of the mystique of 
suffering is Ariane Leprieur in le Chemin de cr~te. 
Ariane returns to Paris, after convalescing in the mountains for several 
years l for she has received information from an anonymous source that her 
husband, Jerome, is having an affair with Violette ~lazargue, a young music-
ian, Both J~rame and Violette have, apparently, sought solace in each 
other. Jerome is not just financially dependent upon Ariane, he reveres 
her but has found that it is difficult to live with a "saint", VioleUe 
has already been disappointed in love and has been left with a sickly 
chjld. Just as Edm€e Ltmoyne had not wi shed to meet Michel Sandler asain, 
Violette does not want to meet her loverrs long-suffering wife. In e&ch 
case they do meet and the consequences are ultimately disastrous. E\en In 
their attitude to suffering, Ariane and VioleHc differ. for Violette t 
236 
suffering stifles her, like being in a tomb; for Ariane suffering is a 
purgative catalyst which impels her to seemingly sublime acts of selfless 
generosi ty. SLe gives evidence when, to Violette t s amazement, she active-
ly encourages the illicit liaison as long as Jer'Ome does not learn of his 
wife 1 s connivance. Marcel himself is not prepared to judge Ariane t s 
motives although he does suggest that there is "quelque chose d'inquiet-
ant et d l impur dans Pelan pa.ssionne qui la porte vers la ma1tresse de 
• 11 66 son marl. 
Violette gradually comes under the influence of Ariane, in much the 
same way as Mireille submits to Aline. Both Violette and Ariane have a 
common interest in music and also agree on an interpretation of morality 
which will justify each otherts conduct. Furthermore, as a sign of her 
friendship and patronage Ariane promises to arrange for free medical care 
for Monique, Violette t s child. When, therefore, Jerome is irritated by 
Ariane's continuing and embarrassing presence and proposes divorce in 
order to legalize his situation with Violette, the latter demurs. Ariane 
had herself offered "helpful" suggestions and ree.sons with such question-
ing provisos as to discourage Violette from marrying an allegedly syco-
phantic Jerome. 
Yet in breaking with Jerome, Violette is confirmed in her suspicions 
about the motives of Ariane. 67 Like Mireille before Aline, Violette 
charges Ariane with perfidy. She tells her that she suspects that Ariane 
had calculated it all, that Arianefs apparent nobility was 1Ile moyen le 
plus snr, le seul moyen efficace de me separer de Jeromc tout en gardant 
A mes yeux et aux v6tres cc qui ~tait llessentiel, un rSle d'herolne ou 
de sainte. 1I68 Whatever Arianefs real reasons, this separation is effected. 
Jer~me returns to the captivating spell of his wife and rejects Violette 
for having so shamefully accused Ariane of hypocrisy. Ariane is certainly 
no hypocrite: at no time does she vaunt any pretended superiority over 
other lesser mortals. But in the end she is forced none the less to 
examine herself. She insists on accusing herself to Violette (in front of 
JerSme) when Violette returns in response to the appeal of a confused 
Ariane. In her own eyes, Ariane is guilty of partial dishonesty, at least, 
in her behaviour to Violette and her plea for forgiveness seems sincere. 
Violette must admit that Ariane was sincere, if misguided. 
Je suis silre que vous parlez du fond de vous~'meme; mais 
est-ce que vous ne voyez pas que, si vous jouiiez la 
corr;edie, que si vous etiez la femme la plus cnl cula-
trice et la plus perfide, VOtiS ne pourricz pns vous y 
prendre plus habilement pour creuser entre Je-r3me et 
moi un ab1me infranchissable. (69) 
Violette proposes to accept the offer of a cheap irnpressario and departs, 
but not before loosing a Parthian shaft. She th8~'s Ariane for having 
taught her at least one thing : fila vertu du cynisrnc. ,,70 
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By the time the play starts, Ariane has recovered from her tubercular 
condition after a prolonged rest-cure in the mountains. But she appears 
to have contracted another ailment which is more serious because it affects 
the soul, the core of one's being o This illness is a kind of inverted 
spiritual vertigo. As long as she remains physically on the heights, her 
soul is uplifted as well; she holds herself aloof of the pettiness and 
jealousies of everyday life in the world which is symbolized by the city. 
Bu t w hen she returns to this world, the consequences are not only damaging 
to herself but to those she tries to help out of the greatness of her soul. 
She maintains her moral ascendancy but her actions, if not her judgment, 
are adversely efficacious as if she herself has become giddy from disorient-
ation. The beneficiaries of her attentions are in turn "infected" by this 
giddiness through contact with one who still appears to be trying to breathe 
in her familiar rarefied atmosphere. Ariane appears to be inspired by 
genuine existential concern for others, but something is terribly awry. So 
convincing is the appearance - which is a distortion of the reality - that 
even at the end Violette, despite her misgivings, is still bathed in the 
reflected aura of this pseudo-intersubjective fidelity. Impulsively, she 
kisses Arianets hand and asks for her intercession: 
Puis que la priere VOllS a ete donnee avec tout le reste 
••• priez quelquefois pour moi et pour Monique. (71) 
Herein may lie the reason for Arianets failure to give true witness to 
Being. For, as Marcel observes, although she appears in many ways a more 
deserving figure than Claude Lemoyne, Ariane has no God to whom to pray, 
to whom to appeal for herself and for others. Her only course is to seek 
some measure of relief in wri ting her autobiography, but even in this she 
. 72 has no illusions about the value of such an evasion. Without the support 
of faith she will still be una.ble to find the true answer to the question 
of who she really is. 
Among the characters who give a more positive witness to the mystery of 
Being under the test of suffering and death is Werner Schnee in le Dard. 
Werner recognizes both the ambiguities and dangers of life. For him there 
are two great temptations: pride in his success and love for another man!s 
wife. In order to avoid yielding to these temptations he is fully pre-
pared to sacrifice himself, not only his interests and ambitions but his 
life as well. By taking his decisi.on to return to Germany, he hopes to 
ensure the preservation of his integrity and at the same time gain a far 
greater possession which is the safety of his being, the salvation of his 
soul. There is, then, a superior type of possession, which transcerids the 
possessiveness of "[laving" because its source is inexhaustible: it is 
being itself. 
Etre c' est posseder une cedaine plenit.ude, et par suite 
une certaine assurance, (73) 
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It is this realization which di~tinguishes Werner Schnee from Eustache 
Soreau; it is what makes Werner "rich" and Eustache "poor" in the aware-
ness of the priority of being. 74 
Eustache is not unaware of his "poverty". His guilty consciousness, 
arising from a sense of betrayal of his socialist ideals in an advantageous 
marriage and reinforced by the accusing example of Gertrude Heuzard who has 
sacrificed her own material prospects by sticking to her principles, is an 
awareness of what he is not. His ontological poverty stems not only from 
his lack of "stickability" (adh~sion) but also, and more importantly, from 
his impermeability to the presence of others. He suffers, though not with 
the pathetic egocentrism of Am~d~e Chartrain. He suffers because, while ad-
mitting that wealth and success are only possessions, he cannot communicate 
with his own wife and with Werner who together are finding their way towards 
the light of being. Eustache feels that he is being left out; he cannot 
bear being treated as "un tiers, une troisieme personne.,,75 
Werner, on the other hand, is "rich" in the possession of being because~ 
by a strange paradox, he is prepared to give himself, to extend "cred.it" to 
another. He is open to B~atrice (as she is to him) but more so to his per-
secuted countrymen to whom he intends to return so that he may share, like 
Simon Bernauer~ the "blessed bread of persecution". Ontological wealth is 
gained, therefore, through the intermediary of a "thou"; it is vested in 
participation in the Fellowship of Being. Werner proposes to return so as 
to help others live. First of all, he extends this aid to Beatrice. He 
tells her that she cannot abandon Eustache now. (The lesson is particularly 
acute for him because his own wife has left him for an impressario.) More-
over s the "rich" must not condemn ·the "poor"; rather they must help them, 
even if they be never cured of this ontological poverty which is "le plus 
grand mG.! de notre temps, il se repa.nd comme une peste. ,,76 Werner assures 
Beatrice that she will be sustained in her mission among these "lepers" by 
a special grace. This grace, he adds, is more a "viaticum"; it is the 
spiritual sustenance of the true homo viator. It is, in effect, the sal-
vific property of continuing fidelity to presence (meaning the presence of 
those she loves). She will think of him as he thinks of Rudolf, his former 
accompanist. In time (perha.ps he means after his death) he will "dwell in 
her" as a living presence. Finally, he reminds her of the true place of 
the dead whom we love. Their remaining presence and the promise of immort-
ality in reunion saves existence from absurdity and gives life its true 
meaning. 
stil niy avait que des vivants, Beatrice, je pense que 
la terre serait tout a fait inhabitable. (77) 
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really treated Edm~e as a person but as a problem. Similarly he had 
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claste (written in 1919-1920), Antoine wants to be assured by tangible 
i"iObjective ll evidence. Jacques wants the best of both worlds : he wants 
objective proofs of the dead Vivianc's presence which, as Abel Renaud-
ier cowes to realize, is a mystery to be su tained only by true fidel-
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his spiteful wife, Renee (RPR 58-66, 106, 134-140; cr. Chapter 5, fn 80). 
Puscal!s dignity and courage will be revealed in the final scene, but 
not until he has undergone his purgatory as forewarned by Esther. 
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to warn his countrymen not to follow his example of .escapism. The refer-
ence to that form of mission reminds us of Bruno in Croissez et ',Iul tip-
li~~, Bruno, a Dominican missioner, received his particular appeal when 
he met j after many years, a Rumanian who had told him of the plight of 
the Rumanians beyond the Iron Curtain. Rather melodramatically, Bruno 
intends thereupon to parachute into Rumania French religious who will 
show the natives that they are not forgotten but still prayed for. 
"Llappel lance vers moi," he declares, "il m'a semble que ctetait dn 
ciel quI il tombait" (CM 174). Bruno would appear to be more a Quixotic 
figure than the image of him by his sister, Agn~s, as a Parsifal (and 
"un Parsifal imaginaire" at that - CM 173). 
33. RPR 92. The emphases are mine. The language of the first part of 
the passage is remarkably similar to that used by Baudelaire to describe 
the expectancy of his escapist fellow-travellers in the poem, le Voyage, 
The conclusion - that deat.h holds the key - is much the same, aL:o. 
34·. RPR 58, We are reminded of the character of Marie-Henriette Champel 
in Mon Temps n'est pas le vatre. She, too, belongs to an "unpro\,ided-
for" generation - in the cynical attitude of her father. She is, like 
Sylvie, redeemed in caring for her abandoned father. See Chapter 5, 
p • 147, C ha p t er 6, p. 1 85 • 
35. R PR 82. 
36 • RP R 11 7 -11 9 • 
37. RPR 142-143. 
38. cf. PACMO 60-61, EPC 22, HP 70. 
39. RPR 143. 
40. EA I 118. Marcel adds that. he sees a classical parallel in the 
recognition of Ulysses by Eumaeus. 
4L EA I 55. 
42. RPR 146. 
43. HV 69-70. cf. EA I 87 : fill nty a pas de vie sans enjeu; la vie 
n I est pas separable d tun certain peril. 11 
44. 
45. 
46. 
Ir7. 
SdI 237. 
profit a ITlan 
RFR 148. 
PR-GM 62. 
MdD 166. 
This affirmation echoes the words of Christ, "What. does it 
to gain the whoJe world and yet suffer' the loss of his soul?" 
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48. Ther'ese tries to point out to Germain that he is always locking so 
far ahead that he cannot see what is needed immediately. He is like a 
traveller who has settled his itinerary in such detail that he has 
come home before he sets out. Unfortunately (for him, and COHse 
ly for her) ~ she says, there are no tlagences pour la condui te de la 
vie" IIHorizon 99-100). 
49. CA 95-96. 
A further character could be Edith Lechevallier who is considered 
almost immediately in the text. 
51. See Chapter 5,pp. 148~~149. 
54. 
Just as Mireille gains strength from her own sufferings to pity 
Aline who caused it (CA 135). 
avides (originally entitled la Soif) 146 : HIl te faut 
~~-------~~~~ des ~es, Eveline. (Arnaud is talking to his step-
mother.) 11 y en a d'autres, comme il existe des maladies non reconnuesj 
et ce ne sont pas les moins affreuses. Je crois quant a moi que papa 
est un homrr.e extremement meJ_heureux, d I autant plus malheureux qu I il 
coml1:unique moins avec son mal. L' espece de soif indistincte qui le 
devore, lui~·meme ne la reconna1 t pas .... justement parce qu1 elle l' a 
devore. 1t Amedeels melancholy may stem from the bitter memory of his 
first wife (and mother of Arnaud and Stella) who had tried to poison 
him and had been, for that, committed to an asylum. 
Les Co s 135. (Emphases mine.) 
------------------
55. PI 215-218. Robert I s enlightenment on the qualities of the tlreal tI 
Maurice is also aided by certain remarks of his other brother Gustave 
(PI 215-216) and by his mother (PI 212-213, 219-220). 
56. PI 8. 
57. The conversation does not get away to a prOIlas~ng start when the 
abbe declares that modern women have too much leisure (and that play 
was writ ten in 1919!). The rift between the two cracks open when the 
abbe ascribes Edithts suffering to a disregard for her religious exer-
cises. And when he aggravates her chagrin by insisting that these 
exercises are very important for her who is a woman who thinks too 
much~ Edith retorts, "Purce <lIJ'eUes emp~chent de penser!" (PI 223). 
58. PI 224. 
59. PI 225. (Edith is speaking of the dead Maurice who loved her yet not 
in a IIsinful" way.) 
60. PI 228. In this respect the abb~ls professional attitude is like 
that of other characters who wish to keep the dead dead. Jearme 
Framont treats her husband as already dead, Madame Ferrier treats 
Cl~ment like a machine, and Aline Fortier's memory of Raymond is as 
inarrimate as his photograph. 
61. PI 229, 231. 
62. PI 233. 
63. MdD 161. 
64. PACIIIO 86. Originally, this famous treatise was published as an 
appendix to the play, ~l~.;,....;...;...;.;..;.......;...........;.....;.. 
65. Germc.in's action of offering hi~; wife to his friend Dernard 
("hich involves the separGtion of HeronI'd and Valentine) in order to 
prevent her from thl'o,~ing herself at illarc Villars can be contrasted 
wi th Polyeuctc I s gen~rM' i U~ to\\'ar-ds hi:-:; "ri va] fI severe to safeguard 
the future haJll~in~ss--~f'r)D'Uline, in Corneil1e
'
s play, P t 
66. DH 148. 
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67. These suspicions may have been helped by the observations of 
68. 
69. 
70. 
71. 
Ariane's brother, Philip Varet. Philip has said that, for Ariane, art 
is a means to an end; she is not easy to know. Earlier he had confront-
ed Ariane with a possible explanation for her interest in the suffering 
of others. He insinuates that she becomes interested in people only 
when they upset others or are upset by them. He ascribes her interference 
as a need to assert herself, and claims that she cannot stand barriers. 
Somehow or other, he warns her, she will want to "worm ll her way right 
into the affair between Jerome and Violet tee Philip tries to warn 
Violette that Ariane's taste for "peculiar tl relationships has in it 
something of an unconscious perversion. 
CdC 241. 
CdC 246. 
CdC 247. 
ibid. 
72. DH 150 ." car la litt~rature n'est qu'une evasion et par la 
cette tragedie de l'ambigu~te se clot sur le meme appel qu'Un Homme de 
Dieu - appel inarticule et qu'aucune foi n'aimante." 
73. J, Chenu, Le Th~~tre de Gabriel Marcel et sa signification m~ta-
physique, 200. 
74. See Chapter 5, p. 150. 
75. SdI 17. Marcel adds, "et je remarque en passant qu'il y a ici 
une illustration particulierement significative d'un des themes fonda-
mentaux de ma rE!flexion philosophique." We may compare also the situ-
ation in Rome n'est plus dans Rome where Ren~e is left out while her 
husband Pascal and her sister Esther seem to be progressing together 
in an ontological communion. 
76. Le Dard 117. 
77. Le Dard 118. Actually, he had first addressed these words to his 
wife Gisela who was incapable of comprehending their significance 
(le Dard 87). cf. Saint Paul, I Corinthians 15:" 19 - "If our hope in 
Christ has been for this life only we are the most unfortunate of 
people. 11 And both these phrases - from Marcel t s play and from Saint 
Paul - sum up Marcel' s whole "philosophy of existence" in that it is 
the expression of an option, that life has meahing when we acknowledge 
that our very being is oriented towards transcendence and, therefore, 
towards ultimate fulfilment in the ontological communion established in 
God. 
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